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Preface 
On Friday 11 January 2013, the Governor-General appointed a six-member Royal Commission 
to inquire into how institutions with a responsibility for children have managed and responded 
to allegations and instances of child sexual abuse.   
The Royal Commission is tasked with investigating where systems have failed to protect 
children, and making recommendations on how to improve laws, policies and practices to 
prevent and better respond to child sexual abuse in institutions.  
The Royal Commission has developed a comprehensive research program to support its work 
and to inform its findings and recommendations. The program focuses on eight themes:   
1. Why does child sexual abuse occur in institutions?
2. How can child sexual abuse in institutions be prevented?
3. How can child sexual abuse be better identified?
4. How should institutions respond where child sexual abuse has occurred?
5. How should government and statutory authorities respond?
6. What are the treatment and support needs of victims/survivors and their families?
7. What is the history of particular institutions of interest?
8. How do we ensure the Royal Commission has a positive impact?
This research report falls within theme 5.   
The research program means the Royal Commission can: 
 obtain relevant background information
 fill key evidence gaps
 explore what is known and what works
 develop recommendations that are informed by evidence, can be implemented and
respond to contemporary issues.
For more on this program, please visit www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/research. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
BACKGROUND 
Children and young people who have been sexually abused sometimes disclose that abuse 
soon after the event or events occurred, or at least later during childhood. However, many 
children and young people do not tell anyone about the abuse until decades later, long after 
they reach adulthood. An unknown number, the ‘dark figure’, never tell anyone or if they do, 
do not report it to the police.  
Delayed disclosure and reporting are associated with various characteristics of the victim and 
perpetrator, and the relationship between them. Older children, for example, are more 
reluctant to disclose than younger children, and boys are more reluctant than girls. Delayed 
reporting is particularly common in cases of institutional child sexual abuse; for example, 
where the abuser is a trusted church member, a teacher, or a staff member in a boarding school 
or residential care facility. In some cases, the victim has told someone at the time, but has not 
been believed, or the complaint has not reached the police.  
Where an adult has reported sexual abuse committed against them as a child, particular 
forensic difficulties stand in the way of prosecution that do not apply to contemporary reports. 
These include needing to prove the offence as it was on the statute book at the time it 
occurred, and addressing issues about the reasons for the delayed complaint. Another barrier 
to successful prosecution is the likelihood of ‘degraded evidence’. As time goes on, memories 
fade and evidence which may have corroborated some aspects of the complainant’s account 
may have been lost; for example, due to the death of another witness.  
THIS STUDY 
This report examines how the criminal justice systems in New South Wales and South Australia 
deal with complaints of child sexual abuse reported to the police in childhood compared with 
those in which the report is delayed until adulthood, which is often referred to as historical 
child sexual abuse.  
The research investigates the trends in delayed disclosure and reporting of child sexual abuse, 
and maps the prosecution process and outcomes associated with varying degrees of delay in 
18 
reporting to the police, together with other case characteristics such as the age of the 
complainant victim, and the relationship between the complainant and the alleged offender.1  
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research focuses on the following questions: 
1. What are the trends in recorded reports to police of historical child sexual abuse over
a recent 20-year period compared with reports made during childhood in two
Australian states – New South Wales and South Australia?
2. What are the trends in the number of prosecutions of cases of historical child sexual
abuse over a recent 20-year period compared with child sexual abuse reported during
childhood in two Australian states?
3. What factors – including characteristics of the complainant, the type of offence, the
relationship between the complainant and the alleged offender, and the delay in
reporting to police – are associated with the matter proceeding from a report to the
police to prosecution?
4. What is the likelihood of cases reported in childhood and in adulthood resulting
in conviction?
5. What factors (as above) are associated with the matter resulting in a conviction or not,
and a custodial or other type of sentence?
6. Is there any difference in the rate of appeals, the grounds of appeals, and the outcome
of appeals in cases in New South Wales:
o where there are delayed complaints compared with cases reported in
childhood?
o that involved ‘institutional’ child sexual abuse compared with intra-familial
cases of abuse and other extra-familial cases?
DATA 
The data addressing research questions one to five were derived from police and court records 
in both New South Wales and South Australia, and from case file analysis and discussions with 
legal and other professionals in New South Wales. New South Wales and South Australia are 
the only two states with equivalent statistical analysis bodies that can produce multi-year 
‘clean’ datasets for both the police and court collections – the Bureau of Crime Statistics and 
Research in New South Wales (BOCSAR) and the Office of Crime Statistics and Research 
1 The findings in this report are based on sexual offences against a child that are reported to the police. It is well 
known that these represent only a small proportion of offences, with a large ‘dark’ figure that are not reported, 
estimated in a range of studies of attrition at about 85–92 per cent. 
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(OCSAR) in South Australia. These two states also provide a useful basis of comparison in terms 
of different population sizes and some differences in legislative and policy provisions.  
Both the police and court data in each state are administrative datasets, and are not designed 
with research as the primary focus. Ideally it would be possible to track matters from reporting 
to police, through the investigation and prosecution process to court, and finalisation at court 
via conviction and sentencing. The nature of these administrative databases means, however, 
that it is not possible to map the police data directly onto the court data. The police and court 
data in each state have therefore been analysed separately. The data addressing research 
question six comprise 291 decisions on appeals against conviction and sentencing involving 
child sexual offences in the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal from 2005 to 2013.  
The definition of ‘child’ used in this report refers to persons under the age of 18, consistent 
with the Royal Commission’s Terms of Reference. This means that offences against children 
above the age of consent (16 in New South Wales and 17 in South Australia) are included. The 
term ‘victim’ is used in accordance with the terminology used by New South Wales and South 
Australian Police, even though there has been no finding or substantiation of an offence at the 
time the ‘offence’ is reported. The alleged perpetrator is known as a ‘person of interest’. 
‘Child sexual abuse’ was defined broadly to include all offences relating to child sexual abuse, 
and to encompass the various offences relating to the Royal Commission’s definition of child 
sexual offences. The Royal Commission has defined child sexual abuse for its purposes as:  
Any act which exposes a child to, or involves a child in, sexual processes beyond his 
or her understanding or contrary to accepted community standards. Sexually 
abusive behaviours can include the fondling of genitals, masturbation, oral sex, 
vaginal or anal penetration by a penis, finger or any other object, fondling of 
breasts, voyeurism, exhibitionism, and exposing the child to or involving the child 
in pornography. It includes child grooming, which refers to actions deliberately 
undertaken with the aim of befriending and establishing an emotional connection 
with a child, to lower the child’s inhibitions in preparation for sexual activity with 
the child (2014, Vol 1: 95). 
It is important to note that the term ‘child sexual assault’ is often used interchangeably with 
child sexual abuse in the literature and in research studies to include both penetrative and non-
penetrative sexual offending. In this report ‘sexual assault’ refers to penetrative sexual 
offences and the distinction is made between cases of sexual assault and cases of indecent 
assault based upon the statutory definitions in the relevant state.  
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NEW SOUTH WALES POLICE DATA 
Reports of child sexual assault have more than doubled from 1,274 incidents in 1995 to 3,030 
in 2014. There has, in particular, been an upward trend in the number of sexual assaults on 
girls. Complaints of indecent assault have fluctuated.2 
Just over 80 per cent of reports of child sexual offences in New South Wales over this period 
were made during childhood. Around 66 per cent were reported within 12 months of the 
incident, but nearly 25 per cent were not reported until five or more years later. About 
20 per cent of all reports were delayed into adulthood. There have been periods when adult 
reports have been particularly high, for example in the late 1990s during the Royal Commission 
into the New South Wales Police Service (the Wood Royal Commission). Such media focus 
appears to generate a greater number of complaints from adults.  
Where the person of interest was not known to the victim, the incident was likely to be 
reported with less delay than where the child knew or had any type of relationship with 
the suspect.3  Conversely, the greatest likelihood of delayed reporting involved persons of 
interest in a position of authority in relation to the child such as a teacher, clergy, carer or youth 
leader. 
Overall, levels of adult reporting of child sexual abuse offences have remained fairly consistent 
since 2003, while reports from children have increased fairly consistently over the same period. 
It follows that the increase in children who report child sexual offences cannot be explained by 
saying that victims of abuse are now simply reporting much earlier than a generation ago.  
Even taking into account the modest increase in the number of children in New South Wales 
over the period included in this study, the increase in complaints of sexual offences against 
children is substantial. For example, in 1999 a total of 2,875 offences were reported in 
childhood. In 2014, the total was 4,397 reports, an increase of nearly 53 per cent. Most of that 
increase occurred from 2007 onwards. The increase in reports may represent a real increase in 
prevalence, an increase in public awareness, and/or an increase in reporting. It is possible that 
the prevalence of child sexual abuse in the community has not changed, but that the level of 
reporting, or of recording reports, has increased. There has also been a 132 per cent increase 
in the overall rate of reported sexual assault, 96 per cent increase in other reported sexual 
offences including indecent assault (against both adults and children), and a 67 per cent 
increase in assault since 1990 (Goh and Ramsey, 2015). 
2 The report focuses on sexual assault and indecent assault based on the statutory definitions in the relevant state. 
In both jurisdictions during the period under study, sexual assault has involved fellatio, cunnilingus, or penetration 
by some part of the body or an object, of the vagina or anus of the victim. Indecent assault is an offence of sexual 
contact that does not involve sexual assault or penetration. Examples include forced masturbation and fondling.  
3 Please see the discussion on the definition of child sexual abuse in institutional contexts for the purposes of this 
report on page 53.   
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Characteristics of victims in New South Wales 
Overall, three out of four incidents involved female victims, mostly as the only victim 
per incident.  
The age group with the most numerous victims of sexual assault was 14–17 year olds, followed 
by 10–13 year olds; 35 per cent of incidents were victims under 10. There was some difference 
by gender in the age distribution for sexual assault incidents, with boys under 10 comprising 
nearly half of the male victims and girls the same age comprising just under one-third of female 
victims. Boys made up 28 per cent of victims under 10 but only 12.5 per cent of those aged 14–
17.  
Indecent assault showed a somewhat different pattern, with those aged 10–13 having the most 
numerous reports (34 per cent). The age and gender differences were not the same as for 
sexual assault. 
A relatively small proportion of sexual assault incidents (4.8 per cent) and a higher proportion 
of indecent assault incidents (7.5 per cent) involved persons in positions of authority in relation 
to the child, a conservative proxy for ‘institutional abuse’.4 Family members were the most 
common persons of interest for both sexual assault and indecent assault, involved in around 
40 per cent of incidents. Almost the same percentage, 38 per cent, involved another known 
person who was unrelated to the victim (for example, a friend). The vast majority were 
therefore someone known to or related to the child.  
What proportion of cases proceed to prosecution in New South Wales? 
Criminal proceedings are commenced against a suspect or person of interest in New South 
Wales when police issue a court attendance notice or summons. This requires that a suspect 
can be identified, and that police consider the evidence to be strong enough to proceed. 
In 1995, a person of interest was identified in 94 per cent of all child reports of sexual assault, 
and was proceeded against in 63 per cent of these incidents. In 2014, a person of interest was 
identified in only 55 per cent of reported incidents, and was proceeded against in only 33.5 per 
cent of these incidents. Overall, legal proceedings were commenced in less than 19 per cent of 
sexual assault incidents reported to police in 2014 compared with 59 per cent in 1995. The 
trend is similar but less marked for indecent assault.  
Although there has been a substantial decrease in the proportion of cases in which a person of 
interest was identified, this does not seem to be the result of increased sexual abuse by 
strangers. The number and proportion of persons of interest not known to the child decreased 
from 7.6 per cent to 4.1 per cent between 2003 and 2014. There is also no marked increase in 
4 Please see the discussion on the definition of child sexual abuse in institutional contexts for the purposes of this 
report on page 53.   
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the number of younger children who were reported victims of sexual assault over time, that 
might be associated with less ‘success’ in identifying the person of interest. There has, 
however, been an increase in reports involving peers where the age difference between the 
victim and the person of interest was less than two years, and less than five years. It is possible 
that complaints are now more routinely recorded but that a person of interest may not be 
identified or recorded if the person of interest is a child (particularly under the age of criminal 
responsibility), or if the victim is unwilling to proceed or if family members want to shield the 
child from the criminal justice process. The decrease in cases proceeding to court may also 
reflect resource constraints and perhaps an increase in the time required to investigate and 
prepare matters to proceed to court.  
There is a similar downward trend in the number of sexual assault and indecent assault 
incidents reported during adulthood in which legal proceedings commenced. In 1995, 
65 per cent of all adult reports of child sexual assault proceeded to court, with a person of 
interest identified in almost all cases. In 2014, only 20 per cent of all such matters proceeded 
to court, or 25 per cent of the cases where a person of interest was identified. The drop in cases 
proceeding to court for adult reports of indecent assault was less marked, but still substantial. 
Delayed reporting 
The proportion of incidents in which an identified person of interest was proceeded against 
has been consistently highest for offences reported in adulthood. This is contrary to the 
expectation that delayed reporting into adulthood is necessarily associated with degraded 
evidence or unavailable witnesses and a reduced likelihood of proceeding to prosecution. It 
may mean that where adults do report, they are committed witnesses and better able to 
articulate their evidence.  
There has been a sharp decline in the probability that a child sexual assault case will proceed 
to court since the 1990s. In 2014, if a child reported a sexual assault incident on the same day 
as it occurred, the probability that it would proceed to court was only 13 per cent. If the child 
reported the next day, the probability that it would proceed to court was only 10 per cent. 
These percentages were even lower in the four years before 2014. It may be that cases of 
disclosure on the same day or the next day in childhood involve more situations where parents, 
having made an initial report to the police, decide that they do not want to ‘go through with’ 
the prosecution. The highest probability of proceeding to court in 2014 for a sexual assault 
offence was 38 per cent where the delay was between one and five years, and 36 per cent for 
a delay of five to 10 years. For indecent assault, the patterns were similar.  
These estimates of probability take into account the age of the child. So while the lowest 
probability of a reported incident of child sexual abuse resulting in legal proceedings was in 
cases where the child was younger than six at the time of the report, overall the age of the 
child is not a factor that explains the declining likelihood of prosecution over time. That is, 
when, for example, a 10-year-old child or a 14-year-old child reported the incident on the same 
day or next day, it was much less likely to lead to a prosecution in the last five years than it was 
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in the 1990s. The peak probability of proceeding to court (62 per cent) was for adolescents 
aged 14–17 at the time of the incident, and aged 19–29 when they reported it. 
Incidents involving persons in positions of authority in relation to the child (a proxy for 
‘institutional abuse’) that were reported either in childhood or in adulthood were more likely 
to proceed than other matters. When reported in childhood, the matter was least likely to 
proceed when the person of interest was a sibling, a boyfriend or girlfriend, or a person not 
known to the victim. For reports made in adulthood, the most likely to proceed were those 
that involved parents or guardians, household members, or boyfriends (although the number 
of reports against boyfriends was small).  
In summary, these findings indicate that there has been a substantial increase in the number 
of reports of sexual offences against children reported during childhood in New South Wales 
from the mid to late 1990s through to 2014. There has been a relatively constant level of adult 
reporting of historical child sexual abuse. Despite the very large increase in child reports, 
however, there has been a substantial decline in the likelihood of legal action being initiated 
for sexual offences against a child. That is, the trends of reporting and proceeding to court are 
heading in opposite directions. 
NEW SOUTH WALES COURTS DATA 
A total of 16,042 persons were prosecuted for at least one sexual offence against a child in 
finalised matters from 1994 to 2014; 97.5 per cent were male. At finalisation, the average age 
of defendants across the period was 42 years. Nearly 43 per cent were charged with at least 
one sexual assault offence, alone or in combination with other types of offences; most of the 
sexual assault charges (70 per cent) were heard in the higher courts. Just under one in three 
defendants (31 per cent) faced an indecent assault charge, heard in either the higher courts or 
Local Court. Ten per cent were charged with a child pornography offence, procuring or 
grooming; the remaining 16 per cent faced charges relating to acts of indecency. 
In the higher and lower courts, the number of adult defendants who pleaded guilty to at least 
one child sex offence has trended upwards to around 60 per cent, despite some fluctuation. In 
the cases that proceeded to trial in the higher courts (mostly District Court matters), 43 per 
cent were convicted on at least one charge. One in six defendants had all charges dismissed 
without a hearing. Overall, 62 per cent of persons with finalised appearances in the higher 
courts were convicted; 69 per cent of these offenders received a full-time custodial sentence. 
The longer the interval between the offence and finalisation in the higher courts, the greater 
the probability of a prison sentence. 
Guilty pleas and conviction rates were lower in the Local Court and Children’s Court. Overall, 
33 per cent of defendants pleaded guilty and 45 per cent of offenders were convicted in the 
Local Court. Overall, in the Children’s Court, 37 per cent pleaded guilty and 48 per cent had 
proven offences. In the Local Court, where less serious offences are dealt with, the likelihood 
of imprisonment as the principal penalty was 35 per cent for both indecent assault and child 
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pornography. Around one in four offenders were imprisoned for sexual assault and for an act 
of indecency. The most common penalty for those appearing in the Children’s Court was a 
probation order (41 per cent); 11.0 per cent of young offenders received a control order, the 
most serious penalty in the Children’s Courts. 
Delays in the court process 
Once the court process began, the time from committal to finalisation in the higher courts was 
on average nearly 10 months; and from first appearance to finalisation in the Local Court it was 
5.8 months. The higher courts and the Local Court differ significantly in the likelihood of 
conviction when taking into account the length of the interval between the earliest offence 
date and the finalisation date. The likelihood of a conviction for the most serious offence with 
which a defendant was charged (mostly sexual assault) in the higher courts remained fairly 
consistent (between 54 per cent and 63 per cent) for ‘time gaps’ between the offence and 
finalisation of the matter ranging from less than a year to more than 20 years. In the Local 
Court, however, the probability of a conviction trends downwards as the interval gets longer, 
and this drop-off is quite marked beyond 20 years. This is despite the greater probability overall 
of a conviction for indecent assault than for sexual assault in the Local Court; indecent assault 
is more commonly heard in the Local Court.  
APPEALS AGAINST CONVICTION AND SENTENCING 
The success rate of appeals against conviction for the period 2005–13 (28.1 per cent) has 
dropped from the earlier rates reported by the Judicial Commission of NSW: for 2000–03, it 
was 55.9 per cent reported by Hazlitt et al. (2004), and for 2003–07, it was 50.3 per cent 
reported by Donnelly et al. (2011). However, the success rate for appeals by the accused 
against sentence has increased from 44.4 per cent (40 out of 90 cases) in 2000–03 to 60.8 per 
cent (96 out of 158 cases) from 2005–13. Crown appeals against the leniency of the sentence 
were upheld in 22 of 34 appeals (64.7 per cent) for 2005–13 and in seven of 12 such appeals in 
the period 2000–03 reported by Hazlitt et al. (2004). It is noted that the number of appeals in 
each year was quite low, and there was significant fluctuation in results over the years 2000-
2013. 
Twenty-nine cases were identified as cases of ‘institutional’ child sexual abuse; 17 were 
historical matters. They involved teachers, church youth leaders, music teachers and sports 
coaches, a child care and residential care worker, and a nurse. Just under half of these cases 
revealed a delay in complaint/reporting of 20 years or more. Less than one in three (11 out of 
29 cases) were successfully appealed from 2005 to 2013.   
Of the 17 historical cases, six involved an appeal against conviction only, four an appeal against 
sentence only, and four were appeals against both conviction and sentence. Only three were 
Crown appeals, two against sentence, and the other an interlocutory appeal. Nine were 
successful on appeal, whether wholly or in part. Eight were dismissed. Five of the nine 
successful historical ‘institutional’ cases involved an appeal by the accused against conviction; 
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four were appeals against conviction only, and the fifth also included an appeal against 
sentence.  
One in four cases (74 cases, 25.4 per cent) involved delay as an appeal issue, two-thirds were 
historical cases and appeals in these matters were more likely to succeed than those that were 
not historical. 
In the last decade, some changes in law and practice have arguably streamlined, clarified and 
minimised potential error in judicial warnings and directions in a case. However, judicial 
misdirections appear to be a continuing source of error in child sexual assault trials, generating 
a basis for overturning convictions and jury verdicts. Most of the judicial errors related to giving 
inadequate warnings to the jury, unbalanced judicial summing-up, and failure to correctly 
direct the jury.  
The Child Sexual Offence Appeals in the NSW Criminal Court 2005-2013 report can be found in 
Appendix: Appeals study, with further material related to that study available online 
(www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au).  
SOUTH AUSTRALIA 
The South Australian courts dataset is based on cases that were heard and finalised between 
1992 and 2012. As far as possible, the analyses of the data applied the same inclusion criteria 
and similar coding and categorisation of variables as used in the New South Wales analyses. A 
significant difference between the two states, however, was the barrier to prosecutions of 
historical offences imposed by the statute of limitations until 2003 in South Australia.  
POLICE DATA 
The trend patterns in the South Australian data for the period 1992–2012 are somewhat 
different from those in New South Wales but, similarly, the reporting peaks coincided with the 
conduct of two major inquiries into child protection and the abuse of children in state care.  
The number of reported incidents generally increased with victim age for all offences. As 
in New South Wales, those aged 14–17 were the most likely age group to have been the victims 
of sexual assault (48 per cent), comprising just under half of all victims. More than one-third of 
the victims of sexual assault were under 10, similar to New South Wales. As in New South 
Wales, boys were more likely than girls to be in the two younger age groups – under six, and 
six to nine. The most common relationship was someone known to the child but not related: 
45 per cent of sexual assault and 41 per cent of indecent assault incidents. In both states, about 
20 per cent involved young persons of interest under the age of 18 (siblings, other family and 
household members, and other known peers). Only 7.5 per cent of the persons of interest in 
sexual assaults and 12.9 per cent in indecent assaults were not known to the victim. As in New 
South Wales, the proxy for ‘institutional abuse’ involved a ‘person in a position of authority’, 
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and this comprised only a very small proportion of incidents.5 In South Australia, that category 
included teachers; foster parents; step-parents or guardians of the child; religious officials or 
spiritual leaders; medical practitioners; psychologists or social workers providing professional 
services to the child; correctional officers; and employers or managers of the child. 
Overall, 84 per cent of reports were made in childhood. The number of reports made in 
adulthood varied, with peaks associated with the abolition of the statute of limitations 
on historical offences, and the Commission of Inquiry into Children in State Care (the Mullighan 
Inquiry).  
As in New South Wales, most sexual offences against children were reported within three 
months of the offence, but nearly one in four sexual assaults were reported more than five 
years after the offence. Male complainants were also more likely than female complainants to 
delay reporting, particularly for more than 20 years. Where the person of interest was in a 
position of authority, there were much higher proportions of both sexual assault and indecent 
assault incidents in which the delay was 10 years or longer. 
Cases proceeding to prosecution 
In contrast to New South Wales, the patterns of cases proceeding to court in South Australia 
were fairly consistent. Overall, legal proceedings commenced in 49 per cent of child reports of 
sexual assault incidents from 1992 to 2012. The pattern is similar for child reports of indecent 
assault. 
Both sexual assault and indecent assault reported as an adult show slight upward trends in the 
number of reported incidents and the number in which legal action was commenced. This was 
in contrast to the downward trend for child reports. 
The highest proportion of reported sexual assault cases in which legal action was initiated was 
for matters reported in childhood involving a parent or guardian (63 per cent), followed by 
other known person (60 per cent). Legal action was commenced in just over half (52.5 per cent) 
of matters involving a person in a position of authority, and in less than one-third of matters 
(30 per cent) involving a sibling. Arrest or apprehension was somewhat less likely for sexual 
assault incidents reported in adulthood. The pattern was quite similar for indecent assault.  
It was much more likely that a case reported immediately by a child would proceed to court in 
South Australia than in New South Wales. If a sexual assault was reported on the same day as 
it was alleged to have occurred, there was a 58 per cent chance it would proceed to court. For 
an indecent assault, the figure was 43 per cent. The likelihood of arrest or report for both types 
5 Please see the discussion on the definition of child sexual abuse in institutional contexts for the purposes of this 
report on page 53.   
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of offence dropped to around 35 per cent when the delay between the incident and the report 
was 5–20 years or more.  
The probability of arrest or apprehension was generally higher when the alleged offender was 
a person in a position of authority in relation to the child.  
For all age groups, there was a substantial drop in the likelihood of a matter leading to arrest 
or apprehension for reports made more than five years after the alleged incident. 
SOUTH AUSTRALIAN COURTS DATA 
A total of 7,095 persons were prosecuted on at least one sexual charge against a child in 
finalised matters in the four courts from 1992 to 2012. This is just under half (44 per cent) 
of the number prosecuted in New South Wales from 1994 to 2014, with defendants facing 
a similar total number of charges in both states. This is despite the population in 
South Australia being about 22 per cent of that in New South Wales (September 2015).  
Similar proportions of persons were dealt with in the higher and lower courts in both states, 
except that only 4.1 per cent were young persons in the South Australian Youth Court 
compared with 10.4 per cent in the New South Wales Children’s Court.  
There is a general upward trend in South Australia in the number of defendants before the 
courts, especially the Magistrates Court and the District Court. This likely reflects a bump in the 
numbers following the Mullighan Inquiry, and the removal of the statute of limitations in 2003. 
Overall, in South Australia about 42 per cent of accused persons pleaded guilty in the higher 
courts and about 40 per cent pleaded guilty in the Youth Court compared with only 17 per cent 
on average in the Magistrates Court. Whereas the plea rates are increasing in New South 
Wales, in South Australia, the trend for plea rates is flat or, for the Magistrates Court, falling.  
The conviction rate for sexual assault in the higher courts was relatively steady over the period 
1992–2012, averaging 41 per cent. Indecent assault followed a very similar pattern, averaging 
43 per cent. More than 25 per cent of accused persons in the higher courts had all charges 
dismissed with or without a hearing, mostly because the charges were withdrawn on the 
application of the prosecution (nolle prosequi, ‘white certificates’ or no evidence tendered).  
The conviction rate for indecent assault in the South Australian Magistrates Court was much 
lower than in New South Wales – it decreased from 46 per cent in 2001 to 12 per cent in 2012 
compared with a low of 33 per cent in 2005 and a high of 54 per cent in 2011 in New South 
Wales. In the Magistrates Court and Youth Court, 65 per cent and 57.5 per cent, respectively, 
of accused persons had all charges dismissed with or without a hearing. Thus while a high 
number of cases with a larger number of charges per defendant (in terms of population) went 
to court in South Australia compared with New South Wales, the prosecution was much more 
likely to abandon these matters.   
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Overall, the conviction rates (including guilty pleas) in both the higher and lower courts in South 
Australia were much lower than in New South Wales. The imprisonment rate was also 
substantially lower; for example, 56 per cent of convicted persons were imprisoned by the 
South Australian higher courts compared with 69 per cent in the New South Wales higher 
courts. In the Magistrates Court in South Australia, offenders were much more likely to receive 
a suspended sentence (42 per cent) than a custodial sentence (15 per cent), whereas the 
pattern was reversed in New South Wales Local Court (31.7 per cent received a custodial 
sentence, and 19.5 per cent a suspended sentence). In the Youth Court, by far the most 
common penalties were a probation order or bond. 
Compared with New South Wales, cases in South Australia are more likely to be prosecuted, 
but charges are also more likely to be withdrawn, a guilty plea is less likely, a conviction is less 
likely, and a convicted offender is less likely to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
In summary, less than half the cases that have come to the attention of the police over the last 
decade in either state have resulted in charges that proceeded to trial or a guilty plea. There 
are a number of reasons that a case may not reach court, including a decision by the family to 
withdraw the charges or by the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions that the case 
should not proceed. Some caution is needed in drawing comparisons between the two states 
because of differences in legislation and definitions, in police recording practices, and in police 
policy and practice relating to investigation and charging. 
Between the states, the proportion of reported incidents that resulted in legal action in the 
most recent three years differed markedly; there were also differences between child and 
adult reports and between sexual assault and indecent assault reports. 
In New South Wales, legal action commenced in nearly 17 per cent of child reports and 33 per 
cent of adult reports of sexual assault; for indecent assault, the figures were 19 per cent for 
child reports and 35 per cent for adult reports.  
In South Australia, in the three years from 2010 to 2012, the proportions were markedly higher, 
especially for child reports. Just over half (55 per cent) of the sexual assault reports and nearly 
46 per cent of the indecent assault reports reported in childhood resulted in arrest or 
apprehension; for sexual and indecent assaults reported in adulthood, the proportions were 
45.5 per cent and 49 per cent, respectively. However, as noted, a much greater proportion of 
matters were withdrawn or dismissed in South Australia compared with New South Wales. The 
proportion of cases withdrawn by the prosecution in South Australia has been consistently 
higher than other states and in Australia as a whole, as noted in other research studies (Daly 
and Bouhours, 2010) and in Australian Bureau of Statistics reports on Criminal Courts. 
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ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. The trends in the reporting of historical child sexual abuse over the last 20 years or so have
been relatively consistent, but substantially affected by the publicity associated with major
public inquiries. The patterns for child sexual abuse reported during childhood vary
substantially between the two states. Reports in South Australia have changed
comparatively little over time whereas there has been a sharp increase in New South
Wales, especially for sex offences against girls reported in childhood.
2. In New South Wales, it is more likely that cases of historical child sexual abuse will be
prosecuted than sexual abuse reported during childhood. The opposite is the case in South
Australia.
3. The factors associated with a matter proceeding from a police report to prosecution vary
significantly between the two states, but in both states cases involving persons in a position
of authority in relation to the child, were more likely to be prosecuted.
4. The most significant trend in cases resulting in conviction in New South Wales is that there
is a marked downward trend in the probability of a conviction in the Local Court as the
interval between the offence and court proceedings gets longer: from 35 per cent for the
shortest gap of less than a year to a low of only 8 per cent for a gap of more than 20 years.
There is no drop-off in the higher courts.
5. Overall, historical matters are more likely to result in legal action being commenced and,
contrary to expectations, are more likely to result in a conviction and imprisonment. This
may be because those adults who report being sexually abused as children may be more
determined complainants who are better able to articulate their evidence than
child complainants. They may already have had counselling and are ready to take action in
relation to events they see as having had some impact on their lives.
6. The success rate for appeals against conviction in New South Wales for the period
2005–13 was 28.1 per cent, which has fallen from 55.9 per cent in 2000–03 and
50.3 per cent for 2003–07. However, the success rate for appeals by the accused against
sentence has increased from 44.4 per cent in 2000–03 to 62 per cent in 2003–07. There
was a small number of Crown appeals against lenient sentences each year from 2000
(average of four); overall 64 per cent were upheld and resulted in a new sentence. Twenty-
five per cent of cases involved delay as an appeal issue, most of which were historical cases;
appeals in historical matters were more likely to succeed than those that were not
historical. Twenty-nine cases were identified as ‘institutional’ cases of child sexual abuse.
Slightly less than 33 per cent of ‘institutional’ abuse cases were successfully appealed in the
period 2005–13.
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1 THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 
Child sexual abuse is widely recognised by prosecutors and legal commentators as one of the 
most difficult crimes to investigate and prosecute, primarily because there is often little 
physical or corroborative evidence, and there are a number of difficult legal and evidentiary 
barriers (Cashmore, 1995; Cossins, 2001, 2006; Eastwood, Kift and Grace, 2006; Shead, 2014; 
Walsh, Jones, Cross and Lippert, 2010). Child sexual abuse is typically committed in secrecy by 
someone known and trusted by the child and their family. Many children do not tell anyone 
about the abuse at the time, or during their childhood or adolescence; an unknown number 
never tell anyone (Cossins, 2010a; London, Bruck, Ceci and Schuman, 2005; Priebe and Sevedin, 
2008). Some report the abuse as adults, and for some, this does not occur until many years 
after the abuse (Cashmore and Shackel, 2014). Delayed reporting is particularly common in 
cases of institutional child sexual abuse where, for example, the abuser is a trusted church 
member (Parkinson, Oates and Jayakody, 2010), or a staff member in a boarding school or 
residential care facility.  
This report focuses on how the criminal justice system deals with these matters when they are 
reported early and when there are lengthier delays in reporting. This has been the subject of 
much debate and criticism over the last four decades or so from professionals, academics and 
commentators in a number of countries. There have been consistent and strong concerns 
about the attrition of cases as they move through the system, the difficulties for complainants 
in being heard and believed, and the adverse impact of involvement in the investigation and 
prosecution process (Daly and Bouhours, 2010). The challenges for prosecutors in child sexual 
abuse cases include the typical absence of eyewitnesses and other corroborative physical or 
medical evidence, and the stress for victims of giving evidence about deeply personal issues 
that may cause them to feel a deep sense of shame (Cashmore, 2008; Cossins, 2006; Spencer 
and Flin, 1990).6  
1.1 EARLY COMPLAINT 
Some children disclose sexual abuse at or close to the time it occurred, although some do so 
‘accidentally’ rather than purposefully. In some cases, the abuse is witnessed or ‘discovered’ 
as a result of physical evidence (Campis, Hebden-Curtis and DeMaso, 1993; Fontanella, 
Harrington and Zuravin, 2000; Shackel, 2009; Schaeffer, Leventhal and Asnes, 2011). Several 
studies suggest that accidental disclosure of child sexual abuse may be particularly common 
among younger children (Shackel, 2009, pp 382–85). Finkelhor et al. (1988), in an earlier US 
study of sexual abuse in day care, found that many young children did not disclose 
6 Cossins (2006) provides a detailed outline of how the various features of the criminal justice system’s response 
to child sexual abuse inhibit the prosecution of child sexual abuse and make the experience more difficult and 
painful for child victims/witnesses. 
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purposefully. Only 37 per cent of initial disclosures in this study were made directly by the 
victim. The remaining 63 per cent of initial disclosures were prompted by an adult, after noting 
some suspicious behaviour or symptoms. Campis et al. (1993) found that the average age of 
children who accidentally disclosed sexual abuse was significantly younger than that of children 
who made purposeful disclosures; 87.5 per cent of pre-school children (aged 23 months to six 
years) who disclosed did so accidentally. Farrell (1998) found that self-disclosed reports of 
father–daughter incest increased as the victim’s age increased: only 3 per cent of victims aged 
three and 5 per cent of victims aged 4–7 self-disclosed compared with 64 per cent of victims 
aged 12–17.  
Schaeffer et al. (2011) provide important confirmatory evidence of the reasons children are 
reluctant to disclose sexual abuse. Their study also provides information about who they tell, 
and how they come to do so. Children suspected of being abused were asked in forensic 
interviews at a child sexual abuse clinic (CSAC) of Yale-New Haven Children’s Hospital how they 
came to tell someone. There were three main reasons: feeling upset and angry, or having 
nightmares and other signs of disturbance; being directly asked about it; and the abuse being 
seen or evident to others. The reasons children delayed disclosure or were reluctant to tell 
included: threats being made by the perpetrator; fear of the consequences and reactions of 
others; not feeling that they had the appropriate opportunity to tell; not understanding that 
the abusive behaviour was unacceptable; and not wanting to jeopardise their relationship with 
the perpetrator (p 343). The ‘grooming’ behaviours of perpetrators operate on these fears and 
feelings and are deliberately intended to gain and maintain children’s compliance, secrecy and 
loyalty (Erooga, 2012). This contributes to children’s confusion, denial and feelings of being 
complicit and responsible for the abuse (Paine and Hansen, 2002; Parkinson et al., 2010).  
When children do disclose the abuse at or close to the time it occurred, the key issue in terms 
of a criminal justice system response is the extent and reliability of the evidence (Cashmore, 
2008; Walsh, Jones, Cross and Lippert, 2010). The child’s statement is typically the main 
evidence, so the way children are questioned both during the investigation process and at 
court can have a significant impact on the quality, quantity and the credibility of the 
information children are able to provide (Brown and Lamb, 2015). Australian states and 
territories and other countries now have specialist investigative teams to interview children in 
these circumstances, and generally video-record interviews to preserve an accurate record 
(Cashmore, 2002; Davies et al., 1995; New South Wales Children’s Evidence Taskforce, 1997). 
To some extent, this guards against the impact of delays on the quality and completeness of 
children’s evidence, and on their willingness to remain engaged in the prosecution process. 
The challenge remains, however, to elicit quality evidence from children, especially young 
children and those with particular emotional and cognitive needs who may not be adequately 
catered for during the investigation and trial process (Lamb, Hershkowitz, Orbach and Esplin, 
2008; NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2002; Powell and Hughes-Scholes, 2009).  
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As outlined above, there are a number of reasons why children are reluctant to tell anyone and 
either do not report sexual abuse or delay their disclosure. Indeed, Cossins (2010b, p 82) argues 
that ‘delay is a typical, rather than an aberrant, feature of child sexual abuse’. For example, 
most of the children being assessed for sexual abuse in various studies delayed their disclosure 
of the abuse for periods ranging from six months to five or more years (DeVoe and Faller, 1999; 
Goodman et al., 1992; Henry, 1997; Sas and Cunningham, 1995). In a review of a number of 
studies that included adults who alleged they were abused as children, and children 
undergoing sexual abuse evaluations, London et al. (2005) found that only about one‐third of 
victims disclosed the abuse to anyone during childhood. Based on a representative sample of 
adults from Quebec, Hébert et al. (2009) reported that almost 58 per cent of the victims of 
child sexual abuse delayed disclosure for five years or more, and 20 per cent never disclosed.  
Delayed disclosure and reporting are associated with various characteristics of the victim and 
perpetrator, and the relationship between them. Older children, for example, are more 
reluctant to disclose than younger children, and boys are more reluctant than girls (Cashmore 
and Shackel, 2014; Easton, 2013; Goodman‐Brown, Edelstein, Goodman, Jones and Gordon et 
al., 2003). Children have also been found to be less likely to disclose and more likely to delay if 
the perpetrator is a parent or parent figure, or a person in a position of trust and authority than 
an unknown or unrelated person (Arata, 1998; Goodman-Brown et al., 2003; Paine and Hansen 
2001; Smith et al., 2000). The research evidence for an association between the type and 
frequency of the abuse is more mixed, with more serious abuse more likely to be reported in 
some studies, less likely in some, and no association noted in others (Hershkowitz et al., 2007; 
Paine and Hansen, 2002; Schaeffer et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2000). 
Victim’s gender 
The research evidence relating to gender differences in disclosure is consistent. A number of 
studies have found that boys and adolescent males are less likely than their female 
counterparts to disclose child sexual abuse at the time of the abuse. When they do disclose, 
they take longer to do so, and make fewer and more selective disclosures (Connolly, Chong, 
Coburn and Lutgens, 2015; Gries, Goh and Cavanaugh, 1996; Hébert et al., 2009; Hunter, 2011; 
O’Leary and Barber, 2008; Priebe and Svedin, 2008). For example, in O’Leary and Barber’s 
(2008) study, only one in four males who had been sexually abused as children or adolescents 
disclosed at or around the time of the abuse whereas nearly two-thirds of the females did so. 
For nearly half the men (45 per cent), it took at least 20 years for them to discuss their abuse 
compared with 25 per cent of the women.  
Similar patterns are also evident in relation to church-related abuse. In a retrospective study 
of 191 cases of complaints of child sexual abuse in the Anglican Church of Australia, Parkinson, 
Oates and Jayakody (2010) found that boys who were sexually abused by members of the 
clergy were less likely than girls to report the abuse during childhood and took, on average, 25 
years to make a complaint compared with 18 years for girls. Parkinson et al. also found that 
‘media reporting of child sexual abuse in the Church was a major factor in encouraging victims 
1.2 DELAYED COMPLAINT 
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to come forward’ (p 183). There were similar findings in a large-scale study of child sexual abuse 
in the Catholic Church in the United States (John Jay College, 2004).  
There are several socio-cultural explanations for the particular barriers to disclosure and 
reporting for boys and men. These include their fear of being labelled ‘homosexual’ (Alaggia, 
2005; Alaggia and Millington, 2008); the perception that boys do ‘not get sexually abused’ 
(Alaggia, 2005; Easton, 2014; Sorsoli, Kia-Keating and Grossman, 2008); and the belief that boys 
who have been sexually abused are likely to become sexual abusers (Cashmore and Shackel, 
2013; Richards, 2011). Being a ‘victim’ also challenges cultural views of masculinity. There is 
also evidence that the attempts by boys and men to discuss or report child sexual abuse were 
not believed or taken seriously, even in therapy (Alaggia and Millington, 2008). 
Evidentiary challenges with delayed reporting 
When a report of child sexual abuse is finally made – months, years or decades after the abuse 
occurred – there are a number of challenges for the investigation and prosecution of the 
alleged offences. The main challenge is the likelihood of ‘degraded evidence’ (Newbury, 2014; 
Read and Connolly, 2007). As Newbury (2014) points out, ‘the availability and reliability of 
evidence is often highly uncertain’ by the time police become aware of historical offences, in 
some cases 40 to 50 years later:  
With time, offenders have the opportunity to escape, dispose of evidence and 
construct alibis; victim and witness memories fade or are distorted; witnesses 
become hard to locate or identify, and in some cases die; and crime scenes and 
exhibits are obliterated or contaminated (p 44). 
Similarly, Shead (2014), an experienced prosecutor, states that: 
The passing of time means that police and ultimately prosecutors are faced with an 
inevitable loss of evidence: memory, scientific and medical evidence, written 
records and living or competent witnesses. Generally speaking, with witnesses who 
can be located, recall is diminished … There is often no overt evidence of this type 
of offence occurring. There is usually no injury, no eyewitness, and no DNA 
evidence: no independent support (p 746). 
There are also a number of evidentiary and admissibility issues, including witness credibility 
and reliability, and associated directions to juries in relation to the impact of delay on the 
capacity of the accused to mount a defence (for example, see Connolly et al., 2009, 2010; 
Cossins, 2010b; Donnelly, 2007; Flatman and Bagaric, 1997–98; Hamer, 2010; 2015). Of course, 
the defendant’s capacity to contest ‘old’ evidence is also diminished as time goes on. Witnesses 
who might have corroborated or contradicted the evidence of the complainant may have died 
or may be untraceable. In addition, in such cases the issue of the reliability of the identification 
of the accused may be significant, at least where the complainant had little or no prior 
relationship with the accused. Newbury (2014) argues that the legal restrictions on the 
admissibility of confessions and admissions, including those obtained by telecommunications 
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intercepts, pretext calls, and the use of documentary and electronic exhibits, should and could 
be eased without negating the right of the accused to a fair trial. 
The possible advantage in historical matters is that complainants who report child sexual abuse 
as adults are often committed to seeing the investigation and prosecution through and may be 
seen as more credible in terms of having little incentive to go through what can be a very 
painful process after a number of years without good cause. Adult complainants may also have 
less difficulty than children in understanding and answering questions in cross-examination 
about their evidence, apart from possible problems in recalling details. There is also some 
suggestion that judges view adult complainants in child sexual abuse cases more positively (as 
more cognitively competent) than complainants who are children at the time of the trial, 
though children were generally seen as more honest (Connolly, Price and Gordon, 2010). 
1.3  ATTRITION FROM REPORTING TO PROSECUTION AND BEYOND 
What is clear from both Australian and international research over several decades is that 
when complaints of child sexual abuse are reported to the police, only a very small proportion 
result in prosecution and conviction. The most consistent figure ranges between 8 per cent and 
15 per cent (Bunting, 2014; Daly and Bouhours, 2010; Eastwood et al., 2006; Fitzgerald, 2006; 
Kelly, Lovett and Regan, 2005). This report focuses on the extent to which the investigation and 
prosecution outcomes vary with the delay in reporting and prosecution, especially into 
adulthood for historical matters.  
There are various points in the process where the allegations are assessed and where decisions 
are made by police, prosecutors and others as to whether or not the case will proceed. The 
first, and possibly most significant, point of attrition is the ‘failure to report the crime’ to the 
police or any other statutory authority (Daly and Bouhours, 2010; Kelly et al. 2005). This is the 
‘dark figure’ of child sexual abuse, the unknown proportion of the offences that are committed. 
One indication of the extent of lack of reporting comes from a Norwegian survey of more than 
4,400 adolescent school students about sexuality and sexual abuse; 65 per cent of the girls and 
23 per cent of the boys reported some form of sexual abuse experience that included peer-
related unwanted sexual contact or non-contact abuse; only 8.3 per cent had talked to a 
professional, and only 6.8 per cent indicated that the incident had been reported to the 
authorities or police (Priebe and Svedin, 2008, p 1098). 
From reporting to investigation and commencement of criminal proceedings 
For offences that are reported to the police, the next point of attrition is the investigation stage 
(between reporting and clear-up), where police may decide for various reasons not to proceed 
or victims and their families may become unwilling to do so (Bunting, 2008, 2014; Cossins, 
2010a; Daly and Bouhours, 2010; Fitzgerald, 2006; Kelly et al., 2005; Lievore, 2003).  
Even after reporting to the police, the victim may still decide not to proceed. For example, 
O’Brien, Jones and Korabelnikoff (2008: p 5) found a decline over six years in the number of 
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both adult and child victims of a sexual offence who were willing to proceed to court in New 
South Wales. In 2006, one-third (32.5 per cent) of victims in their detailed analysis did not want 
to proceed compared with 21.5 per cent in 2000. Two UK studies found similar proportions of 
victims who withdrew from the investigation. Bunting’s (2008) study in Northern Ireland found 
that 28.2 per cent of child victims and 38.7 per cent of adult victims who reported sexual 
offences declined to proceed. Kelly et al.’s (2005) study of both adult and child sexual offence 
allegations in three areas of England found that the ‘victim declining to complete the initial 
investigative process and withdrawing accounted for a third of the cases lost at the police 
stage’ (p xi). Wundersitz (2003a) also found that in 2003 in South Australia victims ‘requesting 
no further action’ was the main reason child sexual abuse cases were cleared without the 
apprehension of a suspect. The proportion of cases varied, however, according to the 
relationship between the alleged victim and offender. Nearly double the number of cases 
involving an intimate family member (31.9 per cent) was ‘cleared’ because the victim 
requested no further action than when the person was known but not a family member (17.7 
per cent). The victim requested no further action in only 9 per cent of cases where the alleged 
offender was a stranger.   
In a recent Australian study of 659 identified cases reported to the police in one (unidentified) 
Australian jurisdiction in 2011, the parents or the child withdrew the complaint in 52 matters 
and the child refused to engage in the forensic interview in a further 18 cases. In 69 cases, the 
child did not disclose the abuse or particularise the offence, and it is not clear whether this was 
a function of capacity or preparedness (Christensen, Sharman and Powell, 2016a). Older 
children (aged 13–15) and those closer in age and known to the suspect were more likely to 
withdraw their complaint, therefore not proceeding to a forensic interview; so also were those 
where the complaint related to a single incident rather than repeated abuse. 
Even where the complainant and their family are willing to proceed, there are several reasons 
why the police may decline to do so. These include not being able to identify or locate the 
suspect, an assessment that there is insufficient evidence to justify a prosecution or that there 
is no evidence that a crime has been committed, including a decision that the allegation is 
unfounded (O’Brien, 2008; Wundersitz, 2003a). Christensen et al. (2016a) found that the police 
did not lay charges in just over half of the 659 cases (51.1 per cent) in which a child sexual 
offence was reported to them. The main reason was insufficient evidence (43.6 per cent), 
followed by the child not disclosing the abuse in the early assessment interview or not 
particularising the elements of the offence (20.5 per cent). A suspect not being identified (11.6 
per cent) or no offence being identified (8.0 per cent) were less common reasons. Even less 
common was a determination that the child was deemed too young or did not appear credible 
(5.3 per cent). Cases involving children aged 7–12 were, however, more likely to proceed at the 
point of the forensic interview than those involving younger children (under seven), and also 
adolescents aged 13–15 (Christensen et al, 2016b). This curvilinear association between the 
age of the child and the likelihood of the child disclosing and of the case proceeding is 
consistent with the findings of several other studies (Bunting, 2008; Leach, Powell and Anglim, 
2015; London et al., 2005; Walsh et al., 2010). 
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Allegations deemed unfounded comprise only a very small proportion of cases. In Wundersitz’s 
(2003) South Australian study, allegations were deemed unfounded in 4.8 per cent of cases, 
but in 8 per cent of matters involving family members. The comparable figure for false 
allegations of sexual assault offences with mostly adult female victims in Kelly et al.’s (2005) 
English study was 8 per cent. 
In Bunting’s (2014) study of 2,079 police records in Northern Ireland (2008–10), about 
one-quarter of the reported cases of childhood sexual abuse were reported during adulthood. 
This study confirmed the influence of age at the incident and delay in police decision-making, 
as well as gender. The probability of matters proceeding from the police to prosecution was 
highest for children aged seven to 12 who reported immediately (0.28), with little diminution 
for delays within a year of occurrence (0.25) and more than a year after occurrence (0.22); for 
adolescents aged 13 to 17, the probability dropped from 0.21 to 0.11 when the delay extended 
to more than one year. The lowest probability of proceeding was for children six and under 
(ranging between 0.06 and 0.12). Therefore, among child reporters adolescents were the most 
disadvantaged by delayed reporting. For those who reported as adults (aged 18 and over), 
there was a marked difference between males and females, with cases involving females 
whose alleged offence occurred under the age of 13 significantly more likely to proceed (0.20) 
than those involving older (aged 13–17) female adolescents (0.04) and male child victims of 
any age (0.7 to 0.10). Thus, as delay in the reporting time increased, adult women reporting 
offences that occurred when they were aged 12 or younger appeared to benefit in relation to 
the proportion of offenders charged, summonsed or cautioned, but this was not the case for 
adult men. Twice as many cases involving female child reporters proceeded compared with 
male child reporters (16.4 per cent compared with 8.3 per cent). 
Similarly, Fitzgerald’s (2006) study of attrition in sexual assault cases in New South Wales found 
that the age and gender of the victim and less extensive delays in reporting the offence 
increased the likelihood of criminal proceedings commencing. Cases where the victim was 
female, older than 10 at the time of the offence, knew the alleged offender, and made the 
report to the police within 10 years of the offence, were more likely to proceed (Fitzgerald, 
2006, p 11). Fitzgerald found that, overall, criminal proceedings commenced in only 15 per cent 
of sexual offence incidents in 2004 that involved a child victim.  
Prosecutorial discretion 
The next point at which cases may drop out of the criminal justice system is associated with 
the prosecution, which has discretion in terms of what charges should be prosecuted or 
whether the case should be discontinued. Basic tests include assessments of whether there is 
a reasonable prospect of a conviction based on the strength of the evidence and whether it is 
in the public interest to prosecute (Corns, 2014, pp 189–92; Davis et al., 1999; Lievore, 2003; 
NSW ODPP, 2007). In cases involving child sexual offences where the main evidence is that of 
the child complainant, the capacity and willingness of the witness to provide reliable evidence 
to support the prosecution is critical. Prosecutorial guidelines refer to a range of factors that 
prosecutors must take into account, including the credibility of the witness, how well the 
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witness is likely to cope with testifying, the availability of corroborative evidence, and the 
likelihood of evidence being excluded and trials being separated (Corns, 2014). A substantial 
body of research also indicates that prosecutorial decisions are influenced by legal and 
non-legal factors such as: 
 the age of the victim at time of the offence, reporting and prosecution (Cossins, 2010a;
Gray, 1993; Fitzgerald, 2006; Spears and Spohn, 1996; Stroud et al., 2000)
 the level of family support for the victim
 the nature and circumstances of the alleged abuse (Brewer et al., 1997; Goodman-
Delahunty, Granhag, Hartwig and Loftus, 2010; Goodman-Delahunty et al., 2011, 2014;
Sedlak et al., 2008).
The quality of the interview with the complainant is also a consideration in determining the 
adequacy and reliability of the evidence (Beichner and Spohn, 2005; Blackwell and Seymour, 
2014; Burrows and Powell, 2014; Pipe et al. 2013). Communication with police and with the 
victim and the family are part of this process, but little is known about the decision-making 
processes nor how police and prosecutors exercise discretion and determine which cases 
proceed and which do not (Cossins, 2010a; Ernberg, Tidefors and Landström, 2016; Muldoon, 
Taylor and Norma, 2013; Taylor and Gassner, 2009; Tinsley, 2011).  
Attrition at court 
The next point in the criminal justice system where attrition may occur is when the matter is 
moved past prosecutors for listing in court, and whether it remains in the court process (Daly 
and Bouhours, 2010). Even at this stage, charges may be withdrawn, victims may decide to 
withdraw and no evidence may be tendered by the prosecution. For example, Daly and 
Bouhours (2010) reported that a high rate of sexual assault cases did not proceed further, with 
about one in three cases dismissed or withdrawn in South Australia. For cases that remain in 
the court system, there are obstacles in the way of obtaining a conviction, with or without a 
guilty plea, even when the evidence gathered by the police seems strong. Over the last few 
decades, considerable concern has focused on the problems that child witnesses face in the 
adversarial and adult-oriented environment of the court, which contribute to the difficulties of 
achieving a conviction in these cases. Until the mid to late 1980s in Australia and other common 
law countries, children were treated as inherently unreliable witnesses, and relatively few 
children met the stringent statutory and procedural requirements for giving evidence.7 
7  The rules of evidence and the competency requirements were based on legal suspicion about children’s 
evidence, outlined by Heydon (1984) [former Australian High Court Judge] and cited by Spencer and Flin (1990, p 
285) in their seminal book on child witnesses: 
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With the relaxation of competency requirements, more children, and especially younger 
children, have been witnesses in child sexual offence cases.8 However, the early experience in 
New South Wales indicates that the increased rate of prosecutions has not led to a 
commensurate increase in the number of convictions for child sexual abuse. Cashmore (1995) 
found that the conviction rate in New South Wales dropped sharply as the number of 
prosecutions increased. In 1992, the number of cases accepted for prosecution was more than 
four times the number in 1982 (1982, 34 cases; 1992, 143 cases). During the same period, the 
guilty plea rate dropped from 83.6 per cent to 58 per cent and the overall conviction rate fell 
from 92.3 per cent to 76.5 per cent. Thus, while more prosecutions were being brought, and 
with younger child witnesses than might have been the case 10 years earlier, defendants were 
less likely to plead guilty and the chances of obtaining a conviction declined.  
Two more recent comparable studies in New South Wales indicate that the rate of convictions 
and guilty pleas fell even further after 1992. In a study of all child sexual abuse matters in the 
District Court in 1994, Gallagher, Hickey and Ash (1997) found that just under half (49 per cent) 
of the alleged offenders pleaded guilty; overall, 65 per cent were convicted on at least one 
charge. In 2004, the overall conviction rate was 57 per cent: 45 per cent pleaded guilty and 
12.3 per cent were found guilty of at least one charge at trial (Fitzgerald, 2006). This study also 
found that defendants charged with sexual offences against a child in 2004 were somewhat 
less likely than those charged with sexual offences against an adult to have their charges 
dismissed in the higher courts without a hearing (18 per cent compared with 23 per cent); 
these figures were also substantially higher than for defendants charged with assault (8.2 per 
First, any child’s powers of observation and memory are less reliable than an adult’s. Secondly, 
children are prone to live in a make-believe world, so that they magnify incidents which happen to 
them or invent them completely. Thirdly, they are also very egocentric, so details seemingly 
unrelated to their own world are quickly forgotten by them. Fourthly, because of their immaturity 
they are very suggestible and can easily be influenced by adults and other children. One lying child 
may influence others to lie; anxious parents may take a child through a story again and again so 
that it becomes drilled in untruths. Most dangerously, a policeman taking a statement from a child 
may without ill will use leading questions so that the child tends to confuse what actually happened 
with the answer suggested implicitly by the question. A fifth danger is that children often have little 
notion of the duty to speak the truth, and they may fail to realise how important their evidence is 
in a case and how important it is for it to be accurate. Finally, children sometimes behave in a way 
evil beyond their years. They may consent to sexual offences against themselves and then deny 
consent. They may completely invent sexual offences. Some children know that the adult world 
regards such matters in a serious and peculiar way, and they enjoy investigating this mystery or 
revenging themselves by making false accusations. (Heydon, 1984, p 84) 
8 According to changes to the rules on admissibility of children’s evidence, for example, in the Uniform Evidence 
Jurisdictions (NSW, Vic, Tas, ACT, NT) children are now presumed competent to give sworn evidence unless a 
child’s competency is specifically called into question (Section 12). Nevertheless, even where the criteria for giving 
sworn evidence is not met, children may still provide unsworn evidence (Sections 13(4) and 13(5)).  
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cent) and across all offences (8.4 per cent). However, the plea and conviction rates for child 
sexual offences were higher than for those charged with adult sexual offences (plea rate of 23 
per cent and overall conviction rate of 34.9 per cent). For cases that proceeded to trial, 38.8 
per cent of defendants facing child sexual offences were found guilty of at least one charge 
compared with 26.3 per cent of those on trial for adult sexual offences. Overall, however, a 
conviction was significantly more likely across the board for all offences (80.2 per cent) and for 
assault (73.3 per cent).  
Measures to ease the prosecution process for child witnesses 
Over the last 25 years or so, significant steps have been taken in Australia, as in other 
jurisdictions, to make it easier for children to give evidence by removing them from both the 
courtroom and the presence of the accused. This has been achieved by using closed circuit 
television and pre-recording the investigative interview for use as evidence-in-chief 
(Cashmore, 2002; Connolly et al., 2015; Richards, 2000; McWilliams et al., 2014). Research in 
New South Wales found that jurors accept and understand the need for such measures 
(Cashmore and Trimboli, 2006).  
Child witnesses also have some protection under the uniform evidence legislation – and similar 
provisions in other states – that imposes either a positive duty on the court, or gives the judge 
discretion, to disallow questioning of witnesses at trial that is harassing, intimidating, offensive 
or oppressive.9 However, earlier research indicates that judges are reluctant to intervene in 
the absence of an objection by the prosecution and it remains a challenge for judges to 
recognise when language that is so familiar to them is difficult and uncomfortable for non-
lawyers and particularly for children (Cashmore, 2007; Cashmore and Trimboli, 2006). Further 
changes to introduce intermediaries10 to try to reduce the language difficulties (following the 
lead of England) and to allow all of the child’s testimony, including cross-examination, to be 
pre-recorded (following the lead of Western Australia) are currently being implemented in 
New South Wales (Plotnikoff and Woolfson, 2015).  
Special measures generally apply only to child witnesses under the age of 16 at the time of the 
hearing, and do not benefit those who delay their reporting and any subsequent prosecution 
of child sexual offences until the witness is 16 or older. 
9 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 41; Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 41 (which applies in the ACT); Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), 
s 41. Section 41 of the Evidence Act 2011 (NT) and Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) impose such positive action only in the 
case of ‘vulnerable’ witnesses; otherwise, judicial intervention is discretionary. Vulnerable witnesses include all 
children aged under 18 (s 41(4)). Similar provisions exist in the non-uniform states: Evidence Act 1997 (Qld), s 21; 
Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 26; Evidence Act 1929 (SA), s 25. In SA, the statutory provision requires mandatory 
exclusion of improper questions whereas in WA and Qld exclusion is discretionary. 
10 Criminal Procedure Amendment (Child Sexual Offence Evidence Pilot) Act 2015. 
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Judicial warnings and directions to the jury 
All sexual offence matters, and particularly historical cases involving child sexual offences, may 
also be the subject of particular warnings or directions to the jury about the impact of delay on 
the assessment of the evidence.11 The three most common judicial warnings in child sexual 
abuse cases over the last 20 to 30 years relate to delay in complaint (Longman and Crofts 
warnings) and lack of corroborative evidence (Murray direction) (Cossins, 2010).12 The ‘recent 
complaint doctrine’ that applied only to sexual offences was based on the expectation that 
victims would report such allegations at the first opportunity and that failure to do so cast 
doubt on the credibility of the allegation (Connolly et al., 2015). Similarly, a lack of 
corroborative evidence, particularly where the child was unsworn, effectively acted as a barrier 
to conviction (Cashmore, 2008; Cossins, 2006; Spencer and Flin, 1990). 
The Murray direction (R v Murray (1987)) permits the judge to warn the jury in cases where 
there is only one witness asserting the commission of the crime (as is typical in sexual abuse 
cases) that the evidence of that witness ‘must be scrutinised with great care’ before deciding 
upon a guilty verdict.13  
11 The complexity of judicial directions at common law and pursuant to legislation has been widely recognised 
both judicially and extra-judicially (R v BWT (2002) at 251, per Wood CJ at CL). Judicial directions in child sexual 
assault cases pose a challenge not only for judges who must decide what warning and directions to give jurors but 
also for jurors who must make sense of such directions and apply them to their decision-making and assessment 
of the evidence in the case. 
12 Other warnings that may arise in child sexual assault cases include a BRS direction (judge required to warn the 
jury of the limited use that may be made of propensity/tendency evidence when admitted for a 
non-propensity/tendency purpose); KRM direction (except where evidence relating to one count charging sexual 
assault is admissible in relation to another count/s alleging a separate occasion of such assault, the jury must 
consider each count separately based on evidence pertaining only to that count; and where appropriate such a 
direction should be balanced by a reminder to the jury that if they have a reasonable doubt concerning the 
credibility of the complainant’s evidence on one or more counts, they can take it into account when assessing 
reliability on the other counts; any warning required in the face of a ruling concerning the use that may be made 
of evidence of a complaint or delay in complaint in adjudging credibility or as evidence of the facts asserted; any 
warning necessary in relation to coincidence evidence). 
13  However, as the NSW Judicial Commission Sexual Assault Trials Handbook states, there are further 
qualifications on the use of this warning. ‘For proceedings commenced after 1 January 2007, it is impermissible 
to suggest that complainants as a class are unreliable witnesses and a trial judge is prohibited from warning the 
jury of the danger of convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of any complainant: s 294AA Criminal Procedure 
Act. For proceedings commenced after 1 January 2009, it is impermissible to suggest that children as a class are 
unreliable witnesses: s 165A(1) Evidence Act’ (p 307, June 2015 update). 
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The Crofts direction (Crofts v Queen (1996)) requires that if a jury is informed, pursuant to 
section 29414, that a delay in complaint does not necessarily indicate that the allegation is false 
and that there may be good reasons why a victim of sexual abuse hesitates to complain, then 
the jury should also be informed that the absence of a complaint or a delay in complaint may 
be taken into account in evaluating the evidence of the complainant, and determining whether 
to believe him or her. In New South Wales, legislative amendment has sought to limit the 
circumstances when a judge can direct the jury that the delay in complaint can be taken into 
account in assessing the complainant’s credibility.15 
Arguably the most important and problematic of these warnings is the Longman warning. The 
Longman warning requires the judge to warn the jury that because of the passage of many 
years between the alleged offence and the time of complaint, it would be ‘dangerous to 
convict’ on the complainant’s evidence alone, unless the jury is satisfied of its truth 
and accuracy, having scrutinised the complainant’s evidence carefully. This warning has been 
the subject of considerable criticism from judges, the New South Wales Court of Criminal 
Appeal, law reform commissions in Victoria and Tasmania, and the Australian Law Reform 
Commission (Cossins, 2010a; Nicholson, 2008; Wood DCJ, 2003) and academic commentators 
(Cossins, 2010b; Hamer, 2010). The criticisms of the Longman warning concern: 
 the ‘illogicality’ of the presumption of the loss of evidence and consequent forensic
disadvantage to the defendant where there is ‘no evidence available capable of
contradicting the complainant, let alone in a case where the accused was guilty of the
offence charged’ (Wood, 2003)
 the lack of requirement that the defendant demonstrate the probative significance of the
loss of evidence or specific disadvantage
 the unbalanced treatment of forensic disadvantage – ‘the potential for lost evidence to
go either way’ (Hamer, 2010, p 682)
 the lack of definition or guidance on ‘delayed complaint’, with earlier cases having
defined ‘delay’ as being in the realm of hours or days, but more recent cases considering
six months to be a relevant delay (Cossins, 2010b)
14 Section 294 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) requires that where evidence is given or a question is 
raised about a delay in complaint in a sexual offence case, a judge must warn the jury that the absence of 
complaint, or delay in complaining, does not necessarily indicate that the allegation is false, and must inform the 
jury that there may be good reasons why a victim of a sexual abuse may hesitate in making, or may refrain from 
making, a complaint about the abuse. 
15 For proceedings commenced on or after 1 January 2007, s 294(2)(c) requires that the judge must not give the 
direction required by s 294(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ‘unless there is sufficient evidence to 
justify such a warning.’ 
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 the link between delay and complainant credibility, and conflation of the ‘specific issue
of forensic disadvantage with the credibility of the complainant’ (Cossins, 2010b)
 the inconsistency of the warning with the findings of psychological literature about the
patterns of disclosure of victims of child sexual abuse (Cossins, 2010b)
 the possibility that a jury may perceive the term ‘dangerous to convict’ as a direction to
acquit (Cashmore and Trimboli, 2006; BWT (2002)).
While legislative reforms and guidance in the New South Wales Sexual Assault Trials 
Handbook 16  have attempted to limit the scope and strength of the warning, High Court 
judgments arguably maintained its role (Cossins, 2010b; Hamer, 2010). The Longman warning 
has been the subject of a number of successful appeals in New South Wales against conviction 
for child sexual assault trials; these occurred mostly prior to 2004, with nine of the 26 resulting 
in an acquittal and 17 in a retrial (Donnelly, Johns, Poletti and Buckland, 2011; pp 208–13). The 
law has since been substantially changed by s 165B Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) which provides 
that a warning may be given where the cost is satisfied that the defendant has suffered a 
significant forensic disadvantage because of the consequences of the delay.17  
In addition, careful directions must also be given to jurors where tendency or coincidence 
evidence is led by the prosecution that draws on evidence of sexual incidents that are not the 
subject of any charge. In such cases, the jury must be reminded that evidence of an uncharged 
incident is not direct evidence that the accused committed any of the charged acts, and that 
any charged incident must be proved beyond reasonable doubt (Gipp v The Queen (1998); 
R v MM (2000)). 
These warnings and directions give rise to complex considerations in sexual abuse cases and 
focus attention on the characteristics of such cases, namely, that often there is a delay in laying 
a complaint in such cases and that the allegations are uncorroborated. These warnings are 
likely to affect how juries assess the evidence in child sexual abuse cases involving delayed 
complaint (Cossins, 2010a). The challenges raised by judicial warnings in such cases are 
reflected by the high number of appeals against conviction in child sexual assault cases that 
16 For proceedings commencing on or after 1 January 2009 in NSW, s 165B of the Evidence Act 1995 applies. 
Section 165B(2) provides that, if the court, on application by a party, is satisfied that the defendant has suffered 
a significant forensic disadvantage because of the consequences of delay, the court must inform the jury of the 
nature of that disadvantage and the need to take that disadvantage into account when considering the evidence. 
The mere passage of time is not to be regarded as a significant forensic disadvantage. The section is intended to 
make it clear that (contrary to the tendency at common law following Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79 
for judges to routinely give warnings in relation to forensic disadvantage arising from delay) information about 
forensic disadvantage need only be given if a party applies for it, and should only be given where there is an 
identifiable risk of prejudice to the accused. Such prejudice should not be assumed to exist merely because of the 
passage of time. Section 165B(4) says that a judge cannot suggest to a jury that it would be unsafe to convict 
because of delay or forensic disadvantage suffered because of the consequences of the delay. 
17 See New South Wales Criminal Trial Courts Bench Book [2.640]. 
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succeed on the grounds of judicial misdirection. This is also an area of interest and analysis in 
this report and the related full report (Shackel, 2016). 
Overall attrition 
The difficulties of bringing such cases to trial is illustrated by a number of Australian and 
international studies on the extent to which cases involving sexual offences against children 
have proceeded from initial identification in hospitals or by child protection authorities through 
to criminal proceedings and conviction. These are all early complaint studies. In an analysis of 
cases seen at the Royal Children’s Hospital in Melbourne, Goddard and Hiller (1992) tracked 
104 cases of child sexual abuse. They found that only 14 per cent of the cases in which the 
police were involved resulted in a conviction. In one other case, a juvenile was cautioned.  
Hood and Boltje (1998) analysed the progress of 500 cases referred to a hospital-based child 
protection service in Adelaide that provided a specialist medical and psycho-social evaluation 
service for the state child protection system. Two-thirds (66 per cent) of the cases in the sample 
were sexual abuse cases. Of the referrals, 356 were assessed by the service and 230 (64.6 per 
cent of those assessed) were substantiated by clinicians. Of the 230, the police investigated 
144 and agreed with the assessment that there had been abuse in 135 cases. Prosecution 
occurred in 63 cases and there were 39 convictions. The conviction rate was 17 per cent of the 
cases substantiated by the clinicians.  
Similarly, Parkinson et al. (2002) examined the process of attrition in relation to 183 child sexual 
abuse cases referred to two child protection units in Sydney in the late 1980s. Of the 183 cases, 
the name of the offender was known in 117 cases. Forty-five cases reached trial and 32 resulted 
in a conviction. A sub-cohort of 84 children and their families was interviewed in detail to 
determine why many cases did not proceed to criminal investigation and prosecution and why 
other cases dropped out of the criminal justice system. Among this sub-cohort, the offender 
was identifiable in 67 cases; in 13 cases, the offender pleaded guilty, and in 12 was found guilty 
at trial. Reasons for not proceeding to trial included the offence not being reported to police; 
parents wishing to protect their children, the perpetrator or other family members; the 
evidence not being strong enough to warrant proceeding; the child being too young or too 
distressed; and the offender threatening the family.  
These findings are consistent with findings from the US and UK. Tjaden and Thoennes (1992) 
found in their study of substantiated child maltreatment cases in three US states that only 17 
per cent of cases of sexual abuse resulted in prosecution. In a study conducted in Chicago, 
Martone, Jaudes and Cavins (1996) tracked a sample of cases where sexual abuse was 
diagnosed by clinicians in a hospital setting. Of these, 324 cases were regarded as being 
probable sexual abuse and 269 alleged perpetrators were identified; 136 (51 per cent) were 
charged. In a study in the North of England, San Lazaro, Steele and Donaldson (1996) tracked 
the cases of 160 children who were seen in a specialist paediatric facility in a public hospital 
and who were deemed by the researchers to have made an unequivocal allegation of sexual 
abuse that required police investigation. The children named 145 males and nine females as 
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perpetrators. None of the women were prosecuted. Of the 145 males, 124 (86 per cent) were 
known to have been interviewed by the police. Fifty-four (37 per cent) went to trial, of which 
49 (86 per cent) were convicted. Five others were cautioned. Overall, 44 per cent of the cases 
investigated by police resulted in convictions or cautions. 
Two other US studies examined various features of the progress of cases through the criminal 
justice system. Stroud, Martens and Barker (2000) compared cases that resulted in prosecution 
and those that did not among 1,043 children who completed forensic interviews about child 
sexual assault allegations in New Mexico. Just under half of the cases were not referred to the 
prosecutor. These cases were more likely to involve younger children (aged under four), boys, 
and cases in which the child did not make a disclosure, and where the alleged perpetrator was 
a family member. The characteristics of the assault – the type of abuse (fondling, oral sex and 
penetration), its duration and the force used – did not differ significantly between the cases 
that were referred and those that were not. Of the 587 cases that were referred, 320 (54.5 per 
cent) were rejected or dismissed, 168 (28.6 per cent) resulted in a guilty plea, 13 were tried by 
a jury, and the resolution of the matter was still pending or unknown for 86 (14.7 per cent). 
Overall, only 16 per cent of the interviews involving 1,043 children resulted in a conviction. 
Edelson and Joa’s (2010) study of the legal outcomes for 137 female and 34 male children and 
adolescents, some of whom were seen at Child Abuse Assessment Centers (CAAC) or Child 
Advocacy Centers, built on an earlier study by Joa and Edelson (2004). This study found that 
children seen at a CAAC were more likely to have their cases pursued by the District Attorney’s 
(DA’s) office, to have more counts charged, and the defendants were more likely to plead guilty 
or be found guilty than in cases where children were not seen at such a centre. The follow-up 
study by Edelson and Joa (2010) focused on the differences in legal outcomes for male and 
female children and adolescents. They found that cases involving female complainants were 
more likely to proceed (be filed), with more counts, and to have a greater likelihood of the 
defendant pleading guilty than cases with male complainants. There was no significant gender 
difference in the conviction rate but the defendant was more likely to be found guilty at trial 
where the complainant was male than female. There was a non-significant trend for offenders 
against females to be more likely to go to prison than offenders against males, and to receive 
a longer sentence, despite the fact that they were more likely to have pleaded guilty. The 
overall conviction rate for offenders against both male and female complainants was more 
than 70 per cent for the cases that proceeded, but significantly lower as a proportion of the 
children initially referred to a CAAC or DA’s office. 
1.4 APPEAL MATTERS 
The final step in the criminal justice system where decisions are made about the outcome of 
cases is the appeals process, which can overturn the findings of other courts in relation to 
conviction and sentencing. For example, some convictions may be overturned and sentencing 
appeals may lead to a different and in some cases a more lenient sentence. 
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Thus, appeals data are an important part of the overall picture of how many cases reported to 
the police result in convictions. The available appeals data, though rather limited, indicate that 
a substantial number of child sexual assault cases are successfully appealed by the accused. In 
a study of conviction and sentence appeals in the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal 
over a four-year period (2000–03), Hazlitt, Poletti and Donnelly (2004) reported that appeals 
against conviction in child sexual assault cases were upheld in more than half of the cases 
(55.9 per cent). Appeals against severity of sentencing were successful in 44.4 per cent of cases. 
The success rate of appeals against conviction showed a marked increase, from 43.5 per cent 
in 2000 to 73.3 per cent in 2003 (Hazlitt et al., 2004, p 47). A further study of appeals by 
Donnelly, Johns and Poletti (2011) found that child sexual assault appeals represented nearly 
one in four (22.5 per cent) successful conviction appeals in New South Wales over the period 
2001–07. The success rate for sexual assault appeals involving a child victim (50.3 per cent) was 
significantly higher than for those involving an adult victim (32.4 per cent). The acquittal rate 
following a successful appeal was also higher in child sexual assault cases (42.7 per cent) than 
adult sexual assault cases (27.3 per cent), though this difference was not statistically significant. 
Judicial misdirection was the most prevalent source of error in successful sexual assault appeals 
(22.1 per cent), followed by judicial error in admissibility of evidence (19.2 per cent). 
Further discussion on these issues can be found at Part 4.9 and in the Appendix of this report. 
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2 AIMS OF THE RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY 
This research aims to examine the prosecution process for cases of child sexual abuse that are 
reported to the police in adulthood compared with those reported in childhood. In this report, 
the term ‘child sexual abuse’ is used to describe the offending behaviour generally. In 
presenting detailed statistics, it will be necessary to distinguish between child sexual assault 
and other sex offences against children. The research seeks to investigate the trends in delayed 
disclosure and reporting of child sexual abuse, and to map the prosecution process and 
outcomes associated with varying degrees of delay in reporting to the police, together with 
other case characteristics such as the age of the complainant, and the relationship between 
the complainant and alleged offender. The focus of the Royal Commission’s work is the sexual 
abuse of children in institutional contexts so the relationship between the complainant and 
alleged offender is of particular importance though it was not possible using the available data 
to match the Commission’s definition of institutional abuse.  
2.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research focuses on the following questions: 
1. What are the trends in recorded reports to police of historical child sexual abuse over a
recent 20 year period compared with reports made during childhood in two
Australian states?
2. What are the trends in the numbers of prosecutions of cases of historical child sexual
abuse over a recent 20 year period compared with child sexual abuse reported during
childhood in two Australian states?
3. What factors – including characteristics of the complainant, the type of offence, the
relationship between the complainant and the alleged offender, and delay in reporting to
police – are associated with the matter proceeding from a report to the police
to prosecution?
4. What is the likelihood of cases reported in childhood and in adulthood resulting in
a conviction?
5. What factors (as above) are associated with the matter resulting in a conviction or not,
and a custodial or other type of sentence?
6. Is there any difference in the rate of appeals, the grounds of appeals, and the outcomes
of appeals in cases in New South Wales:
o where there are delayed complaints compared with cases that were reported in
childhood?
o that involve ‘institutional’ child sexual abuse compared with intra-familial cases of
abuse and other extra-familial cases?
47 
 
2.2 METHODOLOGY 
The data that form the basis of this research were derived from police and court data in 
New South Wales and South Australia, and from case file analysis and discussions with legal 
and other professionals in New South Wales. New South Wales and South Australia are the 
only two states with equivalent statistical analysis bodies that can produce multi-year ‘clean’ 
datasets for both the police and court collections – the Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research 
in New South Wales (BOCSAR) and the Office of Crime Statistics and Research (OCSAR) in South 
Australia. These two states also provide a useful basis of comparison in terms of different 
population sizes and some differences in legislative and policy provisions.  
The data used for this study included: 
 unit record police data provided by the New South Wales BOCSAR and the 
South Australian OCSAR 
 unit record court data provided by New South Wales BOCSAR and the South Australian 
OCSAR 
 a sample of case files in which the defendant was a person in a position of authority  in 
relation to the child (a proxy for institutional abuse) and familial child abuse matters held 
by the New South Wales Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) 
 focus groups held with New South Wales ODPP solicitors and Crown prosecutors to 
discuss the evidentiary issues involved in prosecuting child sexual abuse cases and 
particularly historical cases 
 appeal data relating to 291 appeal decisions involving child sexual offences in the 
New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal (NSWCCA) from 2005 to 2013.  
Members of the research team also discussed the issues with members of the ODPP Sexual 
Assault Review Committee (New South Wales) at a meeting in December 2014. This committee 
included representatives from NSW Police, ODPP, Health and other agencies.  The findings 
were also discussed with NSW Police. 
The research has ethics approval from the Human Research Ethics Committee at the University 
of Sydney. The assistance of BOCSAR, OCSAR and the New South Wales ODPP is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
2.3 ISSUES CONCERNING DATA ANALYSIS 
Even in a single state, tracking child sexual abuse prosecutions over time is complex due to: 
 changes in record-keeping  
 changes in offence categories 
 differences between the types of records kept by the police and the ODPP (especially 
where, due to plea bargaining or otherwise, the offence as charged by the police is not 
the offence for which the defendant is convicted)  
 gaps and errors in data entry.  
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Data cleaning and checking 
Administrative datasets generally require data cleaning and checking as part of the preliminary 
analysis. For this research, this involved discussions and querying the fields and interpretation 
with the data custodians in both New South Wales and South Australia before, during and after 
analysis of the police and court data. Appendix 1 (NSW) outlines the series of steps taken in 
extracting, cleaning and managing the data for both states.  
The main changes to the original databases excluded cases that did not meet the most 
important criteria for inclusion – the offence must be a sexual offence against a child. This 
meant excluding entries where the offences were other than sexual offences and ‘cases’ where 
the victim/complainant18 was aged 18 or older at the time of the offence. Incidents/cases 
where the only victim or all the victims were aged 18 or older at the date of the 
offence/incident were excluded.19  
The limitations of the data 
Both the police and court data in each state are administrative datasets, and are not designed 
with research as their focus. For example, the primary purpose of the NSW Police 
Computerised Operational Policing System (COPS), as explained by the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics (ABS), is to record ‘all police activities by NSW Police’; a ‘secondary purpose’ is to 
provide extracted data for BOCSAR and the ABS to produce crime statistics for New South 
Wales. It includes ‘information on all reported criminal incidents, data on police actions, and 
other occurrences attended by, or reported to, police’. The ‘extract from the COPS database, 
in the BOCSAR Recorded Crime Statistics Database, includes verified records of criminal 
incidents, persons of interest and victims’.20  
Like other administrative databases, both the police and court data are subject to changes in 
recording practices and directions, and also to the willingness and attention to detail of police 
and court staff in completing fields. Some information fields are mandatory and data entry for 
a matter cannot be completed without entering information in those fields; others are not 
mandatory and may be deemed unnecessary or less important, and often may not be filled in. 
NSW Police have also indicated that in 2003 and 2008, changes were introduced to improve 
the rigour of data entry and checking processes. At the same time, changes have also been 
made in the investigation of child sexual offences, especially with the introduction and 
18 The terms ‘victim’ and ‘complainant’ are used as a form of shorthand throughout the report, rather than ‘alleged 
victim’.  
19 For example, in NSW 468 incidents/cases were excluded where the only victim or all the victims were aged 18 
or older at the date of the offence/incident.  
20 Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, available at 
www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/7d12b0f6763c78caca257061001cc588/dfd6faea24f68ad6ca257235001cd
238!OpenDocument 
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expansion of Joint Investigation Response Teams (JIRTs), involving NSW Police and Department 
of Family and Community Services staff.   
Problems linking police and court data  
Ideally it would be possible to track matters from reporting to police, through the investigation 
and prosecution process to court, and finalisation at court via conviction and sentencing. 
However, the nature of these administrative databases means it is not possible to map the 
police data directly onto the court data for several reasons, even where there is a common 
linking case number. In New South Wales, the link between police records and ODPP records 
is through the ‘H number’ but this link is lost if, as frequently happens, the charges, as 
eventually taken to trial or the subject of a guilty plea, are different from those laid by the 
police.21 
As Fitzgerald (2006) pointed out in relation to New South Wales data in a similar exercise:  
The counting units are not the same; the police data show recorded criminal 
incidents and the court data show finalised defendants and charges. A single 
defendant can be involved in multiple incidents and a single incident can give rise to 
multiple charges. Secondly, the court statistics for a given year do not necessarily 
arise from incidents recorded by police in the same year due to the time it takes to 
investigate an offence and for charges to be finalised in court (p 2). 
Similarly, Wundersitz’s technical paper (2003a) and research report (2003b) outlined in some 
detail the difficulties in trying to trace cases using South Australian police and court data. As 
Wundersitz pointed out, the flow of cases through the criminal justice system is ‘neither simple 
nor linear’. This is despite the fact that South Australia has the advantage of ‘the assignment 
of a unique personal identification number (Police Identification Number, PIN) to every 
individual who comes into contact with the criminal justice system’ (both as a victim and as a 
person of interest or accused), which remains constant across time, being re-assigned to that 
individual on each occasion that he/she has dealings with the system’ (p 1). However, as 
Wundersitz (2003a) pointed out, the unique identifier in South Australian data is not sufficient 
to allow tracking across the police, court and corrections systems because: 
 a single incident report may lead to the apprehension of multiple offenders, or 
conversely, multiple incident reports may be ‘solved’ by one apprehension 
 a single apprehension report may contain charges arising from a number of incidents, 
some of which are extraneous to the ones targeted for the study 
                                                     
21 The difficulty with losing the link through a PIN, or H number in NSW, is that the police data include information 
about the victim (for example, age, gender and relationship to the offender) whereas the court data include 
information about the alleged offender, the charges and the outcomes of prosecution, so it can be difficult or 
impossible to conduct analyses of court data that refer to victim characteristics.  
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 charges arising from the one apprehension report may be split among different court 
files, and take different paths through the court system 
 a particular court file may, as the case progresses, be consolidated with other court files 
relating to the same offender, even though they may contain charges arising from 
incidents and apprehension reports unrelated to the ‘targeted’ incident (p 2). 
The police and court data in each state have therefore been analysed separately, exploring 
within the police data trends and the factors associated with greater or lesser likelihood of the 
matter proceeding to court, and within the court data the likelihood of a plea, conviction and 
type of sentence. Appendix 1 (NSW) for each state also outlines the data analysis processes, 
including aggregation, and explains the relevant unit of analysis – incident/major 
offence/victims/accused/court.  
The appeal data 
The appeal cases were identified for the period 2005–13 using AustLII and the NSWCCA 
database and relevant keywords. All cases that involved a victim under 18 in the principal 
offence were included. ‘Child sexual abuse’ was defined broadly to include all offences relating 
to child sexual abuse, and to encompass the various offences relating to the Royal 
Commission’s definition of child sexual offences. The cases were summarised and coded based 
on the grounds of appeal, outcomes and categories (whether historical child sexual abuse and 
whether intra-familial, extra-familial or ‘institutional’). The study was limited to NSWCCA cases 
with published judgments, and these were not consistent in the amount of background 
information provided, so it was sometimes difficult to reconstruct context. It is also possible 
that some appeals may have been missed despite thorough and systematic searches of the 
relevant case databases. See Appendix: Appeals Study for the Child Sexual Offence Appeals in 
the NSW Criminal Court 2005-2013 report by Associate Professor Rita Shackel.  
2.4 DEFINITIONS OF SEXUAL OFFENCES AGAINST CHILDREN 
The Royal Commission adopted a working definition of child sexual abuse that sets the 
parameters for the behaviours and activities that are captured by the legal definitions of child 
sexual assault, indecent assault, acts of indecency, grooming and child pornography. It includes 
‘abuse’ perpetrated by an adult or another child, though in legal terms it does not include the 
above legally proscribed behaviours perpetrated by a child under the age of 10, since this is 
the age of criminal responsibility in Australian states and territories. The Royal Commission 
definition is:  
Any act which exposes a child to, or involves a child in, sexual processes beyond his 
or her understanding or contrary to accepted standards. Sexually abusive 
behaviours can include the fondling of genitals, masturbation, oral sex, vaginal or 
anal penetration by a penis, finger or any other object, fondling of breasts, 
voyeurism, exhibitionism and exposing the child to or involving the child in 
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pornography (Bromfield, 2005). It includes child grooming which refers to actions 
deliberately undertaken with the aim of befriending and establishing an emotional 
connection with a child to lower the child’s inhibitions in preparation for sexual 
activity with the child.  
There is a very large number of offences that may be charged, depending on the jurisdiction 
and the year in which the alleged offences occurred; they are charged under the relevant 
provisions at that time and in that jurisdiction. The analyses in this report include data from 
both New South Wales and South Australia so the legislative provisions and definitions that 
apply will vary by state, though there are considerable commonalities (Boxall, Tomison and 
Hulme, 2014). 
Comparisons across states and the analysis of large-scale administrative datasets are both 
complex and difficult processes for several reasons. First, states have different legislation that 
includes different definitions of the elements of sexual offences (for example, ‘sexual assault’); 
differences in the age cut-offs that apply in the offences, and different penalties. Second, the 
relevant legislation has changed considerably since the 1950s, and these changes occur at 
different times across states, though there is some similarity in developments across Australia 
with one state following the law reform trajectory of another.  
Definition of ‘child’ 
The definition of ‘child’ used in this report refers to persons under the age of 18, consistent 
with the Royal Commission’s Terms of Reference, and the definition of ‘child’ in the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989. This means that offences against children 
above the age of consent are included. The age of consent in New South Wales is 16 years, and 
in South Australia it is 17 years for heterosexual and homosexual sexual acts involving 
penetration but 16 years for all other sexual acts (Boxall et al, 2014).  
Definition of sexual offences against children 
Sexual offences against children have been categorised in this report into four main types 
of offence:  
 sexual assault involving sexual intercourse/penetration – without consent or as defined 
as unlawful because of the age of the victim and/or the relationship between the victim 
and the offender 
 indecent assault – contact sexual offence not involving sexual intercourse/penetration 
 acts of indecency – non-contact sexual offences 
 child pornography. 
These categories are in line with the definitions and categories of sexual offences used by the 
New South Wales BOCSAR, the Judicial Commission of New South Wales and the South 
Australian OCSAR. The use of these generic categories is ‘a broad indicator of the seriousness 
of the offence’ though as Hazlitt et al. (2004) pointed out, ‘there are difficulties in grouping 
sexual offences this way given the broad range of offending that can occur within the three 
categories. An overlap also occurs between the statutory maximum for offences that constitute 
these categories’ (p 22), especially given the various changes in definition of sexual 
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intercourse/penetration and the changes in statutory maximum penalties, especially for 
historical offences. Table 1 outlines the definitions of various sexual offences in the New South 
Wales Police database (COPS).22  
Table 1. Definitions of sexual offences in the New South Wales Police COPS database 
Offence type Defined as 
Sexual assault  Where any person has sexual intercourse with another person without the 
consent of the other person and who knows that the other person does not 
consent to the sexual intercourse. Includes carnal knowledge, in reference 
to historical matters only* and incest** where a person under 18 was 
involved 
Indecent assault Where any person assaults another person and, at the time of, or 
immediately before or after, the assault, commits an act of indecency on or 
in the presence of the other person 
 
Act of indecency 
Where any person commits an act with or towards another person that 
offends the currently accepted standards of decency and has some 
sexual connotations 
Grooming/procuring Procuring or grooming child aged under 16 for sexual activity 
Possess/disseminate 
child pornography 
Possess/disseminate child exploitation material 
 
* ‘Carnal knowledge’ is a legacy offence that was included with ‘sexual assault’ on the advice of the Chief 
Statistician of NSW Police though the two are not quite equivalent. For current instances of sex with a person 
under 16 years, the police are directed to use ‘aggravated sexual assault’ or other suitable category. 
** Incest is defined as sexual intercourse by any person with a close family member who is 16 or older. 
 
Boxall et al. (2014) provide detailed explanations of the changes since the 1950s and especially 
since the 1980s, in the relevant legislation in all states, including New South Wales and South 
Australia. These changes relate to the expansion of the definition of sexual intercourse or 
penetration, the decriminalisation of homosexual sexual acts, the specific inclusion of further 
categories of persons in a position of trust or authority in relation to a child, and the inclusion 
and expansion of child pornography offences.  
For example, in New South Wales sexual intercourse is defined in the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 
61H and this definition has been expanded several times since 1980. First, as a result of changes 
made by the Crimes (Sexual Assault) Amendment Act 1981, sexual intercourse/penetration was 
                                                     
22 It is important to note that the term ‘child sexual assault’ is often used interchangeably with child sexual abuse 
in the literature and in research studies to include both penetrative and non-penetrative sexual offending. In this 
report, ‘sexual assault’ refers to penetrative sexual offences.  
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expanded to include the penetration of the vagina or anus of a person by any part of the body 
of another person; or by an object manipulated by another person; or fellatio or cunnilingus 
(oral to body contact). As a result of changes made by the Crimes Legislation (Amendment) Act 
1992, it is sufficient that the accused penetrated ‘to any extent’ the genitalia of a female or the 
anus of any person. Then in 1996, the definition of ‘vagina’ was expanded to include surgically-
constructed vaginas (Transgender (Anti-Discrimination and Other Acts Amendment) Act 1996) 
(Boxall et al., 2014, p 30). Similar changes were made in South Australian legislation in 1976, 
1985 and 2008. 
The definition of indecent assault in the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61L is that an assault has 
been committed on a person and ‘at the time of, or immediately before or after, the assault,’ 
the accused ‘commits an act of indecency on, or in the presence of, the person’. For there to 
be an assault, typically there is touching of the body of the victim that was not accidental and 
did not occur in the course of the ordinary exigencies of everyday life. For the assault to be 
indecent, it must have a sexual connotation. It includes forced manipulation and masturbation, 
and fondling.  
The offence of act of indecency ‘with or towards a person’ carries a higher sentence if the victim 
was under 16 years (Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61N). An example would be exposing one’s 
genitalia to someone else (who did not invite it) in an act popularly known as ‘flashing’. 
Child pornography offences were introduced in New South Wales in 1977 and in South 
Australia in 1978, and have been amended several times since to be more inclusive and 
specifically criminalise the ‘production, dissemination and possession of child pornography’ 
(Boxall et al. 2014, p 59). Child pornography material is defined in the South Australian Criminal 
Law Consolidation Act 1935 as material that:  
‘describes or depicts a child under, or apparently under, the age of 17 years engaging in 
sexual activity or consists of, or contains, the image of (or what appears to be the image of) 
a child under, or apparently under, the age of 17 years, or of the bodily parts of such a child, 
or in the production of which such a child has been or appears to have been involved; and 
that is intended or apparently intended:  
i. to excite or gratify sexual interest; or
ii. to excite or gratify a sadistic or other perverted interest in violence or cruelty.’ (Boxall et al.,
2014, p 46).
Child sexual abuse in institutional contexts 
The Royal Commission’s Terms of Reference provide a broad and inclusive definition of 
institutional child sexual abuse in relation to the persons involved, the premises, and the 
circumstances or conditions that create, facilitate or contribute to the risk of child sexual abuse 
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in relation to the institution’s activities. 23  The abuse may occur on the premises of the 
organisation or elsewhere. 24 It includes, but is not limited to, sexual abuse perpetrated by: 
 institutional staff or volunteers who work directly with children, that is, ‘a person in 
authority’ (for example, teacher, scout leader, clergy, foster carer, childcare worker, 
manager, residential care worker or correctional facilities worker) 
 institutional staff, volunteers and contractors in an ancillary role (for example, cleaner, 
bus driver, gardener, caretaker) 
 other minors in circumstances where the institution is in loco parentis (for example, 
classmate, peer during a school camp, child in a residential care facility). 
The data available from the police and court databases do not allow a close match with the 
Royal Commission’s definition of ‘institutional abuse’. The closest match (with the minimum 
missing data) is provided by using the relationship of the person of interest to the victim in the 
police incident and victim databases, and reference in the particular offence to the alleged 
offender being a ‘person in authority’ in relation to the child.25 Both New South Wales and 
South Australia have had specific offences that explicitly criminalise sexual contact between 
children and persons in a position of authority that have been expanded in various ways from 
1935 in South Australia and from 1950 in New South Wales. The current provisions in both 
states cover a range of professions and positions of power and authority in relation to a child.26  
                                                     
23 The Royal Commission’s Terms of Reference adopt a very broad definition of an ‘institution’ to mean: 
Any public or private body, agency, association, club, institution or other entity or group of entities of 
any kind (whether incorporated or unincorporated) and however described and includes for example an 
entity or group or entities (including an entity or groups of entities that no longer exists) that provides 
or has at any time provided, activities, facilities, programs or services of any kind that provide the means 
through which adults have contact with children including through their families and does not include 
the family. 
24 The Royal Commission’s Terms of Reference define child sexual abuse in institutional contexts as when it occurs 
‘on the premises of an institution, where activities of an institution take place, or in connection with the activities 
of an institution’; or ‘it is engaged in by an official of an institution in circumstances (including circumstances 
involving settings not directly controlled by the institution) where you consider that the institution has, or its 
activities have, created, facilitated, increased, or in any way contributed to, (whether by act or omission) the risk 
of child sexual abuse or the circumstances or conditions giving rise to that risk’; or in any other circumstances 
where an institution is considered to be ‘or should be treated as being, responsible for adults having contact with 
children’.  
25 Further information was also used in some analyses in relation to the location of the offence and the occupation 
of the person of interest. 
26 For example, in SA ‘the Criminal Law Consolidation (Rape and Sexual Offence) Amendment Act 2008 expanded 
the categories to encompass a range of individuals in a position of authority in relation to the victim, namely: 
teachers engaged in the education of the child; foster parents, step-parents or guardians of the child; religious 
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Under the South Australian Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935, ‘a person in authority’ 
includes:  
 teachers engaged in educating the child  
 foster parents, step-parents or guardians of the child 
 religious officials or spiritual leaders providing pastoral care or religious instruction to the 
child 
 medical practitioners, psychologists or social workers providing professional services to 
the child  
 persons employed or providing services in a correctional institution or a training centre  
 employers of the child or other individuals who have the authority to determine 
significant aspects of the child’s terms and conditions of employment or to terminate the 
child’s employment (regardless of whether the work is paid or volunteer) (citing Boxall et 
al., 2014, p 58). 
The Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) does not define a person in authority but the ‘circumstances of 
aggravation’ for sexual offences include circumstances in which ‘the alleged victim is (whether 
generally or at the time of the commission of the offence) under the authority of the alleged 
offender’.27  
                                                     
officials or spiritual leaders providing pastoral care or religious instruction to the child; medical practitioners, 
psychologists or social workers providing professional services to the child; persons employed or providing 
services in a correctional institution or a training centre, and; employers of the child or other individuals who have 
the authority to determine significant aspects of the child’s terms and conditions of employment or to terminate 
the child’s employment (regardless of whether the work is paid or volunteer)’ (Boxall et al., 2014, p 58). The 
categories in NSW are similar but specifically include those in a position of authority or relate to ‘intellectually 
disabled individuals and those who, in connection with a facility or program providing intellectual disability 
services, are in a position of authority relative to the victim (Crimes (Personal and Family Violence) Amendment 
Act 1987 (NSW))’ and make the ‘person in authority’ relationship an aggravating circumstance (Crimes 
(Amendment) Act 1989 (NSW)) (Boxall et al., 2014, p 31). Further, in 2003, NSW introduced ‘a small  number of 
offences into the Crimes Act 1900 that criminalised sexual contact between an adult and a child (16–17 years old) 
under their ‘special care’ (Crimes Amendment (Sexual Offences) Act 2003). The legislation identified a series of 
scenarios in which the child would be considered as being under special care if the offender: is the step-parent, 
guardian or foster parent of the victim; is a school teacher and the victim is a pupil of the offender; has an 
established personal relationship with the victim in connection with the provision of religious, sporting, musical 
or other instruction to the victim; is a custodial officer of an institution of which the victim is an inmate; or is a 
health professional and the victim is a patient of the health professional’ (p 31).  
27 ‘Under the authority of the alleged offender’ is included as one of the ‘circumstances of aggravation’ in several 
sections of the Act: for example, see s 61J(2) (e) in relation to aggravated sexual assault; and s 66C(5)(d) in relation 
to sexual intercourse-child between 10 and 16; s 61M (3)(c) in relation to aggravated indecent assault, and 
61O(3)(b) in relation to aggravated act of indecency. 
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The information in the New South Wales and South Australian police databases relating to 
persons in ‘positions of authority’ in relation to the child28 provides a narrower and more 
conservative definition of institutional sexual abuse than the Royal Commission’s more 
expansive definition and is therefore likely to underestimate the incidence of institutional 
abuse as defined by the Royal Commission. 
Historical child sexual abuse  
Historical child sexual abuse is defined in this report as abuse that occurred when the victim 
was a child (under 18) but was not reported until adulthood.29 This, by definition, brings in 
some element of delayed reporting (from childhood to adulthood) but there may be substantial 
variation in the length of that delay. As Newbury (2014) points out, ‘historicity is always a 
matter of degree’ (p 44). For that reason, the actual length of delay from the offence date to 
the date of reporting is also used in the analyses in this report. 
Other terms 
The term ‘victim’ is used in accordance with the terminology used by New South Wales and 
South Australian Police, and by BOCSAR and OCSAR, although there has been no finding or 
substantiation of an offence at the time the ‘offence’ is reported.  
‘Offender’ is defined by BOCSAR as ‘persons of interest who have a legal action commenced 
against them by the police; this can include referral to court, caution or criminal infringement 
notice’.30  
 
  
                                                     
28 With some additional information, as outlined, on the relevant charges, occupation and location. 
29 It should be noted that different research studies apply different definitions of historical matters: for example, 
Connolly, Chong, Coburn and Lutgens (2015) defined cases as ‘historic’ when they ‘were prosecuted more than 
two years after the alleged abuse ended’ (p 550).  
30 Source: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR) glossary of terms, available at  
www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/Pages/bocsar_crime_stats/bocsar_glossary.aspx#I 
57 
 
3 NEW SOUTH WALES POLICE DATA 
3.1 GENERAL TRENDS IN REPORTING OF CHILD SEXUAL OFFENCES TO POLICE 
When an alleged offence is reported to NSW Police, information is recorded in COPS. The 
information relates to the criminal ‘incident’, which is defined as an activity detected by or 
reported to police, which:  
 involves the same offender(s) and the same victim(s) 
 occurs at the one location, during one uninterrupted period of time 
 falls into one offence category and into one incident type (for example, ‘actual’, 
‘attempted’, ‘conspiracy’). 
For example, one incident may involve two offenders sexually assaulting the same victim. This 
is recorded as one sexual assault incident if the offence fell into the same category. If more 
than one offence type is alleged at the same time, involving the same offenders and victims, 
this is recorded as a separate incident. 31  Incidents are the main unit of analysis used by 
BOCSAR, and the following analyses are commonly based on incidents as well as the ‘person of 
interest’ and the ‘victim’. 
Figure 1a presents the number of reported incidents for the four main types of sexual offences 
against children in New South Wales for the period 1995–2014. There is some variation by 
offence type, with only sexual assault showing a fairly consistent upward trend over this period, 
more than doubling from 1,274 incidents in 1995 to 3,030 in 2014. After closely following the 
sexual assault figures until 2002, the trend in the number of indecent assault incidents showed 
a marked decrease until 2007 (with a low of 1,406 incidents in that year). Reports of sexual 
assault, indecent assault and acts of indecency all peaked in 1997–98 just after the Wood Royal 
Commission, which exposed sexual offending against children in churches, and the failure of 
various government agencies including the departments of Community Services, Juvenile 
Justice, and Sport and Recreation. The review of the Children and Young Persons (Care and 
Protection) Act 1998 (NSW), which followed the Wood Royal Commission and came into effect 
in 2000, also mandated the reporting of children at ‘risk of harm’ and later at ‘risk of significant 
harm’.32 
                                                     
31 Each offender or alleged offender is counted only once for each event. Note that multiple criminal incidents may 
be associated with a single event. More information is available at 
www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/Pages/bocsar_crime_stats/bocsar_glossary.aspx#P 
32 Medical practitioners have been required by law to report physical and sexual abuse since 1977, and the 
categories of professionals and others required to report sexual abuse was expanded in 1987, and again, more 
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In 2004 and 2007, new criminal offences were added to the statute book concerning ‘procuring 
or grooming’ a child for pornography or prostitution. The number of reported incidents under 
these provisions has gradually increased from only 20 in 2008 to 274 in 2014 (see Figure 1a).  
 
 
Figure 1a. Number of incidents involving sexual offences against a child reported to NSW Police by offence 
type from 1995 to 2014  
Figure 1b shows the total number of reported sexual assault or indecent assault offences 
committed against children between 1995 and 2014. It shows a sustained upward trend, 
almost doubling between 1995 (2,625 reports) and 2014 (5,200 reports). 
                                                     
substantially, from 18 December 2000 in s 27 of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 
(NSW), to include anyone who: 
‘(a) in the course of his or her professional work or other paid employment delivers health care, welfare, 
education, children’s services, residential services or law enforcement wholly or partly to children under the 
age of 16 years; or  
(b) holds a management position in an organisation the duties of which include direct responsibility for or 
direct supervision of a person referred to in (a), and that person has reasonable grounds (that arise as a 
consequence of their employment) to suspect that a child is at risk of harm.’ 
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Figure 1b. Number of incidents involving sexual assault or indecent assault against a child reported to NSW 
Police from 1995 to 2014 
Gender of victim 
Consistent with the typical gender breakdown for child sexual abuse, the majority of victims 
were female. Overall, three out of four incidents (n = 76,088, 74.9 per cent) involved female 
victims, mostly as the only victim per incident (n = 71,848, 94.4 per cent of all incidents 
involving females).33 About one in five of the reported incidents (n = 23,563, 23.2 per cent) 
involved a single male victim and a further 1.2 per cent involved more than one male victim; a 
very small proportion of incidents (n = 1,944, 1.9 per cent) involved a combination of male and 
female victims. The proportion of male victims was somewhat higher for indecent assault (29.5 
per cent) than for sexual assault (23.8 per cent). 
Figures 2a and 2b show the number of child sexual assault and indecent assault incidents 
reported to NSW Police involving male and female victims by year.  
                                                     
33 A given incident could have multiple victims, offenders and charges but only one offence category.  
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Figures 2a and 2b. Number of reported incidents of (a) sexual assault and (b) indecent assault from 1995 to 
2014 in New South Wales 
Figure 2a shows an upward trend in the number of sexual assault incidents for both girls and 
boys, with both more than doubling in number from 1995 to 2014. In contrast, the trend lines 
for indecent assault in Figure 2b are fairly flat with some fluctuation for both male and female 
victims and a peak for males in 1997–98, around the time of the Wood Royal Commission.  
Age of victim 
Figure 3 shows the breakdown by age of the victim(s) for each offence category. The most 
numerous age group for victims of sexual assault was those aged 14–17 (32.2 per cent) 
followed by those aged 10–13 (28.6 per cent); victims younger than 10 together comprised 
35.3 per cent of reported incidents of sexual assault. Indecent assault showed a somewhat 
different pattern with those aged 10–13 being the most numerous age group (34.1 per cent) 
with proportionately fewer victims aged 14–17 (20.5 per cent), and more victims younger than 
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10 (42.0 per cent). A small number of incidents (3.3 per cent) involved two or more victims who 
fell into different age categories. Most child victims of child pornography, procuring or 
grooming (87.1 per cent) were aged 10 and older. 
 
Figure 3. Number of reported incidents by age of victim and type of offence in New South Wales 
There was some difference by gender in the age distribution for sexual assault incidents, with 
boys under 10 comprising nearly half (48.2 per cent) of the male victims and girls of the same 
age comprising just under one-third (32.1 per cent) of female victims.34 More than one-third 
of female victims (36.0 per cent) were aged 14–17 compared with just under one-fifth of boys 
(19.7 per cent). Correspondingly, the proportion of male victims decreased with age. Boys 
made up 28 per cent of victims under 10 but only 12.5 per cent of those aged 14–17.  
 
  
                                                     
34 Note: A given child could occur more than once depending on how many incidents they were involved in. 
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Table 2. Number and percentage of sexual assault incidents involving male and female victims 
by age  
 Female Male Male and female Total 
Age n % n % n  % N 
Under 6  5,311 14.8 2,094 22.3 127 18.4 7,532 
6–9 years 6,208 17.3 2,433 25.9 73 10.5 8,714 
10–13 years 10,851 30.2 2,806 29.8 52 7.5 13,709 
14–17 years 12,936 36.0 1,850 19.7 51 7.4 14,837 
Combination 
of ages 
597 1.7 228 2.4 389 56.2 1,214 
Total 35,903  9,411  692  46,006 
This pattern by gender and age was less evident for indecent assault; in 46.7 per cent of 
incidents involving males, the victims were aged under 10 compared with 40.5 per cent 
for females.  
Relationship of the person of interest to the victim 
Of particular relevance to the Royal Commission’s focus on child sexual abuse in an institutional 
context are offences where the person of interest or the alleged offender35 is in a position of 
authority or trust in relation to the child. 36 The relationship of the person of interest, and in 
particular, relevant recoding of ‘persons in authority’ was used as a proxy for institutional 
                                                     
35 As explained earlier, a ‘person of interest’ becomes an alleged offender when the police lay charges and take 
legal action against them.  
36 This information on the relationship of the ‘offender’ to the victim has several limitations in terms of missing 
data and some questionable coding since it appears that sometimes the ‘victim–person of interest relationship’ 
is recorded, rather than the ‘POI to victim relationship’ (for example, ‘child’ rather than ‘parent’) or perhaps the 
relationship of the person of interest to one of the child’s parents is recorded. For example, the incidents in which 
the ‘person of interest–victim relationship’ was coded as ‘child’ were cross-checked and the average age of the 
person of interest at the time of the incident was 38 years; the vast majority of these incidents (83 per cent) were 
categorised as ‘not recorded’ in the field ‘by whom committed’ in the offender database so they do not fit the 
definition of ‘child’ or ‘student’. For this reason, the categories ‘child’, ‘spouse/partner’, and ‘ex-spouse/ex-
partner’ are excluded from the figures. The incidents that fell into these categories constituted only 1.6 per cent 
of all sexual or indecent assaults from 2003 to 2014.  
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abuse, correcting for missing data where possible.37   The relevant recoding of ‘persons in 
authority’ includes teachers, clergy (‘religious representatives’), youth leaders, employers and 
managers, ‘carers’ and ancillary staff such as caretakers, cleaners and drivers.  This is narrower 
than the Royal Commission’s definition of ‘institutional child sexual abuse’ and it is therefore 
likely to underestimate the incidence of institutional abuse as defined by the Royal 
Commission. 
The following analyses exclude the years prior to 2003 because there was a preponderance of 
missing information on the person of interest–victim relationship until 2003, with the vast 
majority of incidents marked as ‘Not recorded’ in this field. 
A small percentage of incidents, on average 5.6 per cent, from 2003 to 2014 involved persons 
in authority (ranging from 4.0 per cent in 2011 to 7.6 per cent in 2014). The vast majority of 
offenders were male (96.5 per cent). The average age was 39.6 years at the time of the 
incident. Just under half of the victims were female (47.3 per cent); just over half 
(53.4 per cent) involved indecent assault and 40.9 per cent involved sexual assault. Overall, 
4.3 per cent of reported sexual assaults and 7.5 per cent of reported indecent assaults involved 
a person in authority.  
Overall, 22 per cent of the incidents involved a person of interest under 18; of these, 
43.1 per cent was a known but unrelated person; 13.3 per cent were siblings and a further 21.2 
per cent another family member. Where the location of the incident was an educational 
institution, over half (56.2 per cent in total) involved a child or young person under 18 (mostly 
male, 96.2 per cent) as the person of interest; 67 per cent of the victims were aged 10–15. 
Figure 4a shows the percentage of sexual assault incidents by the relationship between the 
person of interest and the victim, excluding those in which this information was not recorded.38 
In just under 5 per cent (4.8 per cent) the person of interest was a person in authority. Family 
members together comprised nearly 40 per cent (39.8 per cent) of the persons of interest in 
sexual assault incidents over this period, with 18.2 per cent being parents, 5.1 per cent siblings, 
and 16.5 per cent other family members. In 69.9 per cent of the incidents involving siblings, 
the person of interest was aged under 16 at the time of the incident; 84.4 per cent were aged 
under 18. For 38.0 per cent of incidents over this period, the person of interest was a person 
                                                     
37 This involved some recoding of the ‘person of interest–victim relationship’ field in the incident database to 
combine ‘persons in authority’ with ‘carers’, as well as cross-checking using the variable ‘by whom committed’ in 
the offender database to capture cases in which information in the ‘by whom committed’ field provided missing 
information; for example, ‘religious representative’, ‘youth leader’ and ‘teacher’ where the ‘POI to victim 
relationship’ was marked as ‘not recorded’. 
38 There was an increase in the proportion of incidents for which the relationship of the person of interest to the 
victim was not recorded from 0.3 per cent in 2007 to 12.4 per cent in 2013.  
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known to but unrelated to the child (including friends) (32.1–48.2 per cent). Another 1.8 per 
cent on average were household members, and 10.9 per cent were boyfriends or girlfriends.39 
Therefore, the most common relationship was someone known to but not related to the child. 
Only 5.2 per cent of persons of interest were not known to the victim.  
Figure 4b shows a similar pattern for indecent assault incidents. However, a somewhat greater 
proportion involved a person in authority, ranging from 5.6 per cent to 9.2 per cent and 
averaging 7.5 per cent. The proportion of parents and other family members was also slightly 
higher than for sexual assault (overall average of 43.7 per cent), with parents at 20.6 per cent, 
siblings 4.4 per cent, and other family members 18.7 per cent. The age distribution for sibling 
persons of interest at the time of the incident was very similar to that for sexual assault (70.4 
per cent were aged under 16, 84.5 per cent were under 18, and 95 per cent were under 24). 
Only 1.1 per cent were boyfriend/girlfriend and 1.9 per cent were a member of the household. 
A slightly higher percentage (8.5 per cent) than for sexual assault was unknown to the victim. 
 
 
                                                     
39 The vast majority were male (boyfriends, 96.6 per cent) and were child reports (94.1 per cent) of sexual assault. 
Of the reports, 28.5 per cent of those involving ‘girlfriends’ concerned same-sex female victims but only 2.2 per 
cent involving ‘boyfriends’ concerned same-sex male victims. Almost 43 per cent (42.5 per cent) of the 
boyfriends/girlfriends were under 18 at the time of the incident and 38.5 per cent were under 18 at report; the 
youngest was 11 years old and the oldest for females was 49 years; the oldest for males was 60 years. There was 
no significant difference in age between male and female persons of interest in this category.  
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Figures  4a and 4b. Percentage of sexual assault and indecent assault incidents by the person of interest–
victim relationship from 2003 to 2014 in New South Wales 
3.2 DELAYS IN REPORTING  
Delayed reporting is common for child sexual offences; this is a central issue for this research. 
In most cases, child sexual assault offences are reported while the victim is still a child but in a 
substantial proportion of cases, the report is not made until adulthood, with delays extending 
in some cases to well over 20 years.  
As Figure 5 shows, the great majority of reports of child sexual offences40 in New South Wales 
between 1995 and 2014 were made in childhood. Overall, 80.6 per cent of incidents were 
reported while the victim was still a child (under 18), and 19.5 per cent were adults reporting 
their victimisation during childhood.41  
                                                     
40 Pornography is not included in these analyses because it is often not possible to establish the actual date of the 
offence or indeed the victim. 
41 ‘Incidents reported in childhood’ means that the victim(s) reported the incident to the police while they were 
under 18; 18 rather than 16 (the age of consent) was used as the threshold for both the age at offence and age at 
report. The change in age threshold to 18 ‘brought in’ an additional 400 cases where the incident occurred when 
the child was aged 16 or 17 and/or where the report was made when the complainant was aged 16 or 17, but this 
made little difference to the analyses.  
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Figure 5. Number of incidents of child sexual offences reported in adulthood and childhood from 1995 to 2014 
in New South Wales 
There have also been periods when adult reports were considerably higher, particularly in 
1997–99 following significant media attention during the Wood Royal Commission. Media 
focus appears to generate a greater number of complaints from adults (Parkinson et al., 2010). 
For example, the number of reports in 1997 was double that for 1995, prior to the Wood Royal 
Commission. In 1995, there were 2,495 child reports (81.5 per cent) and 566 adult reports (18.5 
per cent). In 1997, there were 3,343 child reports (60.9 per cent) and 2,146 adult reports 
(39.1 per cent). As Figures 6(a), (b) and (c) show, the proportion of reports made in adulthood 
also varies by the type of offence, with sexual assault more likely to be reported during 
adulthood (21.4 per cent) than indecent assault (17.4 per cent) and acts of indecency (17.3 per 
cent).  
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Figures 6a, 6b and 6c. Number of incidents of (a) sexual assault and (b) indecent assault and (c) acts of 
indecency reported in adulthood and childhood from 1995 to 2014 in New South Wales 
Child reports 
Figure 7 shows the increase in child reports of sexual offences against them. Even taking into 
account the modest increase of about 6 per cent in the number of children in the population 
in New South Wales over that period,42 this is still substantial. For example, in 1999, there were 
2,875 child report incidents. In 2014, the total was 4,397 reports, an increase of nearly 53 per 
cent. Most of that increase occurred from 2007 onwards, for sexual and indecent assault.  
                                                     
42 In June 1995, there were an estimated 44,176 10-year-old boys and 42,101 10-year-old girls in NSW, and in June 
2015, 47,332 10-year-old boys and 44,585 10-year-old girls, an increase of 7.1 per cent for boys and 5.9 per cent 
for girls (ABS, Population, 2015). 
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Figure 7. Number of child sexual offence incidents reported in childhood by offence from 1995 to 2014 
in New South Wales 
Another measure of the level of child sexual abuse is the number of substantiated cases of 
sexual abuse reported to the child protection statutory authority.43 Is there a similar trend over 
time? The Australian Institute of Health and Welfare figures44  for the number of children 
involved in substantiated child sexual abuse matters reported to the New South Wales 
Department of Family and Community Services45 indicate a similar increase over much of this 
period, and particularly since 2004–05 (Figure 8).46 The main changes to recording reports of 
suspected child abuse and neglect in New South Wales coincided with the introduction of the 
                                                     
43 ‘A substantiation indicates there is sufficient reason (after an investigation) to believe the child has been, is 
being or is likely to be, abused, neglected or otherwise harmed.’ Child Protection Australia 2014–15 (p 3).  
44 These figures are derived from the appendices of the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare’s Child Welfare 
series of publications on child protection from 1999 to 2015; for example, in the most recent publication, Child 
Protection Australia 2014–15, see ‘Table A7 – Children who were the subjects of substantiations of notifications 
received during 2014–15, by type of abuse or neglect and sex, states and territories’ (p 74). 
45 The Department of Family and Community Services, which has undergone a number of name changes, is the 
statutory authority that receives and assesses reports of suspected child abuse and neglect and harm to children 
in New South Wales; Departmental staff members have also been involved in Joint Investigation Teams with NSW 
Police since 1997. 
46  These substantiation figures also indicate an increasing proportion of incidents involving boys – up from 
24.8 per cent of children involved in substantiated sexual abuse in 1999–2000 to 30.8 per cent in 2013–14. 
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Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW), which came into force in 
December 2000. This legislation extended the grounds for reporting ‘current concerns for the 
safety, welfare or well-being’ of a child (s 23) and expanded the mandatory reporting 
requirements to all those who manage or deliver services to children (s 27).47  
 
Figure 8. Number of children by gender in substantiated child sexual abuse reports to the New South Wales 
statutory authority 
Note: There were no figures for New South Wales for the year 2003–04. 
Adult reports 
The trend for adult reports (Figure 9) is somewhat different, with the overall number of child 
sexual offences peaking in 1997 at the time of the Wood Royal Commission – this increased 
pattern of reporting lasted until 1999. The level of reporting of child sexual assault in adulthood 
remained relatively constant from 2000 to 2012 but increased from 2012 to 2014 (474 to 733). 
This coincides with when the Royal Commission was announced and commenced its work. The 
number of reports of indecent assault declined from 2002 to 2007, but has almost tripled from 
2007 to 2014 (130 to 363).  
                                                     
47 Mandatory reporting requirements had been in place since 1977 in New South Wales for certain professions 
(teachers and medical professionals) to report physical and sexual abuse.  
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Figure 9. Number of child sexual offence incidents reported in adulthood from 1995 to 2014 in 
New  South Wales 
Figures 10a and 10b show little variation over time in the proportion of male and female victims 
of sexual and indecent assault reported in childhood (solid lines), but substantial variation for 
the same offences reported in adulthood (dashed lines). Generally, more females than males 
reported child sexual assault in adulthood. However, in 1997 at the time of the Wood Royal 
Commission, 50 per cent of reports of historical sexual assault involved male victims (1,182). 
Overall, the proportion of male victims was higher for adult reports than for reports made in 
childhood for both sexual assault (37.2 per cent of adult reports compared with 20.1 per cent 
of child reports) and indecent assault (31.9 per cent and 17.8 per cent, respectively).  
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Figures 10a and 10b. Percentage of male and female victims making child and adult reports of (a) sexual 
assault and (b) indecent assault from 1995 to 2014 in New South Wales 
Overall, levels of adult reporting of child sexual abuse offences have remained fairly consistent 
since 2003, while child reports have increased fairly consistently during the same period. Of 
course, we do not know from these statistics whether this represents a real increase in 
prevalence as opposed to an increase in reporting. It is possible that the prevalence of child 
sexual abuse in the community has not changed, but that the level of reporting, or of recording 
reports, has increased. What is clear, however, is that it is quite common for some delay in the 
reporting of sexual offences against children, in some cases into adulthood and for long 
periods. 
The following figures and tables take a more detailed look at the actual delay in terms of days, 
months and years. 
The extent of delay 
Sexual offences against children were more likely to be reported within the first three months 
of the incident, but nearly one in four (24.2 per cent) were not reported until five or more years 
later. Both Figure 11 and Table 3 show the delay between the offence and the date of reporting 
for the three main offence types, as the number of reported incidents (Figure 11) and 
percentage of reported incidents (Table 3) for each type of offence. It is important to note that 
an incident is defined by the New South Wales BOCSAR ‘as an activity detected by or reported 
to police which: involved the same offender(s), and the same victim(s), which occurred at the 
one location, during one uninterrupted period of time, and falls into one offence category and 
one incident type’. 
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Figure 11. Number of incidents by delay between offence and report to NSW Police by offence from 1995 to 
2014 in New South Wales  
As Table 3 shows, just over half of the reported incidents for all three offences were reported 
within three months of the offence: sexual assault, 55 per cent; indecent assault, 55.0 per cent; 
and acts of indecency, 59.7 per cent. Nearly two-thirds were reported within a year of the 
offence. However, one in five (19.9 per cent) sexual assault incidents, and about 16 per cent of 
indecent assaults and acts of indecency took at least 10 years to be reported, and one in 10 
sexual assault incidents (11.4 per cent) were reported after 20 years.  
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 Table 3. Percentage of incidents reported to NSW Police with varying periods of delay 
Time between 
offence and report 
Sexual assault Indecent assault Act of indecency 
 n  % n  % n  % 
Same or next day 13,586 29.3 11,934 32.4 3,330 38.0 
2 days to 3 months  9,983 21.5 8,333 22.6 1,913 21.8 
3 months to 1 year  5,192 11.2 4,029 10.9 856 9.8 
1–5 years  5,319 11.5 4,427 12.0 845 9.6 
5–10 years  3,080 6.6 2,045 5.6 475 5.4 
10–20 years  3,964 8.5 3,035 8.2 699 8.0 
>20 years  5,277 11.4 3,013 8.2 652 7.4 
Total 46,401 100.0 36,816 100.0 8,770 100.0 
As Table 4 shows, males were more likely than females to delay reporting for more than 
10 years across all three offence types. Male complainants reported about double the 
proportion of all three types of sexual offence 10 years or more after the offence compared 
with female complainants. Figure 12 shows the number of sexual assault incidents by gender.  
Table 4. Percentage of incidents reported to NSW Police with varying periods of delay by victim 
gender and offence* 
Time between offence 
and report 
Sexual assault Indecent assault Act of indecency 
 
Female 
% 
Male 
% 
Female 
% 
Male 
% 
Female 
% 
Male 
% 
Same or next day 30.4 24.5 33.6 28.4 41.2 27.9 
2 days to 3 months 22.6 17.3 23.8 19.2 22.1 20.6 
3 months to 1 year 11.6 9.4 11.6 9.1 9.7 9.6 
1 to 5 years 11.6 11.0 12.7 10.3 9.1 11.4 
5 to 10 years 6.5 7.4 5.9 4.9 5.1 6.7 
10 to 20 years 7.6 12.3 6.3 13.9 6.4 12.8 
>20 years 9.7 18.1 6.2 14.1 6.4 11.0 
*Note: Incidents involving both male and female complainants in the same incident were excluded (n = 1,287) 
from this table. 
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Figure 12. Number of sexual assault incidents by delay between offence and report and by victim gender 
Figures 13a and 13b show another measure of delay in reporting that takes into account the 
age of the child at offence and at report – the mean difference between the age at offence and 
at report. The biggest difference was for girls aged 6–9, and for boys 10–13 at the time of the 
incident. For girls who were 14–17 at the time of the incident, on average there was 
approximately a year between the incident and the report to police (1.2 years for sexual 
assault, 0.97 years for indecent assault and 1.2 years for act of indecency); it was substantially 
longer for boys – 5.8 years for sexual assault, 7.8 years for indecent assault, and 6.2 years for 
acts of indecency. Figures 13a and 13b also show that the mean delay in reporting was 
generally greater for sexual assault offences than for indecent assault and for acts of indecency 
– except for boys who were 10 or older at the time of the incident. 
 
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
 Same or
next day
 2 days-3
months
 3 months
- 1 year
1-5 years  5-10 years 10-20
years
> 20 years
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
re
p
o
rt
ed
 in
ci
d
en
ts
Sexual assault
Female
 Male
75 
 
 
 
Figures 13a and 13b. Mean delay between age at incident and age at report for (a) female and (b) male 
victims 
Figures 14a and 14b show the delay in reporting for different types of relationship between 
the person of interest and the victim. The longest delays were for cases involving persons in 
positions of authority, with more than half of these sexual assault incidents (56.5 per cent) 
reported more than 10 years later; almost half (47.1 per cent) reported more than 20 years 
later; and only one in five (19.1 per cent) reported within three months. The figures for 
indecent assault were similar but not quite as marked: 45.3 per cent were reported more than 
10 years later; 38.5 per cent were reported more than 20 years later; and nearly one in three 
(30.9 per cent) were reported within three months. Most of these were adult reports, with only 
6.3 per cent of sexual assault and 6.9 per cent of indecent assault incidents reported within 10 
years. Again, male victims were more likely to wait longer to report persons in positions of 
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authority: 65 per cent of such incidents involving males were reported more than 20 years later 
compared with 27.8 per cent for female victims. 
Where the person of interest was not known to the victim, the delay in reporting was likely to 
be shorter than for any other type of relationship: 78 per cent of sexual assault incidents and 
94.3 per cent of indecent assault incidents were reported within three months; and 
77.1 per cent of indecent assault incidents with a person of interest not known to the child 
were reported on the same or next day. 
The delay in reporting sexual assault involving a family member (parent, guardian, sibling or 
other family member) was longer than for incidents involving a household member, 
boyfriend/girlfriend or other known person, including friend. Incidents involving a boyfriend or 
girlfriend were very likely to be reported within three months (70.7 per cent of sexual assault 
incidents and 75.3 per cent of indecent assault incidents). Indecent assault incidents involving 
siblings were also likely to be reported within three months (71.2 per cent compared with 55.8 
per cent for sexual assault).  
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Figures 14a and 14b. Percentage of reported incidents by delay for each person of interest-victim relationship: 
(a) sexual assault and (b) indecent assault in New South Wales 
In summary, the delay in reporting was longer for boys than for girls, across all offence types, 
and greater for sexual assault than for other offence types. It was also more common for the 
delays to be extensive (10 years or more) when the incident involved a person in a position of 
authority than when the person of interest was a relative or someone known to the child.  
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3.3 CASES PROCEEDING TO PROSECUTION 
Criminal proceedings are commenced when police issue a court attendance notice or summons 
(Fitzgerald, 2006) to a person of interest.48 This, of course, requires that a suspect can be 
identified, that an investigation can produce evidence to support the charges (in particular 
available witnesses), and that the police consider the evidence to be strong enough to proceed. 
At any stage of this process, a case can drop out of the system – if a person of interest cannot 
be identified; if the child or the family is unwilling to proceed; or if police have doubts about 
the evidence; for example, where the child is deemed too young to give reliable evidence.  
One of the main research questions compares child sexual offences reported in childhood with 
those reported in adulthood, and the likelihood that each will proceed to prosecution. A 
number of factors may affect the likelihood of the matter proceeding, including: 
 the characteristics of the complainant  
 the type of offence 
 the relationship between the victim and the alleged offender  
 the extent of the delay in reporting to police, since a long delay may affect the 
availability and reliability of the evidence. 
Sexual offences reported during childhood 
Figure 7 showed differences between the three main types of sexual offences against children 
reported in childhood, and that acts of indecency were relatively uncommon. Therefore, the 
following analyses focuses on sexual assault and indecent assault.49  
Figure 15 shows the number of incidents of sexual assault reported during childhood, together 
with the number of such incidents in which the police identified a person of interest, and also 
the number in which legal proceedings were commenced against the person of interest.  
 
                                                     
48 Referral to court is usually by a Court Attendance Notice (CAN) (bail or no bail CAN). ‘Person of interest 
proceeded to court’ does not necessarily mean that court action followed. Please see  
www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/Pages/bocsar_crime_stats/bocsar_glossary.aspx#P  
49 A person of interest could be included under different offence categories if charged with more than one type 
of offence. Also see Appendix 2 (NSW) for an explanation of the analysis using ‘events’ rather than ‘incidents’. 
79 
 
  
Figure 15. Number of sexual assault incidents reported as a child, number with an identified person of 
interest, and with person of interest proceeding to court in New South Wales 
Figure 15 indicates: 
 a marked increase in the number of incidents of sexual assault reported as a child, more 
than doubling from 954 in 1995 to a peak in 2012 of 2,453 (157 per cent increase) 50 
 some fluctuation in the number of such incidents with an identified person of interest, 
but with a slow increase overall (rising from 894 in 1995 to a high of 1,414 in 2012, a 58 
per cent increase);  
 a substantial decrease in the number of incidents in which legal proceedings 
commenced, from 567 in 1995 to 245 in 2010 (44 per cent decrease). However, this has 
increased significantly since 2010 from a low of 245 to 423 in 2014.  
This means that in 1995 a person of interest was identified in 94 per cent of all child reports of 
sexual assault, and was ‘proceeded against’51, in 63 per cent of these incidents. In 2014, a 
person of interest was identified in only 55.4 per cent of reported incidents, and proceeded 
against in only 33.5 per cent of these incidents. Overall, legal proceedings were commenced in 
only 18.6 per cent of the 2,285 sexual assault incidents reported to police in 2014 compared 
with 59 per cent in 1995.52  
                                                     
50 This was not a function of any systematic change in the number of offenders per incident. 
51 ‘Proceeded against’ is shorthand for ‘legal proceedings being commenced’ or legal action taken against the 
person of interest. O’Brien et al. (2008) defined ‘legal proceedings being commenced’ in terms of the person of 
interest ‘being charged or given a Court Attendance Notice/summons’ (p 10). 
52 These figures are in line with the 15 per cent of sexual offences against children reported by Fitzgerald (2006).  
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Therefore Figure 15 shows two effects:  an increasing divergence between the number of 
reported incidents and the number in which a person of interest is identified, and a divergence 
between the number of incidents in which the person of interest is identified/recorded and the 
number in which criminal proceedings were initiated. Both effects are consistent with O’Brien 
et al.’s (2008) findings of a marked decrease in police clear-up rates in sexual assault incidents 
between 1995 and 2006, as well as a drop in the number and percentage of cases where police 
laid charges against an offender; however, that study did not separate out offences against 
children and adults.  
The trend is similar but less marked for indecent assault (see Figure 16). For example, legal 
proceedings commenced in 51.1 per cent of the 1,370 indecent assault incidents in 1997 
compared with 32 per cent of the 1,144 incidents in which a person of interest was identified 
in 2014; the 2014 figure of 32 per cent is, however, somewhat higher than the 24.4 per cent in 
2012.  
 
Figure 16. Number of indecent assault incidents reported as a child, number with an identified person of 
interest, and number where the person of interest proceeded to court in New South Wales 
There may be several reasons for the downward trend in the number of child sexual assault 
and indecent assault matters proceeded against, relating to the work involved in investigating 
and identifying the person of interest, and then having that case proceed to court.  
The increasing gap in New South Wales between the number of reported incidents and the 
number of cases proceeding to prosecution is mostly a result of a decrease in the proportion 
of cases in which a person of interest is identified. While the number of reports has increased, 
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
in
ci
d
en
ts
Indecent assault - child report
All reported incidents Identified POI
POI to court Linear (All reported incidents)
Linear (Identified POI) Linear (POI to court)
81 
 
the number of persons of interest identified has not. In 2014, a person of interest was 
identified in only 57 per cent of reported incidents compared with 94 per cent in 1995. This is 
consistent with O’Brien et al.’s (2008) analysis of the decline in clear-up rates of sexual offences 
(from 1995 to 2006 for both adult and child victims) that indicated an increase from 10 per 
cent to nearly 40 per cent in the proportion of sexual assault incidents reported to police where 
no suspected offender was identified or recorded on COPS (p 6). 
There are several possible explanations for the decreasing likelihood of a person of interest 
being identified: strangers were involved more often; children or their families were less willing 
or able to identify the offender; or there has been an increase in the number of peer-to-peer 
incidents. There is no evidence of more strangers being involved. In only a minority of cases 
throughout was the person of interest a stranger, making identification more difficult – the 
number and proportion of persons of interest not known to the child decreased between 2003 
and 2014 (from 155, 7.6 per cent, to 132, 4.1 per cent). There is also no indication of a marked 
increase in the number of younger children who might be less able to identify the person of 
interest.  
There is, however, an increase in the number of incidents in which the person of interest is 
under 18 and the age difference between the victim and the person of interest is less than two 
years, in peer-to-peer incidents: from 2.2 per cent in 1997 to a peak of 9 per cent in 2011. In 
cases with an age difference of up to five years, there has been a four-fold increase from 4 per 
cent in 1997 to 17.3 per cent in 2011. There has even been a seven-fold increase from a very 
small base in the proportion of incidents in which the person of interest was younger than the 
victim: from 0.5 per cent in 1997 to 3.6 per cent in 2013. The police and child protection 
response to a child or young person of interest (and the likelihood of a case proceeding to 
court) is likely to be quite different, and quite appropriately so depending on the facts, when 
it involves a peer-to-peer incident with a small age difference than an adult person of interest.  
Further, no police action is possible when the person of interest is a child under 10, the age of 
criminal responsibility.  
Another possibility is that the increasing number of (recorded) reports reflects both mandatory 
reporting and a change in recording practices, particularly with the advent and expansion of 
the JIRTs from the late 1990s.53 NSW Police are cautious about the reliability of figures prior to 
2003, and suggest that the increase in child reports of sexual offences against children may 
reflect greater attention to recording reports. O’Brien et al. also noted a marked reduction in 
the number of cases where no information was recorded to indicate whether criminal 
proceedings were initiated. It is possible that the police were likely to record child sexual 
offences in the early years only when a person of interest was identified, but tightened policy 
and practices have left the police with little or no discretion over recording such offences, 
                                                     
53 Joint Investigation Response Teams were established in 1997 following earlier pilot trials in 1994 and attention 
from the Wood Royal Commission (Summary Report: Evaluation of the Joint Investigation Team (JIT)/ Joint 
Investigation Response (JIR) Strategy, June 2002).  
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whether or not charges are likely. The discretion may lie in identifying and recording the person 
of interest where there is deemed to be little substance in the report or when the person of 
interest is a child.  
Another aspect of Figure 15 is the gap between the number of persons of interest who are 
identified and proceeded against. In relation to the likelihood of police charging suspects and 
cases proceeding to court, O’Brien et al. (2006) also reported a substantial drop from 1997 
(during the Wood Royal Commission) to 2006 in the numbers of persons of interest proceeded 
against and ‘a corresponding increase in the number of persons of interest who were not 
proceeded against’ (p 4).54 While their analysis included sexual offences against both children 
and adults, they found no association between the proportion of incidents involving victims 
aged 10 or younger (approximately 25 per cent per year) and the likelihood of police charging 
suspected offenders.  
O’Brien et al. also suggested that the profile of such cases coming to police attention may have 
‘shifted in ways that make victims less likely to give evidence against suspected offenders and 
police less likely to have the evidence required to mount an effective prosecution’ (p 8). 
Although they caution that ‘it is impossible to give a definitive explanation for this conclusion’, 
they cited the possible decrease in victim willingness to give evidence against the offender and 
the wish of families to shield children from the court process. Discussions with ODPP solicitors 
and Crown prosecutors in our study support the suggestion that victim unwillingness to 
proceed or family members’ understandable desire to shield children from the process were 
major factors in cases being dropped, though they do not generally see cases, except for 
advising, until after charges are laid.  
Another possible explanation is resource constraints and perhaps an increase in the time 
required to investigate and prepare matters to proceed to court. To understand more about 
the reasons for the divergence between the number of cases reported where a person of 
interest is identified, charges are laid and legal proceedings commenced, requires more 
information than is available for analysis from the COPS database, and more inquiry into police 
and prosecutorial discretionary decision-making, and consultation with families and victims.  
Child sexual offences reported in adulthood 
Comparing adult and child reports of sexual and indecent assault against children is important 
because it may throw light on the possible factors associated with the number of cases in which 
there was an identified person of interest, and the police proceeded.  
Figures 17 and 18 show the corresponding patterns for both sexual assault and indecent 
assault. In contrast to these same offences reported as children, the number of incidents of 
                                                     
54 O’Brien et al. (2008) suggested that the ‘decline in clear-up rates’ was ‘driven by a decrease in the rate at which 
alleged offenders have been charged in relation to sexual assault matters’ (p 4). 
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both sexual and indecent assault reported by adults follows closely the number of incidents in 
which a person of interest was identified, though the gap has increased in more recent years. 
The close mapping is not surprising since it is likely that someone reporting child sexual 
offences as an adult knows the perpetrator. Until the early 2000s, there were only a small 
number of incidents each year in which the person of interest was not identified, and according 
to ODPP solicitors and the police this was sometimes because the victim could report the 
position or relationship that person held but not necessarily their exact identity; for example, 
a family friend or a teacher at school. In some cases, the alleged perpetrator had died. It is also 
possible that reports were reliably recorded only when a person of interest could be or was 
identified. 
 
Figure 17. Number of sexual assault incidents reported as an adult, number with an identified person of 
interest, and number where the case proceeded to court in New South Wales 
However, like the incidents reported during childhood, there is a downward trend in the 
number of incidents for both offences in which legal proceedings commenced. For example, 
for sexual assault: 
 in 1995, prior to the Wood Royal Commission, there were 279 adult reports of child 
sexual assault, with a person of interest identified in all but five cases, and 181 were 
proceeded against – representing 64.9 per cent of all adult reports of child sexual 
assault in that year, and 66 per cent where a person of interest was identified  
 in 2014, there were 733 adult reports of child sexual assault, with a person of interest 
identified in 575 cases, but only 146 were proceeded against – representing only 
19.9 per cent of all such matters reported in that year, and 25.4 per cent where a person 
of interest was identified. 
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Therefore, there was a substantial drop in the proportion of child sexual assault incidents 
reported in adulthood with an identified person of interest where legal action proceeded – 
from 66 per cent to 25.4 per cent, similar to the drop for child reports from 63 per cent to 33.5 
per cent. The drop for adult reports of indecent assault was less marked but still substantial – 
from 72.5 per cent in 1997 to 44.3 per cent in 2014 – and was less than for child reports of 
indecent assault – 51.1 per cent in 1997 to 32 per cent in 2014. 
 
Figure 18. Number of indecent assault incidents reported as an adult, number with an identified person of 
interest, and number where the case proceeded to court in New South Wales 
Figure 19 pulls these figures together and shows the proportion of incidents of sexual and 
indecent assault reported as a child or as an adult, with an identified person of interest, in 
which legal action was initiated. 
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Figure 19. Proportion of sexual assault and indecent assault incidents with an identified person of interest 
reported before or after age 18 in which legal action was initiated in New South Wales 
Figure 19 shows that the proportion of incidents in which an identified person of interest was 
proceeded against has been consistently higher for indecent assault offences reported in 
adulthood, followed by adult reports of child sexual assault. Incidents of sexual and indecent 
assault reported during childhood, although more numerous, were less likely to proceed than 
those reported during adulthood, although the trend has reversed since 2010; the yearly 
pattern is very similar for these two offences reported in childhood. This is contrary to the 
expectation that delayed reporting into adulthood is necessarily associated with degraded 
evidence or unavailable witnesses and a reduced likelihood of proceeding to prosecution. It 
may mean that where adults do report, they are committed witnesses and keen for the case 
to proceed. These cases then constitute a selected group of cases of child sexual offences 
where the victim complainant elects to report as an adult.  
Probability of legal proceedings commencing  
Logistic regression55 was used to model the association between the probability of legal action 
being initiated and factors including: 
                                                     
55 Logistic regression allowed the simultaneous testing of the various factors included in the model (for example, 
year of report and offence category) and assessed their effects while holding other factors constant. The 
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 the type of offence – sexual assault or indecent assault 
 the age of the child at the time of the offence56 
 the gender of the child57 
 the interval between the offence and reporting to police (delay in reporting)58 
 the year the report was made (1995–2014). 
As well as testing the individual effects of these variables, the analyses also tested interactions 
between the variables. For example, the interaction between offence category and year of 
report was assessed to see whether there were any differences between offence categories in 
terms of the likelihood of a person of interest being proceeded against over different reporting 
years.59 
When considering these results, it should be borne in mind that the effects discussed are those 
obtained when all other variables and interactions in the model are held constant. Therefore, 
the patterns of results may be different from the patterns observed when no adjustment is 
made for other variables.  
The four significant interactions were: 
 a three-way interaction – involving type of offence, extent of delay and year that the 
incident was reported 
 three two-way interactions – involving age of victim by extent of delay; age of victim by 
type of offence; and age by gender of victim.  
All of the tested variables were involved in at least one interaction; their effects are considered 
in the context of these interactions (explained below), starting with the three-way interaction, 
shown in Figures 20a and 20b. Each bar in Figures 20a and 20b shows the adjusted or 
                                                     
correlations between the results for related incidents were taken into account by using the COPS variable event 
number as a clustering variable according to the methodology described by Williams (2000) and implemented in 
Stata 13 (Statacorp, 2013). Only incidents involving sexual assault and indecent assault were included in the 
analyses because of the smaller number of incidents involving pornography and procurement and the different 
characteristics of these incidents. 
56 Age of the child was categorised as: 5 years and younger, 6–9 years, 10–13 years, 14–17 years (the relatively 
small numbers of incidents involving children of different ages were excluded). 
57 The small number of incidents involving a combination of male and female children were excluded. 
58 The delay in reporting was categorised as: same day, next day, two days to three months, three months to one 
year, 1–5 years, 5–10 years, 10–20 years, more than 20 years. 
59 In the analysis, a reduction process was used to eliminate non-significant interactions starting with a series of 
models containing all two- and each three-way interaction, in order to arrive at a model that contained all the 
individual variables plus any interactions that were significant (at the nominated alpha level of .001) plus two-way 
interactions that were contained in the retained three-way interaction. 
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conditional probability of a case (reported incident) proceeding to court for that type of offence 
(sexual assault or indecent assault) for each delay category and for the year in which it was 
reported.60 The higher the bar, the higher the probability that a case would proceed. The 
different colours of the bars represent the increasing delays between the incident and 
reporting to the police. These effects were adjusted for the age of the child and other 
interactions. The statistical detail including the odds ratios are included in Appendix 3 (New 
South Wales). 
The predicted probability of legal action being initiated for a reported incident of both types of 
offence – sexual assault and indecent assault – differed according to the year in which the 
report was made and the extent of delay in reporting. The overall pattern is that a reported 
incident of child sexual assault was significantly more likely to proceed in the mid-1990s than 
more recently, consistent with the pattern in Figure 19.61 The likelihood of a case proceeding 
also tended to increase with longer delays62, although this dropped off for the longest delay, 
of greater than 20 years.63 For example, the probability of sexual assault incidents reported on 
the same day or the next day proceeding to court decreased markedly from the early 1990s to 
2000, and throughout the 2000s to 2014, and to a much greater extent than in matters in which 
the delay ranged between one year and 10 years.  
                                                     
60 The three-way interaction was highly significant: χ2 = 200.4, 133 df, n = 78, 843, p <.0001. 
61 Odds ratios (ORs) based on effect coding, which ranged from 3.04 for 1996 to .67 for 2014, showed a reduction 
(with some variation) in the likelihood of a case proceeding over the years covered by the study (χ2  = 1012.3, 19 
df, n = 78, 843, p <.0001.) 
62 ORs ranged from .53 to 2.14: χ2 = 1095.9, 7 df, n = 78, 843, p <.0001. 
63 OR = 1.49. 
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Figure 20a. Predicted probability of the person of interest in reported incidents of sexual assault proceeding 
to court by delay between offence and report and by year of report from 1995 to 2014 in New South Wales 
Note: The figure shows 1995 to 2014 but the odd years are not marked on the z axis. 
The highest probability of proceeding was in the mid-1990s: 0.71 or 71 per cent with delays of 
three months to five years, and 0.72 or 72 per cent for delays between 10 and 20 years. In stark 
contrast, the probability of a sexual assault incident proceeding if reported on the same or the 
next day was only 0.13 (13 per cent) and 0.10 (10 per cent) in 2014, and even lower in the four 
years before 2014. In 2014, the highest probability of proceeding for a sexual assault offence 
was 0.38, with a delay of between one and five years. While these figures reflect the 
characteristics of the cases included in these years and with this delay, these analyses also held 
constant the age of the child at offence. That is, the age of the child is not a factor that explains 
the declining likelihood of prosecution over time. In addition, the number of cases contributing 
to each of the bars in Figure 20a is significant so small numbers cannot explain the pattern. 
For indecent assault, the patterns were very similar, as Figure 20b shows, but the extent of the 
differences was greater, and the odds of a case proceeding were 1.17 greater for indecent 
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assault than for sexual assault.64 The significant two-way interaction between offence type and 
delay65 indicates that the increase in the likelihood of a case proceeding with longer delays 
tended to be greater for indecent assault than for sexual assault.66 For example, indecent 
assault (reported to police after longer delays) had the highest probability of proceeding in the 
mid-1990s (0.81 or 81 per cent with a delay of between 10 and 20 years), and this was higher 
than for sexual assault. The lowest probability for indecent assault was 0.12 for an incident 
reported the same or the next day in 2010.  
 
Figure 20b. Predicted probability of the person of interest in reported indecent assault incidents proceeding 
to court by delay between offence and report and by year of report from 1995 to 2014 in New South Wales 
All three two-way interactions involve the age of the victim: with delay, offence type and 
gender. The interaction between delay and the age of the victim is shown in Figure 21.67 Not 
surprisingly given the likely evidentiary issues for young children, the lowest probability of a 
                                                     
64 χ2 = 135.1, 1 df, n =78, 843, p < .0001. 
65 χ2 = 73.7, 7 df, n =78, 843, p < .0001. 
66 ORs for the effect-coded interaction contrasts increased from 0.89 to 1.29. 
67 χ2 = 100.0, 21 df, n = 78, 843, p < .0001. The year of reporting and the type of offence were taken into 
account/held constant in this interaction. 
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reported incident of sexual assault or indecent assault resulting in legal proceedings was in 
cases where the child was aged five or younger (consistent with Bunting, 2014). When an 
incident involving a child of this age was reported almost immediately (same or next day 
report), the probability of it proceeding was only 0.10 but this tripled when reporting was 
delayed for 10 years or more (0.32 for a delay of 10 to 20 years, and 0.29 for more than 
20 years).68  
Perhaps counterintuitively, increasing delay was associated with a fairly steady increase in the 
likelihood of the matter proceeding for the three older age groups.69 This was so, at least till 
the five-year to 10-year mark for adolescents aged 14–17 years, and the 10-year to 20-year 
mark for those aged 6–13 at the time of incident, after which the likelihood dropped away to 
around 0.42 or 42 per cent. There was also little difference between these three older age 
groups except when the delay was between five and 10 years. The peak probability of 
proceeding to court (0.62 or 62 per cent) was for older adolescents (aged 14–17 at the time of 
the incident, and 19–29 at the time it was reported). This compares with 0.37 for children aged 
6–9 at the time of the offence (aged 11–16 at report) and 0.52 for those aged 10–13 (aged 15–
23 at report).  
                                                     
68 The ORs for the comparisons between the youngest and other age groups ranged from almost 2 to just over 6, 
all statistically significant. For comparisons among the three older age groups, they were generally close to 1 for 
delays of up to three months to a year, but reflected significant differences for longer delays in which cases tended 
to be more likely to proceed for older age groups. For example, the OR for the comparison of the 14–17 and 6–9 
age groups in which the reporting was delayed for 5-10 years was close to 3. 
69 Odds ratios comparing the likelihood of a case proceeding if it was reported on the day that it occurred and at 
later times were generally significantly greater than 1, varying between 1.1 and 5.5, and generally increased with 
longer delays (except for the longest delay of greater than 20 years) reflecting the general increase in probability, 
and the variations, evident in Figures 20 and 21. 
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Figure 21. Adjusted probability of the person of interest proceeding to court for reported incidents of sexual 
assault or indecent assault by age of victim at time of offence and delay between incident and report in New 
South Wales 
The second and third significant two-way interactions, shown in Figure 22, also involve the age 
of the victim. The interaction between the age of the victim and the type of offence70 (Figure 
22a) indicates that there is little difference in the probability of indecent assault and sexual 
assault cases proceeding to court for young children, but for older children indecent assaults 
are more likely to proceed to court than sexual assault cases. Cases involving young children 
aged under six were just as unlikely to proceed when the charge was indecent assault as sexual 
assault (0.18 or 18 per cent) but for older adolescents (14–17), there was a 40 per cent 
probability that an indecent assault matter would proceed compared with 30 per cent 
probability for a sexual assault.71 
70 χ2 = 50.03, df = 3, p < .0001. 
71 The odds ratio comparing the increase in probability from the under 6 age group to the 6-9 years age group for 
the two offence types was not significantly different from 1, while those for a similar comparison between the 
two oldest groups and the under 6 age group were 1.21 and 1.58, respectively, and were both significantly 
different from 1. 
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Figures 22a and 22b. Adjusted probability of the person of interest proceeding to court for (a) reported incidents of 
sexual assault or indecent assault by age of victim, and (b) age and gender of victims in New South Wales 
The interaction between the age and gender of the victim 72  (Figure 22b) is the result of an 
increasing probability of legal action commencing for sexual offence incidents involving boys aged 
6–9 (.27) to the oldest group (aged 14–17) (.40) relative to a flatter probability for girls from that 
age (.33 at 6–9 years, .34 at 10–13 years, and .33 for females aged 14–17). Bunting (2014), however, 
noted that cases reported in adulthood involving female pre-adolescent victims were more likely 
to proceed than those involving males.  
Several other factors of interest were not included in the logistic regression because of the amount 
of missing information on these variables and the small proportion of incidents involved. These 
were the relationship between the suspect/person of interest and the victim, the location of the 
incident, and the Indigenous status of the victim and offender. Additional analysis also focused on 
the age difference between the victim and the person of interest.73  
 
 
 
                                                     
72 The two-way interaction (age of victim by gender) was highly significant: χ2 = 79.60, 3 df, n = 78, 843, p< .0001. 
73 Similar analyses are not presented for South Australia because 78 per cent of records had missing data on Indigenous 
status and the age difference was inaccurate because of the de-identification process in which birth dates were 
removed.  
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Relationship of the person of interest to the victim 
The probability of matters proceeding also varied with the relationship between the person of 
interest and the victim.74 Figure 23a shows the proportion of sexual assault incidents in which the 
person of interest was proceeded against for each type of relationship for incidents that were 
reported in childhood and those where the report was delayed into adulthood. When reported in 
childhood, the matter was least likely to proceed when the person of interest was a sibling, 
boyfriend/girlfriend or not known to the victim, with only about one in 10 of these matters 
proceeding. The most likely to proceed were incidents involving persons in positions of authority 
abuse (37.7 per cent) reported in childhood. For reports made in adulthood, the most likely to 
proceed involved boyfriend/girlfriends (39.6 per cent, 44 of 111 incidents), parents and guardians 
(34 per cent), other family members (30.1 per cent) and those involving persons in positions of 
authority (33.0 per cent). The least likely to proceed were those involving siblings (12.5 per cent) 
and persons unknown to the victim (9.2 per cent). 
For indecent assault (Figure 23b), the highest percentage of both child and adult reports in which 
legal action commenced involved persons in positions of authority (49.5 per cent for adult reports 
and 36.3 per cent for child reports). More than double the percentage of incidents involving parents 
and guardians proceeded when the incident was reported in adulthood (44.7 per cent) than in 
childhood (19.3 per cent). Similarly, double the percentage of incidents involving other family 
members proceeded in the case of adult (45.9 per cent) compared with child reports (20.8 per 
cent). The least likely to proceed were child reports of indecent assault involving siblings (7.8 per 
cent) and boyfriends/girlfriends (8.2 per cent), but the numbers for each were quite low (62 
incidents for siblings, and 16 for boyfriends/girlfriends).  
                                                     
74 The relationship of the person of interest to the victim was not tested in the logistic regression because there was a 
preponderance of missing information on the person of interest–victim relationship prior to 2003. It was explored in a 
supplementary analysis based on incidents and information about the relationship of the person of interest to one of 
the victims associated with each incident. The analysis was based on type of incident (sexual or indecent assault) and 
the age of the victim when the incident was reported. This supplementary analysis was not adjusted for the other 
variables. The overall differences were significant: χ2 = 491.8, df = 9, p <.0001.  
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Figures 23a and 23b. Percentage of (a) sexual assault and (b) indecent assault incidents, reported as a child or 
adult, in which the person of interest proceeded to court, by relationship of the person of interest to the victim in 
New South Wales 
Note. Incidents involving reports of indecent assault against boyfriends/girlfriends are not included in Figure 24b 
because the number of adult reports was so low (12 incidents of which only seven proceeded) that they give a 
misleading impression in a comparison with child reports (194 incidents of which only 16 proceeded). They comprised 
only 0.5 per cent of adult reports of indecent assault and 1.1 per cent of child reports. 
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Age difference between the victim and the person of interest 
Another important aspect of the relationship between the victim and the person of interest is the 
age difference. Although little research has specifically addressed this issue, sexual activity or sexual 
offending is judged to be more serious when the age gap is greater (Daly and Bouhours, 2010). 
Figure 24 shows the probability of legal action being initiated by victim age and the age difference 
between the victim and the person of interest. Where the person of interest is within two years of 
the victim’s age, or younger, the probability of legal action is very low, with 12–16 per cent of cases 
proceeding. When the age difference is less than five years, the probability rises to 23 per cent 
when the victim is aged 10–12. Where the age difference is at least five years, the curvilinear 
relationship reported in other studies is evident (Bunting, 2008; Leach et al., 2015; Walsh et al., 
2010). The highest probability of a case proceeding is when the age difference is 10 years or more 
and the victim is 10 to 15 years old (52 per cent).  
There are several likely explanations. For younger children, there appears to be a threshold (under 
seven years) below which child victims are likely to be seen as ‘too young’ for police or prosecutors 
to proceed or their families may be less willing for them to do so (Daly and Bouhours, 2010, p 617). 
For young victims where there is an age difference of less than five years, the person of interest 
may also be under the age of criminal age of responsibly (10 years). For older victims, and 
particularly where there is an age difference of less than five years, the matter may bring up issues 
of consent if both the person of interest and the victim are close to or over the age of consent (16 
years). However, older children were also more likely to be the victim in sexual assault incidents 
than younger children and these matters were more likely to proceed.  
 
Figure 24. Probability of legal action by age of victim and age difference between victim and person of interest 
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More than half (56 per cent) of the incidents which occurred in educational institutions involved 
persons of interest who were under 18 and in two-thirds of these, the victim was aged 10–15.  
Matters involving young persons of interest (under 18) were much less likely to proceed than those 
aged between 25 and 50 (18 per cent compared with 61 per cent).75   
Indigenous status 
A small proportion of incidents involved victims (7.3 per cent) and offenders (4.7 per cent) who 
were identified as Indigenous (Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander); 4.2 per cent involved victims 
and offenders who were both Indigenous. The likelihood of legal action being initiated was lower 
when the victim was Indigenous (around 30 per cent) than non-Indigenous (40 per cent) or status 
unknown (46 per cent). A person of interest was somewhat less likely to be identified where the 
victim was Indigenous.  This is consistent with the recent findings reported for Aboriginal children 
in Western Australian communities (Bailey, Powell, and Brubacher, under review). 
3.4 SUMMARY 
Taking into account the complexity of the various interactions and main effects from these 
analyses, it is clear that the probability of legal action being initiated: 
 decreased steadily from 1995 to a low in 2010 with a small upward trend to 2014 
 decreased with an increase in the delay between the offence and the report, with the 
greatest probability for a delay of one to five years and 10 to 20 years (relative to same-day 
report) and the lowest probability for a report the next day – a somewhat counterintuitive 
finding 
 increased with the age of the victim at the time of the alleged offence and with the 
difference in age between the victim and the person of interest  
 was relatively quite high for both child and adult reports involving persons in positions of 
authority, though these incidents of sexual assault and indecent assault comprised only 4.3 
per cent and 7.5 per cent, respectively, of reported incidents76 
 was lower when either the victim or suspect or both were Indigenous.  
                                                     
75 The proportion of young persons of interest and the likelihood that the matter would proceed to court also differed 
for private versus public secondary schools; 79.7 per cent (n = 1,155/1.449) of the persons of interest in public 
secondary schools were under 18 and legal action was initiated for 17.9 per cent whereas only 25.2 per cent of incidents 
in private schools (n = 204/801) involved persons of interest under 18 and legal action was initiated in 25.5 per cent of 
cases.  The person of interest was much more likely to be aged 30 to 50 (49.6 per cent) in incidents located in private 
schools than in public secondary schools (11.1 per cent) and just as likely to have the matter proceed (67 per cent 
compared with 61 per cent).  
76 As defined by the available data as outlined earlier. 
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In summary, these findings indicate a substantial increase in the number of reports of child sexual 
assault and indecent assault reported during childhood in New South Wales from the mid to late 
1990s to 2014. The level of adult reporting of child sexual assault has been relatively constant. Only 
in the category of indecent assault has there been a decline in adult reporting. However, despite 
the very large increase in child reports, there has been a substantial decline in the likelihood that 
court proceedings would be initiated for sexual assault or indecent assault offences against a child. 
That is, the trends of reporting and proceeding are heading in opposite directions.  
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4 NEW SOUTH WALES COURTS DATA 
Sexual offences against a child may be prosecuted in the following courts in New South Wales: the 
New South Wales Children’s Court, Local Court and the higher courts (District Court and Supreme 
Court), depending upon the age of the defendant, the seriousness of the charges and the 
consequent severity of the possible penalties.  
4.1 NUMBER OF PERSONS PROSECUTED 
A total of 16,042 persons were prosecuted for at least one sexual offence against a child in finalised 
matters in the Children’s Court, a Local Court or in the higher courts in 1994–2014 in relation to 
38,099 charges. A ‘person’ in these figures is defined as a person charged with ‘a group of one or 
more charges which are finalised by the court on the same date’.77 Persons are therefore not 
‘distinct persons’ – as outlined in the explanatory notes in the New South Wales Criminal Courts 
Statistics 2014:  
If an accused person is in more than one case finalised on different dates during the counting period 
[ie year], they will be counted more than once. However, separate charges finalised on the same 
date for one accused person are consolidated and counted as one person (p 155). 
Figure 25 shows the trend by year and by court. The largest number of defendants or accused 
persons with finalised charges over the period 1994–2014 was in the Local Court (n = 7,528, 
46.9 per cent); followed by the higher courts (n = 6,841, 42.6 per cent); and then the Children’s 
Court (n = 1,673, 10.4 per cent).  
The overwhelming majority of defendants were male (n = 15,641, 97.5 per cent). There were 265 
female defendants in the Local Court (n = 400, 3.5 per cent), and fewer than 2 per cent in both the 
higher courts (n = 105, 1.5 per cent) and Children’s Court (n = 30, 1.8 per cent). 
The majority of defendants in the Local Court and Children’s Court were facing only one charge (per 
finalisation date): 66.1 per cent in the Local Court and 62.5 per cent in the Children’s Court. About 
                                                     
77 These analyses use the same counting rules as the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, outlined in the 
explanatory notes in the New South Wales Criminal Courts Statistics 2014 (pp 143, 149, 155). Similarly, in relation to 
the Local Court, persons charged is explained in the following terms: 
Data in JusticeLink are case-based, with each case containing one or more charges against a single individual. When 
different charges within the same case are finalised on either the same or different dates, these are counted as 
one finalised court appearance and therefore reported as one person. An individual may also be involved in 
multiple JusticeLink cases. Only when these cases are finalised on the same date they are reported as one person 
(p 149).  
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90 per cent in both courts involved three or fewer charges. In the higher courts, however, only 35.1 
per cent of finalisations involved only one charge, another 26.1 per cent involved two charges; 74.6 
per cent involved up to three charges. The figures for the higher courts are similar to those for all 
offences in the 2014 New South Wales Criminal Courts Statistics: 34.5 per cent of persons were 
charged with one offence and 22.7 per cent with two offences.78  
Figure 25. Number of persons with at least one finalised charge of a sexual offence against a child, by year and 
court in New South Wales 
The number of persons with at least one finalised charge of a sexual offence against a child shows 
an upward trend for the higher courts from 2003 (a low of 246 defendants) to a high of 378 in 2014. 
Both the higher courts and the Local Court show a post-Wood Royal Commission ‘bulge’ in the late 
1990s (in 1998, there was a high of 466 in the higher courts and 442 in the Local Court), consistent 
with the number of sexual assault and indecent assault incidents reported to the NSW Police just 
before that (see Figures 1a and 1b). The numbers in the Local Court have fluctuated around a 
steeper trend line. The numbers in the Children’s Court have ranged from a low of 35 in 1995 to a 
high of 116 in 2005 and 118 in 2014.  
Figure 26a shows the age of defendants at the time of the offence for the Local Court and higher 
courts. The overwhelming majority (79.4 per cent) of those under 18 at the time of the offence 
were dealt with in the Children’s Court, but a small number with serious offences were dealt with 
in the Local Court (n = 121) or higher courts (n = 311). The highest number and proportion of 
78 The figures were very similar for 2013 (see New South Wales Criminal Courts Statistics 2014, p 13 and Table 3.5, 
p 103); no equivalent figures are provided for the Local Court or Children’s Court.  
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defendants in the Local Court were under 30 or 55 or older at the time of the offence, and in the 
higher courts, were between 30 and 45. One in 10 persons in the higher courts was aged 55 or over, 
as were 14.9 per cent in the Local Court. The average age at the time of the (earliest) offence for 
persons appearing in the Local Court was 39.1 years and 37.1 years in the higher courts; the average 
age in the Children’s Court was 14.9.  
At finalisation, the average age of persons in the period 1994–2014 was 42.1 years in the Local 
Court; 43.9 years in the higher courts; and 16.2 years in the Children’s Court. A comparison of 
Figures 26a and 26b shows the number of defendants aged 55 or over at finalisation is significantly 
higher than age at offence, reflecting the delay in reporting and prosecution in historical cases.  
Figures 26a and 26b. Number of persons with finalised charges of at least one sexual offence against a child by age 
of defendant at (a) earliest offence and (b) finalisation by a court in New South Wales 
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Table 5 presents the most common charges prosecuted according to the sections of the Crimes Act 
1900 (NSW), including offences relating to persons in positions of authority (for example, sexual 
assault, indecent assault or an act of indecency on a child under authority by a teacher). The 
offences in Table 5 comprise 88 per cent of the charges laid over the period 1994–2014. The most 
commonly charged offences (each comprising between 7 per cent and 13 per cent of charges), in 
order, were: 
 aggravated indecent assault (s 61M(1)) – 13.3 per cent79
 aggravated indecent assault with a child under 10 years (s 61M(2)) – 13.2 per cent
 sexual intercourse/penetration with a child between 10 and 14 years (s 66C(2)) and
between 10 and 16 years (s 66C(1)) – 10 per cent
 act of indecency (s 61N) – 7.2 per cent
 production, dissemination or possession of child abuse material (s 91H(2) and (3)) – 7.0 per
cent
 sexual intercourse/penetration with a child under 10 years (s 66A) – 6.9 per cent
 aggravated sexual assault (s 61J) – 6.9 per cent.80
These offences fall into the four main categories used in the analyses and shown in Table 5: sexual 
assault (sexual intercourse/penetration), indecent assault, acts of indecency and child 
pornography. There was also a small number of charges (0.6 per cent) associated with procuring or 
grooming, and meeting with a child with the intention of engaging the child in sexual activity.  
One offence (s 66EA(1)), persistent sexual abuse of a child, was introduced in 1998 ‘to overcome 
the problems of proving particulars (time, date and place) following the decision of the High Court 
in S v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 266’ in recognition of the difficulties that children may have in 
pinpointing and articulating these particular details. The offence provides that ‘a person who, on 
three or more occasions occurring on separate days during any period, engages in conduct in 
relation to a particular child that constitutes a ’sexual offence’, is liable to imprisonment for 
25 years’.81 This offence is rarely charged, however; there have been only 62 charges under s 66EA 
since 2000, with an average of four charges per year, and ranging between two and 10.  
79 ‘Aggravated’ sexual offences include those where ‘the alleged victim is (whether generally or at the time of the 
commission of the offence) under the authority of the alleged offender’ (Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61J(2)(e)). 
80 Five of these were also the most common offences sentenced in Hazlitt et al.’s (2004) study of sentencing of child 
sexual offences in the NSW District Court (not included in this list were s 61n and s 91H offences).  
81  Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 66EA(1). See Judicial Commission of New South Wales JIRS website: 
http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/sentencing/sexual_offences_against_children.html#p17-500  
4.2 TYPES OF OFFENCES 
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Section of 
Crimes Act 900 
n % Category of offence Penalty 
SEXUAL ASSAULT 
61D(1) 874 2.2 
Sexual intercourse (category 3) without consent – 
child under 16 and under authority; and in 
company 
8–14 years 
61J(1) 2,613 6.9 Aggravated sexual assault 20 years 
66A(1) 2,682 6.9 Sexual intercourse – child under 10 years 25 years, prev. 20 years 
66C(1) 2,562 6.7 
Sexual intercourse – child between 10 and 16 
years 
16 years 
66C(2) 1,245 3.3 
Sexual intercourse – child between 10 and 14 
years 
20 years 
66C(3), 66C(4) 
and 66D 
1,837 4.8 
Sexual intercourse – child between 14 and 16 
years; Aggravated sexual intercourse – child 
between 14 and 16 years; Attempt same act 
10 years, 12 years 
78H-O 939 2.4 Sexual intercourse/penetration with male child 5–25 years 
INDECENT ASSAULT 
61M(1) 5,078 13.3 Aggravated indecent assault 7 years 
61M(2) 5,019 13.2 
Indecent assault – Aggravated child under 10 
years 
10 years 
76 1,288 3.4 
Indecent assault – girl under 16 [replaced by 
s 61E(1)]  
4–6 years 
ACT OF INDECENCY 
61N & 61N(1) 2,751 7.2 Act of indecency 2 years 
61O(1) and (2) 2,030 5.4 
Aggravated act of indecency, including child under 
10 years 
5 years, 7 years 
61E(1) and 
61E1(A) 
1,838 4.9 
Sexual assault category 4 – indecent assault 
and act of indecency (s 61E) [replaced by 
s 61M(1), (2)] 
4 years; 6 years if aged 
under 16 
61E(2) 484 1.3 Act of indecency [replaced by 61N] 2 years 
61E(2A) 226 0.6 
Act of indecency – Child under 16 and under 
authority [replaced by s 61N(1)] 
4 years 
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
91H(2) & H(3) 
2,661 7.0 
Production, dissemination or possession of child 
abuse material 
10 years 
TOTAL 33,643 88.3 
Table 5. Number and percentage of most common charges by section of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) 
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The number of persons in finalised appearances by year, type of offence and court82 is shown in 
Figures 27–29. The more serious offence, sexual assault, was the most common offence dealt with 
in the higher courts. Again, there was a peak in sexual assault charges dealt with following the 
Wood Royal Commission (315 in 1998) with lows of 182 in 2004 and 193 in 2012. There has been 
an increase since 2012 to a high of 239 in 2014, the highest number since 2000. The pattern for 
indecent assault matters has been broadly similar to that for sexual assault charges throughout, 
with a similar increase from 2012 to 2014. The number of pornography, grooming and procurement 
matters has gradually increased since 2006. The number of persons with finalised charges of acts 
of indecency in the higher courts has remained relatively low, ranging between 43 and 85.  
Figure 27. Number of persons with finalised charges in New South Wales higher courts by type of offence from 
1994 to 2014 
The number of defendants with finalised appearances in the Local Court varied considerably in 
1994–2014, with 2014 seeing the highest number of prosecutions (n = 511) since an overall low of 
290 in 1995. The number of indecent assault matters was generally higher than for other offence 
types, particularly in 1998–2008, peaking at 226 in 2001, with another high of 198 in 2008. The 
number of persons with finalised charges of sexual assault has fluctuated between 26 in 2003 and 
74 in 2008. Matters involving pornography, grooming and procuring children for sexual activity 
have increased markedly from 14 in 2000 to 167 in 2014.  
82 In these figures, persons are counted for each finalisation, without taking into account the combinations of offences; 
therefore, a person could appear in each offence type if they were facing charges in more than one type of offence (for 
example, both sexual assault and indecent assault if they had one or more charges in each type of offence).  
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Figure 28. Number of persons with finalised charges in New South Wales Local Court by type of offence from 1994 
to 2014 
There has been considerable fluctuation in the number of defendants in the Children’s Court with 
finalised charges of sexual assault and indecent assault, the two most common charges of sexual 
offences against children and young persons in that court. The pattern for indecent assault matters 
broadly followed the trends for sexual assault matters, with steady increases in both from 2011 to 
2014. Forty-eight young persons were committed to a higher court for the more serious offences 
of sexual assault and indecent assault (these young persons are not included in Figure 29). 
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Figure 29. Number of persons with finalised charges in New South Wales Children’s Court by type of offence from 
1994 to 2014 
4.3 PERSONS PLEADING GUILTY 
A guilty plea provides some acknowledgement for the victim of the validity of their complaint 
though they will still need to give evidence unless the defendant pleads guilty to all charges against 
them. In the higher courts, 35.1 per cent of defendants had only one charge and, of those, 46 per 
cent pleaded guilty to that offence; in the Local Court and the Children’s Court, the proportion with 
one charge was higher, at 66 per cent and 62.5 per cent, respectively; of those, 31.6 per cent 
pleaded guilty to that charge in the Local Court and 39.2 per cent in the Children’s Court.  
Figure 30 shows the number of persons in finalised appearances with at least one guilty plea to a 
sexual offence against a child. In both the higher courts and the Local Court, the number of persons 
with at least one guilty plea has shown an upward trend despite some fluctuation. The two peaks 
in the higher courts occurred in 1998 (n = 201) and in 2014 (n = 228). The number in the Local Court 
varied between 78 in 1995 and 185 in 2008 and in 2014.  
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Figure 30. Number of persons in finalised appearances with at least one guilty plea by court by year 
in New South Wales 
Figure 31 shows the proportion of persons in finalised appearances with at least one guilty plea to 
a sexual offence against a child. Again, a person could appear in more than one finalised matter in 
a year or across years and is counted in each matter. The plea rate is defined as the proportion of 
persons with at least one charge of a sexual offence against a child who have pleaded guilty to at 
least one charge. There has been a fairly steady upward trend in the higher courts from around 0.4, 
or 40 per cent in 2000, to 0.6, or 60 per cent, in 2013 (.63) and 2014 (.60).83 The plea rate is generally 
higher than for the Local Court and the Children’s Court. There is little variation in the Local Court 
around the overall average of 0.35 or 35 per cent. The overall average plea rate of 0.49 or 49 per 
cent in the higher courts is greater than for the Local Court and the Children’s Court (both 0.43 or 
43 per cent). 
83 This in line with the 45.4 per cent rate reported by Fitzgerald (2006) for sexual offences against a child in 2004; this 
is lower than the plea rate for assault (65.1 per cent) and all offences (70.7 per cent) at that time. 
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Figure 31. Proportion of persons in finalised appearances with at least one guilty plea by court by year in 
New South Wales 
There was an increase in the higher courts from 2010 followed by a drop-off from 2013 to 2014. 
The increasing plea rate may reflect the effect of the standard non-parole period legislation, and 
the later drop-off may be explained by the removal of an incentive to plead guilty as a consequence 
of the High Court’s decision in Muldrock v The Queen. 
4.4 COURT OUTCOMES 
Table 6 presents the outcomes for persons with finalised charges in the higher courts over the 
period 1994–2014. Just over one-third proceeded to trial (35.2 per cent), and of those, 42.9 per 
cent were convicted on at least one charge. Guilty pleas were entered for 47.1 per cent of persons 
who then proceeded to sentence. One in six (16.5 per cent) had all charges dismissed without a 
hearing. Overall, 62.3 per cent of persons with finalised appearances in the higher courts were 
convicted. 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
p
er
so
n
s 
w
it
h
 a
t 
le
as
t 
o
n
e 
gu
ilt
y 
p
le
a
Children's Court Local Court Higher courts
Linear (Children's Court) Linear (Local Court) Linear (Higher courts)
108 
 
 
Table 6. Outcomes for persons with finalised charges of sexual offence against a child in the higher 
courts 
  Number 
of persons 
% of 
persons 
% of  
persons at trial 
Proceeded to trial  2,407 35.2  
Acquitted of all chargesi  1,375 20.1 57.1 
Convicted of at least one chargeii 992  14.5  41.2 
Acquitted, had other guilty plea  40 0.6  1.7 
Proceeded to sentence only – 
guilty plea 
3,225  47.1   
No charges proceeded withiii 1,020  14.9   
All charges otherwise disposed ofiv  184  2.7   
Total  6,841  100.0  
Total guiltyv  4,257  62.3   
 
Categories and notes taken from Fitzgerald (2006) p 9 and New South Wales Criminal Courts Statistics 2014. See 
New South Wales Appendix 4 (NSW) Table A: Explanatory Notes for Tables 6 and 7 for an explanation of the outcome 
categories in this table. 
i. This includes three persons found not guilty by reason of mental illness.  
ii. This includes two persons with proven outcome that is not further described. 
iii. These are most commonly applications for no further proceedings by the Crown. 
iv. These are most commonly cases where the accused either failed to appear or died.  
v. This includes persons who pleaded guilty and those who were found guilty – as well as three for whom it was not 
known whether the proven outcome was by plea or verdict. 
Table 7 shows the outcomes for persons with finalised appearances in both the Local Court and 
Children’s Court. Proportionately, fewer persons were dealt with via a defended hearing than in 
the higher courts (28.8 per cent in the Local Court and 32.0 per cent in the Children’s Court) and 
fewer pleaded guilty and were sentenced (33.1 per cent in the Local Court and 37.1 per cent in the 
Children’s Court compared with 47.1 per cent in the higher courts). A higher proportion (34.1 per 
cent in Local Court and 27.4 per cent in Children’s Court compared with 14.9 per cent in the higher 
courts) had all charges dismissed without hearing, most commonly where no evidence was offered 
by the prosecution. Overall, fewer than half were convicted in both the Local Court (44.7 per cent) 
and the Children’s Court (47.9 per cent) compared with 62.3 per cent in the higher courts. 
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Table 7. Outcomes for persons with finalised charges of sexual offence against a child in 
New South Wales Local Court and Children’s Court 
 Local Court Children’s Court 
  Number of 
persons 
%  Number of 
persons 
% 
Defended hearing  2,171 28.8 536 32.0 
All charges dismissed  1,311  17.4 370  22.1 
Convicted on at least one charge  831  11.0  131 7.8  
Other outcome  25  0.3 33  1.97 
Proven outcome not further 
describediv 
4 0.05 2 0.1 
Sentenced after guilty plea  2,494 33.1 621 37.1  
Convicted ex partei 35 0.5 47 2.8 
All charges dismissed without 
hearingii  
2,568  34.1 458 27.4  
All charges otherwise disposed ofiii 260 3.5  11  0.6  
Total  7,528  100.0  1,673 100.0 
Guiltyiv  3,364  44.7  801  47.9 
 
Categories and notes taken from Fitzgerald (2006), p 9 and New South Wales Criminal Courts Statistics 2014. See 
New South Wales Appendices Table B for an explanation of the outcome categories in this table. 
i. This outcome means the defendant was convicted in his or her absence. 
ii. Most commonly these are cases where no evidence was offered by the prosecuting authority.  
iii. Most commonly these cases stood out of the list. 
iv. This includes persons who pleaded guilty and those who were found guilty. 
Figure 32 shows the number of defendants with at least one charge of a sexual offence against a 
child in a given offence category in which there was at least one conviction, either by plea or by 
finding, by court. A person was counted once per finalisation date in each court. There is a gradual 
upward trend in the number of persons convicted in each court.  
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Figure 32. Number of persons convicted of at least one charge by court by year in New South Wales 
The number of persons convicted of at least one offence is broken down by offence category and 
by court in Figures 33–35. The figures show the number of defendants with at least one charge of 
a sexual offence against a child in a given offence category in which there was at least one 
conviction, either by plea or by finding, by court. A person was counted once per finalisation date 
for each offence category in which they had a guilty plea or finding in each court. For example, if 
their matter was finalised on a given finalisation date and they pleaded guilty or were found guilty 
of several counts of sexual assault and several counts of indecent assault, they would contribute 
once to each of the lines in the graph for that court for sexual assault and for indecent assault.  
 
Figure 33. Number of persons convicted of at least one major sexual offence against a child in the 
New South Wales higher courts by year 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
p
er
so
n
s 
co
n
vi
ct
ed
Children's Court Local Court Higher courts
Linear (Children's Court) Linear (Local Court) Linear (Higher courts)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
p
er
so
n
s 
co
n
vi
ct
ed
Sexual assault Indecent assault
Act of indecency Pornography/groom/procure
Linear (Sexual assault) Linear (Indecent assault)
Linear (Act of indecency)
111 
 
 
The majority of persons convicted of a sexual offence against a child in the higher courts were 
convicted of child sexual assault, with a peak of 159 after the Wood Royal Commission, and 152 
in 2014 following an upward trend since 2011. The overall low was 89 in 2003. There is a 
similar pattern for indecent assault convictions, and a steady increase in the number of 
persons convicted of at least one child pornography charge since the mid-2000s from a very low 
base previously.  
 
Figure 34. Number of persons convicted of at least one major sexual offence in New South Wales Local Court 
by year 
More persons were convicted of indecent assault in the Local Court than for any other sexual offence 
against a child until the mid-2000s, when there was a strong increase, with spikes in 2005 and 2009, 
in the numbers convicted on at least one child pornography charge. Relatively few and fairly stable 
numbers of persons were convicted of sexual assault charges in the Local Court. 
 
Figure 35. Number of persons convicted of at least one major offence in New South Wales Children’s Court by year  
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In the Children’s Court, the trends for sexual assault and indecent assault were broadly similar, 
generally with more young people convicted of indecent assault than sexual assault, with significant 
fluctuations for both. Fewer than 10 young people were convicted of acts of indecency per year.  
4.5 PROBABILITY OF A CONVICTION  
Figures 36–38 show for each court the proportion of persons who were convicted (after pleading 
guilty or being found guilty at trial or hearing) on at least one charge in the major offence categories. 
Each person is counted in each offence category for which they had charges for each finalisation 
date.84 The proportions vary around the overall average of 0.53 and range between 0.42 and 0.64 
for sexual assault, indecent assault and acts of indecency. The proportion of persons convicted of 
pornography, grooming and procurement offences since 2007 is substantially higher, ranging 
between 0.78 and 0.95; fewer than 10 persons were convicted of these offences before 2007, so 
the proportions are not reported. Figure 36 shows the proportion of persons who were convicted 
for each type of offence and indicates fairly flat trend lines for each offence with slowly increasing 
conviction rates for sexual assault and indecent assault between 2010 and 2014, with highs of 0.64, 
0.65 and 0.71.  
 
Figure 36. Proportion of persons in New South Wales higher courts convicted of at least one major offence against 
a child by year 
                                                     
84 These figures exclude categories of offence by court in which the number of persons per cell was less than 10 across 
the board since a small number base was associated with high proportions.  
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Figure 37. Proportion of persons in New South Wales Local Court convicted of at least one major sexual offence 
against a child by year 
In the Local Court, the conviction rates are substantially lower than in the higher courts. The 
proportion of persons convicted of indecent assault, the most common offence in this court, has 
varied between 0.23 in 2000 and 0.54 in 2011 and 2013 (Figure 37). Similarly, the figures for acts 
of indecency have fluctuated around 0.34, the overall average. The conviction rate for sexual 
assault, a less common offence heard in this court, has been low averaging 0.23, ranging from 0.10 
in 2004 and 2005 to 0.37 in 2014, though the number of persons facing sexual assault offences in 
this court has been relatively low (see Figure 28). The highest conviction rate in the Local Court 
since the late 1990s has been for child pornography, procuring and grooming (averaging 0.69) but 
until 2004, there were fewer than 50 persons per year charged with this offence.  
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Figure 38. Proportion of persons in New South Wales Children’s Court convicted of at least one major sexual 
offence against a child by year 
The proportion of children and young persons appearing before the Children’s Court who had 
proven offences for at least one sexual offence against a child averaged 44 per cent across the 
period since 1994, with the highest overall for indecent assault (0.50), ranging between 0.37 in 2005 
and 0.60 in 2014. The graph for acts of indecency should be treated with some caution given the 
low numbers of children and young people charged with this offence and having a proven offence 
(ranging between six in 1997 and 21 in 2014). Grooming and pornography offences were not 
included because very few young persons were convicted of these offences with less than 10 for 
pornography in all years except 2013, and ranging between zero and 11.  
4.6 DELAYS AT COURT 
The earlier analyses focused on the time from the date/s of the alleged offence/s to the date on 
which a report was made to the police. The following analyses focus on the time matters take to 
be finalised within the criminal justice system from first appearance in the Local Court to 
determination, or from committal to finalisation in the higher courts. The amount of time from the 
date of the offence to the date on which all related charges are finalised is made up of a series of 
time periods before and after reporting to the police. The main overall measure, however, is the 
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interval between the date of the offence and the date on which it was finalised. This is the best 
available overall measure of delay in the court data across both the Local Court and higher courts.85 
Ideally it would be useful to examine the time from report to police to arrest, from arrest and 
charging to first appearance, and from first appearance to determination. However, the court data 
do not include information on the date of reporting or the date of arrest.86 It would also have been 
useful to be able to compare the court process for reports initially made to the police when the 
victim/complainant was a child with those made during adulthood; however, the court data do not 
provide any information on the age of the child at the time of the offence and at report so this is 
not possible. There is also no systematic data collection for tracking the time that cases take to 
proceed through all parts of the court system.  
Time between offence and finalisation  
The time between the offence and court finalisation is shown in Figure 39. Most matters, across all 
years in both the Children’s Court (84.8 per cent) and the Local Court (72.7 per cent) were finalised 
within two years of the date of the offence. The median period between the date of the offence 
and finalisation in the Local Court was 11 months, and the mean was 38.4 months (SD = 75.4) 
Matters heard in the higher courts had markedly longer periods between the offence and 
finalisation than those in the lower courts. Only one-third (33.6 per cent) were finalised within two 
years of the offence and 40.8 per cent were finalised five or more years after the offence; 15.4 per 
cent were clearly historical matters, finalised 20 years or more after the offence. The median period 
was 40 months, and the mean was 101.4 months or more than eight years (SD = 123.7 months), 
similar figures to those reported by Hazlitt et al. (2004) for child sexual assault matters sentenced 
in the District Court in the period 2000–02 (median of 4.9 years and mean of 9.6 years).  
                                                     
85 If there was more than one offence, the earliest date was selected. 
86 The date of arrest was in the dataset but the amount of missing data meant it was not useful.  
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Figure 39. Percentage of defendants by interval between offence and finalisation by court in New South Wales 
Note: The period for the higher courts is for 2002–14 because offence dates are not available in the dataset for the 
higher courts before 2002. 
Figures 40a and 40b show the interval between the offence and court finalisation by year of 
finalisation for both the higher courts and Local Court. In the Local Court, most cases were finalised 
within two years of the offence (purple and blue bars) but the proportion of short finalisations 
(within a year) fell substantially from the 1990s – from 65.2 per cent in 1994 to 23.6 per cent in 
2004 – before rising to 66 per cent in 2014. Few matters are finalised in the Local Court beyond five 
years of the offence and that has been consistent over the period 1994–2014. The pattern is very 
different in the higher courts, where a substantial proportion of matters over the period are 
finalised at least five years after the date of the (earliest) offence. The highest proportion were 
finalised within two to five years.  
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Figures 40a and 40b. Interval between date of offence and finalisation by year of finalisation by (a) higher courts 
and (b) Local Court in New South Wales 
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Within this overall period, there are several time measures for the higher courts, Local Court and 
Children’s Court. An unknown proportion of the time from offence to committal (for higher court 
matters) or first appearance (for lower court matters) is a result of the delay between the 
offence and the report to the police, which is beyond the control of the criminal justice system. 
However, once the matter reaches court, there are significant time periods before finalisation, as 
Table 8 shows.  
Table 8. Intervals between offence and stages at court 
Higher courts (Earliest) offence to committal Committal to finalisation 
Median  28 months 8 months 
Mean  91.1 months 9.9 months 
Range  19–655 months 2–378 months 
From earliest offence to finalisation  
 Median = 40 months Mean = 101.5 months 
  
Local Court Offence to first appearance First appearance to 
finalisation 
Median  5 months 5 months 
Mean  42.0 months 5.8 months 
Range 19-65 months 0–685 months 0–95 months 
          From earliest offence to finalisation  
 Median = 12 months Mean = 48.2 months 
As Table 8 shows, the interval between the earliest offence and committal in the higher courts is 
considerably longer than the interval between the offence date and the first appearance in the 
Local Court. This probably reflects both the greater number of historical matters in the higher courts 
and the longer time to report more serious offences, and the longer delays in getting to the District 
Court. Once in the court process, the time from committal to finalisation in the higher courts (mean 
is 9.9 months) is longer than the time from first appearance to finalisation in the Local Court (mean 
is 5.8 months); it is also commensurate with the average time between committal and finalisation 
reported by Weatherburn and Fitzgerald (2015). 
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Another measure available for the Local Court and Children’s Court is the number of adjournments 
before the matter is finalised. In both courts, few cases have no or only one adjournment – only 
15.7 per cent in the Local Court and 8.8 per cent in the Children’s Court. The median number of 
adjournments in the Local Court was 4 (mean = 4.4) and in the Children’s Court 5 (mean = 5.4). 
These figures indicate that delay and adjournments are a common feature of the criminal justice 
system once a matter proceeds and adds to the uncertainty of the process for the 
victim/complainant.   
What then is the association between delay (as measured by the time between the earliest offence 
and finalisation) and the probability of a conviction in the different courts? And what other factors 
predict the likelihood of a conviction? 
4.7 PREDICTING THE LIKELIHOOD OF A CONVICTION 
Logistic regression87 was used to model the association between the probability of a conviction (by 
verdict, plea or proven offence) and factors such as: 
 the type of offence – sexual assault and indecent assault 
 the court in which the case was heard (Local Court or higher courts) 
 the interval between the date of the offence and the finalisation date for that matter88  
 the year the matter was finalised89 (using data from 2002 onwards) 
 the gender of the defendant 
 the age of the defendant at finalisation. 
All possible three-way interactions between the six predictor variables were tested individually in 
models that contained all main effects and two-way interactions.90 One three-way interaction was 
                                                     
87 The logistic regression allowed the simultaneous testing of the various factors included in the model (for example, 
year of report and offence category) and assessed their effects while holding the other factors in the model constant.  
88 When there was more than one offence, and they occurred at different dates, this was based on the date of the 
earliest offence. The categories for intervals were <1 year, 1–2 years, 2–5 years, 5–10 years, 10–20 years and >20 years. 
89 The model was based on data from 2003 because of missing data on the date of the offence; hence the delay between 
the date of the offence and finalisation date for the higher courts before 2002. 
90 For this analysis, the data were aggregated such that a given defendant was included for each finalisation date, for 
each offence type (sexual assault or indecent assault) for which they were charged, and also for each type of court in 
which they appeared. For example, a person could appear more than once in a year if they had two different finalisation 
dates in that year (this was rare) and/or if they had charges in more than one of the offence categories (this was much 
more common). The total number of observations in the aggregated dataset was 7,659, although the number used in 
analyses was reduced to 7,630 because of missing data. The possible effect of the lack of independence of observations 
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retained, and the model was then further reduced by removing two-way interactions that were not 
contained in the three-way interaction and were not significant at the nominated alpha of .001.  
The final reduced overall model was significant91 and the main and interaction effects were: 
 a significant three-way interaction between the type of offence, the court in which it was 
finalised and the defendant’s age at finalisation92  
 a significant two-way interaction between court and the interval between the date of the 
offence and the finalisation date (referred to as the delay) 
 year of finalisation. 
The main effect of year was not involved in any significant interactions. It showed an overall 
increase across the period 2003–14 in the likelihood of a conviction adjusted for all other effects.93  
The only main effect (other than year of report, which was not involved in an interaction) was the 
gender of the defendant, which was not statistically significant; the overwhelming majority of the 
defendants were male.  
The interaction of most interest is shown in Figure 41 – the delay between the offence and 
finalisation by court. Figure 41 shows a significant difference in the likelihood of conviction 
associated with the length of the interval between the earliest offence date and the finalisation 
date in the Local Court, but not in the higher courts. The probability of conviction in the higher 
courts for the most serious offence with which a defendant was charged (mostly sexual assault) 
remained fairly consistent (ranging between 54 per cent and 63 per cent) over the different ‘time 
                                                     
for the same person, both within and between finalisation years, was taken into account during significance testing 
using the methodology described by Williams (2000) and implemented in Stata 13 (Statacorp, 2013).  
91 χ 2 (N = 7,630) = 404.4, df = 30, p <.0001. 
92  The odds ratio for the three-way interaction, involving the type of offence, court and age of the defendant 
(χ2 (N = 7,630) = 56.4, df = 1, p <.0001), resulted from the relatively low probability of a conviction for sexual assault 
charges in the Local Court for defendants who were older at the time of finalisation. While statistically significant, these 
are not important effects given the relatively small number of defendants facing sexual assault charges in the Local 
Court and the low overall conviction rate in that court for this offence; as Figure 28 shows, the numbers fluctuated 
between 26 in 2003 and 74 in 2008, with 68 in 2014. Defendants facing sexual assault offences in the Local Court were 
significantly less likely to be convicted than those facing indecent assault charges in that court (OR = 0.13), or in the 
higher courts (OR = 0.50). The odds of a conviction for sexual assault in the higher courts were 13.7 times those for the 
Local Court.  
93 From 2008 onwards, the odds ratios comparing the conviction rates for each year with those in 2003 were all greater 
than one, significantly so in 2013 and 2014.  
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gaps’ between the offence and finalisation of the matter.94 However, in the Local Court, there is a 
marked downward trend in the probability of a conviction as the interval gets longer: from 
35 per cent for the shortest gap of less than a year to a low of only 8 per cent for a gap of more 
than 20 years.95 This is despite the greater probability overall of a conviction for indecent assault, 
the more common offence in the Local Court, than for sexual assault. The probability of conviction 
was significantly greater in the higher courts than in the Local Court at all levels of delay.96 It is 
worth noting that matters heard in the higher courts were finalised with markedly longer periods 
between the offence and finalisation than those in the lower courts. As outlined earlier, the median 
interval between the date of the offence and finalisation in the Local Court was 11 months, and the 
mean was 38.4 months (SD = 75.4). In the higher courts, the median interval was 40 months, with 
a mean of 101.4 months (SD = 123.7 months). More than one in four (28 per cent) was finalised at 
least 10 years after the offence (see Figure 39).  
 
Figure 41. Adjusted probability of conviction by court and interval between the offence and court finalisation in 
New South Wales 
 
                                                     
94 The odds ratios for the comparison between the shortest delay and each successive delay ranged between 0.71 and 
0.82 and, except for delays between two and five years, did not differ significantly from 1. 
95 The odds ratios ranged from 0.13 to 0.98. 
96 Another way of illustrating this is with reference to the odds ratios comparing the odds of conviction in the higher 
courts versus those in Local Court over the delays: at the shortest delay, the odds ratio is 13.7; it then drops to 9.9 for 
a delay of 1–2 years, subsequently rising through 11.5, 17.3 and 19.4 to 83.5 for a delay of 20+ years.  
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4.8 SENTENCING ON MOST SERIOUS OFFENCE 
The legislation relating to sexual offences against children provides for a range of penalties, the 
most serious of which is imprisonment for adult offenders and control orders for juveniles. 
However, the legislation has undergone considerable changes since the 1950s, both in relation to 
the definition of sexual assault and the associated penalties.97 While changing community attitudes 
to child sexual assault have led to longer sentences, when sentencing offenders who are convicted 
years after the offences were committed, the courts are required to have regard for the penalties 
in force at the time the offence was committed, rather than at the time of sentencing.98 As Hazlitt 
et al. (2004) point out, the changes and the number of offences and statutory maximum penalties 
present a very complex and difficult picture for the courts to deal with. 
The following data on penalties and sentencing are based on the principal sexual offence of which 
the offender was convicted. This is in line with the approach of the New South Wales BOCSAR in its 
reports and the Judicial Commission of New South Wales (Hazlitt et al., 2004).99 The principal 
offence is defined as the offence that receives the most severe penalty among the sentences 
imposed on an offender.100  
Table 9 shows the principal or most severe penalty imposed on the 8,104 persons whose matters 
were finalised in the higher courts, Local Court and Children’s Court over the period 1994–2014. 
The most common principal penalty in the higher courts (n = 2,721, 68.9 per cent of persons) was 
imprisonment (full-time custodial sentence), with an additional 5.4 per cent on periodic or home 
detention or an intensive correction order, and 14.0 per cent receiving a suspended sentence, with 
or without supervision.  
                                                     
97 Hazlitt et al. (2004) outlined the various changes in the legislation and the increased sentences for child sexual 
offences to 2002. They focused on sentencing offenders convicted of child sexual assault in the District Court over the 
period 2000–02. 
98 Hazlitt et al. (2004, p 4) stated that the Court of Criminal Appeal in MJR [R v MJR (2002) 54 NSWLR 368] held that 
sentences should reflect the pattern or standard of sentences imposed at the date of the offence. A specially 
constituted five-judge bench ruled that a court is ‘… to take into account the sentencing practice as at the date of the 
commission of an offence when sentencing practice has moved adversely to an offender’. Citing (2002) 54 NSWLR 368 
at [31] per Spigelman CJ, Grove J, Newman AJ and Sully J with Mason P dissenting. 
99  There are, however, differences between the data used by the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research 
(BOCSAR) and the Judicial Commission of New South Wales in that the Commission’s data are corrected to reflect the 
outcome of successful appeals, whereas BOCSAR’s data are not; BOCSAR provided the data in this report. In addition, 
the Commission reports median sentences rather than means or averages, and also the total head sentence rather 
than the non-parole period reported by BOCSAR. 
100 Where an offender was sentenced for multiple offences in a single finalised court appearance, the offence that 
attracted the highest penalty in terms of type and quantum of sentence is selected as the principal offence, in terms of 
the hierarchy presented in Table B in Appendix 4 (NSW). 
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In the Local Court, the most common principal penalty was also imprisonment (31.7 per cent), 
followed by a bond with or without supervision (29.5 per cent), and then a suspended sentence 
(19.5 per cent).  
In the Children’s Court, the most common penalty was a probation order (40.7 per cent), followed 
by a bond with or without supervision (26.9 per cent). Just over one in 10 (11.0 per cent) young 
persons received the most serious penalty in the Children’s Court, a control order, a fixed-term or 
non-parole period of detention in a Juvenile Justice New South Wales facility (see explanatory notes 
for the New South Wales Crime Statistics in Appendix 4 (New South Wales) Table B).  
Table 9. The principal penalty* (number of persons) by court 
 Higher 
courts 
Local 
Court 
Children’s 
Court 
Total 
 n % n  % n  % N 
Imprisonment 2,721 68.9 1,055  31.7 – – 3,776 
Control order** 19 0.5 – – 91 11.0 110 
Periodic and home detention 173 4.4 142 4.3 – – 315 
Intensive correction order** 16 0.4 11 0.3 – – 27 
Suspended sentence 
with/without supervision 
403 1.0 650 19.5 83 10.0 1,136 
Community service order 123 3.1 234 7.0 18 2.2 375 
Probation order** 13 0.3 – – 337 40.7 350 
Bond with/without supervision 443 11.2 981 29.5 223 26.9 1,647 
Fine 1 – 124 3.7 1 0.1 126 
Nominal sentence and conviction 
without penalty 
5 0.1 6 0.2 6 0.7 17 
Dismissed with caution 3 0.1 – – 65 7.8 68 
S 10 bond without conviction/no 
conviction recorded/other 
27 0.7 125 0.4 5 0.6 157 
Number of persons – offenders 3,947 100.0 3,328 100.0 829  100.0 8,104 
* The order in the table (rank order and numeric code) provided by the New South Wales BOCSAR determines the 
rank of the penalty as provided. Imprisonment is the most punitive penalty and ranked 1 (Hazlitt et al., 2004). The 
types of penalty are explained in Table C in the New South Wales appendices.  
** A small number of young people (offenders under the age of 18 at the time of the offence) were dealt with in the 
higher courts rather than in the Children’s Court and their penalties are shown in italics. 
124 
 
 
Figures 42a, 42b and 42c provide a breakdown of the principal penalty (generally for the most 
serious offence) for each major offence category by court. As Figure 42a shows, the most common 
principal penalty in the higher courts was imprisonment across all four major offence categories; it 
was highest for sexual assault (n = 1,778, 78.2 per cent) and child pornography (n = 254, 67.9 per 
cent). Other forms of detention (home and periodic detention) added 4 per cent to 7 per cent for 
each offence type (ranging from 3.9 per cent for sexual assault and 7.5 per cent for indecent 
assault). Suspended sentences, with and without supervision, added a further 18.5 per cent for 
child pornography, 13.8 per cent for indecent assault, 7.5 per cent for sexual assault and 5.8 per 
cent for an act of indecency. The next most common penalty in the higher courts was a bond, with 
or without supervision, for an act of indecency (34.1 per cent), but this was the least common 
offence dealt with in these courts (n = 208 for the period 1994–2014).  
The likelihood of imprisonment as the principal penalty in the Local Court (Figure 42b) was much 
lower, at 35.3 per cent for indecent assault, 34.9 per cent for child pornography, and around one 
in four for both sexual assault (24.2 per cent) and an act of indecency (25.2 per cent).101 A bond 
with or without supervision was the most common penalty for sexual assault (38.4 per cent) and 
for an act of indecency (42.9 per cent). The next most common penalty for child pornography was 
a suspended sentence (27.0 per cent).  
 
Figure 42a. Percentage of convicted persons with principal penalty by major offence category in the 
New South Wales higher courts 
                                                     
101 Some of the delayed reporting of acts of indecency may have involved gross acts of indecency with a male under 
s 78Q of the Crimes (Amendment) Act 1984 (NSW), which carried a penalty of two years imprisonment – s 78Q was 
repealed in 2003 and replaced by s 61N(1), s 61N(2) and s 61O(1) and s 61O(2). 
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Figure 42b. Percentage of convicted persons with principal penalty by major offence and court in the 
New South Wales Local Court 
 
Figure 42c. Percentage of convicted persons with principal penalty by major offence and court in the New South 
Wales Children’s Court 
The most common principal penalty for those appearing in the Children’s Court was probation 
(Figure 42c), particularly for indecent assault (n = 149, 47.6 per cent) and sexual assault (n = 130, 
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36.5 per cent); the percentage for child pornography was relatively high (41.9 per cent) but the 
overall number of young people receiving penalties for child pornography (n = 31) was low. The 
next most common penalty in the Children’s Court was a bond, more commonly with supervision 
than without. One in 10 (n = 80, 10.4 per cent) of the 767 young people receiving a penalty in the 
Children’s Court were given a custodial sentence (control order).  
Imprisonment 
As outlined above, imprisonment was the most common principal penalty in the higher courts and 
relatively common in the Local Court (after a bond). On average, those who were imprisoned 
received 2.99 sentences (SD = 3.77) in the higher courts (median of 2.0) and 1.98 sentences 
(SD = 1.72) in the Local Court (median of 1.0). 
The following table indicates the quantum or median length as well as the mean length of the non-
parole period for each court for the main offence categories. The term ‘median’ refers to the length 
of sentence that lies in the middle of the range of values; the advantage of the median is that 
compared with the mean, it is much less affected by extreme values or outliers (Hazlitt et al., 2004). 
By far the longest sentences (with a non-parole period) were imposed on offenders convicted of 
sexual assault offences in the higher courts; these were approximately twice as long as those for 
indecent assault imposed by the same court. In the Local Court, there was less difference in the 
length of sentence for the two offences. 
 
Table 10. Non-parole period (months) for full-time custodial sentences by type of offence 
 Higher courts Local Court 
n Median Mean n Median Mean 
Sexual assault 1,778  31.7 37.4 54 8.5 9.6 
Indecent assault 602 15.0  19.7  456 8.0 8.3 
Act of indecency 84 12.0  14.9 158 6.0 7.2 
Pornography 254 13.1 17.3 312 8.5 8.5 
Total 2,718 24.0 30.9 980 7.5 8.3 
Figures 43a and 43b show the percentage of offenders who received a full-time custodial sentence 
as a function of whether or not they pleaded guilty to all charges and were therefore sentenced 
without trial or a defended hearing. A discount is applied for pleading guilty because it saves court 
time and costs, and also avoids the need for complainants to give evidence. In the higher courts, 
75.3 per cent of those who were convicted pleaded guilty to all charges, consistent with Hazlitt et 
al.’s (2004) finding that most offenders in the District Court pleaded guilty (at a rate of 
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approximately three to one). In the higher courts, those who pleaded guilty were markedly less 
likely than those who pleaded not guilty to receive a full-time custodial sentence, but they may 
have been pleading to modified or negotiated charges with a lesser penalty. In the higher courts, 
more than nine in 10 (93.1 per cent) of those convicted of sexual assault after pleading not guilty 
received a prison sentence compared with 71.5 per cent of those who pleaded guilty. As indicated, 
the rates of imprisonment in the Local Court were lower, and the difference by plea 
in the likelihood of a prison sentence was much less marked than in the higher courts (within 4 to 
5 percentage points).  
 
 
Figures 43a and 43b. Percentage of convicted persons who receive a full-time prison sentence by major offence 
category in New South Wales Local and higher courts 
Note: The Local Court axis extends only to 50 per cent. 
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The average length of imprisonment (with a non-parole period) was also shorter for offenders who 
pleaded guilty to sexual assault in the higher courts than for those who did not; it was 32.5 months 
compared with 41.1 months, but there was little difference for the other offences or for offenders 
convicted in the Local Court (Figures 44a and 44b). 
 
 
Figures 44a and 44b. Mean length of prison sentence by major offence category and plea in New South Wales (a) 
higher courts and (b) Local Court 
The probability of a full-time custodial sentence also varied by the length of the delay between the 
offence and finalisation, and by the offence type and court (Figures 45a and 45b). In the higher 
courts, the longer the interval between the offence and finalisation at court for sexual assault 
offences, the higher the probability of an offender being given a prison sentence. With an interval 
of at least five years, the probability of a prison sentence was at least 85 per cent, but was greatest 
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for an interval of 10 to 20 years (92.4 per cent). The trend was similar for indecent assault and acts 
of indecency, but not for pornography, grooming and procuring a child for sexual activity; few if any 
offenders were convicted of pornography after an interval of 10 years or more from the date of 
offence.  
In the Local Court (Figure 45b), the number of offenders convicted of indecent assault was generally 
substantially higher than for either sexual assault or an act of indecency. As Figure 40b shows, 
relatively few matters were finalised in the Local Court beyond five to 10 years from the date of the 
(earliest) offence. Sexual assault and pornography are excluded from Figure 45b beyond the five to 
10-year interval because the very low numbers mean that any percentages would be misleading. 
The proportion of offenders receiving a custodial sentence increases, however, up to the 5-year 
period, particularly for sexual assault. In the Children’s Court, only 11 per cent of young persons 
received a detention order for a sexual offence against a child. 
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Figures 45a and 45b. Proportion of those convicted who were imprisoned by gap between offence and finalisation 
by offence type in New South Wales (a) higher courts and (b) Local Court 
In summary, the majority of persons convicted in the higher courts of a sexual offence against a 
child received a custodial sentence, with the length of that sentence (non-parole period) reflecting 
the seriousness of the offence and the absence of a guilty plea. A bond with or without supervision 
was more common in the Local Court, with between one-quarter and one-third of those convicted 
receiving a prison sentence. In the higher courts and Local Court, those who pleaded guilty were 
less likely to receive a custodial sentence, and if they did, it was significantly shorter than for those 
who pleaded not guilty. The highest proportion of custodial sentences was associated with 
convictions in the higher courts for (historical) child sexual assault offences (involving penetration) 
where the interval between the offence and finalisation was at least five years.  
4.9 APPEALS AGAINST CONVICTION AND SENTENCE 2005–13 
Appeal decisions represent the final step in the prosecution of child sexual assault cases in which 
the decisions of juries and other courts may be overturned on appeal against conviction and/or 
sentencing. A successful appeal against conviction may lead to acquittal or retrial. Sentencing 
appeals may lead to sentences being varied, and result in a more lenient sentence.  
The primary aim of the appeal study was to investigate whether there were any differences in the 
grounds of appeal and outcomes in historical cases of child sexual abuse compared with those 
involving a child complainant/witness in appeals against conviction and sentencing, taking into 
account the characteristics of those cases. 
There were 291 appeal cases over the period 2005–13. The vast majority (89 per cent) involved 
appeals by the accused; 54 per cent were against conviction and 64 per cent against sentence. The 
estimated rate of appeal against conviction and/or sentence in child sexual abuse cases was almost 
17 per cent. This suggests a marked reduction in the proportion of child sexual abuse appeals 
against conviction between 2000 and 2013, from 61.3 per cent in 2000 to 31.4 per cent in 2013. 
For appeals against conviction alone, Donnelly et al. (2011) reported an appeal rate against child 
sexual assault convictions of 52.6 per cent for the period 2000–07, and 50.3 per cent for sexual 
assault offences involving an adult victim compared with about 33 per cent across all categories of 
offences (xii, 199).  
Outcome of sentencing and conviction appeals 
More than half of the 291 appeals (156, 54 per cent) were successful, wholly or in part, on appeal. 
The Crown lodged 34 appeals against the leniency of the sentence; 22 (64.7 per cent) were upheld 
and a new sentence ordered; seven of 12 such appeals from 2000 to 2003 were successful (Hazlitt 
et al., 2004). 
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Appeals by the accused against the severity of a sentence were successful in 96 of the 158 cases 
(60.8 per cent), substantially higher than the 44.4 per cent success rate for 2000–03 reported by 
the Judicial Commission of New South Wales (Hazlitt et al., 2004).  
Conviction appeals were upheld in 39 of the 139 cases (28.1 per cent) – a marked decrease from 
the 55.9 per cent success rate for the period 2000–03 (Hazlitt et al., 2004) and 50.3 per cent for the 
period 2001–07 (Donnelly et al., 2011). Most of the successful conviction appeals resulted in a new 
trial (76.9 per cent) and 23.1 per cent in an acquittal. This acquittal rate is lower than the 51.5 per 
cent rate reported by Hazlitt et al. (2004) and 42.7 per cent reported by Donnelly et al. (2011). The 
reason for this drop-off in acquittal rates is unclear. It is possible it reflects changes in the law over 
this period which has impacted on judicial directions, such as changes relating to Longman 
directions that have made such directions less susceptible to error and to miscarriages of justice. 
Just over half of the appeals against conviction included argument on the basis that the verdict of 
the jury was unreasonable or could not be supported having regard to the evidence; 10 per cent of 
these cases were successful on this basis.  
About one-third of the appeals against conviction included argument that the verdict should be 
overturned on the basis of an error on a question of law (with objection raised at trial), and of these 
one-quarter were successful. Just under three-quarters of the conviction cases raised miscarriage 
of justice on any other ground, and a little over one-quarter were successful.  
A majority of appeals against conviction were argued on more than one ground. The findings 
suggest that judicial misdirections remain a significant source of error in child sexual assault trials, 
which generate a basis for overturning convictions and jury verdicts; 16.5 per cent of all conviction 
appeals succeeded on this basis and more than half of the successful appeals against conviction 
cases involved judicial misdirection. 
Historical and non-historical matters 
Of the appeals, 28.9 per cent (84 out of 291) were identified as historical matters where the 
complainant/victim reported the abuse or offence as an adult. Almost 60 per cent of historical cases 
of child sexual abuse were intra-familial. 
One in four (74 cases, 25.4 per cent) involved delay as an issue on appeal; 48 were historical and 
26 were not. Of the appeals, 21 (43.8 per cent) of the historical matters and six (23 per cent) of the 
non-historical matters succeeded. Not surprisingly, this suggests that delay continues to be more 
of an issue in historical cases than non-historical cases, though the numbers are small and caution 
is warranted.   
Fifteen cases raised an appeal related to a Longman direction; nine were historical matters. Of 
these 15 cases, only four – all historical matters with delay ranging from six to 20 years – were 
successful on the basis of a Longman misdirection.  
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There were few other substantive differences between historical and non-historical child sexual 
abuse appeal cases. Overall, historical child sexual abuse appeals (against both conviction and 
sentencing) were more successful than non-historical appeal cases in the period 2005–13, but this 
has reduced over time and with a fair amount of fluctuation.  
Institutional child sexual abuse cases 
Twenty-nine cases were identified as institutional child sexual abuse involving persons in positions 
of authority in relation to the child, such as teachers, clergy and youth workers; 17 of these were 
historical matters. Just under half of these cases revealed delay in complaint/reporting of 20 years 
or more. Less than one in three appeals relating to institutional sexual abuse (11 out of 29) were 
successful in the period 2005–13.  
Of the 17 historical cases, six involved an appeal against conviction only, four an appeal against 
sentence only, and four were appeals against both conviction and sentence. Three were appeals by 
the Crown, two against the leniency of the sentence, and the third an interlocutory appeal. Nine 
were successful wholly or in part and eight were dismissed on appeal. Five of the nine successful 
appeals in historical ‘institutional sexual abuse’ cases involved an appeal by the accused against 
conviction; four out of the five were successful on the grounds of conviction, one of which was also 
partly successful on the grounds of sentencing; three were conviction-only appeals, and two were 
conviction and sentencing appeals. Four of the five were successful on their conviction ground, one 
of which was also successful in part on its sentencing grounds. 
In summary, the success rate for appeals against conviction for the period 2005–13 (28.1 per cent) 
appears to have dropped from the earlier rates reported in two reports by the Judicial Commission 
of New South Wales: for 2000–03 (55.9 per cent) reported by Hazlitt et al. (2004) and for 2003–07 
(50.3 per cent) by Donnelly et al. (2011). However, the success rate for appeals by the accused 
against sentence has increased from 44.4 per cent (40 out of 90 cases) in 2000–03 to 60.8 per cent 
(96 out of 158 cases). Twenty-two of the 34 (64.7 per cent) Crown appeals against the leniency of 
a sentence were upheld for 2005–13; all resulted in a new sentence being ordered. In the earlier 
period (2000–03), seven of the 12 Crown appeals against sentence were successful (Hazlitt et al., 
2004). 
One in four cases involved delay as an appeal issue, most of which were historical cases; the appeals 
in historical matters were more likely to be successful than appeals in those that were not historical. 
Over the last decade, some changes in law and practice have arguably streamlined, clarified and 
minimised potential error in judicial warnings and directions. However, judicial misdirections 
appear to be a continuing source of error in child sexual assault trials, generating a basis for 
overturning convictions and jury verdicts. Most of the judicial errors related to giving inadequate 
warnings to the jury, unbalanced judicial summing-up in a case, and failure to correctly direct 
the jury.  
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5 SOUTH AUSTRALIAN POLICE DATA 
The South Australian data provide a useful comparison for New South Wales. Although it is a smaller 
state, it is the only other state with a body that undertakes statistical analysis equivalent to BOCSAR. 
Like BOCSAR, OCSAR can produce ‘clean’ datasets for both the police and court data collections.  
OCSAR provided the data in accordance with a Notice to Produce issued by the Royal Commission. 
The data comprise two police datasets and a court dataset. The police record victim and offence 
data on police incident reports102; they record data on the arrest, and on the suspect or ‘offender’ 
on police apprehension reports.103 According to OCSAR (2014):  
When police identify a person suspected of having committed an offence and they have 
sufficient information to proceed against that individual by way of an apprehension, an 
apprehension report is filed, detailing the offences alleged against the suspect … The same 
individual may be apprehended more than once during the year, and therefore be the subject 
of more than one apprehension report. Moreover, each apprehension report may contain more 
than one offence or multiple counts of the same offence (Profile of Apprehensions in South 
Australia, OCSAR, 2014).  
The data extraction was designed to draw out all sexual offences against children using the JANCO 
codes104 from 1992 to 2012 by matching the two police datasets using a master Police Identification 
Number (PIN).105 (See Appendix 1 (South Australia) for further details about the data management 
process.)  
                                                     
102 In the South Australian data, a given ‘incident’ always involves a single victim but a given victim may be associated 
with multiple incidents. 
103 It should also be noted that one apprehension report may clear multiple incident reports as the accused may have 
committed multiple offences against multiple victims. In some instances, multiple apprehension reports can also clear 
a single incident report where one victim was victimised by multiple offenders. 
104 ‘The JANCO classification system is the South Australian adaptation of the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ offence 
classification system ANCO (Australian National Classification of Offences, 1985, Catalogue No. 1234.0)’ – Office of 
Crime Statistics and Research, JANCO Classification System, Technical Paper, October 2011, p 1. 
105 The Police Identification Number (PIN) is assigned to individuals upon initial contact with police and is a unique 
identifier that is used across the justice system (police, courts and corrections) for the life of the individual. An 
individual’s PIN may appear in both the victim and accused datasets as they may have been both a victim and a sexual 
offender at some stage in their history.  
134 
 
 
The OCSAR court dataset is based on cases that were heard and finalised in the courts between 
1992 and 2012.106 It does not include cases that were still in the court process at the time the data 
was extracted (post-2012).   
As far as possible, the South Australian data analyses included the same criteria and similar coding 
and categorisation of variables as was used in the New South Wales data analyses. For example, 
offence type was coded in line with the New South Wales data to create four main categories: 
 sexual assault defined as sexual intercourse/penetration 
 indecent assault 
 act of indecency/aggravated act of indecency 
 child pornography/grooming for pornography and other sexual offences. 
As outlined earlier, law reform since the 1980s in both New South Wales and South Australia, as in 
all Australian states, has made significant changes to the relevant legislation by: 
 expanding the definition of sexual intercourse or penetration 
 decriminalising homosexual sexual acts 
 including further categories of persons in a position of trust or authority in relation to a child 
 including and expanding child pornography offences (Boxall, 2014).  
While there are differences in the wording and timing of these changes, and the penalties attached 
to these offences, the overall effect is similar.  
However, a significant difference between the two states was the barrier to prosecuting historical 
offences imposed by the statute of limitations in South Australia. The statute of limitations was 
abolished in June 2003, with the Criminal Law Consolidation (Abolition of Time Limit for Prosecution 
of Certain Sexual Offences) Amendment Act 2003, which deleted s 76A and inserted s 72A: ‘Any 
immunity from prosecution arising because of the time limit imposed by the former section 76A is 
abolished’ (See Appendix 2 (South Australia)). A minor difference is the age of consent for sexual 
intercourse – it is 17 years for both heterosexual and homosexual intercourse in South Australia 
rather than 16 years in New South Wales, and most other Australian states; it is 16 years in 
South Australia for other sexual acts (Boxall, 2014).  
 
                                                     
106 A matching process using the ‘master PINs’ set for ‘accused offenders’ was performed on the courts’ finalised cases 
dataset (all cases finalised in 1992–2012) to extract all cases finalised in court against the accused offenders. The data 
for 1991 was excluded because of missing matching data. 
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5.1  GENERAL TRENDS IN REPORTING OF CHILD SEXUAL OFFENCES TO POLICE 
The trend patterns in the South Australian data for the period 1992–2012 (Figure 46) are somewhat 
different to those in New South Wales but, like New South Wales, the reporting peaks coincided 
with the conduct of two major inquiries, one into child protection (the Layton Inquiry) and another 
into the abuse of children in state care (the Mullighan Inquiry). Reports of both sexual assault and 
indecent assault107 peaked between 2003 and 2007, when these inquiries were being run.108 The 
Mullighan Inquiry was established in 2004 and reported in 2008; it heard from 792 people who 
reported being victims of child sexual abuse. Some people made allegations against more than one 
perpetrator. Even where there was just one allegation of an act of child sexual abuse, it could 
involve more than one perpetrator. Victims of child sexual abuse made 1,592 allegations with some 
dating back to the 1930s against 1,733 alleged perpetrators of child sexual abuse (Mullighan, 2008, 
p 24). While 533 of these people did not come under the terms of reference of the inquiry because 
their alleged abuse did not occur when they were in state care, a number of these people and the 
242 who had been abused in state care109 may have reported their abuse to the police. The media 
coverage may also have motivated others to report to their abuse to police.  
Both the reported acts of indecency and of child pornography have a lower base and show different 
trends – a slight downward trend in the number of reported incidents of acts of indecency and an 
upward trend in child pornography (Figure 46).  
 
 
                                                     
107 The number of sexual assault incidents peaked at 670 in 2003 and 602 in 2007, and indecent assault incidents peaked 
at 595 in 2004. 
108 The Layton and Mullighan inquiries reported in 2003, 2005 and 2008. The 2003 child protection review (the Layton 
Report) by Robyn Layton QC, is available at Our best investment: a state plan to protect and advance the interests of 
children. The Hon EP Mullighan QC, Commissioner, presented the full report to the South Australian Parliament in 2008 
and it is available at Children in State Care Commission of Inquiry: Allegations of sexual abuse and death from criminal 
conduct. Please also see the Mullighan Inquiry, Children on the APY Lands Inquiry, 2008.  
109 At the time of the alleged abuse, 242 people – 124 males and 118 females – were children in state care. They made 
826 allegations against 922 alleged perpetrators (Mullighan report, p 24). 
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Figure 46. Number of incidents of sexual offences against children reported to South Australia Police 
Gender of victim 
Figure 47 shows the number of reported child sexual offence incidents involving male and female 
victims. As in New South Wales, the majority of victims were female (78.7 per cent). The proportion 
of victims in indecent assault incidents (25.1 per cent) who were male was substantially higher than 
for sexual assault (17.8 per cent); this latter figure was somewhat lower than for New South Wales 
(21.7 per cent). 
  
Figure 47. Number of reported incidents by victim gender and type of offence in South Australia 
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Age of victim 
Figure 48 shows the breakdown by age of the victim for each offence category. The number of 
reported incidents generally increased with age for all offences, though more victims aged 10–13 
were involved in indecent assault than for other age groups. As in New South Wales, those aged 14–
17 were most likely to have been the victim in sexual assault incidents (n = 4,180), comprising 47.7 
per cent of the victims of sexual assault and just over half (51.9 per cent) of those aged 14–17. More 
than one-third (36.2 per cent) of the victims of sexual assault were under 10; similarly, the New 
South Wales figure was 35.3 per cent. Again as in New South Wales, most children involved in child 
pornography were 10 and older (81.0 per cent in South Australia and 87.1 per cent in New South 
Wales). 
 
Figure 48. Number of reported incidents by victim age and type of offence in South Australia 
As in New South Wales, boys were more likely than girls to be in the two age groups under 10; 
nearly half (47.9 per cent) of the boys were under 10 compared with just under one in three girls 
(32.1 per cent). Unlike New South Wales, in South Australia the discrepancy in the pattern by 
gender and age was marked across all three main offence types.   
Table 11. Number and percentage of incidents involving male and female victims by age 
 Female Male Total 
Age  n %  n  %  n  % 
Under 6 years  2,461 14.3  972 20.9 3,433 15.7 
6–9 years 3,058 17.8 1,251 27.0 4,309 19.8 
10–13 years 4,588 26.7 1,411 30.3 5,999 27.5 
14–17 years 7,061 41.1  997 21.3 8, 058 37.0 
Total 17,168 78.9* 4,631 21.1* 21,799 100.0 
* Percentage of total 
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Relationship of the suspect/person of interest to the victim 
To facilitate comparison with the New South Wales data, only sexual assault and indecent assault 
incidents reported from 2003 to 2012 were considered. In addition, the detailed coded categories 
for the relationship between the victim and the suspect were grouped to match those used for New 
South Wales.110 The variety of offences was dealt with by categorising each incident according to 
the major offence, as described earlier in this report.  
Figures 49a and 49b show the percentage of sexual assault and indecent assault cases, respectively, 
by the relationship between the victim and the suspect. As in New South Wales, only a very small 
proportion of incidents involved a person in a position of authority in relation to the child such as a 
teacher, member of the clergy, carer, or youth worker (a proxy for institutional abuse).111 The 
percentage of ‘institutional abuse’ incidents was somewhat higher for indecent assault than for 
sexual assault, peaking at 14.3 per cent for indecent assault in 2004. The overall percentage for 
indecent assaults was 9.2 per cent and 3.5 per cent for sexual assault. The higher figures in the 
years 2003 to 2005 may reflect the impact of the Layton and Mullighan inquiries. 
Family members were involved in about one-third of the sexual assault incidents (on average 
32.4 per cent) and 36 per cent of indecent assault incidents. Parents and guardians were on average 
involved in 16.8 per cent of sexual assaults and 17.9 per cent of indecent assaults. Siblings were 
involved in a small number – about 4 per cent on average. For 44.6 per cent of sexual assault 
incidents and 40.9 per cent of indecent assault incidents reported over this period, the person of 
interest was another known person but unrelated to the victim (ranging from 37 per cent to 47 per 
cent). Another 12 per cent of sexual assault incidents but less than 1 per cent of indecent assault 
incidents involved a boyfriend or girlfriend. Less than 1 per cent of sexual assault and indecent 
assault incidents involved a household member.  
 
                                                     
110 Some of these codes appear to have been subject to the same coding variations in ‘viewpoint’ as those from New 
South Wales. Accordingly, the South Australian categories ‘detainee’, ‘ex-partner/de facto’, ‘ex-partner opposite sex’, 
‘ex-spouse’, ‘grandchild’, ‘partner opposite sex’, ‘partner same sex’, ‘partner/de facto’, ‘prisoner’, ‘son/daughter’, 
‘spouse’, ‘step-child’ and ‘patient’ were omitted. These made up from 0.6 per cent to 1.8 per cent of the combined 
sexual and indecent assault cases each year from 2003 to 2012.  
111 The South Australian data included a smaller set of categories in the victim dataset for the relationship of the suspect 
to the victim. The category ‘persons in authority’ as a proxy for ‘institutional abuse’ included carers, clergy, health 
professionals (doctors and nurses), police officers, teachers and tutors, employers and youth leaders. 
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Figures 49a and 49b. Percentage of (a) sexual assault and (b) indecent assault incidents by suspect-victim 
relationship by year in South Australia 
The most common relationship was someone known to the child but not related: 45 per cent of 
sexual assaults and 41 per cent of indecent assaults. Only 7.5 per cent of suspects in sexual assaults 
and 12.9 per cent in indecent assaults were not known to the victim. 
Overall, just under 20 per cent (19.7 per cent) of persons of interest were under 18 and a further 
9.5 per cent were under 20. Over half (56.7 per cent) of the persons of interest who were under 18 
were known to the child but not related, 16 per cent were siblings, and another 11 per cent were 
another family member. Just under a third (31.8 per cent) of those recorded as a boyfriend or 
girlfriend of the victim were under 18 but just as many (31.8 per cent) were 20 to 40 years old. 
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5.2 DELAYS IN REPORTING  
Reports made in childhood and adulthood  
South Australian reports to the police of sexual offences against children were, like those in 
New South Wales, primarily reports made while the victim was a child (aged under 18). Overall 
84.3 per cent of reports were made in childhood, with peaks in excess of 1,000 reports in 1993 
(1,034) and 2002 (1,093). The number of reports made in adulthood (Figure 50) shows a somewhat 
different pattern, increasing from 39 (4.3 per cent of all reports in 1992) to a peak of 406 in 2004 
and 360 in 2007 (32 per cent and 31.9 per cent of all reports, respectively, compared with an overall 
average of 15.7 per cent). These peaks coincide with the Mullighan Inquiry, during which 792 
people reported their sexual abuse as children; the vast majority of these complainants (84 per 
cent) were aged over 18 when they reported abuse that occurred decades earlier, in some cases 
dating back to the 1930s. A number of these were reported to the police during the inquiry. The 
peak in 2004 and the higher numbers beyond are also likely to be associated with the abolition of 
the statute of limitations in June 2003, which removed the time limit on the prosecution of sexual 
offences against children. Significantly, South Australia Police established the Paedophile Task 
Force to deal with the 20-year backlog of cases that could then be prosecuted, as well as the cases 
arising from the Mullighan Inquiry. 
 
Figure 50. Number of child sexual offence incidents reported in adulthood and childhood in South Australia 
Figures 51a and 51b show the number of sexual assault and indecent assault incidents reported in 
childhood and adulthood. Although the patterns for both types of offence are quite similar, overall 
sexual assault was more likely to have been reported during adulthood (19.8 per cent) than 
indecent assault (14.3 per cent), with peaks in both in certain years (in 2007, about one in three 
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sexual assaults and indecent assaults were reported in adulthood). There were very few acts of 
indecency reported in adulthood – averaging six per year with the exception of 19 in 2003.  
 
 
Figures 51a and 51b. Number of incidents of (a) sexual assault and (b) indecent assault reported in adulthood and 
in childhood in 1993–2012 in South Australia 
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Figure 52 shows the number of cases reported while the complainant was still a child for the three 
main offence types. The pattern is very similar for sexual assault and indecent assault, again with 
peaks in 1993 and between 2001 and 2003, and then declining. There is, however, a downward 
trend in the number of indecent assaults over the whole period.  
 
Figure 52. Number of child sexual offence incidents reported in childhood by offence in 1992–2012 in 
South Australia 
The decreasing (indecent assault) or flat (sexual assault) trend lines in South Australia for child 
reports are quite different to the increasing trend lines in New South Wales (Figure 7).  
In contrast, the number of sexual assault and indecent assault cases reported in adulthood 
(Figure 53) shows a steep increase in 2003 and 2004, with another peak in 2007 for sexual assault, 
and to a lesser extent for indecent assault. The number of acts of indecency reported in adulthood 
is very low, averaging only six, with a high of 19 in 2003.  
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Figure 53. Number of child sexual offence incidents reported in adulthood by offence in 1992–2012 in 
South Australia 
Figures 54a and 54b show the proportion of male and female victims for both sexual and indecent 
assault by year. The pattern is similar to that for New South Wales in terms of the higher proportion 
of male adult reports of indecent assault, but the rise in that proportion in 1999 precedes the 
Layton and Mullighan child abuse inquiries in South Australia. Unlike New South Wales, the 
proportion of male victims of indecent assault exceeds that of female victims during some periods. 
The highest proportion of female victims throughout is for child reports of sexual assault, ranging 
between 79.5 per cent and 90.7 per cent. 
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Figures 54a and 54b. Percentage of male and female victims for child and adult reports of (a) sexual assault by year 
in 1991–2012 and (b) indecent assault by year in 1992–2012 in South Australia 
In summary, while the majority of sexual offences against children were reported during childhood, 
adult reports of child sexual assault and indecent assault increased over time, especially from 2003, 
peaking between 2003 and 2007. In 2004 and 2007, adult reports comprised about one-third of the 
total number of reports in those years (32 per cent). This fits with the abolition of the statute of 
limitations for certain sexual offences in 2003, and also the influx of cases associated with the 
Mullighan Inquiry. 
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The extent of delay 
As in New South Wales, most sexual offences against children were reported within three months 
of the offence, but rather than the more immediate reports seen in New South Wales, in South 
Australia, the most common delay was between two days and three months (Figure 55). 
 
Figure 55. Delay between offence and report to the South Australia Police by offence type   
As in New South Wales, nearly one in four sexual assaults (24.2 per cent) were reported more than 
five years after the offence, with the number increasing for reports after 20 years. As Table 12 
shows, the more serious offences of sexual assault and indecent assault were much less likely than 
an act of indecency to be reported immediately (same or next day) or within three months: 46.6 
per cent of sexual assaults, 53.1 per cent of indecent assaults compared with 80.8 per cent for acts 
of indecency. One in six (n = 1,708, 17.7 per cent) of the sexual assaults and 13.6 per cent (n = 1,186) 
of the indecent assaults, but only 4.2 per cent of the acts of indecency, took at least 10 years to be 
reported.  
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Table 12. Number and percentage of incidents reported to South Australia Police by delay periods 
Time between offence and 
report 
Sexual assault Indecent assault Act of indecency 
  n  %  n %  n % 
Same or next day 1,729 17.9 2,142 24.5 1,668 59.9 
2 days to 3 months 2,782 28.7 2,506 28.6 581 20.9 
3 months to 1 year 1,419 14.7 1,274 14.6 205 7.4 
1–5 years 1,400 14.5 1,199 13.7 169 6.1 
5–10 years 629 6.5 441 5.0 41 1.5 
10–20 years 690 7.1 324 3.7 42 1.5 
>20 years 1,018 10.5 862 9.9 75 2.7 
Total 9,667 100.0 8,748 100.0 2,781 100.0 
Again as in New South Wales, male complainants were also more likely than females to delay 
reporting, particularly for more than 20 years, for both sexual assault and indecent assault (Table 13 
and Figure 56). For example, 29.3 per cent of male complainants delayed reporting sexual assault 
incidents for 10 years or longer compared with 17 per cent for female complainants. One in five 
male complainants of sexual assault (20 per cent) and indecent assault (19.0 per cent) took more 
than 20 years to report; for female complainants, the figures were 8.3 per cent and 6.5 per cent. 
Table 13. Percentage of incidents reported to South Australia Police by delay and gender of 
complainant  
Time between 
offence and report 
Sexual assault Indecent assault Act of indecency 
 Female 
% 
Male 
% 
Female 
% 
Male 
% 
Female 
% 
Male 
% 
Same or next day 19.1 12.2 27.1 16.6 64.6 40.9 
2 days to 3 months 30.2 22.3  30.6 22.9 20.5 22.6 
3 months to 1 year 15.0 13.1 14.2 15.5 6.4 11.3 
1–5 years 14.2 15.8 13.5 14.2 5.2 9.8 
5–10 years 6.3 7.4 4.7 6.1 1.2 2.8 
10–20 years 6.7 9.3 3.2 5.3 0.9 3.9 
>20 years 8.5 20.0 6.7 19.4 1.2 8.9 
Total 7,943 1,724 6,555 2,193 2,240 541 
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Figure 56. Number of sexual assault incidents by delay between offence and report by gender to South Australia 
Police by victim gender  
Figures 57a and 57b show the mean difference between age at offence and age at report 
for both male and female complainants by offence type. It is generally consistent with the 
New South Wales pattern (Figures 13a and 13b), with the peak age difference at offence and at 
report for male complainants aged 10–13 at the time of the incident. As in New South Wales, the 
average mean difference for females aged 14–17 at the time of the incident was between 0.6 years 
(for act of indecency) and 2.0 years (for sexual assault), but these were much higher for males (6.2 
and 6.5 years for sexual assault and indecent assault, respectively) and especially so for boys aged 
10–13 (10.5 years mean delay for sexual assault and 13.3 years for indecent assault). Again, the 
patterns in Figures 57a and 57b for both male and female complainants are similar to those in New 
South Wales (Figures 13a and 13b). The mean delay in reporting is generally greater for both male 
and female complainants for sexual assault offences except for boys who were aged 10–13 at the 
time of the incident. 
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Figures 57a and 57b. Mean difference between age at incident and age at report for (a) female and (b) male victims 
in South Australia 
Figures 58a and 58b show the delay in reporting for different types of relationship of the suspect 
or person of interest to the victim. As in the New South Wales data, ‘persons in authority’ and 
‘carers’, as a proxy for ‘institutional abuse’, involved much higher proportions of both sexual assault 
and indecent assault incidents in which the delay was 10 years or longer: 73 per cent of sexual 
assaults and 72 per cent of indecent assaults. For parents and other family members, between 25.6 
per cent and 43.5 per cent of these sexual and indecent assaults were reported 10 years or more 
after the incident. Same-day reporting of indecent assaults was highest (61 per cent) when the 
person of interest was not known to the victim: 27.9 per cent for sexual assault and 61 per cent for 
indecent assault.  
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Figures 58a and 58b. Percentage of reported incidents by delay for each person of interest-victim relationship for 
(a) sexual assault and (b) indecent assault in South Australia  
In summary, reports were most likely to be substantially delayed when they involved sexual assault, 
male complainants, and persons in positions of authority. More immediate reports were made in 
cases involving persons not known to the child, and acts of indecency with female complainants. 
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5.3 CASES PROCEEDING TO PROSECUTION  
The analyses of the South Australian data relating to cases in which legal action commenced are 
based on police clearance status data.112  
Just over 40 per cent of incident reports (40.9 per cent overall) were cleared by arrest/report of the 
suspect or person of interest. About one in five (19.1 per cent) were cleared with no further 
action113 or no offence being revealed, and a further one in three (37.6 per cent) were ‘not cleared 
with little or no prospect of proceeding’.114 The ‘not cleared’ rate is consistent with Wundersitz’s 
(2003a) finding for similar earlier data in 2003 (34.4 per cent). A small proportion of incidents were 
cleared due to the death of the person of interest (n = 108) or the complainant (n = 4). In 3.1 per 
cent of incidents, the matter was cleared and marked as ‘no offence being revealed’. This is similar 
to the figure of 2.9 per cent Wundersitz (2003b) reported for ‘unfounded reports’.  
To ensure a similar approach to the New South Wales data analyses, the incidents were categorised 
as ‘legal action being commenced’ when they were cleared by arrest or report; this does not mean 
that all the matters in which a person was apprehended or arrested proceeded to court. It was not 
possible to be definitive about exactly which incidents involved ‘identified’ suspects or persons of 
interest, apart from excluding those where the coding indicated that the suspect had died or was 
clearly not identified.115  
                                                     
112 ‘Clear-up’ status was coded by South Australia Police using 24 codes, which were collapsed following extensive 
discussions with OCSAR about the categories, into:  
 ‘cleared by arrest, report or the issue of a warrant’ – equivalent to the code ‘legal proceedings 
commenced/legal action taken’ used for the New South Wales data  
 ‘cleared’ with no further action or no offence revealed (including insufficient evidence), as well as various 
codes for incident reports that had not been cleared where the case had been ‘filed’ and there was no further 
action  
 ‘cleared’ with no legal action possible – this involved 108 cases where the accused had died and four where 
the complainant had died 
 ‘not cleared open cases’ where the person of interest had not been identified.  
113 The data do not indicate the reasons for ‘no further action’ but Wundersitz (2003b) does indicate that in 2003, 23.6 
per cent of police incident reports involved the victim requesting no further action (Table 2, p 6). 
114 These comprised a small proportion of incidents (5 per cent) that were ‘not cleared and were still being investigated’ 
and a further 2.1 per cent where the ‘suspect was flagged as wanted’. In a technical report on the methodological issues 
of tracking from incident report to finalisation in court in the South Australian data, Wundersitz (2003b) reported that 
about one-third of the police incident reports in 2000–01 had not been cleared, but that ‘other analyses undertaken 
by OCSAR indicate that incidents which are not cleared within the first 12 months have a very low probability of being 
cleared after that time’ (p 6). Fitzgerald (2006) made a similar observation in relation to New South Wales data (Note 
5, p 12): ‘The proportion of incidents with a Person of Interest (POI) criminally proceeded against went from 17.8 per 
cent 180 days after reporting to 19.9 per cent 365 days after reporting.’ 
115 This excluded 2,028 of the 21,919 incidents (9.3 per cent), leaving a total of 19,891 incidents. 
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The following figures (Figures 59a and 59b and Figures 61a to 61b) show the number of incidents 
reported as a child and as an adult since 1992, together with the numbers in which legal action was 
commenced via arrest or report for both sexual assault and indecent assault. 
Sexual offences reported during childhood 
Figure 59a shows the number of incidents in which legal action commenced for child reports of 
sexual assault fairly closely follows the pattern of the number of reported incidents per year. Both 
trend lines are relatively flat but there is much more variation in the numbers reported (ranging 
from 263 in 1997 to 442 in 2003) than in the numbers proceeding (ranging from a high of 213 in 
1994 to a low of 142 in 2004). Overall, legal proceedings commenced in 49.4 per cent of child 
reports of sexual assault incidents from 1992 to 2012: 59 per cent in 1992 and 55 per cent in 2012.  
The pattern is similar for child reports of indecent assault (Figure 59b), again with less variability in 
the number of matters ‘proceeded against’ compared with the number of reported incidents. There 
is, however, more of a downward trend in the number of indecent assault incidents compared with 
sexual assault incidents, and the number resulting in arrest or report. 
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Figures 59a and 59b. Number of incidents of (a) sexual assault and (b) indecent assault reported as a child and 
number in which the person of interest was proceeded against in South Australia 
These patterns for child reports of sexual assault and indecent assault in South Australia are quite 
different to those for New South Wales, where there is increasing divergence between the growing 
number of child reports and the number of reports in which the suspect or person of interest was 
proceeded against. However, in both states the trend lines for the number of matters in which legal 
action was initiated are flat or downward. 
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Unlike New South Wales, these patterns of child reports are not consistent with the trends in the 
number of children involved in substantiated (child protection) reports made to the statutory 
department. In South Australia, the declining number of substantiated reports of sexual abuse until 
2007–08 (Figure 60) is in marked contrast to the peak numbers of sexual assaults and indecent 
assaults reported to South Australia Police between 2001 and 2004–05 (Figures 59a and 59b). The 
number of substantiated reports involving boys fell to a low of 12 in 2006–07 and 63 for girls in 
2007–08 (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare reports, 1999–2015). 
 
Figure 60. Number of children in substantiated sexual abuse reports made to the South Australian statutory 
authority 
The rate of substantiated child sexual abuse reports to the statutory department is also much lower 
in South Australia than in New South Wales, which has one of the highest rates in Australia. The 
rate of substantiated sexual abuse for the period 2008–13 was 0.4 per 1,000 children in 
South Australia, and four times that at 1.6 per 1,000 children in New South Wales.116 Substantiated 
sexual abuse reports to the statutory authority in South Australia also made up a smaller proportion 
of substantiated child protection reports (8.1 per cent) than in New South Wales (18.9 per cent) 
over the period 2008–14.  
                                                     
 
116 Rates per 1,000 children for the period 2008–14 are based on Australian Institute of Health and Welfare data from 
the Child Protection Australia reports for 2008–09, 2009–10, 2010–11, 2011–12, 2012–13 and 2014–15.  
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Child sexual offences reported in adulthood 
Figures 61a and 61b show the number of adult reports of sexual assault and indecent assault, 
respectively, together with the number of cases in which the suspect or alleged offender was 
proceeded against via arrest or report. The trend lines and the pattern of the two lines are generally 
very similar for both types of offence, with the number of cases involving arrest following the 
pattern of the overall number of reported incidents but with a dampened range. The spikes in the 
number ‘proceeded against’ in 2004 and 2007 again are likely to reflect the abolition of the statute 
of limitations in 2003 and the Mullighan Inquiry dealing with historical matters up to and including 
2007. The biggest disparity between the number of reported incidents and the number of suspects 
apprehended occurred at the time of these spikes, suggesting a resource constraint or a possible 
change in the nature and quality of the reports. In contrast to the incidents reported as a child, both 
sexual assault and indecent assault reported as an adult show an upward trend in the number of 
reported incidents and the number in which legal action was commenced. 
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Figures 61a and 61b. Number of incidents of (a) sexual assault and (b) indecent assault reported as an adult and 
number in which the person of interest was proceeded against in South Australia 
The probability of arrest for sexual offences reported in childhood and adulthood 
Figures 62a and 62b show the proportion of sexual assaults and indecent assaults, respectively, 
reported to South Australia Police in which legal action was commenced via arrest or report. Sexual 
assault and indecent assault are presented separately because of the degree of overlap and level 
of fluctuation in both, in contrast to the more parallel patterns for New South Wales. 
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Figures 62a and 62b. Proportion of (a) sexual assault and (b) indecent assault incidents reported before or after age 
18 (as a child or adult) in which the person of interest was proceeded against in South Australia  
As Figure 62a shows, despite a downward trend, sexual assault incidents reported during childhood 
were more likely to proceed than those reported in adulthood until 2002; in the period 2000–09, 
there was little difference between adult and child reports. There was a similar pattern for indecent 
assaults but there was greater fluctuation in the adult reports of indecent assault (Figure 62b). 
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Relationship of suspect to victim by adult or child report 
As Figure 63a shows, the highest percentage of reported sexual assault cases in which legal action 
was initiated by arrest or report was for matters reported in childhood involving a parent or 
guardian (63 per cent), followed by other known person (60 per cent). Legal action was commenced 
in just over half (52 per cent) of the matters involving persons in a position of authority, and in less 
than one-third of matters (30 per cent) involving a sibling. Apprehension by arrest or report was 
somewhat less likely for sexual assault incidents reported in adulthood, particularly those involving 
a parent or guardian (40 per cent) or another family member (20 per cent).  
 
 
Figures 63a and 63b. Proportion of (a) sexual assault and (b) indecent assault incidents reported as a child or 
adult in which person of interest was proceeded against by arrest or report by relationship of suspect to victim 
in South Australia 
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The pattern was similar but flatter for indecent assault (Figure 63b) – 54 per cent for a parent or 
guardian, and 51 per cent for a person in authority and other known person. There was also a 
smaller differential between child and adult reports, except for incidents involving siblings 
(14 per cent for adult reports and 36 per cent for child reports). About 40 per cent of sexual assault 
and 42 per cent of indecent assault reports in adulthood involving a person in authority resulted in 
the commencement of legal action against the suspect by arrest or report. This does not necessarily 
mean that these matters actually reached or were dealt with at court. 
Probability of legal proceedings commencing  
Logistic regression was used to model the association between an arrest or report being 
commenced and, while holding some factors constant, specific police clear-up categories and the 
following factors were used, with the same coding as for the New South Wales analysis: 
 type of offence – sexual assault and indecent assault  
 age of the children at the time of the offence  
 gender of the children 
 extent of the delay between offence and reporting  
 relationship of the suspect to the victim 117  
 year the report was made (2003–12 in line with NSW). 
The police clear-up categories involving the arrest or report of the suspect were treated as the 
binary outcome measure (‘arrest/report’ and ‘not proceed’). The unit of analysis was the incident: 
records in the police database of victims were aggregated by incident number.118 The overall model 
was significant.119 No three-way interactions met the 0.001 criterion for statistical significance, but 
seven two-way interactions, four of which involved the delay variable, and three the relationship 
with the alleged offender, were significant. All variables in the model involved at least one 
interaction so, for the reasons outlined in the description of the results of logistic regression 
analysis of the NSW Police data, the effects of individual variables are described in the context of 
the interactions of which they are a part. The focus is on those interactions that involve delay in 
                                                     
117 This field had more complete data than New South Wales so was included in the analysis. 
118 Records bearing the same incident number always concerned a single victim, and a single report date, but the 
offence and the age of the victim at the time of the offence – and hence the delay between the offence and its report 
– could vary over records. However, the number of aggregated incidents that had combinations of ages and delays was 
very small – 118 and 150 for sexual and indecent assault, respectively, out of the 18,961 incidents in which the major 
offence was either sexual or indecent assault – and were excluded from the analysis. 
119 χ 2 (N = 18,114) = 1,672.25, df = 313, p <.00001. 
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reporting and the relationship of the alleged offender or suspect to the victim; other significant 
interactions are described in Appendix 3 (South Australia). 
Delay by year of report 
Figure 64 shows the (adjusted) probability of arrest or report by the extent of the delay between 
the offence and reporting of that offence by the year of the report.120 The delay ‘effect’ is not as 
clearly differentiated by year in the South Australian data as it is in the New South Wales data, and 
it also appears to show a reverse trend with short delays being associated with a higher probability 
of legal action being taken (represented by higher bars), especially in more recent years. 121 
However, with delays beyond a year the likelihood of legal action being taken, as in New South 
Wales, decreased over time, with the early cases in the 1990s having a greater chance of proceeding 
than those in more recent years.122 
                                                     
120 χ 2 = 187.25, df = 80, p <.00001. 
121 For the delay variable, odds ratios obtained with effect coding, which allowed comparisons of each delay category 
with the average likelihood of legal action, were: 0.94, 0.83, 1.07, 1.57 and 0.77, showing a gradual increase from a 
delay of two days to three months to 1–5 years, followed by a drop to 0.77 for the longest delay. The odds ratio for 1–
5 years (1.57) was significantly different to that at the 0.001 level and that for the 5–20+ years delay was marginally so 
(p = 0.006). The ratios for the interaction contrasts generally did not depart significantly from 1 and did not appear to 
show any systematic trends apart from those already discussed. 
122 The patterns of odds ratios comparing the likelihood of legal action over years with 2002 as the reference category 
were considered separately for each delay category. Odds ratios generally varied between approximately 3 and 0.6 
within years, and the differences leading to the interaction were evident: in the shortest delay category, there was 
relatively little variation, while in the middle three delay categories there was more variation and a tendency for the 
odds ratios to be lowest in the middle of the range of years. In the longest delay category, the odds ratios showed a 
consistent downward trend. 
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 Figure 64. Adjusted probability of arrest or report by delay and year of report in South Australia 
Delay by type of offence  
As Figure 65 shows, if a sexual assault was reported on the same day as it was alleged to have 
occurred, it was more likely to lead to an arrest report than an indecent assault incident (0.58 versus 
0.43, OR = 2.0).123 For longer delays, the rates of arrest or report were similar for the two types of 
offence.124 The likelihood of an arrest or report dropped for both types of offence when the delay 
between the incident and the report was 5–20 years or more (0.36 and 0.33).125 
                                                     
123 The interaction was significant: χ 2 = 48.31, df = 4, p <.00001. 
124 The odds ratios ranged from 1.22 through to 1.17 and 0.88; all were non-significant.  
125 The delay categories combined 5–10 years and 10–20 years, and more than 20 years because of the low numbers 
in these categories. 
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 Figure 65. Adjusted probability of arrest or report by delay and type of offence in South Australia 
Delay by relationship of alleged offender to victim 
This significant interaction between the delay in reporting and the relationship of the suspect to 
the victim was a function of a complex pattern of differences as Figure 66 shows, but the focus here 
is on the effects involving persons in a position of authority in relation to the child.126 The adjusted 
probability of apprehension by arrest or report was generally more likely than not (mostly over 0.5) 
where the alleged offender was a person in authority but dropped to almost half of its high of 0.62 
to 0.33 when the report was delayed by more than five years (Figure 66). For both family members 
(other than parents) and siblings, the probability of arrest generally decreased with increasing 
delay.127  
 
                                                     
126 χ 2 = 102.9, df  = 28, p <.00001. 
127 The odds ratios (obtained with effect coding) showed that the probability of arrest or report was significantly higher 
than the overall rate for persons in authority (odds ratio = 1.58), other family members (1.48), other known people 
(1.21) and parents or guardians (1.20). It was significantly lower for alleged offenders known to the victim (0.46). With 
some variation, this pattern was seen at all delays. A notable variation at a delay of 5–20+ years, where the likelihood 
of siblings being arrested or apprehended, was significantly lower than the average at that delay (odds ratio = 0.53).  
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 Figure 66. Adjusted probability of arrest or report by delay and relationship of suspect to victim in South Australia 
Delay by age of victim  
Figure 67 indicates that for delays of up to a year between the alleged incident and reporting, 
incidents involving younger children (aged under six) and adolescents (aged 14–17) were less likely 
to lead to arrest or apprehension report than those for children in the 6–9 and 10–13 age groups.128 
This difference was reduced for longer delays, and for all age groups, there was a significant drop 
in the probability of a matter leading to apprehension for reports made more than five years after 
the alleged incident.129  
 
                                                     
128 χ 2 = 39.97, df  = 12, p < .0001. 
129 In terms of the simple effects of age, the odds ratios showed that delays of 1–5 years deviated strongly from the 
overall pattern, while the odds ratio for victims in the 10–13 age group (effect coded), which was significantly greater 
than at all other delays, was not statistically significant.  
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 Figure 67. Adjusted probability of arrest or report by delay and age of victim in South Australia 
In summary:  
The probability of a report to South Australia Police resulting in an arrest and legal action decreased 
with increasing delay, especially with delays of five or more years, for both indecent assault and 
sexual assault, but more so for sexual assault; a sexual assault was almost twice as likely to proceed 
if reported within several days than if it was reported five or more years later.  
Around three-quarters of sexual and indecent assault incidents involving a person in a position of 
authority were not reported within 10 years of the date of the alleged offence and the likelihood 
of legal action being initiated in these matters also decreased with increasing delay.  
The most likely matters to proceed involved girls aged 6–9 and 10–13 at the time of the alleged 
offence. 
The least likely matters to proceed were those involving children under six and those where the 
person was unknown to the child. 
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6 SOUTH AUSTRALIAN COURT DATA 
Sexual offences against a child in South Australia may be prosecuted in the higher courts (Supreme 
Court and District Court), the Magistrates Court and the Youth Court, depending on the age of the 
defendant, the seriousness of the charges and the severity of the possible penalties.  
6.1 NUMBER OF PERSONS PROSECUTED 
A total of 7,488 persons were prosecuted130 on at least one sexual charge against a child in finalised 
matters in the four courts over the period 1992–2012. The average number of sexual charges per 
finalised appearance was 3.4 (SD = 4.4) with a median of 2. Most persons had a finalised appearance 
in the Magistrates Court (45.4 per cent), excluding committals,131 or the District Court (38.0 per 
cent). A relatively small number of cases were dealt with in the Youth Court (12.5 per cent) or the 
Supreme Court (4.1 per cent).  
Figure 68 indicates a general upward trend in the number of defendants before the courts, 
especially in the District Court and Magistrates Court. There was a sharp increase from 2005 in the 
District Court and from 2008 in the Magistrates Court. Again, this probably reflects a bump in the 
numbers with some lag time before matters reached the courts following the Mullighan Inquiry. 
                                                     
130 Persons are defined here as ‘persons in finalised appearances’, not distinct persons, as in the New South Wales data. 
In 4.1 per cent of finalisation dates, there was more than one case ID indicating that cases were heard together, with 
more than one defendant. Since South Australia has a unique PIN for each person in contact with the criminal justice 
system, the number of distinct persons was 5,394; 72.7 per cent had only one finalisation date, 19.7 per cent had two 
and the remaining 7.6 per cent had three or more. This excludes 428 young persons whose matters were dealt with by 
way of a family conference.  
131 As in the New South Wales data, persons in the Magistrates Court who were committed for trial and for sentence 
are not included since these are not counted as finalised matters, though they are finalised in an administrative sense 
for the Magistrates Court. The total count of ‘persons’ by the date of finalisation and case ID was 10,085 if committals 
are included.  
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Figure 68. Number of persons charged with at least one sexual offence against a child by year in South Australia 
6.2 TYPE OF OFFENCES  
Table 14 presents the main categories of offences charged according to the JANCO codes and 
descriptions under South Australian legislation. The subcategories relating to age differ from those 
charged in New South Wales (for example, under 12 years in South Australia versus under 10 years 
in New South Wales; and a higher age of consent, 17 years in South Australia). The subcategories 
also include more gender-specific offences (for example, unlawful sexual intercourse with female 
12 to 16 years inclusive). In addition to the age and gender-specific categories (N = 27,756), the 
frequencies in Table 14 include cases in the non-age and gender-specific categories (for example, 
attempted unlawful sexual intercourse with female age unspecified) in which the victim’s age was 
under 18 (N = 8,307). The overall total number of offences was 36,063. 
A small number of offences were specifically charged (n = 820, 2.3 per cent) as offences by ‘a person 
in a position of authority in relation to the victim’.  
Like s 66EA(1) in New South Wales, South Australia has an offence relating to persistent sexual 
exploitation or abuse of a child (s 50), which carries severe penalties. There were 436 offences 
under this category from 1996 to 2012. This offence is rarely charged in either state, but in 
South Australia more charges have been laid each year in 2010–12 (69, 82 and 114, respectively) 
than the New South Wales total of 62 charges since 2000. 
These offences fall into the four main categories used in the analyses and shown in Table 14: sexual 
assault (sexual intercourse/penetration), indecent assault, acts of indecency and 
child pornography. The offence categories in Table 14 are the most common JANCO 
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categories, comprising 78 per cent of the sexual offence categories for charges laid over the period 
1992–2012 in South Australia. The most common categories of child sexual offence charged in 
South Australia (each comprising between 8 and 12 per cent of offences) in order were: 
 indecent assault – age or gender unspecified (11.8 per cent) 
 rape or unlawful sexual intercourse of a female 12 to 16 years inclusive (10.4 per cent) 
 rape or unlawful sexual intercourse of a female under 12 years (10.1 per cent) 
 indecent assault of a female under 12 years (9.1 per cent) 
 rape or unlawful sexual intercourse – age or gender unspecified (8.2 per cent). 
These are listed in Table 14 according to the JANCO codes and the associated penalties under the 
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). 
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Table 14. Number and percentage of JANCO offence categories for most common offences charged 
for victims identified as under 18 years 
Aggregated categories of offence (based on JANCO and Criminal Law 
Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). 
      n 
% of total n 
of offences 
Maximum penalty 
SEXUAL ASSAULT   
 
Unlawful sexual Intercourse by person in position of authority 
(for example, teacher/guardian)  
820 2.3 s 49(5) – 10 years 
Incest  485 2.4 
s 70, s 72(1) – 
10 years 
Rape/unlawful sexual intercourse:     
Rape/unlawful sexual intercourse (SI) – female under 12/attempt 3,642 10.1 *s 48 – life 
s 49(1) – life where 
child under 14 years 
s 49(3) – 10 years 
where child under 
17 years 
s 49(5) – 10 years 
where in position 
of authority 
Rape/unlawful sexual intercourse (SI) – female 12–16 years inclusive  3,731 10.4 
Rape/unlawful sexual intercourse (SI) – male under 12/attempt 927 2.6 
Rape/unlawful sexual intercourse (SI) – male 12–16 years inclusive 624 1.7 
Rape/unlawful sexual intercourse (SI) – age or gender unspecified/17+ 2939 8.2 
Persistent sexual abuse of female/male/unspecified child 436 1.2 s 50 – life  
INDECENT ASSAULT   
s 56(1)(A) – 8 years 
 
s 56(1)(B) – 10 years 
if aggravated – victim 
under 14 years 
Indecent assault female under 12 years 3,266 9.1 
Indecent assault female 12–16 years inclusive  839 2.3 
Indecent assault male under 12 years 1,095 3.0 
Indecent assault male 12–16 years inclusive 348 1.0 
Indecent assault – age or gender unspecified/17+ 4,251 11.8 
Act of indecency    
 
 
 
s 58 – 3/5 years first 
/subsequent offence 
 
s 65B – 10 years, 
12 years position 
of authority 
Gross indecency, incite or procure gross indecency female under 16 
years 
1,691 4.7 
Gross indecency or incite male under 16 years 1,000 2.8 
Child pornography 1,575 4.4  
Total most common offence categories charged 27,669 
78% of total 
offences 
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* s 48(1)(A), s 48(1)(B), s 48(2)(A), s 48(2)(B), s 48(2)C and s 49(1) of Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (CLC Act) 
** s 58(1)(A), s 58(1)(B) and s 58(1)(C) of CLC Act – 5 years; s 63B(1)(B)(1) of CLC Act Basic Offence – 10 years; 
s 63B(1)(B)(1) of CLC Act Aggravated Offence – 12 years 
Table 15 presents the number of persons prosecuted in relation to the four child sexual offence 
categories (n = 9,577).132 The highest number of persons (4,140, 43.2 per cent) were charged with 
sexual assault, with most dealt with in the higher courts (62.3 per cent). One-third of the finalised 
appearances (3,541 persons, 37.0 per cent) were facing indecent assault charges in both the higher 
courts and the Magistrates Court. Only 6.6 per cent (630 persons) were charged with a child 
pornography offence, again mostly in the Magistrates Court (54.1 per cent).  
Table 15. Number and percentage of persons by offence type in finalised appearances by court in 
South Australia 
 
Higher 
courts 
Magistrates 
Court 
Youth 
Court 
Total 
  n  n  n  n % 
Sexual assault 2,579 940 621 4,140 43.2 
Indecent assault 1,544 1,600 397 3,541 37.0 
Act of indecency  463 711 92 1,266 13.2 
Child pornography 269 341 20 630 6.6 
Total 4,855 3,592 1,130 9,577 100.0  
6.3 PERSONS PLEADING GUILTY 
Figure 69 shows the number of persons with at least one charge of sexual offence against a child in 
a given offence category in which there was at least one guilty plea. In the higher courts, there has 
been a marked increase in the number of persons pleading guilty to at least one offence since 2005 
compared with relatively flat trends in the two lower courts. In contrast, New South Wales showed 
a downward trend but any comparison also needs to be seen against the number of persons 
appearing in each jurisdiction. This is taken into account in terms of the proportion of persons 
pleading guilty to at least one offence (see Figure 70). 
 
                                                     
132 Persons within each court are counted for each offence type they are charged with in each finalised appearance.  
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Figure 69. Number of persons with at least one guilty plea by court by year in South Australia 
Figure 70 shows the proportion of persons with at least one charge who pleaded guilty to at least 
one sexual offence against a child. As in New South Wales, there is significant variation across courts 
and over time. Unlike New South Wales, where the proportion pleading guilty has an increasing 
trend, the trend lines are fairly flat or downward in South Australia, with a low of only 31 per cent 
of persons pleading guilty in the higher courts in 2012 compared with 60 per cent in New South 
Wales in 2014. Overall, fewer persons pleaded guilty in finalised appearances in the Magistrates 
Court (overall average of 17 per cent) than in either the Youth Court (36 per cent) or higher courts 
(42 per cent average).  
Figure 70. Proportion of persons who pleaded guilty to at least one charge by court by year in South Australia 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
p
er
so
n
s 
p
le
ad
in
g 
gu
ilt
y
Higher courts Magistrates Court Youth Court
Linear (Higher courts) Linear (Magistrates Court) Linear (Youth Court)
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
p
er
so
n
s 
w
it
h
at
 le
as
t 
o
n
e 
gu
ilt
y 
G
 p
le
a
Higher courts Magistrates Court Youth Court
Linear (Higher courts) Linear (Magistrates Court) Linear (Youth Court)
170 
6.4 COURT OUTCOMES 
Table 16 presents the outcome for persons with finalised charges in the higher courts in 
South Australia over the period 1992–2012. Just over half (57.4 per cent) were convicted of at least 
one offence by being found guilty at trial (46.4 per cent) or pleading guilty  and proceeding to 
sentence (10.9 per cent). Another 15.4 per cent were acquitted or had all charges dismissed at trial. 
A substantial proportion of persons (26.7 per cent) in the higher courts had all charges dismissed 
prior to or without a hearing.133 This included nolle prosequi (20.3 per cent in the District Court, 
and 17.6 per cent in the Supreme Court) followed by white certificates (4.4 per cent in the District 
Court and 0.7 per cent in the Supreme Court).134  
Table 16. Court outcome for persons with finalised charges of a sexual offence against a child in the 
higher courts in South Australia 
Number 
of persons 
 % 
 of persons 
% of persons 
at trial 
Proceeded to trial 2,073 61.8 
Acquitted/other charges dismissed at trial* 515 15.4 24.8 
Convicted of at least one charge 1,517 45.2 73.2 
Proven offence but with no conviction recorded 41 1.2 2.0 
Proceeded to sentence only – guilty plea 367 10.9 
All charges dismissed/not proceeded with prior 
to trial** 
895 26.7 
Total 3,355 100.0 
Total guilty 1,925 57.4 
* Includes 17 persons found not guilty by reason of mental health or insanity.
133 In South Australia, the court outcomes included in the category ‘withdrawn by the prosecution’ are: dismissed under 
the Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA], information quashed, nolle prosequi, not proceeded with, withdrawn, and white 
certificate. Again, citing Hunter and Castle (2004): ‘The ODPP defines a “white paper” or “white certificate” as “where 
the director declines to prosecute any charge and files prior to arraignment, a notice pursuant to the Criminal Law 
Consolidation Act section 276”. According to the ODPP, this commonly occurs where the committal process is 
conducted in the country and there is no ODPP involvement prior to committal. In such instances, once assessed by 
the ODPP following committal, the ODPP may decide that the complaint or information should be more appropriately 
heard in the Magistrates Court (as a summary or minor indictable offence) or should not proceed at all. A ‘white paper’ 
is then lodged with the court.’ (p 6). 
134 It also includes other ‘outcome’ codes relating to charges withdrawn on the application of the prosecution at trial 
and prior to trial, and combinations of these categories. 
** Most were nolle prosequi, white certificates or charges withdrawn by the prosecution; in addition, 19 
accused persons died. 
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Table 17 shows the outcomes for persons with finalised charges in both the Magistrates Court and 
Youth Court. In the Magistrates Court, 889 persons (31.3 per cent) were found or pleaded guilty to 
at least one charge; 148 persons had proven offences but no conviction recorded. A small 
proportion of persons were acquitted (3.6 per cent). Again a very high proportion of persons (65.1 
per cent) had all charges withdrawn prior to a hearing, most commonly when there was no 
evidence tendered by the prosecution. Committals in the Magistrates Court for trial or for sentence 
are not included in this count. 
In the Youth Court, 349 (39.2 per cent) young defendants had a proven offence; for 263 of those 
young persons (75.4 per cent), no conviction was recorded. Likewise, a high proportion of young 
persons (57.5 per cent) had all charges dismissed without a hearing. Nine young people were 
committed for trial to a higher court. 
Table 17. Outcome for persons with finalised charges of sexual offence against a child in the 
Magistrates Court and Youth Court in South Australia 
Magistrates Court Youth Court 
 Number of 
persons % 
 Number of 
persons % 
Convicted of at least one charge 741 26.1 86 9.7 
Proven offence but with no 
conviction recorded 
148 5.2 263 29.6 
Not guilty/all other charges 
dismissed at court 
101 3.6 29 3.3 
All charges dismissed prior to 
hearing* 
1,850 65.1 512 57.5 
Total 2,840 100.0 890 100.0 
Guilty/proven/convicted** 889 31.1 349 39.2 
* Most commonly, the Crown made applications for no further proceedings, and with no evidence tendered and no
hearing. Includes 10 persons who died. 
** Includes persons who pleaded guilty and those who were found guilty as well as 148 persons with proven offence 
but with no conviction recorded. 
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Further analysis of the cases in which all charges were withdrawn or dismissed in South Australia 
across the four courts indicates that relatively few persons with the same PIN had further charges 
laid in relation to sexual offences against a child within three years of their charges being withdrawn 
or dismissed. Most cases were heard in the Magistrates Court for both the earlier and later finalised 
appearances (56 per cent), and the conviction rate for the subsequent appearance was also 25 per 
cent for any sexual offence against a child. The subsequent conviction rate was higher for the 
District Court (55.1 per cent) for the lesser number of cases in which the earlier appearance in any 
court had resulted in all charges being withdrawn or dismissed. 
Figure 71 shows the number of defendants with at least one conviction for a sexual offence against 
a child, either by plea or by finding, by a court. The number of persons found guilty in the 
Magistrates Court showed an upward trend from 2004 with a peak of 473 in 2010. The number of 
persons in the higher courts was consistently lower but showed a very similar pattern.  
Figure 71. Number of persons convicted of at least one charge by court by year in South Australia 
The number of persons convicted of at least one offence is broken down by the main offence 
categories in Figures 72a to 72c.  
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Figure 72a. Number of persons convicted of at least one major sexual offence against a child in the higher courts by 
year in South Australia 
As in New South Wales, the majority of persons convicted of a sexual offence against a child in the 
higher courts were convicted of sexual assault (52.2 per cent). Again, there was significant variation 
in the numbers convicted of sexual assault, with a steep increase from a low of 45 in 2000 to a peak 
of 97 in 2010, and an overall yearly average of 63. About 30 per cent of matters in which a person 
was found guilty in the higher courts related to indecent assault. The numbers convicted of an act 
of indecency with a child in the higher courts were very low, averaging 13; these matters were 
generally dealt with in the Magistrates Court. Convictions for child pornography and related 
offences appeared from 2002 but the numbers increased from 13 in 2007 and ranged from 28 to 
58 from 2008 to 2012. 
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Figure 72b. Number of persons convicted of at least one major sexual offence against a child in the Magistrates 
Court by year in South Australia 
The number of persons convicted in the Magistrates Court of indecent assault shows a downward 
trend with peaks in the mid-1990s and early 2000s. Just under half (46.6 per cent) were convicted 
of indecent assault; 31.5 per cent were guilty of an act of indecency and 19.5 per cent of child 
pornography.  
The number of young people with at least one proven sexual offence against a child in the Youth 
Court was low (averaging 10 for sexual assault and 7.6 for indecent assault), with very few for acts 
of indecency or pornography. Note the changing scale on the three figures (Figures 72a to 72c) 
reflecting the much larger numbers in the higher courts. 
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Figure 72c. Number of persons found guilty of at least one offence type in the Youth Court by year in 
South Australia 
6.5 PROBABILITY OF A CONVICTION 
Comparison of the major offence on which a person was convicted with that with which they were 
charged indicates that about 60 per cent of defendants in the higher courts were convicted on the 
same major charge (or one with the same maximum penalty – 63 per cent in the Supreme Court, 
58 per cent in the District Court). Those figures were higher in the lower courts (Magistrates Court, 
76 per cent; Youth Court, 67.9 per cent).  
Figure 73 shows the proportion of persons who were convicted in the higher courts (after pleading 
guilty or being found guilty at trial or a hearing) of at least one charge by the major offence 
categories.135 The ‘conviction rate’136 for sexual assault was relatively steady over the period 1992–
2012, ranging between 45 per cent and 62 per cent, and averaging 52 per cent. Indecent assault 
followed a similar pattern, averaging 48 per cent.  Acts of indecency and child pornography are not 
included in this graph because of the small numbers involved, but since 2008, the proportion of 
135 These figures exclude categories of offence by jurisdiction in which the number of persons per cell was less than 20 
across the board because a small number base was associated with high proportions. This includes acts of indecency 
heard in the higher courts.  
136 The conviction rate includes those with a proven offence with no conviction recorded; a number of persons in this 
category received a penalty, mostly a supervision order or conditional release. 
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those charged with child pornography who were found guilty has been high – ranging between 82 
per cent and 97 per cent. 
Figure 73a. Proportion of persons in the higher courts convicted of at least one sexual offence against a child by 
year in South Australia  
In the Magistrates Court, there is a downward trend in the proportion of persons convicted of both 
indecent assault and an act of indecency. For indecent assault, the most common sexual offence 
against a child being prosecuted in the Magistrates Court, the overall average conviction rate was 
27 per cent but since 2009 it has fluctuated around 15 per cent. The highest conviction rates 
throughout were for acts of indecency, with an overall average of 42 per cent, and for pornography, 
averaging 54 per cent but with smaller numbers contributing to the fluctuation (Figure 73b).  
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Figure 73b. Proportion of persons in the Magistrates Court convicted of at least one sexual offence against a child 
by year in South Australia 
The rates of proven offences for children and young persons appearing before the Youth Court on 
sexual assault and indecent assault offences both show a downward trend, probably reflecting 
diversionary practices (averaging 34 per cent for sexual assault and 41 per cent for indecent assault, 
again with considerable fluctuation).  
Figure 73c. Proportion of persons in the Youth Court with a proven offence for at least one sexual offence against a 
child by year in South Australia 
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6.6 TIME BETWEEN OFFENCE AND FINALISATION 
Figure 74 shows the time between the offence and finalisation at court. Most matters, across all 
years in both the Magistrates Court (72.5 per cent) and the Youth Court (77.1 per cent) were 
finalised within two years of the date of the offence. Only 13.7 per cent were finalised in the 
Magistrates Court five years or longer after the offence. Matters heard in the higher courts were 
finalised over longer periods from the date of the offence than those in the lower courts; 
54 per cent were finalised within two years of the offence but one in four (25.3 per cent) were 
finalised five or more years after the offence.  
Figure 74. Percentage of defendants by interval between offence and finalisation by court in South Australia 
Note: The period for the higher courts is for 2002–12 because offence dates are not available in the dataset before 
2002. 
Figures 75a and 75b show the time between the offence and court finalisation by year of finalisation 
for both the higher courts and the Magistrates Court. In the Magistrates Court, the vast majority of 
cases were finalised at court within a year of the offence, though this proportion has been 
decreasing since the mid-2000s (height of purple bars). As Figure 74 shows, a small proportion of 
matters are finalised beyond five years of the date of the offence in the Magistrates Court. The 
pattern is quite different in the higher courts, where the proportion finalised within a year dropped 
during the mid-2000s; at the same time, there was a sharp emergence in cases being finalised 20 
years or more after the offence. A similar but less marked pattern appears in the Magistrates Court, 
and both courts reflect the impact of the statute of limitations in South Australia. This was in place 
until 2003, which meant that few historical cases of child sexual abuse were heard until the mid-
2000s, in contrast to New South Wales, where the patterns in both the higher courts and the Local 
Court (Figures 40a and 40b) are quite different from South Australia.  
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
< 1 year 1–2 years 2–5 years 5–10 years 10–20 years 20 + years
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
ca
se
s
Interval between offence and finalisation
Higher courts  Magistrates Court Youth Court
179 
Figures 75a and 75b. Time between offence and finalisation by year of finalisation in (a) higher courts and 
(b) Magistrates Court in South Australia 
Table 18 shows the length of time for matters to be heard on first appearance following the offence. 
That time is significantly longer in the higher courts than in the Magistrates Court, including 
committals for trial and sentence. As in New South Wales, this probably reflects both the greater 
SA higher courts 
SA Magistrates Court 
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number of historical matters in the higher courts and the longer time to report more serious 
offences, and longer delays in getting to and having the matter finalised in the District Court. Once 
the matter reaches court, the time to finalisation from the first appearance is relatively short, 
averaging between 5.8 months in the higher courts and 5.6 months in the Magistrates Court. The 
overall median time from the earliest offence to finalisation at court is 21 months in the higher 
courts, 11 months in the Magistrates Court, and 11 months in the Youth Court: the means are 65.8 
months, 39.5 months, and 27 months, respectively. The median time to finalisation of 21 months 
in the higher courts is about half the time taken in New South Wales (40 months), which may be 
partly related to the much higher rate of withdrawal of matters in South Australia. 
Table 18. Intervals between offence, first appearance and finalisation at court 
Offence to first appearance 
(months) 
First appearance to finalisation 
(months) 
Mean SD Median Mean SD Median 
Higher courts 59.5 106.1 14.0 5.8 7.8 4.0 
Magistrates Court 33.4 87.2 5.0 5.6 10.3 3.0 
Youth Court 22.0 55.8 4.0 5.2 6.7 4.0 
6.7 PREDICTING THE LIKELIHOOD OF A CONVICTION 
Logistic regression was used to model the association between the probability of a conviction 
(either by verdict or plea or a finding that the offence was proven) and factors such as: 
 the type of offence – sexual assault and indecent assault137
 the court in which the case was heard (higher courts and Magistrates Court)
 the gap between the date of the offence and the finalisation date for that matter
 the year the matter was finalised (1992–2012)138
 the gender of the defendant
137 Only incidents involving sexual assault and indecent assault were included in the analyses. 
138 The overall 21-year period 1992–2012 was grouped into seven three-year periods because of the relatively small 
number of cases available for analysis. 
 the age of the defendant at finalisation.
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It should be noted that some cases could not be linked to accused data so the cases used for the 
analysis are a subset of those that occurred in the time period covered. The data-matching process 
(using the unique apprehension number) meant there was a considerable loss of cases, so this set 
of analyses needs to be treated with caution. The difficulties of tracking from the police data to 
court data are clearly explained by Wundersitz (2003a), as outlined earlier. 
The overall model was significant 139  and there were three statistically significant two-way 
interactions. The more important interaction in terms of the research questions was the interaction 
between the court and interval between the offence and finalisation, a proxy for delayed reporting. 
Figure 76 shows that the likelihood of a conviction in the higher courts was greater than in the 
Magistrates Court (p <.0023). With increasing intervals beyond five years, the likelihood of a 
conviction increased in the higher courts but dropped slightly in the Magistrates Court. This is a 
variation on the trend in New South Wales, where there was also a drop-off in the probability of a 
conviction with increasing intervals between the offence and finalisation in the Local Court but not 
in the higher courts. As Figures 75a and 75b showed, only a small proportion of cases in South 
Australia were dealt with where the delay between the offence and finalisation was longer than 
five years, presumably because of the statute of limitations.  
Figure 76. Adjusted probability of conviction by court and interval between the offence and court finalisation in 
South Australia 
The other two interactions are not substantively important in terms of the research questions: 
between the type of court and the type of offence, and between the type of offence and the age 
139 χ 2 (n = 5,159) = 421.4, df = 15, p <.0001. 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
< 1 year 1–2 years 2–5 years 5–10 years 10–20 years > 20 years
P
ro
b
ab
ilt
y 
o
f 
co
n
vi
ct
io
n
Magistrates Court Higher courts
182 
of the defendant at finalisation. The interaction between the type of offence and the court is simply 
a function of a conviction for indecent assault being more likely in the higher courts than in the 
Magistrates Court, as above (OR = 2.6). There was no difference in the likelihood of a conviction for 
indecent assault compared with sexual assault in the higher courts (OR = 0.90).140 As noted earlier, 
the high rate of matters with all charges withdrawn or dismissed in the Magistrates Court clearly 
lowers the conviction rate. The interaction with the type of offence and the age of the defendant 
is a function of older defendants being less likely to be convicted of sexual assault than indecent 
assault.141 None of the other variables (year of the offence and gender of the offender) had a 
significant main effect. 
6.8 SENTENCING ON THE MOST SERIOUS OFFENCE 
The following data on penalties and sentencing are based on the principal sexual offence of which 
the offender was convicted. The principal offence is defined as the offence that receives the most 
severe penalty among the sentences imposed on an offender.  
Table 19 shows the principal or most severe penalty for the 2,761 persons whose matters were 
finalised in the higher court, Magistrates Court and Youth Court in South Australia over the period 
1992–2012. The most common principal penalty in the higher courts (56.1 per cent of persons) was 
imprisonment; 36.3 per cent received a suspended sentence; a much less frequent penalty was a 
supervision order or conditional release (5.2 per cent). 
In the Magistrates Court, a suspended sentence (42.0 per cent) was much more common than a 
custodial sentence (15.4 per cent) or the next most common supervision order or conditional 
release (20.8 per cent).  
In the Youth Court, by far the most common penalty was a supervision order (66.6 per cent). One 
in five young offenders (20.1 per cent) received a suspended sentence, and a very small proportion, 
3.6 per cent, received the most serious or punitive penalty, a detention order.  
140 χ 2 (n = 5,159) = 141.7, df = 1, p <.0001. 
141 χ 2 (n = 5,159) = 19.4, df = 1, p <.0001. For indecent assault, a test of simple slope showed there was no significant 
relationship between the age of the offender and the likelihood of a guilty verdict (OR = 1.0). For sexual assault, 
however, the likelihood of a guilty verdict declined with increasing age, OR = 0.98.  
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Table 19. The principal penalty (number of persons) by court 
Higher 
courts 
Magistrates 
Court 
Youth Court Total 
 n % n % n % N 
Imprisonment 883 56.1 135  15.4 11 3.6 1,029 
Supervision order/detention 2 0.1 – – – – 2 
Suspended sentence 571 36.3 369 42.0 62 20.1 1,002 
Community service order 7 0.4 24 2.7 6 1.9 37 
Supervision order/conditional release 82 5.2 183 20.8 205 66.6 470 
Bond with/without supervision 15 1.0 17 1.9 2 0.6 34 
Fine 11 0.7 147 16.7 17 5.5 175 
Other 4 0.3 3 0.3 5 1.6 12 
Number of persons – offenders 1,575 100 878 100 308 100 2,761 
Figures 77a, 77b and 77c present a breakdown of the principal penalty (generally for the most 
serious offence) for each major offence category for each of the three courts. As with New South 
Wales, the most common principal penalty in the higher courts (Figure 77a) was imprisonment 
across all four major offence categories; unexpectedly it was slightly higher for an act of indecency, 
including procuring a child for gross indecency (76.5 per cent) and indecent assault (66.5 per cent), 
than for sexual assault (60.9 per cent).142 The number of those convicted of an act of indecency (n 
= 196) is much lower than for sexual assault (n = 1,093). Those found guilty of child pornography in 
the higher courts were a little more likely to receive a suspended sentence (46.8 per cent) than a 
custodial sentence (43.5 per cent). Other forms of penalty such as supervision or a fine were much 
less common, and less so than in New South Wales.  
In the Magistrates Court, for all four types of offence, a suspended sentence was much more likely 
than a custodial sentence (Figure 77b). For indecent assault, which was the most common offence 
leading to a conviction in the Magistrates Court, the most common principal penalties were a 
suspended sentence (51.4 per cent), a custodial sentence (22.5 per cent) and a supervision order 
(14.5 per cent). The principal penalty for child pornography was fairly evenly divided between a fine 
(34.3 per cent), a suspended sentence (32.0 per cent) and a supervision order/conditional release 
(22.7 per cent).  
142 This may reflect ‘global sentencing’ where the sentence will be ‘the same’ across all offences for an offender. 
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In the Youth Court (Figure 77c), a bond/supervision order was the most common principal penalty 
for all offence categories; child pornography is not included in the graph because of the small 
number of cases (n = 7). Detention was reserved for a small number of young persons (n = 14); half 
(n = 7) had proven offences of sexual assault.  
Figures 77a and 77b. Percentage of convicted persons with principal penalty by major offence category for the 
(a) higher courts and (b) Magistrates Court in South Australia 
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Figure 77c. Percentage of convicted persons with principal penalty by major offence category for the Youth Court 
in South Australia 
Imprisonment 
As outlined above, imprisonment was the most common principal penalty in the higher courts for 
all offences except child pornography, but much less common in the Magistrates Court. In total, 
1,116 offenders (58.7 per cent of those found guilty) were sentenced to imprisonment in the higher 
courts and 223 in the Magistrates Court (9.2 per cent).  
Table 20 indicates the quantum or median length of the sentence for the higher courts and the 
Magistrates Court for the main offence categories, together with the means. The longest terms of 
imprisonment were for sexual assault offences sentenced in the higher courts: mean of 
71.4 months (SD = 48.7) and median of 60 months or five years.  
Table 20. Length of full-time custodial sentences (months) by principal offence in South Australia 
Higher courts Magistrates Court 
n  Median Mean  n Median Mean 
Sexual assault 663 60.0 71.4 6 11.5 16.7 
Indecent assault 420 48.0  63.2  102 15.4 16.6 
Act of indecency 167 54.0 68.6 35 9.0 10.8 
Pornography 67 20.0 37.8 13 6.0 9.2 
Total persons 1,299 60.0 68.9 156 14.0 14.7 
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Figures 78a and 78b show the percentage of offenders who received a full-time custodial sentence 
as a function of whether they pleaded guilty or not to all charges. Those who pleaded guilty to the 
most commonly prosecuted and convicted offence in the two courts were less likely to receive a 
custodial offence than those who did not: in the higher courts for sexual assault, and in the 
Magistrates Court for indecent assault. The number of persons convicted of sexual assault in the 
Magistrates Court was small, and all pleaded guilty; five received a custodial sentence. 
Figures 78a and 78b. Percentage of persons found guilty who receive a full-time prison sentence by major offence 
category in (a) higher courts and (b) Magistrates Court in South Australia 
Note: The number of persons convicted of sexual assault in the Magistrates Court was small and all pleaded guilty. 
Note: The scale on (b) Magistrates Court is to 50 per cent.  
As in the New South Wales higher courts, the average and median length of custodial sentences 
was shorter for offenders who pleaded guilty in the higher courts to sexual assault and indecent 
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assault than for those who did not (Figure 79), but it was not shorter for those convicted of acts of 
indecency or pornography. There was little difference for offenders who pleaded guilty and those 
who did not in the Magistrates Court, similar to the pattern in New South Wales. Given the number 
of withdrawn and dismissed cases, these offenders may have pleaded to lesser charges in plea 
negotiation with lesser penalties.  
Figure 79. Mean length of prison sentence by major offence category and plea in higher courts in South Australia 
Again, as in New South Wales, the probability of a full-time custodial sentence varied with the 
interval between the offence and finalisation. In the higher courts, the proportion of offenders who 
received a custodial sentence increased as the interval between the offence and finalisation 
increased for both sexual assault and indecent assault, and also for the smaller number of acts of 
indecency. The longer the interval between the offence and finalisation at court, the higher the 
probability of a prison sentence (Figure 80). Few offenders were convicted of pornography after an 
interval of five years or more from the date of the offence, and the proportion of pornography 
offenders who were imprisoned decreased as the interval increased. Child pornography offences 
are relatively recent so there is a cap on the interval from the offence to finalisation. There was a 
similar linear pattern for indecent assault in the Magistrates Court: 15.2 per cent received a 
custodial sentence when the interval between the offence and finalisation was less than a year, but 
this increased to 37.5 per cent and 38.5 per cent when the interval was 10 to 20 years, and over 20 
years. 
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Figure 80. Percentage of offenders who were imprisoned by gap between offence and finalisation by offence type 
in the higher courts in South Australia 
In summary, most persons convicted in the higher courts of the more serious offences of sexual 
assault and indecent assault received a custodial sentence, with the length of the sentences and 
the probability of a custodial sentence increasing with the absence of a guilty plea and with a longer 
interval between the offence and finalisation. In a high proportion of matters, all charges were 
withdrawn or dismissed in the Magistrates Court.  
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7 COMPARING NEW SOUTH WALES AND SOUTH AUSTRALIA 
This section outlines the main similarities and differences between the New South Wales Police and 
South Australia Police and court data, based on the analyses of data from both states over about 
20 years. The cautions concerning the interpretation of these data relate to the limitations of 
administrative data, differences and changes in recording practices, and legislative and policy 
changes.  
Comparisons over time are complicated by numerous and significant changes in legislation that 
include changes in the offences and penalties, in the age of consent for homosexual sexual acts, 
and in South Australia, the abolition of the statute of limitations (Boxall, 2014). Matters that are 
reported some years after the alleged offence are required to be dealt with according to the 
legislation at the time of the offence rather than at the time of prosecution. 
Comparisons across jurisdictions are complicated by differences between the states in legislation 
and the particular offences and penalties, policies and practices, and the way data are recorded 
and managed in the relevant police and court administrative databases. 
7.1 TRENDS IN REPORTING 
The number of reports to police of sexual offences against children in New South Wales and 
South Australia show some marked differences in trends. In New South Wales, the number of 
reports of sexual assault steadily increased from 1995 to 2014, but not for the other offences. In 
South Australia, the pattern of reports for child sexual assault and indecent assault ran together 
from 1992 to 2006, but separated from 2006 onwards, with a more marked downward trend for 
indecent assault. In both states, the peaks in reporting numbers coincided with or closely followed 
large inquiries into the police, child protection and out-of-home care systems – notably in New 
South Wales, the Wood Royal Commission Paedophile Inquiry which reported in 1997, and the 
Wood Special Commission of Inquiry into Child Protection Services which reported a decade later 
in 2008, and the Layton and Mullighan inquiries in South Australia, which reported in 2003, 2005 
and 2008. Such inquiries attract considerable media attention, increasing public awareness, and 
generally result in changes to child protection policy and practice that are likely to 
increase reporting. 
Both states, however, show very similar patterns for the main features relating to the victims, the 
types of offence, the proportion of child and adult reports, and the relationship of the person of 
interest/suspect to the victim. Consistent with the typical gender breakdown for child sexual abuse, 
the majority of victims were female in both states: 75.3 per cent in New South Wales and 78.7 per 
cent in South Australia (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2015; O’Leary and Barber, 2008; 
Priebe and Svedin, 2008). In both states, the proportion of male victims was somewhat higher for 
indecent assault than for sexual assault. In South Australia, 25.1 per cent of indecent assault 
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incidents involved male victims compared with 17.8 per cent for sexual assault. In New South 
Wales, the figures were 26.3 per cent for indecent assault and 20.9 per cent for sexual assault. The 
child sexual abuse substantiation figures reported by the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 
also indicate a higher proportion of boys with substantiated reports in New South Wales than in 
South Australia, which is consistent with the higher proportion of males reporting to police across 
a number of years.   
The age pattern for victims is also very similar across the two states. In both states, the number of 
reported sexual assault and indecent assault incidents rose with increasing age, with the exception 
that victims of indecent assault aged 10–13 in South Australia were more numerous than their 
younger or older counterparts.143 When gender was added to the picture, boys were more likely 
than girls to be aged under 10. In both states, those aged 14–17 were significantly more likely than 
other age groups to have reported sexual assault than other types of offence. This is consistent with 
the findings of Australian crime victimisation surveys with respect to sexual assault; indeed, the 
highest rate of sexual assault victimisation in 2013 was for females aged 10–14 (at 559 per 100,000 
members of the female population compared with 419 for the next highest group of females aged 
15–24) (Australian Institute of Criminology, 2016, p 15). The patterns of the relationship of the 
person of interest/suspect to the victim were also very similar across the two states. These patterns 
are consistent with research findings indicating that the vast majority of sexual offences against 
children are perpetrated by someone known to the child, and quite commonly a family or 
household member (Finkelhor, 1994). Most common, however, is another person known but 
unrelated to the victim, a number of whom were under 18. In both states, about 7 per cent of 
matters (in which the relationship of the suspect to the victim was recorded) involved ‘persons in 
authority’ (as a proxy for ‘institutional abuse’ as defined by the limitations of the police databases); 
and in both states was higher for indecent assault than for sexual assault. In New South Wales, the 
proportion of indecent assault reports to police involving ‘persons in authority’ was on average 7.5 
per cent and 4.3 per cent for sexual assault. In South Australia, the comparable figures for persons 
in a position of authority in relation to the child were 9.2 per cent for indecent assault (with a high 
of 14.3 per cent in 2004) and 3.5 per cent for sexual assault. The higher proportion in the early to 
mid-2000s in South Australia likely reflects the activity of the Layton and Mullighan inquiries.  
When considering persons of interest or suspects in relation to child sexual abuse, the focus is 
generally on adults, and in relation to ‘institutional abuse’, on adults who are in positions of 
authority. However, a significant and increasing proportion of the persons of interest or suspects 
in both states were children or young persons under 18 – 22 per cent in New South Wales and 20 
per cent in South Australia.  They included siblings, another family or household member and most 
                                                     
143 The number of 10-year-old children in New South Wales increased by 12 per cent from 1990 to 2015 compared with 
a flat 0.3 per cent for boys and 2 per cent for girls in South Australia over the same period. But this is likely to provide 
only a partial explanation of the different trends of reports made in childhood in both states (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2010, 2015).  
191 
 
 
commonly, other persons known to the victim. Where the location of the incident was an 
educational institution, over half of the suspects were under 18, children or young persons as 
opposed to adults. The majority of the victims were aged 10–15.  
7.2 DELAYS IN REPORTING 
In both New South Wales and South Australia, about 80 per cent of the reports were made when 
the complainant was still a child (aged under 18). The proportion of child reports was slightly higher 
in South Australia (84.3 per cent) than in New South Wales (80.6 per cent); this may be because the 
statute of limitations was in place until 2003 in South Australia. However, the year by year trends 
for the type of offence differed, and in some cases were reversed from New South Wales to South 
Australia. The most marked trend in New South Wales was a steady increase in child reports of 
sexual assault, but a generally flat pattern for adult reports after the peak following the Wood Royal 
Commission.  
By contrast, in South Australia, reports to the police during childhood for sexual assault were flat, 
and there was an overall downward trend for indecent assault. Unlike New South Wales, the 
pattern of reports to the police did not reflect the number of children in substantiated child sexual 
abuse reports to the child protection statutory authority. The substantiation rate for sexual abuse 
in New South Wales (for the period 2008–13) is one of the highest in Australia, and four times that 
of South Australia. It is not clear to what extent these differences might relate to differences in the 
paths that reports to child protection and to police take in the two states, how they are recorded, 
and the way they are dealt with; New South Wales has had a specialist investigatory response to 
child sexual abuse and serious physical abuse involving police and child protection since the mid-
1990s.  
Again in contrast to New South Wales, adult reports of child sexual assault in South Australia 
showed an upward trend with strong peaks for both sexual and indecent assault between 2003 and 
2007. The most likely explanation for the growth in adult reports in South Australia is the abolition 
of the statute of limitations in June 2003 and the backlog of prosecutions once this barrier was 
removed.  
In both states, most reports were made within three months of the incident, but there was an 
upward trajectory in the number of reports made beyond 10 years after the offence date, especially 
for sexual and indecent assault. In both states too, males were more likely to delay their reporting, 
and for longer, than females. The longest delays occurred when the person of interest/suspect was 
a person in a position of authority. For these suspects, the majority of reports were made at least 
10 years after the incident, especially in South Australia; 75 per cent of reports of sexual assault 
involving persons in a position of authority in South Australia were made 10 years or more after the 
incident compared with 56.5 per cent in New South Wales. The state difference was much more 
marked for indecent assault: 72.1 per cent in South Australia and 45.3 per cent in New South Wales. 
This may reflect the abolition of the statute of limitations and the impact of the Mullighan Inquiry.  
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In summary, in both states, reports to the police of sexual offences against children are more likely 
to involve girls, and suspects known to the child, including family members; where the report 
concerned sexual assault, children were likely to be older (aged 14–17). About 20 per cent in both 
states involved persons of interest under 18 including siblings, family and household members and 
other peers at school. Only a small proportion (about 7 per cent) involved persons in a position of 
authority, but when they did, the majority of those reports were made with long delays, 10 years 
or more after the incident. Delayed reports were also more common for boys than for girls.    
7.3 LIKELIHOOD OF CASES PROCEEDING 
A minority of cases that came to the attention of the police in New South Wales and around half 
the cases in South Australia resulted in legal action being commenced against the suspect or alleged 
offender. However, the commencement of legal action by arrest, report or issuing a court 
attendance notice does not necessarily mean the suspect appeared in court. As outlined earlier, 
there are a number of reasons a case may not reach court, including a family deciding to withdraw 
after the suspect is arrested or the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions deciding that a case 
should not proceed. Some caution is also needed in comparing the two states because of likely 
differences in recording practices and in defining incidents in the police databases. Overall averages 
can also hide significant differences associated with a number of factors: time or year of report; 
type of offence; gender of the child and age at the time of the offence; and whether it was reported 
when the victim was a child or an adult.  
First, there is substantial variation over time, which also varies with the type of offence and year of 
report. For example, the person of interest was more often identified for adult reports than for 
child reports in New South Wales, and more likely to be proceeded against for adult reports than 
for child reports of both sexual and indecent assault. In New South Wales, the proportion of reports 
in which legal action was initiated against the person of interest has shown a downward trend for 
both adult and child reports of both sexual assault and indecent assault. The patterns were 
somewhat different for South Australia, where there has been an upward trend in legal action being 
initiated for adult reports, and especially for indecent assault; again this likely reflects the abolition 
of the statute of limitations and the activity of the Mullighan Inquiry. However, child reports in 
South Australia are trending downward, in contrast to child reports in New South Wales.  
The proportion of reported incidents that resulted in legal action in the most recent three years in 
each state was somewhat different between the two states, and again between child and adult 
reports of sexual assault and indecent assault. Figure 81 summarises the number of reports of 
sexual assault and indecent assault for the years 2012–14 for New South Wales and 2010–12 for 
South Australia, together with the proportion of both types of offence in both states in which legal 
action was initiated. In New South Wales, legal action commenced in 16.6 per cent of child reports 
and 33.0 per cent of adult reports of sexual assault. Indecent assaults accounted for 19.3 per cent 
of child reports and 35.1 per cent of adult reports.  
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In South Australia, in the three years from 2010 to 2012, the proportions were markedly higher, 
especially for child reports, though the number of reports was much lower. The proportions of child 
and adult reports cleared by arrest/report were also more even. These proportions were calculated 
as the proportion of reported incidents in which the suspect was apprehended (via arrest/report). 
More than half (55.4 per cent) of the sexual assault reports and 45.7 per cent of the indecent assault 
reports made in childhood resulted in an arrest or report; for sexual and indecent assault reported 
in adulthood, the proportions were 45.5 per cent and 48.8 per cent, respectively. 
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Clearly, there are marked differences between the two states in overall reporting trends and in 
comparisons of recent years. The policies and practices relating to recording reports are likely to 
differ between the two states, but it is unlikely that this explains the different trends over time in 
both states. In New South Wales, the growing gap between the increasing number of child reports 
and the number in which legal action is initiated is of concern – though there has been a small 
reduction in the size of that gap recently. As outlined earlier, the Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare child protection figures for the number of children involved in substantiated child sexual 
abuse reports are consistent with this upward trend in child reports in New South Wales. As 
outlined in more detail earlier, there are several possible explanations for increased recording of 
reports, even where the person of interest is not identified. The increased recording of reports 
coincided with the establishment and expansion of the Joint Investigation Response Teams; 
changes to the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW), which came into 
effect in 2000; the expansion of mandatory reporting; and the introduction of a centralised helpline 
and recording system for child protection matters.  
In New South Wales, the decreasing trend in the proportion of matters in which legal action was 
initiated may be a result of resource constraints in terms of cases taking more time to prepare for 
court. O’Brien et al. (2006) found similar trends for an earlier period (1995 to 2006 for both child 
and adult victims of sexual offences), with an increase in the proportion of incidents reported to 
police where the suspected offender was identifiable but a decline in clear-up rates, and a 
substantial drop in the number of persons of interest proceeded against. Both O’Brien et al.’s (2006) 
study and the current research confirmed that these patterns were not associated with greater 
numbers of younger complainants coming forward for whom investigation and prosecution is likely 
to be more difficult. The increasing proportion of peer to peer reports may, however, contribute to 
the reduction in the proportion of cases in which legal action is taken because they are likely to be 
dealt with differently by the police and child protection workers, especially where the ‘suspect’ and 
the ‘victim’ are of similar age. 
Not surprisingly given the likely evidentiary issues for young children, reported incidents of sexual 
assault or indecent assault were least likely to result in legal proceedings where the child was aged 
six or younger (Bunting, 2014). In New South Wales, there was a clear curvilinear relationship 
between the probability of a case proceeding and the age of the victim when the age difference 
between the victim and the suspect was at least five years. Legal action was more likely to be 
initiated for children aged 7–15. In South Australia, there was a slight curvilinear trend in the 
likelihood of arrest or report for a sexual assault or indecent assault by age, with cases involving 
children under six least likely to proceed, followed by older adolescents aged 14-17, and then 
children aged 6–13. This age-related finding is consistent with the curvilinear relationship reported 
in several other studies (Bunting, 2008; Leach et al., 2015; London et al., 2005; Walsh et al., 2010). 
In both states, incidents involving boys were also more likely to ‘proceed’ with increasing age at the 
time of the alleged offence. The lower proportions for child reports also suggest that adults coming 
196 
 
 
forward to report offences that occurred in childhood may be more willing and able to identify the 
suspect, and may perhaps be more determined complainants. This issue is discussed in more detail 
later.  
There were similarities between the two states in that legal action was more likely for suspects who 
were persons in a position of authority, for children aged 7–12 at the time of the incident, for 
adolescent boys compared with adolescent girls, and when the incident was reported as an adult.  
7.4 PROSECUTION AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONVICTION 
The trends in the number of defendants in finalised appearances in South Australia and New South 
Wales courts were again rather different. In South Australia, there was a general upward trend in 
the number of defendants with at least one sexual offence against a child, in both the District Court 
and the Magistrates Court after 2008. This is consistent with the increased likelihood of the police 
initiating legal action, especially for sexual and indecent assaults reported in adulthood, and with 
the lag in increased numbers following the various inquiries in South Australia. In New South Wales, 
the trend in the number of defendants appearing in both the Local Court and higher courts is flatter 
after the Wood Royal Commission bulge, and also tends to follow the pattern of reported incidents 
in which the police initiated legal action.  
The plea rate, as measured by the proportion of persons in finalised appearances who pleaded 
guilty to at least one charge, also differed between the two states, across courts, and across time. 
In New South Wales, the plea rates were higher in the higher courts (fluctuating around 49 per cent) 
than in the Local Court (fluctuating around 35 per cent); both showed an upward trend over time. 
In South Australia, the plea rates were the reverse; lower in the District Court (fluctuating around 
20 per cent) than in the Magistrates Court (fluctuating around 30 per cent), with a downward trend 
over time. The plea rates in the higher courts in South Australia were also markedly lower than 
those in New South Wales (an overall average of 20 per cent compared with 49 per cent), despite 
concern in New South Wales that the High Court’s decision in Muldrock v The Queen (2011), which 
held that the standard non-parole periods apply even if the defendant pleads guilty, reduced the 
incentive to plead guilty.144 
                                                     
144 As outlined earlier, the increase in the plea rate in New South Wales from about 2007 may reflect the effect of the 
standard non-parole period legislation; the drop-off from 2011 may reflect the removal of an incentive to plead guilty 
following the High Court’s decision in Muldrock v The Queen. A seven-member bench of the High Court in Muldrock v 
The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120 considered the application of Part 4 Division 1A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) 
Act 1999 (the Act) when sentencing offenders convicted of standard non-parole period offences. The Court of Criminal 
Appeal had held that the non-parole period imposed upon Mr Muldrock was inappropriate and was critical of the 
197 
 
 
The conviction rates, like the plea rates, also differed between the two states, more so in the higher 
courts (62.3 per cent in New South Wales and 51.3 per cent in South Australia) than in the lower 
courts (44.7 per cent in New South Wales and 39.4 per cent in South Australia). The conviction rate 
was also somewhat higher in the New South Wales Children’s Court (47.9 per cent) than in the 
South Australian Youth Court (41.4 per cent). The conviction rates also differed relative to the 
length of time between the offence and finalisation at court. In New South Wales, the conviction 
rate showed little variation in the higher courts (fluctuating between 54 per cent and 63 per cent) 
as the interval between the offence and finalisation increased, but there was a significant drop-off 
in the Local Court when the gap increased beyond two years (from 35 per cent for 1–2 years to only 
8 per cent for longer than 20 years). There was a similar but not significant trend in South Australia, 
but the statute of limitations was a barrier to prosecution until 2003.  
A significant difference between the two states, and one that affects the calculation of the 
conviction rates and may also affect plea rates, depending on when the charges are withdrawn or 
dismissed, is the much greater proportion of matters that are withdrawn or dismissed in 
South Australia compared with New South Wales. In both the higher and lower courts, the rates in 
South Australia are about double those in New South Wales. In the recent three-year period 2010–
12, 30.2 per cent of persons in finalised appearances in the higher courts in South Australia had all 
charges dismissed prior to a hearing compared with 14.9 per cent in New South Wales in 2012–14 
(see Figure 81). Most of these cases in South Australia were by way of nolle prosequi, white 
certificates or charges withdrawn by the prosecution, and combinations of these categories. In the 
Magistrates Court and the Youth Court, the rate was even higher at 65 per cent and 62.6 per cent, 
respectively, compared with 34.1 per cent and 27.4 per cent in New South Wales.  
The higher proportion of such matters ‘withdrawn by the prosecution’ in South Australia compared 
with other states was the subject of a special report by OCSAR in 2004 in response to information 
published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) based on 2001–02 higher court matters 
(Hunter and Castle, 2004). The OCSAR report analysed 80 cases where the South Australian ODPP 
queried the classification or method of finalisation in the ABS 2001–02 report; in half the cases 
withdrawn by the prosecution, fresh information was laid. The OCSAR report, like the ABS report, 
dealt with all offences, not just child sexual offences, and concluded that, apart from counting rule 
errors, the higher rate in South Australia ‘could reflect: 
 Differences in the application of the ‘reasonable prospect of conviction’ test in deciding 
whether to prosecute a criminal offence … 
                                                     
sentencing judge’s failure to consider the ‘objective seriousness’ of the offence and the part that the standard non-
parole period should play in determining the appropriate sentence. This was overturned in the High Court, but the 
reasoning of that court indicated that the standard non-parole periods in the legislation were a guidepost for all 
sentencing decisions, whether or not the defendant pleaded guilty. The court held that R v Way (2004) 60 NSWLR 168 
was wrongly decided. 
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 Whether the ODPP or police prosecutions handle matters prior to committal.’  
The 2004 OCSAR finding that fresh charges were laid in 40 of the 80 cases initially withdrawn by the 
prosecution suggests that, in South Australia, the ODPP may withdraw charges and lay new ones to 
start a new prosecution rather than change the charges, as is the case in New South Wales. If this 
was the case, it would inflate the number of finalised appearances and substantially increase the 
cases that are withdrawn or that have all charges dismissed, reducing the calculated conviction 
rate. However, our analysis of the cases in which all charges were withdrawn or dismissed in South 
Australia over the period 1992–2012 does not support this hypothesis. While 37 per cent of cases 
before courts in that period were withdrawn or dismissed, relatively few persons with the same 
PIN had further charges laid in relation to sexual offences against a child within three years of their 
charges being withdrawn or dismissed. 
An OCSAR follow-up review in January 2013 of the withdrawal rates for all offences in the higher 
courts in South Australia confirmed that the rate is higher than for Australia as a whole, and has 
been ‘steadily increasing’ since 2004–05 (OCSAR, 2013, p 1). For example, in 2010–11, 29.1 per cent 
of defendants in South Australian higher courts had withdrawn matters compared with 13.5 per 
cent for Australia as a whole (ABS, 2012). The withdrawal rate for sexual assault and related 
offences was higher than for other offences (32.2 per cent in South Australia and 20.0 per cent for 
Australia). The review examined the reasons for cases being withdrawn via a white certificate or 
nolle prosequi in ODPP briefs and reported that the main reasons were the complainant not 
proceeding (not being willing or able to do so), poor or insufficient evidence, and the complainant 
not being up to proof. The OCSAR review indicated that acceptance of a plea to a lesser charge was 
apparent in a very small percentage of cases. The percentage of white papers was substantially 
higher in the circuit courts (though the number of circuit court matters was much smaller) than in 
the Adelaide courts, probably reflecting differences when the prosecution is initially run by Police 
prosecutors rather than ODPP solicitors. In South Australia, the Committal Unit within the ODPP 
assesses all major indictable offences in the metropolitan area prior to committal, while South 
Australia Police performs this role in regional areas. The ODPP annual report suggested that matters 
where the ODPP is not involved prior to committal are more likely to be withdrawn by way of a 
white paper, which is rarely used, if at all, in other states.  
It seems then that there are differences in the application of prosecutorial discretion in 
South Australia and New South Wales. As Figure 81 indicates, a much higher proportion of cases 
proceed via arrest or report than in New South Wales, though this does not necessarily mean they 
get to court. A much higher proportion of cases are withdrawn once they get to court in 
South Australia than in New South Wales, with a large number of cases withdrawn by the 
prosecution or by no further proceedings via nolle prosequi or white certificates. One reason for 
this may be the late assessment of the quality of the evidence and the willingness and capacity of 
the complainant to proceed, as well as possible overcharging. 
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7.5 LIKELIHOOD OF IMPRISONMENT 
Consistent with the greater penalties imposed by the legislation in both states for sexual assault 
offences, relative to indecent assault and acts of indecency, the rate of imprisonment was 
significantly greater for sexual assault, and in the higher courts where defendants were more 
commonly charged with sexual assault as their principal offence. The rate of custodial sentences 
over the last three years was, however, higher in New South Wales than in South Australia: in New 
South Wales, the overall rate of imprisonment in the higher courts was around 84 per cent for both 
sexual assault and indecent assault compared with 52.3 per cent for sexual assault and 59.6 per 
cent for indecent assault in South Australia.  
The higher rate of imprisonment in New South Wales is consistent with Brignell and Donnelly’s 
(2015) cross-jurisdictional comparison of full-time imprisonment for child sexual assault offences. 
Brignell and Donnelly (2015) explain the difficulty of making such comparisons for child sexual 
assault (broadly defined as ‘sexual penetration’). This is because of the ‘large number and different 
types of child sexual offences within each jurisdiction’ and the different delineations according to 
the age of the victim and the circumstances of offending, such as the child being under the care, 
supervision and authority of the offender (p 15).  
In New South Wales, the age delineations are for children aged under 10, 10–14 and 14–16, with 
greater penalties for younger victims, and for aggravated circumstances; the child being under the 
guardianship or care of the offender is an aggravating factor. The statutory maximum penalties for 
the three age groups without aggravation are 25, 16 and 10 years, respectively; in aggravated 
circumstances, the statutory maximum penalties increase to natural life, 20 and 12 years, 
respectively. In South Australia, the age delineations are for children aged under 12 and under 17. 
For the under 12 age group, the statutory maximum penalty is life; for the under 17 age group, it is 
10 years. There is no difference in the penalty when the person is in a position of authority, in which 
case, the age of the victim extends to persons aged under 18, rather than 17.145  
Comparing and interpreting sentencing over time and across jurisdictions is also complicated by 
the proportion of historical cases (reported as an adult) that result in a conviction, with the 
requirement that the court sentence be determined according to the legislation and penalties as 
they were at the time of the offence. There are also complex differences in sentencing regimes and 
the calculation of sentences (Freiberg, Donnelly and Gelb, 2015).  
In summary, there are similarities relating to the characteristics of the victims, delayed reporting 
and imprisonment rates. There are also unexpected differences relating to reporting trends and the 
                                                     
145 In a comparison of the penalties for sexually assaulting a child aged under 10, New South Wales has a much higher 
rate of full-time imprisonment than either Victoria or Queensland (89 per cent in New South Wales, 76 per cent in 
Victoria and 70 per cent in Queensland). The median head sentences were also much higher (84 months in New South 
Wales, 72 months in Queensland and 48 months in Victoria) (Brignell and Donnelly, 2015). 
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likelihood of legal action being initiated after a report is made to police, and in conviction and 
imprisonment rates.  
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8 THE IMPACT OF DELAYED REPORTING  
There are several main sources of delay in the reporting and prosecution of child sexual offences, 
and indeed any crime: the time the complainant takes to report the alleged offence to the police; 
the time the police take to investigate and determine whether to lay charges; and the time the 
courts take to deal with matters referred for prosecution. This report focuses on the time 
complainants take to report the alleged offence to the police and its associated effects. In 
particular, this report has focused on the differences between matters that are reported while the 
victim is still a child, aged under 18, and those reported in adulthood, in some cases years or even 
decades later. 
8.1 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HISTORICAL MATTERS AND THOSE REPORTED IN CHILDHOOD  
Few studies have compared reporting to the police and the prosecution of child sexual assault 
offences according to whether they were reported in childhood or adulthood. Most of the 
comparisons have been between adult and child victims, not according to the time at which 
the alleged offence was reported but according to the age of the victim when the alleged 
offence occurred.  
Bunting’s (2014) study of police records in Northern Ireland found that about one-quarter of child 
sexual offences were reported during adulthood. This is consistent with, but somewhat higher than, 
19.4 per cent in New South Wales and 16 per cent in South Australia. Consistent with the findings 
of other studies in Australia and elsewhere, males were more likely than females to delay for longer 
before reporting to the police in both New South Wales and South Australia (Bunting, 2014; O’Leary 
and Barber, 2008; Priebe and Svedin, 2008). For example, in Bunting’s study, males comprised 15 
per cent of child reporters and 28 per cent of adult reporters; the vast majority of adult reporters 
had delayed their report to police for 11 years or longer.  
8.2 DIFFERENCES IN THE LIKELIHOOD OF PROCEEDING TO PROSECUTION  
The association between adult and child reporting, the length of delay, and the likelihood of the 
matter proceeding was not straightforward in Bunting’s study in relation to female and male victims 
of different ages at the time of the offence. Bunting’s (2014) study of 2,079 reports to police in 
Northern Ireland reported a lower likelihood overall for adult reports to proceed (10.2 per cent 
compared with 14.2 per cent for child reports). For adult females who had been very young at the 
time of the offence and who had delayed reporting till many years later, the likelihood of legal 
action being taken increased as the delay increased; this was not the case for females who were 
adolescents, nor for males of any age, at the time of the offence. As Bunting (2014) concluded: 
While teenagers were found to be the group most disadvantaged by reporting delay, increased 
delay actually appeared advantageous for some groups, notably adult females reporting offenses 
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that occurred when they were 0 to 6 years old. Conversely, adult males reporting child sexual 
abuse did not appear to benefit from increased delay. (p 557) 
Bunting interpreted these findings in terms of police reluctance to proceed with very young 
witnesses because of concerns about the children’s credibility and capacity to withstand 
questioning in court, overriding concerns about memory recall and the admissibility and evidentiary 
issues of ‘older’ cases (Connolly and Read, 2006; Ernberg et al., 2016). It is also likely that a selection 
effect is operating, in that adults may be less likely to report offences when they were very young 
if there was no corroborating evidence. However, it is not clear why this would apply to females 
and not males; in Bunting’s study, matters in which adult males reported alleged offences at this 
very young age were the least likely to proceed. 
The association between the New South Wales and South Australia Police data on the likelihood of 
legal action being initiated in adult and child reports was not straightforward either; nor was it 
similar to that reported by Bunting (2014). Bunting found that cases were more likely to proceed 
when the victim was pre-adolescent (aged 7 to 12 years) at the time of the offence, both for child 
and adult reports; reports made immediately or within a year of occurrence were the most likely 
to proceed. In New South Wales, legal action was more likely with increasing delay, until the delays 
extended to 10 to 20 years, after which the likelihood of legal action decreased. In South Australia, 
the pattern was quite different – reports of sexual assault were somewhat more likely to result in 
legal action with immediate reporting but there was little difference for indecent assault.  Clearly, 
there is no simple, straightforward association between reporting delay and the likelihood of legal 
action being taken when a number of factors are taken into account. Indeed, in the most recent 
South Australian data for the period 2010–12, there was little difference between the likelihood of 
arrest or report for child and adult reported offences (see Figure 81: 51 per cent compared with 
46.4 per cent). 
There are several possible explanations for the perhaps counterintuitive finding of delayed reports 
in New South Wales being more likely to proceed than those reported more quickly. One 
explanation articulated by a Crown prosecutor was that the complainants in historical matters are 
generally willing to proceed in contrast to those involved in recent reports: 
Very often if they have delayed reporting for some time, and now they are reporting, they are 
quite vehement about proceeding whereas if you have a child where it’s just been reported, 
the parents are trying to balance whether this is in the best interests of the child to proceed. 
In contrast, cases of same day or next day disclosure in childhood may involve more situations 
where parents, having made an initial report to the police, decide that they do not want to proceed 
with the prosecution. Christensen, Sharman and Powell’s (2016a and b) recent studies throw some 
light on the characteristics of cases in which either parents or children decide to withdraw their 
complaint. Complaints involving older children (adolescents aged 13–15) and those with suspects 
outside the family, and involving single incidents were more likely to be withdrawn than other 
cases. The proposed explanations are similar to those outlined by Bunting (2008): that older 
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children are more likely to understand the negative implications of the investigation and court 
process, and may see themselves as more blameworthy or want to protect the suspect. It is also 
possible that the parents of older children may be less supportive (Christensen et al., 2016a and b). 
Where a single incident involves someone outside the family, parents may be more reluctant to 
proceed, wanting their children to move on with their lives rather than have to keep it ‘alive’ in 
their memory for the course of legal proceedings. Solicitors and Crown prosecutors also suggested 
that the wider availability of counselling may mean that some people see it as an alternative way 
of dealing with their experiences rather than trying to get some closure from a criminal conviction. 
They also indicated that parents are more aware than they were a few years ago of the stresses 
and strains of going through the criminal justice system, despite special provisions, including closed-
circuit television, to remove the child from the courtroom.  
Another explanation relates to police being more likely to charge when there is corroboration and 
supporting evidence, though corroboration and physical or medical evidence are not common in 
child sexual abuse matters (Christensen, Sharman and Powell, 2015; Powell, Murfett and Thomson, 
2010; Walsh, Jones, Cross and Lippert, 2010). In Walsh et al.’s US study, 46 per cent of child sexual 
abuse cases had no supporting evidence; not surprisingly, they found that alleged offenders were 
more likely to be charged in ‘cases with a child disclosure, a corroborating witness, an offender 
confession, or an additional report against the offender … controlling for case characteristics’ (p 
436).  
One solicitor commented that if a child discloses on the day of the abuse or the next day, without 
direct evidence, corroboration may be difficult. With historical child sexual assault, however, 
corroboration may come from the child telling somebody else at the time or soon afterwards (as 
evidence of first complaint). Evidence may also be led as to other people the complainant has told 
about the abuse in the intervening years. There may also have been multiple complainants over 
time in historical child sexual assault matters, so the police, looking at records, may discover 
complaints from a number of children who are now adults who tell similar stories. There may also 
be a selection factor with adult reporters more likely to come forward when they have 
corroboration and supportive evidence, which also removes some of the burden from the 
complainant witness.  
8.3 DIFFERENCES IN THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONVICTION  
Child sexual abuse matters, and particularly historical matters, are generally regarded as among the 
most difficult cases to prosecute because of the degrading effects of time on the evidence and the 
difficulty of finding the correct charges, as well as evidentiary and admissibility issues with delayed 
complaint. If the wrong charges are laid and prosecuted as a result of uncertainty about the timing 
of the offences under the relevant legislation at the time, it may not be possible to obtain a 
conviction. For example, one solicitor observed that it is much easier to find an appropriate charge 
for a female victim than for a male victim because various charges were eliminated when 
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homosexual behaviour was decriminalised. In some cases, uncertainty about the timing of the 
abuse may make it very difficult to lay the correct charge and to obtain a conviction.  
In contrast to the view that adult complaints of historical sexual abuse are determined and credible, 
ODPP solicitors and prosecutors also said that these witnesses are often ‘damaged’ by the abuse 
and may not be able to provide sufficient detail to support the elements of the charges. If their 
accounts contain inconsistencies and lack details, and if there is little other corroborative evidence, 
their credibility when giving evidence is likely to be poor.  
Perhaps surprisingly then, there was no drop-off in convictions for sexual assault with increasing 
delays between the offence and finalisation in the higher courts in either state. This was not the 
case for indecent assaults or cases heard in the lower courts. This is likely to be at least partly a 
function of both the seriousness of the offence and the type of court. ODPP solicitors and Crown 
prosecutors suggested that both the police and ODPP lawyers are likely to prepare the brief more 
thoroughly for the higher courts than the lower courts, and sexual assaults are more likely to be 
dealt with in these courts.  
The fact that there was no diminution in the conviction rate with longer delays in the higher courts 
is counterintuitive given concerns about evidentiary issues and the impact of warnings to the jury 
about the dangers of delayed complaints (Cossins, 2002, 2010b; Flatman and Bagaric, 1997–98). 
ODPP solicitors, like a number of commentators, were critical of the law regarding directions to 
juries, which they saw as making it very difficult to achieve a conviction, especially in relation to 
delayed complaint (Australian Law Reform Commission and Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission, 1997; Cossins, 2012; Mirfield, 2015; Shead, 2013). But there was a general consensus 
among Crown prosecutors that the changes to the Longman warning had brought a substantial 
improvement.  
However, there is some indication that judges may view adult witnesses more positively than 
children, in terms of cognitive ability, even though all the complainants were children at the time 
of the alleged offence/s (Connolly, Price and Gordon, 2010). ODPP lawyers also suggested that 
juries may be likely to believe a complainant-victim in ‘old’ matters with long delays; in the words 
of one, ‘otherwise why would you come forward after all these years?’ There is also the possible 
selection factor, and the view that testifying in such matters is very stressful and complainants are 
unlikely to go through all it entails unless they are determined and reliable witnesses. As outlined 
earlier in relation to corroborative evidence, multiple complainants against one suspect or 
defendant may lend credibility to each other if tendency and coincidence evidence is admissible. 
For example, in one historical matter involving a scoutmaster, five complainants had very similar 
experiences of abuse as young adolescents but had not discussed it with each other until 10 or 
more years later. They sought legal advice from a solicitor and reported to the police together. 
Their matter proceeded relatively quickly and smoothly, apart from several adjournments and an 
aborted trial, and the scoutmaster was convicted and received a custodial sentence (see case study 
1). 
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The problems in leading similar factual evidence in separate trials can make prosecuting cases with 
multiple complainants very difficult. Both solicitors and Crown prosecutors observed considerable 
variation between judges in allowing tendency or coincidence evidence to be heard and in ordering 
separate trials where there are multiple victims or offenders (Hamer, 2015). ODPP solicitors 
reported seemingly strong cases which resulted in acquittals after the judge ordered separate trials.  
Solicitors and Crown prosecutors said one explanation may be that the evidence the jury hears from 
a child is difficult to understand or accept if the charges against the individual are treated in 
isolation from the context. For example, one solicitor spoke of a case in which a nine-year-old child 
gave evidence about his sexual assault by a paedophile ring. Without the benefit of knowing that 
the child had first been groomed and abused by perpetrator A, and then passed on to perpetrator 
B, it must have made little sense to the jury that the child could have engaged in anal sex with Mr 
B, a 40-year-old perpetrator, without knowing him and without apparent resistance. The jury was 
not allowed to know the context that would have made sense of the child’s evidence.  
In another case, a music teacher had already been convicted of offences against two teenage boys, 
A and B, in two separate trials. He stood trial again for alleged offences against two other boys, C 
and D. He was convicted. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeal held that separate trials should 
have been held in relation to the charges relating to these two boys. In the first retrial for the 
alleged offences against C, the accused was acquitted on all counts. In the second retrial, dealing 
with the alleged offences against D, the trial judge discharged the jury during the Crown case. The 
same occurred on a third retrial. On a fourth retrial, the accused was acquitted on all counts in 
judge-alone proceedings. 
During the retrials for the matters of C and D, these complainants each appeared as a witness in 
the others’ matters. However, unlike their previously jointly-run trial, they were now not permitted 
to give evidence or indeed mention in any way their own abuse, only that which they observed 
occurring to the other. Many of the offences involved the accused assaulting B, C and D 
simultaneously or, under the command of the accused, the boy’s performing sexual acts upon each 
other. This ruling, according to prosecutors involved in the retrials, had a devastating effect on the 
case, such as: 
 the boys having to choose their words so carefully – so as not to fall foul of the ruling and risk 
another mistrial – that they appeared hesitant, unsure and evasive in their evidence 
 the boys evidence did not flow, seemed out of context, and appeared artificial 
 the high risk that the jury, unaware of the restrictions, were negatively influenced by the way 
in which the boys gave their evidence. 
 
CASE STUDY 1: Institutional child sexual abuse – scoutmaster: five adult complainants 
Five male complainants were aged 24 to 27 years in 2012 when they reported to the police indecent assault 
by their scoutmaster some 10 to 12 years earlier, when they were young adolescents. The first disclosure 
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was made in 2009, when one of the five told a close friend, not a complainant, and then later the same year, 
told another who had been in the same scouting group. He also sent texts to two others, and when they 
met, they each disclosed that they had been subjected to the same forms of indecent assault. Together they 
went to a solicitor and made separate statements. The solicitor then contacted the police on their behalf 
and an investigation was opened. The younger brother of one of them also later made a statement, after 
initially refusing to do so.  
A month later, MR was arrested and charged. The matter was referred to the ODPP three weeks later and 
MR was charged with 10 counts of aggravated indecent assault in relation to each of the five complainants 
(s 61M(2) – person under 16 years old). MR was released on bail under the supervision of his treating 
psychiatrist and directed not to frequent or visit any place where Scouts NSW meets or holds meetings or 
activities. He waived his right to a committal hearing. The case proceeded on these charges. 
The initial mention date was in October 2012, but there were several adjournments, mostly related to 
outstanding brief items before the first trial date, in October 2013. The first trial was aborted on day two 
when a jury member sent a note to a court officer that she knew one of the witnesses. The entire jury was 
discharged on the basis of possible contamination. A second jury was empanelled the following week. 
The trial began with lengthy legal argument about tendency and coincidence evidence.146 In this case, the 
Crown argued that the specifics of the acts alleged were so strikingly similar in nature they could not be 
mere coincidence. The judge found in favour of the Crown and the tendency and coincidence evidence was 
admitted. The accused was found guilty on nine of the 10 counts of aggravated indecent assault. He was 
sentenced in December 2013. He had no prior criminal record. His overall sentence was four years 
imprisonment, consisting of a non-parole period of two years, six months imprisonment, and an additional 
period of one year, six months. The sentences ranged from a fixed term of nine months’ imprisonment on 
one count to three years imprisonment on the longest sentence.  
8.4 DIFFERENCES IN THE LIKELIHOOD OF IMPRISONMENT  
In both New South Wales and South Australia, the probability of a full-time custodial sentence 
varied with the interval between the offence and finalisation. In the higher courts, in both states, 
the longer the interval between the offence and finalisation at court, the higher the probability of 
                                                     
146 Tendency evidence is evidence of the character, reputation or conduct of a person, or a tendency that a person has 
or had, which is adduced to prove that the person has or had a tendency (whether because of the person’s character 
or otherwise) to act in a particular way, or to have a particular state of mind. Coincidence evidence is evidence that 
two or more events occurred, and is adduced to prove that a person did a particular act or had a particular state of 
mind on the basis that, having regard to any similarities in the events, it is improbable that the events occurred 
coincidentally. The test for admissibility under the Evidence Act is whether the tendency or coincidence evidence has 
significant probative value that substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have on the defendant.  
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a prison sentence for sexual assault. 147  It is not clear why there should be this difference in 
sentencing for sexual assault reported in childhood or in adulthood; indeed, since offenders need 
to be sentenced in accordance with the legislation at the time of the offence, and the penalties 
have generally increased substantially over the last few decades, it seems counterintuitive. One 
possibility is that historical cases may be prosecuted in relation to multiple children at the same 
time, resulting in many convictions and a higher likelihood of imprisonment, though separated trials 
may result in fewer convictions overall, and hence a lower likelihood of imprisonment. Another 
possibility is that the abuse and its effects may be more serious or longstanding for those who have 
delayed reporting the abuse for many years. That impact may be one reason they decide to report, 
and their victim impact statement detailing these effects may also be taken into account.  
CASE STUDY 2: Institutional child sexual abuse – police officer with church affiliation  
In 2010, Rebecca* (pseudonym), 23, received an anonymous email with a link to a website containing 
graphic images of a naked 15-year-old girl performing fellatio on the cameraman. She realised she was the 
girl in the photo. She had joined her local church youth group as a shy 14 year old, and was taken under the 
wing of the group’s leader, 31-year-old police officer, JN. He was a popular and trusted youth leader, a 
talented artist and keen photographer. He ‘groomed’ Rebecca with gifts and handwritten letters, convincing 
her to have sex with him and to pose naked for photos. He ensured her silence with romantic tales of 
clandestine lovers and threats about losing his job and his life being ruined if anyone found out.  
JN had also groomed another group member, Eve, who was very upset when she saw JN kissing Rebecca. 
She spoke to the church’s senior pastor and his wife, disclosing that she had been having sex with JN since 
she was 15. The pastor indicated that he did not believe her story and she was soon asked to leave the 
church. The pastor also wrote to JN warning him that: ‘This ministry is full of dangers which can be as 
damaging to yourself and for the youth work of this church’ … [To] ‘protect you and to protect ourselves in 
times of accusation, do not allow Rebecca to express her affection to you physically on church grounds.’ 
Eve’s report to the police was also met with disbelief; JN told his fellow police officers she ‘was not to be 
believed’, that she was ‘crazy’ and had been ‘thrown out of the church for causing trouble’. Accessing the 
police computer system, JN made a series of unauthorised enquiries about the matter, and coerced Eve into 
retracting her complaint, preparing two letters for her to sign. 
The website Rebecca saw contained photos of other girls she recognised from her church youth group. They 
were in the same bedroom, with the same wallpaper and in the same explicit poses. She also recognised 
JN’s 10-year-old neighbour. 
JN was arrested in August 2010. On the grounds that he faced a significant delay in proceedings, he was 
granted strict conditional bail. In August 2012, JN was arraigned on an indictment containing 52 counts 
relating to four complainants. The charges included multiple counts of sexual intercourse with a child 
                                                     
147  The pattern was not consistent for indecent assault, increasing in New South Wales but with a curvilinear 
relationship in South Australia. 
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between 10 and 16 years, aggravated indecent assault, using a child for pornographic purposes, and 
disseminating child pornography, with one count of perverting the course of justice. 
JN pleaded not guilty. The first trial was aborted after a jury member with narcolepsy was noticed repeatedly 
falling asleep. JN was found guilty of 44 of the charges in the second trial.  
JN was sentenced in December 2012 to a total of 10 years and 11 months imprisonment with a non-parole 
period of seven years and five months. The judge described JN as a ‘serial seducer of underage females who 
betrayed the trust of all those who entrusted their daughters with him. He demonstrates a callous disregard 
for the rights of the vulnerable and used his position of power and influence over his victims for his own 
sexual exploitation and gratification’. He was sentenced to five years jail for perverting the course of justice 
but lodged an appeal. 
Rebecca’s victim impact statement described the impact on her of the betrayal of what she thought was 
love. Eve described feeling isolated, alone and without the support of the church she had trusted:  
He was the minister of the church and I told him and it just got disregarded. JN isolated me from my 
parents and made me think they were against me. People from the church that I was friends with, he 
told them to stay away from me, that I was a big liar. He used scare tactics to bully me. I just wanted 
things to go back to the life I had. 
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9 SYSTEM DELAYS 
The delays that complainants have little or no control over are system delays: the time taken for 
reports to be investigated; complainants and suspects interviewed; evidence collected; charges 
laid; referrals made to the ODPP; pleas negotiated; and court dates set. Unexpected delays also 
occur. Perhaps more difficult for complainant/witnesses to deal with are the unexpected and 
sometimes multiple adjournments, cases not being reached in the court list, lengthy legal argument 
and voir dire, and aborted trials. The uncertainty that comes with these delays can be very stressful, 
both emotionally and practically. In some cases, complainants/witnesses simply want to get on with 
their lives and may be unwilling to continue. Of course if complainants/witnesses decide to 
withdraw before a hearing or after an aborted trial, the prosecution case has to be withdrawn, and 
a potential conviction is avoided. 
9.1 ADJOURNMENTS AND DELAYED HEARINGS 
Proceedings are adjourned for a number of reasons. Data on the number of adjournments are 
available only in the Local Court and Children’s Court in New South Wales, but it indicates that more 
than 40 per cent of matters in the Local Court have between two and four adjournments and a 
further 42 per cent have at least five. Trials in the higher courts are also postponed or aborted for 
a variety of reasons. The case files and discussions with ODPP solicitors and Crown prosecutors 
pointed to numerous cases with delays of many months before the trial began because judges, 
defence counsel, interpreters or key witnesses were not available; trial dates were vacated to 
gather further evidence; the defendant was ill; or new lawyers were appointed.  
A backlog of trials also means that cases may not be reached when listed. Weatherburn and 
Fitzgerald’s (2015) study of delays at the New South Wales District Court found that since 2012, 
there has been a steady increase in the number of trials pending in that court, with the average 
time between committal and finalisation increasing since 2010. This is due to an increase in 
the number and percentage of persons committed for trial who actually proceed to trial, and 
an increase in the number charged with strictly indictable offences, including historical 
sexual offences (pp 4, 7). Weatherburn and Fitzgerald also found that the number of late guilty 
pleas, with nearly 30 per cent of defendants committed for trial changing their plea to guilty on the 
day of trial, is contributing to congestion and delays in the District Court. It also means that the 
court needs to list an increased number of trials to ensure that court time is not wasted (New South 
Wales Law Reform Commission, 2014). This is consistent with a common complaint from solicitors 
and Crown prosecutors in New South Wales that cases are listed for trial but are not reached 
because more cases are being listed than there are courts or court time available to proceed. While 
the courts may try to prioritise child sexual assault trials, as the Crown prosecutors observed, there 
are more trials than judges, Crown prosecutors and courtrooms. The result is that some cases that 
are ready for trial cannot go ahead. The shortage of court time also means that where the hearing 
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cannot be completed within the set time, the complainant’s evidence is interrupted; in one case, 
this involved a six-month wait from evidence-in-chief to cross-examination.  
CASE STUDY 3: Delays 
The case involved indecent assault charges against the grandfather of a 16-year-old complainant, heard in a 
Local Court. The offences were reported in September 2013, four years after they were alleged to have been 
committed. The accused was charged a month later, and the first mention at court followed a month after 
that. It was listed for summary hearing six months later. On the first day, the complainant attended but did 
not commence giving evidence. The second day of the hearing was set down for six months later, and the 
complainant completed her evidence-in-chief, watching her recorded investigative interview. During the 
hearing, the defendant was reported to be unwell, and the hearing was adjourned. It was then a further six 
months until the complainant was able to be cross-examined. These long delays occurred because these 
were the first available court dates. This meant a wait of at least 18 months from the first court mention to 
beginning cross-examination, and longer to complete it. The complainant was reportedly visibly distressed 
by these delays. 
CASE STUDY 4: Court file – Institutional child sexual abuse 
In a case involving the sexual assault of a teenage girl by the principal of her school, there were seven 
adjournments after the initial court mention following charges being laid.  
Reasons for the adjournments included finalising the date range of the offending, negotiating with the 
defence about appropriate charges, plea negotiations, and obtaining material relevant for sentencing such 
as the accused’s medical records.  
On nearly all these occasions, the girl and her mother made a seven-hour drive to Sydney from their country 
town, each time having to pay a qualified person to stay at their farm and provide 24-hour care for another 
relative. Eighteen months later, the school principal pleaded guilty. 
A recent case of historical sexual assault illustrates the kinds of delays that complainants, other 
witnesses and lawyers may experience after the decision is made to prosecute. In this case, there 
were multiple complainants. The first of these complaints was made in August 2011. In September 
2012, charges were laid against the accused. Nearly a year later, in August 2013, the accused was 
committed for trial. In May 2014, the trial was adjourned on application by the defence because an 
expert report had not been obtained. In August 2014, there was a voir dire hearing. The matter was 
listed for hearing in April 2015, the first date that suited defence counsel. Those dates were 
subsequently vacated to allow the defence to appeal against the voir dire ruling in April 2015 in the 
Court of Criminal Appeal. Four years after the report to police, it was still not clear whether the trial 
would go ahead. 
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9.2 IMPACT OF DELAYS, ADJOURNMENTS AND RETRIALS 
Delays and retrials can have significant emotional and practical costs for complainants and their 
families. They can have a rollercoaster effect on complainants, who prepare emotionally for a 
committal hearing and the setting of a trial date, only to see the trial adjourned. They then have to 
be emotionally ready again, with other possible setbacks before the matter reaches a conclusion. 
Crown prosecutors indicated that by the time cases reach them, the parents have often been 
waiting for a very long time. Sometimes they have reached ‘the end of their tether’ – or they have 
been living in hope of a guilty plea which does not eventuate. One solicitor also pointed out that 
the process of going through the criminal justice system may be counter to the counselling the 
complainant is receiving. That counselling may involve moving on from the abuse, whereas the 
criminal justice process requires the complainant and their family to keep being prepared to 
remember it in great detail. The stress and the delay sometimes cause victims to give up.   
CASE STUDY 5: Delays 
A case listed for hearing in the District Court in Sydney involved two male complainants of child sexual 
offences, both of whom were 18 at the time of the hearing. They were required to attend court on a Tuesday. 
Initially, legal argument was expected about having separate trials, and the two complainants would need 
to give evidence on a voir dire. However, no judge was available to hear the matter that day. The 
complainants waited until lunchtime and then were told to return the next day. They did so. They waited 
until 2 pm the next day and because no judge was available, they were told to return the following day. A 
judge was allocated to the case the following morning. The judge heard legal argument, and ordered that 
the trials be separated. One of the trials began that afternoon. The second complainant and his family had 
to return home to await the start of a separate trial seven months later. In the end, both trials resulted in 
hung juries. The cases were listed again for trial nine months later, but neither complainant wanted to 
continue with the matters, so both were ‘no billed’. 
Complainants and their families can also face significant practical costs. In one case a one-day 
adjournment was followed by a decision to vacate the trial dates. The three complainants all 
resided a long way from Sydney – two of them in other states. One complainant took all his holiday 
leave from work to attend the trial. In another case, the complainant took voluntary redundancy 
from his work so that he could give evidence without the stress of being at work, and to ensure that 
he was emotionally ready. The trial dates in his case were vacated due, initially, to a legal aid issue. 
The case was set down again for the following week, then adjourned again for another two weeks. 
Meanwhile, new complainants emerged and the case had to be adjourned again. It was 
rescheduled for six months later. 
Appeals may also result in retrials and a lengthy process. ODPP solicitors outlined a case that 
involved a successful appeal against conviction; the Appeal Court held that certain evidence should 
not have been admitted. This was followed by a hung jury at the second trial, and a conviction again 
at the third trial. When the prosecution began, the complainant victim was 17 years old. By the 
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time the offender was convicted, he was 22. His late adolescence and early adulthood were 
affected by the need to give evidence at three trials that were attended by delays and uncertainty.  
9.3 ISSUES CONCERNING POLICE AND COURT DATA 
Monitoring of the criminal justice system and policy development in this area would benefit from 
databases that can ‘speak to each other’ and allow cases to be tracked across the different stages 
of the reporting, investigation and prosecution process. As outlined earlier, it is currently not 
possible to track matters from reporting to the police, through the investigation and prosecution 
process to court, and finalisation at court including pleas, conviction and sentencing. For example, 
in New South Wales, the link between police and court data is lost when the ODPP alters the 
charges from those originally laid by the police (Fitzgerald, 2006). According to ODPP solicitors, this 
is common, particularly in relation to plea and charge negotiations. If the final ODPP charges 
included a reference to the original police ‘H number’, then the New South Wales Bureau of Crime 
Statistics and Research (BOCSAR) would be able to use the administrative JusticeLink system to 
track matters from police to court. However, matching across matters is still difficult, even where 
there is a common linking case number, as in South Australia. As Wundersitz (2003b) pointed out, 
the flow of cases through the criminal justice system is ‘neither simple nor linear’ (p 2). 
A second issue in relation to court data is the lack of information about the complainants/victims. 
The court data have several functions in relation to administration and reporting of crime statistics, 
but using such data for research into serious crimes against the person, including child sexual 
offences, is difficult and time-consuming because court data do not include information about the 
age or gender of the victim. The sections of the Act under which charges are laid provide the 
information used in this report, as outlined earlier, but this may miss cases where the charges laid 
are not age-referenced (for example, aged under 10, under 14, 14 to 16 years). The analyses of the 
South Australian data in this report indicate, for example, that about 22 per cent of the cases 
identified as involving victims aged under 18 related to JANCO codes for charges where the age or 
gender of the child was unspecified or related to 17 year olds. Administrative planning and policy 
development would benefit from a clearer understanding of how many children of various ages are 
witnesses in matters where there are guilty pleas, and no pleas, and who need special provisions 
such as closed-circuit television and the use of intermediaries, which is currently being introduced 
in New South Wales. 
More importantly for the Royal Commission, the data on institutional abuse are inadequate. 
Information about the relationship of the alleged offender to the victim has frequently been missing 
and determining whether a case involves institutional abuse is not at all straightforward.  
As Weatherburn and Fitzgerald (2015) point out, court data are also inadequate for understanding 
and managing the recent increasing delays in the District Court:  
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There are no routinely collected data, for example, on the number of times trial cases are listed for 
trial; the percentage that proceed to trial at first listing; the time required to obtain the results of 
forensic testing or transcripts of tape-recorded evidence; the duration of trials involving different 
times of offence; or the amounts of time spent by the District Court hearing trials, sentence matters 
and appeals. (p 8) 
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10 CONCLUSION 
While the available police and court databases have shortcomings in relation to identifying 
institutional child sexual abuse and tracking cases as they move through the criminal justice system 
from report to the police and through the court system, the comparison across states and over time 
is valuable for several reasons. Such comparisons highlight the attrition processes at each point in 
the criminal justice system, and, importantly, help answer some questions about the impact of 
delays on the prosecution of sexual offences against children. There has been little research to date, 
either in Australia or internationally, comparing reporting to the police and the prosecution of 
sexual offences against children according to whether they were reported in childhood or 
adulthood. Some of the findings are rather unexpected, with historical matters more likely to result 
in legal proceedings, or at least legal action being commenced. In the higher courts, convictions 
were just as likely and imprisonment more likely with longer delays to finalisation. 
The other unexpected finding was the increasing and relatively high proportion of reports 
(20 per cent) involving young persons under 18 as the person of interest. With the option for other 
diversionary processes and appropriate exercise of discretion, these peer to peer reports are the 
least likely to result in legal action, especially when there is little age difference. While the focus of 
sexual abuse has generally been on adult offenders, there is increasing recognition that the risks to 
children may also come from other children and young persons, not just from bullying, but from 
sexually abusive behaviours (Finkelhor, Ormrod and Chaffin, 2009). 
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12 APPENDICES 
The appendices are organised by state (New South Wales and South Australia) followed by the 
Child Sexual Offence Appeals in the NSW Criminal Court 2005-2013 Report by Associate 
Professor Rita Shackel.  
Note: Appendix 1 (NSW) outlines the data cleaning and management processes for both New 
South Wales and South Australia. 
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13 APPENDICES: NEW SOUTH WALES 
Appendix 1 (New South Wales) 
Appendix 1 provides an outline of the data analysis processes and the relevant unit of analysis 
– incident/major offence/victims/accused/court. It also includes an explanation of the COPS
analysis using ‘events’ rather than ‘incidents’, and the use of the 18-year cut-off for children 
rather than the 16-year cut-off used in COPS. 
Data cleaning and aggregation processes 
Four datasets were provided by the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research 
(BOCSAR): 
 One each for incidents; victims; and persons of interest (POIs), derived from the NSW
Police COPS database, and
 Courts database.
The incident file contained one record per incident, and each incident is part of an ‘event’. The 
majority (approximately 90 per cent) of events consisted of a single incident, and incident was 
used as the unit of analysis (in line with BOCSAR’s usual reporting practice). The incident file 
contained, among other information, the date of the incident and its report, a classification of 
the incident type, and whether proceedings had occurred with respect to one or more POIs. 
A criminal incident is defined in the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research 
data as an activity detected by or reported to police that:  
 involves the same offender(s)
 involves the same victim(s)
 occurs at the one location
 occurs during one uninterrupted period of time
 falls into one offence category
 falls into one incident type (for example, ‘actual’, ‘attempted’, ‘conspiracy’).
For example, one incident may involve two offenders sexually assaulting the same victim. This 
is recorded as one sexual assault incident if the offence fell into the same category. 
Incident type was recoded to create five categories that aligned with the categories used by 
the Judicial Commission and with the court data. These are: 
 sexual assault defined as sexual intercourse
 indecent assault
 act of indecency/aggravated act of indecency
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 child pornography/grooming for pornography and other sexual offences148
 other sexual offences
The three datasets derived from COPS and provided by BOCSAR could be linked by the incident 
number, which was contained in each file. More than one victim and POI record could be 
associated with a given incident. The strategy used to combine the incident, victim and POI 
data was to make ‘wide’ versions of the latter two files which contained as many instances of 
a variable as there were victims or POIs. The datasets were merged by incident number to 
produce a wide dataset for use in descriptions and analyses. The summary variables had to 
accommodate information for more than one person. For example, both girls and boys could 
be associated with an incident, and there could be a mixture of ages. It should be remembered 
though, that in the majority of cases, only one victim (in approximately 90 per cent of incidents) 
and one POI (in 86 per cent of incidents) was associated with a given incident.  
Courts data 
Consistent with the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research definitions, the 
counting unit is persons charged in finalised court appearances or persons found guilty in 
finalised court appearances or the number of finalised charges.  
Each record in the court data file concerned a single defendant, who could be represented in 
the file more than once in a year (approximately half occurred only once) associated with 
different charges, different finalisation dates and, sometimes, different courts. Those who 
were committed for trial were not counted in the Local Court, and those who were committed 
for sentence in the higher courts were included in that court’s count (‘Proceeded to sentence’). 
In principle, court and POI data (and thus incident and victim data) could be linked using a code 
created by police which identifies the offence (called the H number or code). However, the 
linkage was from complete because the number was changed or simply omitted if the DPP 
changed the charges, which is often the case. In theory, the date of birth of the accused, and 
other information, could be used to augment the H number to allow the linkage, but missing 
data and other factors left some POIs unlinked or linked with some uncertainty. Following 
preliminary investigations, and discussion with BOCSAR, no attempt was made to link the court 
data with the data derived from COPS.  
148 ‘Grooming/procuring’ and the ‘child pornography’ categories may include reports of crimes that affected a 
particular victim, and other matters where police intervention led to the arrest of an offender but no specific 
victim was involved. Arrests for possession of child exploitation material frequently relate to images of children 
who are not identified and are almost certainly not Australian citizens. On advice from the Chief Statistician for 
NSW Police, we checked and excluded ‘proactive’ matters from our analyses ‘by filtering out the matters which 
have no victim, or for which there is no victim date of birth’. 
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Other modifications and exclusions for the New South Wales data 
 New variables were created using age 18 rather than age 16 (age of consent) as the
threshold for both the age at offence and age at report. ‘Child’ is defined in the NSW
Police COPS data as ‘under 16’, since the age of consent in New South Wales is 16. The
category or variable 'child victim reported as a child' in the COPS data therefore means
the victim/complainant was under 16 years at the time of the offence and also at the time
of the report; ‘child victim reported as an adult’ means that the victim was over 16 by the
time of the report. The change in age threshold to 18 ‘brought in’ an additional 400 cases
where the incident occurred when the child was 16 or 17 years old and/or where the
report was made when the complainant was 16 or 17.149 The analyses based on the 16-
and 18-year thresholds were very similar.
See also Explanatory Notes in BCSR Annual Reports. 
149 This involved some data reconciliation and cross-checking since we were advised by the Chief Statistician of 
the New South Wales Police Force (email 14 March 2014) that: ‘The COPS data using the four categories (child 
sexual assault reported as a child, reported as an adult, and indecent assault reported as a child, and reported as 
an adult) were subjected to data cleaning to remove incident reports with anomalous date of birth information 
when these four categories were created several years ago, across the available years to 1992. If you get a new 
download that is defined based only on the date of incident, date of report and victim date of birth then it may 
be the case that checking and rectification of anomalous dates will have to be re-done.’  
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13.1 APPENDIX 2 (NEW SOUTH WALES): ANALYSES TO COMPARE THE ‘EFFECTS’ OF:  
We compared the effects of: 
 using ‘incident’ or ‘event’ to analyse the likelihood of proceeding with at least one person
of interest (POI) per ‘event’
 defining child as ‘under 16’ or ‘under 18’ (in line with the Royal Commission’s definition).
Further analyses were carried out using EVENT rather than INCIDENT as the unit of analysis and 
also to check whether there were any substantive differences in using age 16 as the cut-off for 
‘child reporting’ as is in the case in COPS (where 16 is the age of consent) rather than 18 (as 
defined by the Royal Commission in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child).  
The COPS data dictionary defines: 
An ‘incident’ as an occurrence of something of interest to the Police, involving one group of 
parties, occurring at the one place at the one time or over a period of time, and falling into 
the same incident category (INCCAT1). 
 An event is made up of a group of related incidents. An event requires Police to initiate a 
chain of actions which must be seen through to an accountable outcome. An event may 
involve one or more possible breaches of the law and there are some events which do not 
involve any breaches of the law, but still require some action by Police. An incident does not 
have to involve a breach of the law but BOCSAR is only interested in incidents which do. 
The original incident data were aggregated into events by year of report. An event was 
classified as involving a sexual assault if at least one of the incidents making up the event was 
said to involve sexual assault. The same approach was used with indecent assault. Thus an 
event could involve both sexual assault and indecent assault. Using information attached to 
the incident file from the victim file, an event was said to involve a victim under 18 at the time 
of report if at least one of the incidents involved a victim under 18 at the time of the report. 
Note that the decision about whether an incident or event was reported by a child (under 18) 
did not come from the variable in the incident file, but from the aggregated data in the victim 
file. If at least one of the incidents associated with an event had resulted in legal action 
commencing for the, the event was said to have resulted in proceeding with a POI. 
The first graph shows the probability of at least one POI proceeding per event by year and age 
at report for events which involved sexual assault. Note that a POI ‘proceeding’ may not have 
involved the sexual assault – it could have arisen from a charge arising from some other 
incident associated with that event. 
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The number of incidents per event 
It is worth noting that the large majority of events consist of a single incident. For example, 
85.7 per cent of events involved only one incident of sexual assault, 6.8 per cent involved two 
incidents and there were six or fewer incidents in 98 per cent of events. The figures were similar 
for indecent assault with 90 per cent of events involving one or two incidents. 
SEXUAL ASSAULT – child under 18 
The second graph shows the same kind of data for indecent assault. 
 INDECENT ASSAULT – child under 18 
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Using 16 rather than 18 as the cut-off age 
When age 16 is used as the cut-off age for child reporting instead of 18, the results are very 
similar to those obtained where the cut-off is 18, as the figures below indicate. 
SEXUAL ASSAULT – child under 16 
INDECENT ASSAULT – child under 16 
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13.2 APPENDIX 3 (NSW): NOTES ABOUT LOGISTIC REGRESSION - COPS DATA  
These notes relate to the logistic regression predicting the probability of legal action 
commencing in relation to a sexual offence against a child based on the New South Wales COPS 
data. See page 68–9 of this report. 
When two or more variables are involved in an interaction, their effects are conditional; that 
is, given an interaction A*B, the effects of A on the dependent variable differ, depending on 
the value of B. Depending on the way categorical variables involved in interactions are coded, 
it may be inappropriate (and could be misleading) to interpret the ‘main effect’ of a variable 
involved in an interaction. In general, the effects of a variable involved in an interaction may 
best be interpreted within the context of the interaction, and simple effects – the effects of A 
(for example) at each level of B – can be examined. Accordingly, the interactions will be 
considered first. 
Given the number of terms involved in the three-way interaction, effect, or deviation, coding 
was used for all variables in order to facilitate interpretation. Effect coding allows the 
comparison of each effect with an ‘average’ effect, rather than with a specific level, as in 
dummy or indicator coding, which is the default method used in the analyses reported here  
In the logistic regression predicting the likelihood of legal action being initiated (‘proceeding to 
court’), for example, the analyses yielded odds ratios (ORs) based on effect coding, which 
ranged from 3.04 for 1996 to .67 for 2014, showed that there was a reduction (with some 
variation) in the likelihood of a case proceeding over the years covered by the study (χ2 = 
1,012.3, 19 df, n =78, 843, p < .0001.) For the similarly coded delay variable, ORs showed that 
the likelihood of a case proceeding tended to increase with longer delays (ORs ranged from .53 
to 2.14, : χ2 = 1095.9, 7 df, n =78, 843, p < .0001.) although the likelihood tended to decrease 
for the longest delay, of greater than 20 years (OR = 1.49), The OR for offence type indicated 
that the odds of a case proceeding was 1.17 greater for indecent assault than for sexual assault 
(χ2 = 135.1, 1 df, n =78, 843, p < .0001). There was a significant two-way interaction between 
offence type and delay (χ2 = 73.7, 7 df, n =78, 843, p < .0001) which indicated that the increase 
in the likelihood of a case proceeding with longer delays tended to be greater for indecent 
assault than for sexual assault (ORs for the effect-coded interaction contrasts increased from 
.89 to 1.29). The ORs for the three-way interaction contrasts showed departures in some years 
from the patterns described above; there did not appear to be any consistent variations. 
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13.3 APPENDIX 4 (NEW SOUTH WALES): EXPLANATORY NOTES 
Table A: Explanatory notes for Tables 6 and 7 – outcome of appearances (NSW) 
Table 6 presents the court outcomes for persons charged in the New South Wales District and 
Supreme Courts.  
The outcome categories are as outlined in New South Wales Criminal Courts Statistics 2014 – 
Explanatory Notes (p 157):  
Proceeded to trial  
Acquitted of all charges: Persons in this category were found not guilty of any offence following 
a trial. This may include some charges not being proceeded with or being otherwise disposed 
of.  
Not guilty by reason of mental illness/health: In published reports prior to 2012, these 
were recorded in the ‘Acquitted of all charges’ category. This data is available from 2008 
on request.  
Found guilty of at least one charge: Persons in this category were found guilty of at least one 
of the offences charged.  
Other: Persons in the ‘Other’ category are those who were acquitted of one or more charges 
following a trial but pleaded guilty to at least one other charge.  
Proceeded to sentence only  
Trial committal: Persons committed for trial who entered a guilty plea after committal, either 
before or during the trial. Persons who entered a guilty plea and were also found guilty/ 
acquitted of other charges at trial are excluded.  
Sentence committal: Persons committed for sentence after entering a guilty plea in the 
lower court.  
No charges proceeded with  
Persons in this category were not proceeded against by the Director of Public Prosecutions 
to trial.  
All charges otherwise disposed of  
Included in this category are accused persons who died or were referred to the Drug Court.  
TABLE 7: OUTCOME OF APPEARANCES IN LOCAL AND CHILDREN’S COURTS 
Table 7 presents court outcomes for persons charged. The outcome categories areas outlined 
in New South Wales Criminal Courts Statistics 2014 – Explanatory Notes (pp 144–45, 150):  
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Proceeded to defended hearing  
Defended hearings include where a ‘not guilty plea’ is entered or ‘no plea’ is recorded and the 
defendant was present when the matter was finalised.  
All charges dismissed: Appearances in this category involved the defendant being found not 
guilty of any offence following a defended hearing. Such appearances may have included some 
charges being dismissed without hearing.  
Guilty of at least one charge: In this category the defendant pleaded not guilty, but was found 
guilty by the court of at least one of the offences charged.  
Other: Appearances in this category include persons for whom one or more charges were 
dismissed after a defended hearing, but who either (i) pleaded guilty to other charges or (ii) 
were convicted ex parte of other charges.  
Proven outcome not further described  
Appearances in this category include persons who received a sentence but there was 
insufficient data to indicate whether they had proceeded to a defended hearing or were 
sentenced after entering a guilty plea.  
Sentenced after guilty plea  
This category includes appearances where the defendant pleaded guilty to at least one charge, 
and any other charges were dismissed or otherwise disposed of.  
Convicted ex parte  
Includes charges where the defendant either: (i) lodged a written guilty plea and was convicted 
and sentenced in his/her absence, or (ii) failed to appear, was convicted and sentenced by the 
court on the evidence presented. This outcome does not include where a conviction warrant 
was issued by the court for the offender to be brought before the court for sentencing.  
All charges dismissed without hearing  
This category includes where all charges were dismissed by the court, but there was no 
defended hearing. For instance, the prosecution may not have offered any evidence in respect 
to the charges or the defendant may have died prior to finalisation.  
All charges otherwise disposed of  
This category includes where charges have been adjourned (previously known as ‘stood out of 
list’). A matter can also be stood out of the court list for various reasons; this outcome allows 
the prosecution to re-enter the matter at a later time. 
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Table B: Explanatory notes for principal offence and penalties  
Table C provides explanations of the penalty types used in the higher courts. Penalties shown 
in the tables indicate the principal penalty imposed for the principal offence. 
The order in the table (rank order and numeric code provided by the New South Wales Bureau 
of Crime Statistics and Research) determines the rank of the penalty as provided. 
Imprisonment is the most punitive penalty and ranked 1 (Hazlitt et al., 2004). The types of 
penalty are explained below for the higher courts, Local Court and Children’s Court.  
PENALTY HIERARCHY FOR PRINCIPAL OFFENCE IN NEW SOUTH WALES  
The penalty hierarchy for the calculation of principal offence is shown below. Penalties are 
listed from the most to the least serious.  
1.  Imprisonment  
2.  Juvenile detention (control order)  
3.  Home detention  
4.  Intensive Correction Order  
5.  Suspended sentence with supervision  
6.  Suspended sentence  
7.  Community Service Order  
8.  Good behaviour bond with supervision  
9.  Good behaviour bond without supervision  
10.  Probation order  
11.  Fine  
12.  Children’s Court bond  
13.  Nominal sentence (Rising of the Court)  
14.  Dismissed with caution  
15.  Conviction without penalty  
16.  Good behaviour bond without conviction  
17.  No conviction recorded  
From the NEW SOUTH WALES CRIMINAL COURTS STATISTICS 2014 – APPENDICES p 165 
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Table C (continued): Explanatory notes for Principal offence and Penalties 
Principal offence  
The principal offence is defined as the offence which received the most serious penalty 
according to the following rules:  
a) Where an offender was found guilty of more than one offence, that offence which received the
most serious penalty type is the principal offence. Appendix 2 lists the hierarchy of penalty type 
seriousness used for this calculation.  
b) Where there were two or more offences which received the same penalty type, that offence which
received the greatest quantum of that penalty type is the principal offence. (Note that for this 
calculation if multiple counts of the same offence type received different penalties they are treated 
as separate offences).  
c) If there was more than one offence with a custodial penalty, the offence with the longest total
sentence is selected as the principal offence. 
d) If there was more than one offence with a custodial penalty with the same quantum of total
sentence, the offence with the longest non-parole period is selected as the principal offence. 
e) If there was more than one offence which received the same quantum of the same penalty type,
including the same quantum of total sentence and non-parole period, the offence with the highest 
Median Sentence Ranking (see the Bureau’s Crime and Justice Bulletin No.142 ‘Measuring Offence 
Seriousness’) is selected as the principal offence.  
f) Where an offence received more than one penalty, a principal penalty for that offence is first
calculated following the rules set out above. The determination of principal offence is then calculated 
on the principal penalty for each offence.  
Imprisonment 
When sentencing an offender to imprisonment, the court sets a total term and may impose a 
non-parole period. The non-parole period must not be less than three quarters of the term 
unless there are special circumstances which the court must note. The court may decline to set 
a non-parole period, noting the reasons. For imprisonment sentences of six months or less, the 
court may not set a non-parole period.  
Note: The New South Wales Criminal Courts Statistics 2014 indicates that the ‘average 
durations’ in their publication ‘includes only the non-parole period where a non-parole period 
has been specified and the total term where no non-parole period has been set. Cumulative 
terms of imprisonment are excluded from these tables. Where a cumulative term was imposed, 
only the non-parole duration for the principal offence is shown.’  
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NOTES ON PENALTIES (New South Wales Criminal Courts Statistics 2014 – APPENDICES p 164) 
Home detention 
Home detention orders are an alternative means of serving sentences of full-time 
imprisonment of up to 18 months. The conditions of the Order constrain the offender’s liberty 
to an extent that approximates confinement in minimum security custody with access to day 
release programs. 
Intensive Correction Order 
Intensive Correction Orders are served in the community for a period of up to two years. 
Under Clause 175 of the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Regulation 2008, the offender 
is subject to intensive supervision, which may include random home visits, searches, drug 
testing, electronic monitoring and curfews. In addition, offenders issued with Intensive 
Correction Orders are required to do a minimum of 32 hours community service work per 
month and to ‘engage in activities to address the factors associated with his or her offending’. 
Intensive Correction Orders replaced the penalty of periodic detention in October 2010. 
Suspended sentence 
Under S 12 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, a court may impose a sentence of 
imprisonment of up to two years duration and then suspend the sentence on the condition 
that the offender enters into a good behaviour bond. 
Community Service Order 
The offender is ordered to perform a specified number of hours of unpaid community service 
work. 
Bond (or Commonwealth recognizance) 
There are several different types of bonds which may be imposed. Generally they require the 
offender to be ‘of good behaviour’ for a certain length of time. Conditions may also be included, 
for example: 
 report to the Probation and Parole Service on a regular basis (bond with supervision);
 attend alcohol counselling;
 reside in a certain area.
This category includes persons charged for certain categories of child sexual assault who have 
been diverted into the NSW Pre-Trial Diversion of Offenders Program (Cedar Cottage). Please 
note that persons charged after 1 September 2013 were not eligible for diversion. In 2013, 
two people were referred to Cedar Cottage. 
Nominal sentence 
241 
This is a nominal penalty where the offender is held in custody until the court adjourns (also 
referred to as ‘Rising of the Court’). 
Conviction without penalty 
Under Section 10A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, the court may, where it 
finds a charge proved, record a conviction and dispose of the proceedings without 
imposing any other penalty. 
Bond without conviction and No conviction recorded 
Under Section 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, a court may, where it 
finds a charge proved, elect not to proceed to a conviction, but to either discharge the 
offender with no penalty, with some nominal penalty, with a good behaviour bond, or with 
an agreement to participate and comply with an intervention program. 
Principal penalties in the Children’s Court 
Principal offence 
The principal offence is defined as the offence charged which received the most serious penalty 
according to the following rules:  
Where an offender is found guilty of more than one offence, the offence which received 
the most serious penalty type is the principal offence. The hierarchy of Children’s Court 
penalties are:  
(i)  Control order – a fixed term or non-parole period of detention in a Juvenile Justice NSW 
facility  
(ii)  Community Service Order 
(iii) Probation Order – probation orders with Juvenile Justice NSW supervision, probation 
orders with other supervision and probation without supervision 
(iv)  Fine 
(v)  Bond – includes bond, suspended control order and conditional discharge, with 
supervision and without supervision 
(vi) Dismissed with caution  
(vii) Other proven outcomes – includes dismissed after Youth Justice Conference, no action 
taken on a breach of court orders, nominal sentence (rising of the court), conviction with no 
other penalty, disqualified driver and compensation.  
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14 APPENDICES: SOUTH AUSTRALIA 
14.1 APPENDIX 1 (SOUTH AUSTRALIA): OCSAR EXTRACTION NOTES AND LIST OF 
VARIABLES 
The South Australian Office of Crime Statistics and Research (OCSAR) supplied two datasets 
based on SA police data, one concerning victims and one concerning the accused, and a third 
dataset based on court information.  
Method of extraction 
South Australia Police datasets 
The Police Identification Number (PIN) for victims of sexual offences and pornography/ 
censorship offences (JANCO ‘13’ and ‘57’) dating between 1/1/1991 and 31/12/2012 were 
extracted from the Police victim/offence dataset. These PINs were the ‘master PINs’ used to 
match back to the victim/offence dataset to extract the entire victimisation history (includes 
other offences other than JANCO ‘13’ and ‘57’) from 1991 to 2012 for these particular victims 
(as seen in Police – Victims).  
The Victims dataset is sorted by incno, PIN_IR and offcode. 
The same method was repeated for the Police Apprehension dataset to obtain the ‘master 
PINs’ for accused offenders. These PINs were used to match back to the apprehension dataset 
to extract the entire offending history (includes other offences other than JANCO ‘13’ and 
‘57’) from 1991 to 2012 for these particular offenders (as seen in Police - Accused). 
The Accused dataset is sorted by apphno, PIN_AP and offcode. 
South Australian Courts dataset 
The ‘master PINs’ set for accused offenders was then used to match to the Courts finalised 
cases dataset (all cases finalised between 1991–2012) to extract all cases finalised in court 
against the accused offenders (as seen in Courts). The Courts dataset is sorted by PIN. 
Key notes in relation to the data: 
 Victims and offence data are recorded by Police on Police Incident Reports while data 
in relation to the apprehension (via arrest or report) of accused offenders are recorded 
by Police on Police Apprehension Reports.  
 It is from the data entered on these reports that OCSAR derives its Police datasets. 
The OCSAR courts finalised cases dataset is based only on cases that have been heard and 
finalised in the courts. It does not include cases that are still in the process of court 
proceedings.  
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As the data is matched based on the ‘master PINs’ for each corresponding police dataset, it is 
not indicative of all offences recorded by Police. 
 The same can be said for the courts data. As it is based on the master PINs of accused 
offenders of sexual offences, the data is not indicative of all cases finalised in courts for 
the given periods. 
 The Police Identification Number (PIN) is assigned to individuals upon initial contact with 
Police and is a unique identifier that is carried over across the justice system (Police, 
Courts and Corrections) for the life of the individual. 
 An individual’s PIN may appear in both the Victims and Accused datasets as they may 
have been both a victim and an offender of a sex related offence at some stage in their 
history. As a result their PIN may also appear in the courts data. 
 It should be noted that one Apprehension Report may clear multiple Incident Reports 
as the accused offender may have committed multiple offences against multiple victims. 
 It should also be noted that in some instances, multiple Apprehension Reports can clear 
a single Incident Report. This is where the one victim was victimised by multiple 
offenders. 
Data cleaning, coding, counting rules and aggregation of files for data analysis 
Cases (victims etc) where the victim was 18 or older at the time of the offence were excluded 
from the databases. The age-specific 13 Janco codes were checked and cases where the victim 
was under 18 with a non-age specified JANCO offence code were included. 
Victim records were aggregated by incno and year, and summary variables were created for 
such variables as the nature and date of the offence, and the delay between the offence and 
the report. In the South Australian data, a given ‘incident’ always involves a single victim but 
a given victim may be associated with multiple incidents. 
The Police Identification Number (PIN) is assigned to individuals upon initial contact with 
Police and is a unique identifier that is carried over across the justice system (Police, Courts 
and Corrections) for the life of the individual. An individual’s PIN may appear in both the 
Victims and Accused datasets as they may have been both a victim and an offender of a sexual 
offence at some stage in their history.  
Records from the accused dataset contained a variable which showed the incident report 
number ‘cleared’ by the apprehension (of the accused) report, referred to here as clr_num. 
Using this variable, accused data which had been restructured to 'wide' format (as described 
in the appendix section on New South Wales data) to accommodate multiple accused for a 
given incident, was, for some analyses, linked to the aggregated victim/incident data. Some 
accused records had no clr_num code and there were accused records which found no match 
in the aggregated victim/incident data. 
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The court dataset contained information about the accused, identified by a police 
identification number (PIN), the disposition (finalisation) date, the major offence with which 
they were charged, and the court outcome. For some analyses it was necessary to add 
information about the accused to the court data. A matching process using the ‘master PINs’ 
set for ‘accused offenders’ was used to match to the Courts finalised cases dataset (all cases 
finalised between 1992 and 2012) to extract all cases finalised in court against the accused 
offenders. The data for 1991 was excluded because of missing matching data. The combined 
file was aggregated to produce records for combinations of pin, caseid, court and finalisation 
date.  
Analyses of the South Australian data applied the same inclusion criteria and similar coding 
and categorisation of variables as used in the New South Wales data analyses, as far as 
possible. Offence type, for example, was coded to create four main categories in line with the 
New South Wales data. 
 Sexual assault defined as sexual intercourse/penetration
 Indecent assault
 Act of indecency/aggravated act of indecency
 Child pornography/grooming for pornography and other sexual offences.
As for New South Wales, persons in the Magistrates Court who were committed for trial and 
for sentence are included in the counts for the higher courts since these are non-finalised 
appearances in the Magistrates Court. 
The closest equivalent of the New South Wales ‘POI proceed to court’ variable in the South 
Australian data was ‘Clear-up’ status. 
This was coded by SA Police using 24 codes which were collapsed following extensive discussions 
with OCSAR into the following categories:  
 cleared by arrest, report or the issue of a warrant: equivalent to the code ‘legal
proceedings commenced/legal action taken’ used for the New South Wales data
 ‘cleared’ with no further action or no offence revealed (including insufficient evidence),
as well as various codes for incident reports which have not been cleared where the
case has been ‘filed’ and there is no further action
 ‘cleared’ with no legal action possible – 108 cases where the accused had died and four
where the complainant had died
 ‘not cleared ‘open cases’ where the person of interest has not been identified.
*One Apprehension Report may clear multiple Incident Reports as the accused offender may have committed
multiple offences against multiple victims. In some instances, multiple Apprehension Reports can also clear a 
single Incident Report where the one victim was victimised by multiple offenders. 
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14.2 APPENDIX 2 (SOUTH AUSTRALIA): STATUTE OF LIMITATION 
South Australia has a statute of limitation of 2 years on all summary offences, irrespective of 
the category of offence (s52 Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA)). Some sex crimes, like 
indecent behaviour and gross indecency (s23 Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA)) are still 
summary, and therefore captured by this limitation. However, the vast majority of sex crimes 
are indictable offences and therefore have no limitation (see Part 3 Divisions 8-15 of 
the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1953 (SA)). 
South Australia used to have a three-year statute of limitations for indictable sex offences, 
but this has now been repealed. This was introduced in 1982 under s76a of the Criminal Law 
Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), barring the prosecution of any such pre-1979 offences. 
The statute of limitations was abolished on 17 June 2003 with the Criminal Law Consolidation 
(Abolition of Time Limit for Prosecution of Certain Sexual Offences) Amendment Act 2003, 
which deleted s76a and inserted s72A: ‘Any immunity from prosecution arising because of 
the time limit imposed by the former section 76A is abolished’. 
On a practical note, the abolition of the statute resulted in a backlog of cases that could then 
be prosecuted; this led to the establishment of the Paedophile Task Force (located within 
SCIB) to work through the 20-year backlog. That Taskforce also dealt with the matters 
emerging from the Mullighan Commission of Inquiry into Children in State Care. 
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14.3 APPENDIX 3 (SA): INTERACTION EFFECTS IN LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Predicting probability of arrest/report [case proceeding] 
Age of victim by gender 
The significant interaction between the age and gender of the victim is shown in Figure A 2.1 
(χ 2 = 57.12, df = 3, p < .0001). For victims in the two younger age groups, legal action against 
the alleged offender was more likely if the victim was female than male but for older victims 
(aged 10 or older), the matter was more likely to lead to arrest or report if the victim was 
male. The highest probability (.54), and indeed the only one in which arrest was marginally 
more likely than not, was for males aged 10 to 13 years. The least likely to proceed were those 
involving boys under 5 (.32). This cross-over pattern for age and gender is similar to, but not 
the same as, that for New South Wales. The odds ratios (ORs) comparing females with males 
for the two youngest age groups (.85 and .81) were not significantly from 1, but they were 
significant for the two oldest age groups (1.47 and 1.59). The ORS comparing age groups for 
female victims indicated significant differences in the likelihood of arrest/report between 6–
9 year olds and 10–13 year olds.  
Figure A 2.1. Adjusted probability of arrest/report by age and gender of victim in South Australia 
Age of victim by type of offence 
The significant interaction between the age of the victim and the type of offence is shown in 
Figure A 2.2 (χ 2 = 48.31, df = 4, p < .0001). As Figure A 2.2 shows, when the victim was aged 
nine or younger, the likelihood of arrest/report tended to be higher for sexual assault than 
for indecent assault. Also, for both types of assault the likelihood of arrest/report was lower 
for victims aged five or younger compared with those aged six to nine and older.  
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
Under 6 years 6-9 years  10-13 years  14-17 years
P
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
 o
f 
ar
re
st
/r
e
p
o
rt
Female
Male
247 
Figure A 2.2. Probability of arrest/report by victim age and type of offence in South Australia 
Type of offence by relationship to alleged offender 
Figure A 2.3 shows the probability of arrest or report for both sexual assault and indecent 
assault by the relationship of the suspect to the victim (χ 2 = 39.40, df = 7, p < .00001). The 
probability of arrest or report was higher when the alleged offender was a person in a position 
of authority, a parent or guardian or other member of the family, and lowest when it was a 
stranger or person not known to the child or a boyfriend/girlfriend. The probability of arrest 
or report was also generally higher for sexual assault than for indecent assault except for 
sibling relationships and persons known but not related to the child. The odds ratios indicate 
that, for an offence in which the accused was a parent or guardian, arrest and legal action 
were significantly less likely for indecent assault offences than for sexual assault (OR = .54), 
and that the same was true for offences involving boyfriends or girlfriends (.63) or another 
known person (.84). Boyfriend/girlfriend comprised 12 per cent of sexual assaults but only 0.7 
per cent of indecent assaults. Siblings comprised 4.5 per cent of sexual assault and 3.9 per 
cent of indecent assault incidents. 
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Figure A 2.3. Adjusted probability of arrest/report by relationship of the suspect to the victim and type of 
offence in South Australia 
Predicting probability of conviction 
The interaction between the type of offence and the age of the offender (χ2 = 30.4, df = 1, 
p < .0001) in Figure A2.4 below indicates that the adjusted likelihood of being convicted of 
indecent assault was unrelated to the age of the offender (37 per cent), but that for sexual 
assault, the probability of being found guilty decreased with increasing age (32 per cent, 
26 per cent and 21 per cent for mean ages 24, 39, and 54 years, respectively). The odds ratio 
(OR) for the simple slope of the age variable for sexual assault was 1.98 was significantly 
different from 1 and means that as the age of the defendant increased, the probability of 
conviction reduced. For indecent assault, the equivalent OR was 1, showing that there was 
no association between age and likelihood of conviction. 
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 Figure A 2.4. Probability of a conviction by age of defendant and type of offence in South Australia 
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15.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
This study covers the outcomes of appeals in child sexual offence matters in the New South 
Wales Court of Criminal Appeal (NSWCCA) over nine years from 2005 to 2013. It focuses on 
the trends in appeals against conviction, rather than appeals against sentence, though there 
is analysis and comment on some aspects of sentencing appeals in child sexual assault cases. 
In particular, this study examines the implications and impact of delay on the outcome of such 
appeals and compares appeals against conviction for historical child sexual offences (those 
reported when the victim was an adult) with those in which the victim was a child at the time 
of reporting and prosecution. It also examines how different grounds of appeal against 
conviction are argued in child sexual abuse appeal cases and the outcome of such appeals. 
Given the Royal Commission’s focus on institutional matters, it provides a detailed analysis of 
the grounds for, and outcomes of, appeals in institutional cases of child sexual abuse over the 
study period. 
Few studies have specifically examined the outcomes of appeal decisions in child sexual 
assault cases in a systematic way. In Australia, over the last 10 years only two studies, which 
were both produced by the Judicial Commission of New South Wales, have examined some 
aspects of appeal outcomes in child sexual assault cases; both focused largely on 
New South Wales data. The first, by Hazlitt et al. (2004), examined the sentencing of 467 
convicted child sexual assault offenders in the District Court between 2000 and 2002. This 
study also reviewed the decisions of the NSWCCA in child sexual assault cases for the period 
2000–03. The second study, by Donnelly et al. (2011), examined some aspects of appeals 
against conviction in child sexual assault cases for the period 2001–07. This study was part of 
a larger project dealing with appeals against conviction across the board in New South Wales 
(Hazlitt, Donnelly and Poletti, 2004; Donnelly et al., 2011). In addition, systematic data is 
available in relation to final sentencing outcomes following appeals against sentence in cases 
involving convicted child sex offenders (for example, Hazlitt et al., 2004; New South Wales 
Parliament, Joint Select Committee on Sentencing of Child Sexual Assault Offenders (Joint 
Select Committee), 2014; Holmes, 2011).150 
These studies and data indicate that appeals in child sexual assault matters constitute a 
substantial number of appeal matters151, and have a significant success rate. Donnelly et al. 
(2011, p 198) reported that child sexual assault appeals represented nearly one-quarter (22.5 
per cent) of all successful appeals against conviction, and almost 70 per cent of all successful 
sexual assault appeals in New South Wales in the period 2001–07. Hazlitt et al. (2004, p 46) 
reported that appeals against conviction in child sexual assault cases in the NSWCCA were 
                                                     
150 See also Sentencing Advisory Council, Sentencing Snapshots (Complete Series), Vic. 
151 See, also for example, findings from Courtin (2006, p 268) that more than half of the convictions relating to 
child sex abuse cases are appealed (between two and six times the appeal rate for other crimes).  
255 
upheld in more than half the cases (55.9 per cent) studied over the period 2000–03. Appeals 
by the accused against severity of sentencing were successful in 44.4 per cent of cases. 
Although the number of appeals against conviction involving child sexual offences decreased, 
the success rate of appeals against conviction showed a marked increase, from 43.5 per cent 
in 2000 to 73.3 per cent in 2003.  
In the Donnelly et al. (2011, p 198) study, the success rate for child sexual assault appeals was 
found to be significantly higher than for sexual assault appeals involving an adult victim (50.3 
per cent and 32.4 per cent, respectively) and higher than for all appeals against conviction 
(35.5 per cent). A higher acquittal rate, while not statistically significant, was seen in child 
sexual assault cases that succeeded on appeal; 42.7 per cent succeeded compared with 27.3 
per cent in sexual assault appeals involving an adult victim (Donnelly et al., 2011, p 198). 
Judicial misdirection was reported to be the most prevalent source of error in all successful 
sexual assault appeals (53.8 per cent), irrespective of whether the case involved a child or 
adult complainant. Judicial error in admissibility of evidence was identified in 19.2 per cent of 
all successful sexual assault appeals (Donnelly et al., 2011, p xix–xx). These errors appear to 
arise as frequently in cases of both child and adult sexual assault and, based on anecdotal 
evidence alone, are likely to occur even more often in cases involving a child 
victim/complainant (discussions with Director of Public Prosecutions solicitors and Crown 
prosecutors; Quadara, 2014; Shead, 2014).  
15.2 THE CURRENT STUDY – RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In line with the Royal Commission’s brief, this study aimed to address the following questions: 
1. What is the rate of appeal in child sexual offence cases – including appeals by both the 
accused and the Crown, and the rate of appeal against conviction and sentence? 
2. What are the outcomes and the success rate of child sexual assault appeals?  
3. What are the main grounds of appeal in child sexual assault cases?  
4. Is there evidence that some grounds of appeal are more likely to succeed than others? 
5. Is there any difference in the rate of appeals, the grounds of appeals and the outcomes 
of appeals in cases: 
a. where there is delayed complaint, compared with cases reported immediately 
in childhood? 
b. involving institutional abuse, compared with intrafamilial abuse and other 
extrafamilial cases? 
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15.3 METHODOLOGY  
This study analysed a sample of appeal decisions involving child sexual offences in 
the NSWCCA over nine years from 2005 to 2013. Relevant cases for inclusion in the study 
were identified by searching AustLII and the NSWCCA database for this period, using 
combinations of the following keywords and phrases:  
child sexual assault; child sexual abuse; child sex crimes; child sex offences; 
persistent sexual abuse; aggravated child sexual offences; indecent assault; child 
pornography; gross indecency; carnal knowledge; aggravated sexual assault; and 
sexual intercourse with a child.  
All cases that involved a child victim under the age of 18 in the principal offence were 
included. Child sexual abuse was defined broadly to include all child sex-related offences, and 
to encompass the various offences relating to the Royal Commission’s definition of child 
sexual offences. 152  Cases were not coded for analysis based on offence type, as this 
information was at times incomplete in the appeal judgment and was considered beyond the 
scope of this study. However, Appendix A15.2 (see Online appendices to the appeals study, 
available at www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au) provides a summary breakdown of 
offence categories in the sample of cases studied, both by type of abuse (intrafamilial, 
extrafamilial and institutional) and whether disclosure was in childhood or adulthood, based 
on the information (where available) provided in the appeal judgment. This summary (albeit 
incomplete) reveals that charges involving allegations of sexual intercourse with a child are 
common, as are charges involving circumstances of aggravation. Cases involving 
complainants aged under 10 are also not uncommon.153 The offence of persistent sexual 
abuse of a child (pursuant to section 66EA(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)) is charged 
infrequently. 
                                                     
152 The Royal Commission has defined child sexual assault or abuse for its purposes as:  
‘Any act which exposes a child to, or involves a child in, sexual processes beyond his or her understanding or 
contrary to accepted community standards. Sexually abusive behaviours can include the fondling of genitals, 
masturbation, oral sex, vaginal or anal penetration by a penis, finger or any other object, fondling of breasts, 
voyeurism, exhibitionism, and exposing the child to or involving the child in pornography. It includes child 
grooming, which refers to actions deliberately undertaken with the aim of befriending and establishing an 
emotional connection with a child, to lower the child’s inhibitions in preparation for sexual activity with the 
child’ (2014, vol 1, p 95). 
153 Some information about offences charged is also provided in relation to the sub-sample of historical child 
sexual abuse cases studied; see Appendix A15.12 (see Online appendices to the appeals study, available at 
www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au). 
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A total of 291 cases were identified as involving offences against a child victim or complainant; 
all 291 appeal judgments were summarised and coded for grounds of appeal and outcomes 
(see discussion below).154 Cases were also categorised, to the extent possible, as involving 
either historical child sexual abuse or non-historical child sexual abuse, and as intrafamilial, 
extrafamilial or institutional abuse (see pages 288–89) for a discussion of relevant definitions). 
Data was housed in an Excel database and analysed both manually and via the database. The 
data analysis in this study is primarily descriptive, though some relevant quantitative data 
analyses are also presented. 
Several limitations in sampling should be noted. First, the study was limited to appeals in the 
NSWCCA with a published judgment. Second, it is possible that some child sexual offence–
related appeals were not identified, despite thorough and systematic searches of the relevant 
case databases; therefore, the sample of cases studied for this period could be incomplete. 
Third, since the study was largely based on information extracted from appeal judgments, the 
type of information and detail contained in the appeal judgments was not consistent across 
the sample of cases. Some judgments provided more background information about the 
nature of the offences while others provided very little, simply focusing on the issue(s) on 
appeal; therefore, at times, the broader context of a case was difficult to reconstruct and 
understand in full. 
15.4 FINDINGS 
Table A15.1 breaks down, by year, the number of cases included in this study and the number 
of finalised appeal cases in the NSWCCA. The 291 child sexual assault appeals constitute 7.7 
per cent of the total number of finalised appeals in the NSWCCA over this period.155 This is 
relatively stable by year, ranging from 6.1 per cent to 9.8 per cent, and a little lower than the 
10 per cent reported by Hazlitt et al. (2004, p 45) for appeals involving child sexual assault in 
the four-year period 2000–03. Hazlitt et al. (2004, p 46) reported that compared with overall 
appeals, the proportion of appeals in the NSWCCA for sexual offences against children 
declined from 12.7 per cent in 2000 to 9.4 per cent in 2003.   
In comparison, in the period 2000–07, of all appeals against conviction in the NSWCCA, 
homicide and related offences made up 16.9 per cent and illicit drug offences accounted 
154 To organise the data for systematic analysis, an initial textual analysis of descriptors/keywords used in the 
judgments was undertaken to broadly characterise the grounds of appeal in each case. These descriptive codes 
were not treated as discrete categories and were not formulaic in nature, but rather were used to identify the 
range of often multiple issues on appeal in any given case.   
155 See Table 3.4 in New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (2005, p 79; 2006, p 79; 2007, p 79; 
2008, p 79; 2009, p 79; 2010, p 89; 2011, p 89; 2012, p 89; 2013a, p 97).  
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for 20.1 per cent. These figures do not include sentencing appeals (Donnelly et al., 2011, p 9). 
All sexual assault and related offences comprised just over a quarter of all conviction appeals. 
Appendix A15.1 (see Online appendices to the appeals study, available at 
www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au) provides a case list of the 291 appellate decisions 
included in this study.  
Table A15.1: Breakdown of appeal cases for the period 2005–13 
Year n Percentage 
of study 
sample 
Number of finalised appeal 
cases in NSWCCA156 
Child sexual assault cases 
as a percentage of 
finalised cases in 
NSWCCA 
2005 34 11.7 536 6.3 
2006 39 13.4 501 7.8 
2007 27 9.3 444 6.1 
2008 39 13.4 414 9.4 
2009 30 10.3 391 7.7 
2010 37 12.7 417 8.9 
2011 21 7.2 340 6.2 
2012 33 11.3 336 9.8 
2013 31 10.7 381 8.1 
Total 291 100.0 3760 7.7 
The calculation for the rate of appeal for child sexual abuse cases – the number of cases 
appealed as a proportion of convictions for those offences – contains several likely sources of 
variation and error. First, there is a difference in the counting rule when using the number of 
persons charged in the New South Wales higher courts and the number of cases involving a 
child sexual offence in the NSWCCA. The number of persons charged and the number of cases 
                                                     
156 Data on the number of disposals in the NSWCCA for the period 2005–09 are sourced from the Supreme Court 
of New South Wales Annual Review (2009, p 55). Data on the number of disposals in the NSWCCA for the period 
2009–13 are sourced from the Supreme Court of New South Wales Provisional Statistics (2014, p 2) 
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may differ as multiple accused persons may be tried jointly in a case157; it is common in New 
South Wales for each sexual assault matter to be tried separately (Goodman-Delahunty, 
Cossins and Martschuk, 2016).158 Second, appeal matters are likely to occur in a different year 
to the first court case.  
Noting these limitations, Table A15.2 provides estimated rates of appeal for the period 2005–
13. These rates are based on the number of persons found guilty of child sexual offences by 
the District Court and the Supreme Court159 and the number of child sexual abuse appeal 
cases in the NSWCCA identified in the present study. This provides an overall estimated rate 
of appeal against conviction and sentencing for the period 2005–13 of approximately 
16.7 per cent.  
Donnelly et al. (2011) calculated that about 33 per cent of convictions across all categories of 
offences in the New South Wales District and Supreme Courts were appealed, and that the 
appeal rate against sexual assault convictions involving a child victim was 52.6 per cent for 
the period 2001–07. This is similar to the figure of 50.3 per cent (Donnelly et al, 2011: xii, p 
199) for sexual assault offences involving an adult victim.  
The marked difference between the rate of appeal against convictions involving a child victim 
reported in Donnelly et al.’s study and our estimated rate of appeal in child sexual assault 
cases involving a child victim may be explained by possible differences in the sources of data 
and the methods used to calculate the rate of appeal; these differences would significantly 
widen the numbers we relied upon compared with Donnelly et al.160  
                                                     
157 The explanatory notes for this data indicate that these figures were calculated on the basis that accused 
persons in more than one case finalised on different dates were counted twice, but if separate charges were 
finalised on the same day, they were counted only once: New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and 
Research (2013a, p 153). 
158 See Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW); Attorney General’s Department of New South Wales Criminal Justice 
Sexual Offences Taskforce (2005, p 82); NSW Parliament Joint Select Committee (2014, p 96). 
159 Based on data the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR) finalised for persons 
found guilty in the higher courts. 
160 Regarding the BOCSAR data we used, BOCSAR states: ‘In both the District and Supreme Courts, a person 
charged refers to a group of one or more charges, against a single accused person, which are finalised by the 
court on the same date. Section 3 of this report does not distinguish “distinct” persons. If an accused person is 
in more than one case finalised on different dates during the counting period, they will be counted more than 
once. However, separate charges finalised on the same date for one accused person are consolidated and 
counted as one person. Where there are outstanding charges against the accused, this would be counted as a 
new person in a subsequent counting period. For these reasons there is no direct relationship between the 
persons registered in trial and sentence cases … and the number of persons with cases finalised.’ (BOCSAR, 2013, 
p 153). As a result, the numbers used in our calculations are likely to be higher than the Donnelly numbers.  
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Table A15.2: Estimated rate of appeals in child sexual abuse cases 
Year Child sexual assault 
appeal cases in our 
sample 
Persons found guilty 
in the higher courts 
of child sexual 
assault offences(a)  
Percentage of appeals 
lodged by persons found 
guilty in the higher courts 
of child sexual assault 
offences 
 N N % 
2005 34 166 20.5 
2006 39 170 22.9 
2007 27 167 16.2 
2008 39 182 21.4 
2009 30 213 14.1 
2010 37 176 21.0 
2011 21 204 10.3 
2012 33 210 15.7 
2013 31 255 12.2 
Total 291 1,743 16.7 
Note: (a) This represents persons found guilty of sexual offences against children in the New South Wales District 
Court and Supreme Court.161 
Appellant 
The vast majority of cases included in this study involved an appeal by the accused. In 
89 per cent of cases, an appeal was lodged by the accused alone or in conjunction with the 
                                                     
Furthermore, the difference in numbers may also be due to different definitions. The BOCSAR categories are for 
‘sexual offences against children’ and may include a wider range of cases than the Donnelly study, which uses 
‘sexual assault against children’; for example, the former category may include child pornography offences, 
which the latter may not. This may have the effect of widening the numbers significantly.  
161 Statistics from 2009–13 were sourced from the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR) 
(2014); statistics for 2005–08 sourced from tables 1.7 and 3.7 in BOCSAR (pp 25, 85).  
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Crown. In 84.9 per cent of cases, the accused alone appealed; in 11 per cent the Crown only162 
appealed; and in 4 per cent both the accused and the Crown appealed. Table A15.3 provides 
a breakdown by year of the number of appeals by the accused and the Crown for the period 
2005–13. No notable changes in appellant trends are discernible overall in the study period, 
although there were fewer appeals by the accused in 2011. This may reflect natural variations 
from year to year, given the small numbers in each year. 
Table A15.3: Breakdown of appellants by year 
Year Appeals – accused 
only 
Appeals – Crown 
only 
Appeals – accused 
and Crown 
Total 
n %a n %(a) n %(a) 
2005 30 88.2 4 11.8 0 0.0 34 
2006 34 87.2 5 12.8 0 0.0 39 
2007 24(b) 88.9 1 3.7 2 7.4 27 
2008 35 89.7 4 10.3 0 0.0 39 
2009 25 83.3 2 6.7 3 10 30 
2010 27 73.0 6 16.2 4 10.8 37 
2011 16 76.2 3 14.3 2b 9.5 21 
2012 28b 84.8 5 15.2 0 0.0 33 
2013 28 90.3 2 6.5 1 3.2 31 
Total 247 84.9 32 11.0 12 4.1 291 
Notes:  
(a) This represents the percentage of total yearly sample under study. 
(b) This figure includes one instance of an interlocutory appeal by the accused. 
162 Crown appeals are infrequent, serving a limited purpose of establishing principle: R v DH [2014] NSWCCA 326 
at [19]; R v Tuala [2015] NSWCCA 8 at [98]; Green v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 462; Quinn v The Queen [2011] 
HCA 49; 244 CLR 462. See also NSW Prosecution Guidelines: ‘Prosecution/Crown appeals are and ought to be 
rare, as an exception to the general conduct of the administration of criminal justice they should be brought to 
enable the courts to establish and maintain adequate standards of punishment for crime, to enable idiosyncratic 
approaches to be corrected and to correct sentences that are so disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime 
as to lead to a loss of confidence in the administration of criminal justice.’ [Guideline 29]. 
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Appeal type 
Overall, the majority of child sexual abuse appeal cases for the period 2005–13 involved the 
accused appealing against sentence. Of the 291 cases, 165 involved the accused appealing 
against sentence (56.7 per cent of all cases and 63.7 per cent of appeals by the accused). This 
compared to 139 involving the accused appealing against conviction (47.7 per cent of all cases 
and 53.7 per cent of appeals by the accused). In 16.5 per cent of cases, the accused appealed 
against both conviction and sentence. 
Over the study period, a greater proportion of appeals by the accused were against sentence 
rather than against conviction, but this was not consistent for every year. For example, in 
2013, in 22 cases the accused appealed against sentence and in 11 cases appealed against 
conviction. This compared with 2008, when the accused appealed against conviction in 22 
cases, and in only 14 cases did the accused appeal against sentence. Table A15.4 provides a 
breakdown by year of the number of cases involving an appeal by an accused against 
conviction and/or sentence. There were no notable patterns of change in the types of appeals 
being brought by the accused over the study period. 
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Table A15.4: Breakdown of appeal types by accused by year 
Year Accused 
appealed 
against 
sentence 
only 
Accused 
appealed 
against 
conviction 
only 
Accused 
appealed 
against 
conviction 
and sentence 
All cases 
in which 
accused 
appealed 
against 
conviction  
All cases 
in which 
accused 
appealed 
against 
sentence 
All cases 
in which 
accused 
appealed 
 n %(a) n % a n %(a) n n N 
2005 19 55.9 6 17.6 5 14.7 11 24 30 
2006 11 28.2 16 41.0 7 17.9 23 18 34 
2007 7 25.9 11 40.7 7(b) 25.9 18 14 26(c) 
2008 13 33.3 14 35.9 8 20.5 22 21 35 
2009 15 50.0 10 33.3 3 10.0 13 18 28 
2010 12 32.4 14 37.8 5 13.5 19 17 31 
2011 11 52.4 2 14.3 4 14.3 6 15 18(c) 
2012 11 33.3 11 33.3 5 15.2 16 16 28(c) 
2013 18 58.1 7 22.6 4 12.9 11 22 29 
Total 117 40.2 91 35.7 48 12.0 139  165 259 
Notes: 
(a) This represents the percentage of the total yearly sample under study. 
(b) This includes one case in which there were two appellants; one appealed against conviction, but the other 
did not. 
(c) The numbers for 2007, 2011 and 2012 do not tally to this total, as each of these years includes an instance of 
interlocutory appeal by the accused.  
Over the nine-year period, 44 cases (15.1 per cent) involved an appeal by the Crown – in 34 
cases (77.3 per cent) this related to sentencing. Table A15.5 shows appeals by the Crown 
by year.  
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Table A15.5: Crown appeals by year 
Year Total appeals by Crown Appeals by Crown related to 
sentencing 
2005 4 3 
2006 5 4 
2007 3 2 
2008 4 3 
2009 5 5 
2010 10 7 
2011 5 4 
2012 5 4 
2013 3 2 
Total 44* 34  
* Of the other Crown appeals, 10 were interlocutory appeals.163  
Further analysis of grounds and outcomes of appeals 
Of particular interest in this study were possible associations between different types of child 
sexual abuse cases and different grounds of appeal appellants relied on; of more specific 
interest were possible associations between certain grounds of appeal and whether the case 
was historical or non-historical child sexual abuse, as well as possible associations between 
the type of abuse (intrafamilial, extrafamilial or institutional), grounds argued and outcomes 
in the case. 
Unfortunately, appeal judgments do not always use clear and consistent language or formats 
in discussing grounds of appeal, and there is no broader systematised or uniform approach 
to how grounds of appeal are approached in cases. Appellants have some flexibility as to how 
they frame their appeal (Donnelly et al., 2011, p xiii); therefore, comparing the grounds of 
                                                     
163 Interlocutory appeals under section 5F of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) are infrequent. For the period 
2005–13, there were only 116 such appeals in all types of cases (NSW Law Reform Commission, 2014, p 210). 
265 
appeal across cases and the decisions of different courts can be challenging. As Donnelly et 
al. stated, ‘The task of grouping the appeals for the purpose of identifying systemic error 
presents a significant challenge’ (2011, p 45).  
For making comparisons with previous research, we used three broad categories of appeals 
– appeals against severity of sentence, appeals against conviction and Crown appeals – in line
with the approach used by Hazlitt et al. (2004).164 
Table A15.6 presents the current data alongside Hazlitt et al.’s data (2004, p 45, in Table 6). 
This reveals a mixed picture. Focusing first on our current data, the number of conviction 
appeals did not change in absolute terms from 2005 to 2013 (n=11 cases), although 
considerable fluctuation is seen between years. However, as a percentage of the total of all 
appeals, a marked decline is seen between 2006, where conviction appeals accounted for 
53.4 per cent of child sexual abuse appeals, and 2013, where this figure fell to 31.4 per cent. 
When also taking into account the Judicial Commission’s data for the period 2000–03, we see 
a marked decline in both the absolute number of conviction appeals – from 46 in 2000 to 11 
in 2013 – and the number as a percentage of the three categories of appeal, from 61.3 per 
cent in 2000 to 31.4 per cent in 2013. However, the percentage of conviction appeals as a 
percentage of all three categories of appeal had already markedly declined in the Judicial 
Commission’s data, from the high watermark of 61.3 per cent in 2000 to 37.5 per cent in 2003 
(see Figure A15.1). 
In terms of appeals against sentence severity, the number of appeals did not change in 
absolute terms, from 2005 to 2013 (n=22 cases). This represents only a marginal increase in 
percentage terms, from 59.5 per cent to 62.8 per cent of the number of cases each year across 
the three categories. Taking into account the data from the Judicial Commission, the number 
of appeals against sentence severity, in absolute terms, decreased minimally, from 24 in 2000 
to 22 in 2013; however, this represents a marked increase in the percentage change across 
the three categories of appeal, from 32 per cent in 2000 to 62.8 per cent in 2013. Again, it is 
noteworthy that the percentage of appeals against sentence severity, as a percentage of the 
164 Note that for tables A15.6 and A15.7, we adopted the same methodology as Hazlitt et al. (2004) for the 
purposes of comparison. This results in different totals for some of these categories as compared to the figures 
from tables A15.4 and A15.5. For tables A15.6 and A15.7, the total number of appeals against sentencing 
severity included sentencing-only appeals, and conviction and sentencing appeals, where either the conviction 
appeal was dismissed or only allowed in part. This results in a lower number of sentencing appeal cases (150 
cases) when compared with the number of appeals involving sentencing given earlier (165 cases). Similarly, for 
Crown cases, tables A15.6 and A15.7 are limited to Crown-only sentencing appeals and combined accused and 
Crown appeals where the conviction appeal was dismissed, and interlocutory appeals are excluded; whereas the 
total given earlier from Table A15.5 (34 cases) includes cases with a successful appeal against conviction and 
one interlocutory appeal on sentencing grounds.  
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three categories of appeal, had already increased to 52.5 per cent in the Judicial Commission’s 
data in 2003 (see Figure A15.2). 
Changes in Crown appeals are relatively unremarkable over the period 2000–13, and the 
numbers involved in this category of appeals are small (see Figure A15.3). 
The number of child sexual abuse appeals in the NSWCCA decreased in absolute terms, from 
65 cases in 2000 to 30 cases in 2013. However, quite a bit of fluctuation occurred in the period 
2005–13, with a low of 20 cases in 2011 and a high of 38 cases in both 2006 and 2008 (see 
Figure A15.4). As discussed above, this absolute decrease in child sexual abuse cases in the 
period 2000–13 reflects an overall decrease in child sexual abuse cases as a percentage of all 
appeal cases before the NSWCCA. 
Over the period 2000–13, the number of appeals against conviction and sentence severity 
fluctuated, with several peaks and troughs (see figures A15.1 and A15.2). However, it is 
interesting to note that the 2013 data is relatively comparable, across all three categories of 
child sexual abuse appeals, with the Judicial Commission’s 2003 data; this is highlighted in 
yellow in Table A15.6. In other words, although we see fluctuations in appeal trends in child 
sexual abuse cases over the period 2003–13, the picture in 2013 is actually (at least overall) 
not dissimilar to what it was in 2003 (see figures A15.1–A15.4). The possible reasons for the 
fluctuations over this period are difficult to identify. 
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Notes: 
(a) This data includes conviction-only appeals, and appeals against conviction and sentence severity – and covers 
only appeals by the accused. 
(b) This data includes severity of sentence-only appeals, and appeals for conviction and severity where the 
conviction appeal was dismissed. It includes cases that were only partially successful on conviction appeal or 
where the sentence was appealed on different counts; therefore, an order was made on sentencing grounds. 
There were three such cases in our sample: two in 2006 had successful appeals against sentence and one in 
2008 was unsuccessful on the grounds of sentencing. The data covers only appeals by the accused. 
(c) This data includes Crown-only appeals, conviction and Crown appeals where the conviction appeal was 
dismissed, and sentencing and Crown appeals, as well as the case referred to in footnote (f). Crown interlocutory 
appeals were excluded from this category. 
(d) This data excludes other types of appeal, including interlocutory, stated cases, costs, permanent stay of 
proceedings and guideline judgments. 
(e) This represents a combined appeal; for example, an appeal against conviction and sentence was counted 
only once in the totals. 
(f) This year included one case that was a combination Crown and accused appeal, where there were multiple 
appellants and multiple counts. Though the conviction appeal was successful, it only pertained to some counts 
and the Crown sentencing appeal was still heard for the remaining counts. 
Numbers marked in red are derived from persons found guilty in higher courts of child sexual assault offences, 
as per Table A15.2 above. 
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Figure A15.2: Pattern of appeals against sentencing in the period 2000–13 
Figure A15.3: Pattern of appeals by the Crown in the period 2000–13 
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Figure A15.4: Pattern of appeals – total appeals in the period 2000–13 
We also analysed the outcomes in our sample of cases to allow direct comparison with the 
outcomes data in Hazlitt et al. (2004). 
Table A15.7 presents our findings for the period 2005–13 alongside the findings of the Judicial 
Commission for the period 2000–03. For the period 2005–13, 157 (or more than half (54.0 
per cent)) of the 291 appeals were successful. This is comparable to the overall success rate 
of 57.4 per cent reported by the Judicial Commission for the period 2000–03 (Hazlitt et al., 
2004, p 46). 
However, a closer examination reveals some significant differences between our findings for 
the period 2005–13 and those of the Judicial Commission for the period 2000–03. First, over 
the period 2005–13, appeals against severity of sentence (n=158) represented (albeit 
marginally) the most common type of appeal for sexual offences against children, followed 
by appeals against conviction (n=139). For the period 2000–03, the Judicial Commission 
reported the opposite trend – appeals against conviction (n=118) were marginally more 
common than sentence severity appeals (n=90) (Hazlitt et al., 2004, p 46). 
Our data reveals that conviction appeals were upheld in 28.1 per cent of cases – a marked 
decrease from the 55.9 per cent success rate reported by the Judicial Commission for the 
period 2000–03. This figure is also lower than that reported by Donnelly et al. (2011, p 198) 
for the period 2001–07. They reported a success rate of 50.3 per cent for child sexual assault 
appeals. In contrast, we found a success rate of 60.8 per cent in appeals against sentence 
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severity for the period 2005–13 (96 of 158 cases).167 This is substantially higher than the 
success rate of 44.4 per cent reported by the Judicial Commission for the period 2000–03. 
Overall, 22 Crown appeals were successful. Our calculated success rate in Crown appeals (64.7 
per cent) was higher than that reported by the Judicial Commission (58.3 per cent); however, 
given the small numbers involved, these figures are comparable. 
Our results reveal an erratic pattern of success in appeals against conviction over the period 
2005–13, ranging from two successful cases out of 13 (in 2009) to 10 successful cases out of 
23 (in 2006). Overall, the rate of success in appeals against conviction increased very slightly, 
from two out of 11 in 2005 to three out of 11 in 2013. Similarly, the rate of success in appeals 
against sentence severity was erratic over the period 2005–13, ranging from eight successful 
cases out of 22 (in 2005) to a high of 13 successful cases out of 16 (in 2012). Overall, the rate 
of success in sentence severity appeals increased from eight out of 22 in 2005 to 12 out of 22 
in 2013. 
The success rate of Crown appeals also fluctuated over the period 2005–13, with an overall 
drop from four out of four successful appeals in 2003 to one out of two in 2013. However, 
the findings in relation to Crown appeals should be treated cautiously given the relatively 
small number of Crown appeals per year (and overall) in the study period. 
Of the conviction appeals that succeeded 30 (76.9 per cent) resulted in a retrial and nine (23.1 
per cent) in an acquittal.168 These findings are markedly different to those of the Judicial 
Commission for the period 2000–03, where just over half (51.5 per cent) of the conviction 
appeals resulted in acquittal and just under half (48.5 per cent) resulted in a retrial.169 This 
clearly begs the question as to why a markedly higher percentage of conviction appeals in the 
period 2005–13 ended in a retrial, compared with 2000–03. It also begs the question as to 
                                                     
167 We calculated 158 cases using the same methodology of Hazlitt et al. According to this methodology, the 
total number of accused appealing against sentence includes accused sentencing-only appeals and conviction 
and sentencing appeals where the conviction appeal was dismissed. As such, it does not tally with the earlier 
figure given of 165 appeals against sentencing by the accused, which included accused appeals against 
conviction and sentencing where the conviction appeal was successful.  
168 One case resulted in acquittal on one count and a retrial on two other counts; as such, the percentages 
totalled more than 100 per cent. 
169 Donnelly et al. (2011, p 198) reported an acquittal rate of 42.7 per cent in child sexual assault appeals for the 
period 2001–07. Based on Table A15.7 below, the acquittal rate in child sexual assault appeals for the equivalent 
period of 2001–07 is 42.6 per cent (absent data for 2004). As Hazlitt et al. (2004) covered the period 2000–03, 
and our study covered the period 2005–13, a detailed analysis of child sexual abuse appeals for 2004 is 
unfortunately missing. In any case, this consistency in our findings provides some cross-validation of the data 
between the three studies. 
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the outcome of these cases on being retried. The answer to this question is beyond the scope 
of this study; however, Donnelly et al. (2011, p 219) reported a reconviction rate of 30.2 per 
cent in child sexual assault cases retried.170 For successful appeals against severity of sentence 
in the period 2005–13, the NSWCCA ordered a new sentence in 92.7 per cent of cases. It 
restructured the sentence in 6.3 per cent of cases; these percentages are comparable to the 
findings of the Judicial Commission for the period 2000–03. All 22 successful Crown appeals 
resulted in a new sentence being ordered in the period 2005–13 compared with 57.1 per cent 
of successful cases for the period 2000–03 (Hazlitt et al., 2004). 
 
                                                     
170 In sexual assault cases involving an adult victim, the authors reported a rate of 63.6 per cent for reconviction 
on being retried.  
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15.5 APPEALS AGAINST CONVICTION – A CLOSER EXAMINATION 
In examining more closely the outcomes in appeals against conviction, we mirrored the 
analysis undertaken by Donnelly et al. (2011). This was done with a view to building on the 
findings of this earlier study, to the greatest extent possible, in relation to child sexual assault 
appeals specifically.  
We categorised appeals against conviction according to the legislative framework of the 
Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW). 
In New South Wales, a person convicted on indictment may appeal against their conviction, 
pursuant to section 5 of the Criminal Appeal Act. A Court shall allow an appeal in accordance 
with section 6(1): 
if it is of opinion that the verdict of the jury should be set aside on the ground 
that it is unreasonable, or cannot be supported, having regard to the evidence, 
or that the judgment of the court of trial should be set aside on the ground of 
the wrong decision of any question of law, or that on any other ground 
whatsoever there was a miscarriage of justice, and in any other case shall dismiss 
the appeal; provided that the court may, notwithstanding that it is of opinion 
that the point or points raised by the appeal might be decided in favour of the 
appellant, dismiss the appeal if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of 
justice has actually occurred.171  
All 291 cases in our sample were classified using the approach Donnelly et al. (2011) adopted 
on the basis of the three limbs of section 6(1), as follows: 
 Limb 1 – draws attention to the evidence against the appellant and asks whether, having 
regard to the evidence, the jury’s verdict is unreasonable or cannot be supported. This 
is a question of fact which the court must decide, based on its own independent 
assessment of the evidence (M v The Queen, 1994: 493; SKA v The Queen, 2011: [14]; 
BCM v The Queen, 2013: [31]; MFA v The Queen, 2002: [25]). 
                                                     
171 Emphasis added. This is the common form of provision for appeal against a conviction in all Australian 
jurisdictions, although it is framed a little differently in the ACT: Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 37O(2). For the 
Victorian approach, see Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 274, 276; for the approach of other Australian 
jurisdictions, see Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 352, 353; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) ss 401, 402; 
Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) ss 23, 30; Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) ss 668D, 668E; Criminal Code Act (NT) ss 410, 
411.  
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 Limb 2 – asks whether there has been a wrong decision on any question of law. This limb 
is directed to decisions made during the trial. 
 Limb 3 – asks whether, on any other ground whatsoever, there has been a miscarriage 
of justice.172 
Our definition and interpretation of the three limbs of section 6(1) reflects the approach 
outlined in Judicial Commission Monograph 35 (see Chapters 3 and 4). In particular, we note 
that, in including cases within limb 2, we required that the appellant objected to or sought 
either a jury direction or a ruling as to the admissibility of evidence, or some other 
intervention at the trial; this is consistent with the approach taken by the Judicial Commission. 
For those grounds of appeal where the appellant did not object, and sought no direction or 
ruling or other intervention at trial, cases were classified as falling within limb 3. We found 
that 38.5 per cent of the total number of limb 2 and limb 3 appeals (successful and 
unsuccessful) involved an objection at trial. Moreover, we found that 46.9 per cent of limb 2 
and limb 3 appeals raised admissibility errors, and 70 per cent raised an issue 
of misdirection.173  
Our analysis differs from that conducted by Donnelly et al. in two significant ways. First, our 
study focused only on appeals against conviction in child sexual assault cases; Donnelly et al. 
examined all offence categories, drilling down to sexual assault offences generally, and only 
examined child sexual assault cases more specifically in some respects.174 Secondly, we did 
not restrict our analysis initially to only those cases with successful outcomes on appeal, as 
was done by Donnelly et al. We examined all child sexual abuse appeal cases against 
conviction (successful and unsuccessful), and the grounds of appeal raised were categorised 
according to the three limbs of section 6(1) (as outlined above). We then examined the rate 
of success of appeals within each limb. Table A15.8 below summarises the rate of success of 
conviction appeals by limb in our sample, and compares this to Donnelly et al.’s findings for 
all sexual assault conviction appeals. Appendices A15.3–A15.5 (see Online appendices to the 
appeals study, available at www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au) present 
the categorisation of cases by limb argued, alongside the outcome in the case. 
Appendix A15.6 follows the format of Appendix A in Donnelly et al., summarising successful 
                                                     
172 This definition and interpretation of the three limbs of s 6(1) reflects the approach used by Donnelly et al. 
(2011), outlined in NSW Judicial Commission Monograph 35 (see chapters 3 and 4). Where the appellant did not 
object, and sought no direction or ruling or other intervention at trial, cases were classified as falling within limb 
3. 
173 There were a number of cases that raised both issues; those cases are included in these percentages.  
174 The analysis presented by Donnelly et al. (2011, pp 199–217) draws on all successful sexual assault appeals 
in the period 2001–07. 
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appeal cases by limb, successful grounds of appeal, and orders entered in successful cases 
(2011, p 253). A breakdown of successful admissibility and misdirection grounds is provided 
in appendices A15.7 and A15.8; these tables replicate the analysis provided by Donnelly et al. 
in their appendices B and C, for the current study sample. 
Table A15.8: Basis and outcome of appeals against conviction 
Category of 
appeal 
All child sexual 
assault appeals 
Successful child 
sexual assault 
appeals 
All successful 
sexual assault 
appeals175 
% 
n %(a) n %(b) 
Limb 1 71 51.1 7 17.9 22.1 
Limb 2 50 35.9 13 33.3 26.9 
Limb 3 117 84.2 29 74.4 58.7 
Notes:  
(a) The data represents the percentage of all appeals against conviction for child sexual assault (n=139). 
(b) The data represents the percentage of all successful appeals against conviction for child sexual assault (n=39). 
The columns add up to more than 100 per cent as cases were argued and/or succeeded on more than one limb. 
n equals the number of cases (cases were not counted more than once, even where multiple grounds of appeal 
were raised within each limb).  
In our sample, 71 cases (51.1 per cent) raised a limb 1 argument against conviction (that is, 
they argued that the verdict of the jury was unreasonable or could not be supported having 
regard to the evidence).176 Of these cases, only seven were successful in whole or in part 
(representing 17.9 per cent of all successful appeals against conviction in our sample). This is 
a little lower than the percentage of limb 1 appeals reported by Donnelly et al. (22.1 per cent) 
in all successful sexual assault appeals against conviction. Fifty cases in our sample raised a 
limb 2 argument on appeal against conviction (that is, they argued the verdict should be 
overturned on the basis of error on a question of law, with objection raised at trial). Of these 
cases, 13 were successful on a limb 2 argument (33.3 per cent of all successful convictions 
against appeal in our sample). This represents a higher percentage of successful limb 2 
appeals compared with all appeals against conviction for sexual assault (26.9 per cent) as 
reported by Donnelly et al. (2011, p 199). In 117 cases, a miscarriage of justice was raised on 
other grounds under limb 3. Of these, 29 cases 177  were successful (74.4 per cent of all 
                                                     
175 Sourced from Donnelly et al. (2011, p 199) for the period 2001–07 but excluding 2004. 
176 Cases were only counted once in each limb, even though multiple grounds of appeal may have been raised 
in a case within each limb. 
177 This number includes cases that also succeeded on limb 2 grounds. 
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successful appeals against conviction). This is a higher percentage compared to all successful 
sexual assault conviction appeals (58.7 per cent) reported by Donnelly et al. (2011, p 199).   
Of the 50 cases in our sample that raised a limb 2 argument, 37 also raised a limb 3 argument 
on appeal; of these, six were successful on both limb 2 and limb 3 arguments. Two cases did 
not succeed on the limb 2 argument, but succeeded on the limb 3 argument.  
Of the 117 cases that raised a limb 3 argument, 80 cases raised only a limb 3 argument (that 
is, they did not raise a limb 2 argument). Of these 80 cases, 21 cases were successful. 
Further analysis revealed that a majority of limb 1 cases were argued on the basis of the 
conviction not being supported by the evidence (85.9 per cent). Of the limb 1 cases, 36.7 per 
cent were argued on the basis of inconsistent verdicts and 22.5 per cent were argued on the 
basis of both the evidence not supporting the conviction and inconsistent verdicts. Of the 
seven successful limb 1 cases in our sample, five cases succeeded on the basis that the 
evidence did not support the verdict 178 , four succeeded on the basis of inconsistent 
verdicts179, and two cases succeeded on both counts. In relation to sexual assault appeals 
generally, Donnelly et al. (2011, p 199) reported that verdicts were set aside in 78.3 per cent 
of successful limb 1 appeals on the basis of being inconsistent and in 21.7 per cent on the 
basis of not being supported by the evidence. 
Of the 13 successful limb 2 appeals in our sample, eight involved an error in the admission or 
rejection of evidence and six involved an error on judicial directions or warnings. Of the 29 
successful limb 3 cases in our sample, three involved an error in the admission or rejection of 
evidence, and 17 involved an error on judicial directions or warnings. Thus, of the successful 
limb 2 and 3 appeals in our study, 29.7 per cent involved an error relating to admission or 
non-admission of evidence and 62.2 per cent involved judicial error on warnings or directions. 
By comparison, Donnelly et al. (2011, p 205) found that 53 per cent of all successful appeals 
against conviction involved a judicial error in warnings or directions. Moreover, sexual assault 
and related offences accounted for 33.5 per cent of misdirection cases (constituting the most 
common offence type) (Donnelly et al., 2011, p xvi). Drilling down further, Donnelly et al. 
(2011, p 205) found the Longman misdirection was the most common misdirection in all 
sexual assault appeals, occurring in 46.4 per cent of cases.  
Appendices A15.7 and A15.8 (see Online appendices to the appeals study, available at 
www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au) provide a further breakdown of the successful 
                                                     
178 NWL v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 67; Norris v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 235; DJV v The Queen [2008] 
NSWCCA 272; SKA v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 205; SI v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 181. 
179 Norris v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 235; SI v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 181; AE v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 
52; R v Tyrone Chishimba; Tyrone Chishimba v The Queen; Likumbo Makasa v The Queen; R v Likumbo Makasa; 
Mumbi Peter Mulenga v The Queen; R v Mumbi Peter Mulenga [2010] NSWCCA 228. 
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admissibility and misdirection appeals in this study. The vast majority of successful 
admissibility cases involved issues raised at the trial, which were carried into appeal. The 
majority of successful admissibility appeals related to tendency and coincidence evidence 
(discussed further below), though the numbers overall are small (see Appendix A15.7 in 
Online appendices to the appeals study, available at 
www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au). The vast majority of successful misdirection 
appeals did not raise error at trial. In the pre-2010 appeal cases, Longman misdirections were 
over-represented. Overall, a substantial proportion of successful appeals related to 
misdirections about context or relationship evidence and tendency or coincidence evidence, 
though numbers are relatively small (see Appendix A15.8 in Online appendices to the appeals 
study, available at www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au). We probed our data a little 
further based on the findings above, to explore some issues in child sexual assault cases that 
raised special challenges, examining three categories of evidence (see Quadara, 2014; Shead, 
2014). 
1. Character evidence 
Only four appeals in our sample of cases raised the use of character evidence on appeal.180 
Three of these appeals failed, but one succeeded. Donnelly et al. (2011, p 200) found that 20 
per cent of admissibility cases over character evidence succeeded on appeal, accounting for 
14.3 per cent of admissibility errors in all sexual assault matters. This suggests that issues 
around character may arise more in adult sexual assault cases than in child sexual assault 
cases. 
  
                                                     
180 Clark v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 122; ALS v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 63; PGM v The Queen [2006] 
NSWCCA 310; Makarov v The Queen (No 1) [2008] NSWCCA 291. 
280 
2. Tendency and/or coincidence evidence  
Eighteen cases (12.9 per cent of all appeals against conviction) in our sample raised the use 
of tendency and/or coincidence evidence in appeals against conviction.181 Appendix A15.9 
(see Online appendices to the appeals study, available at 
www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au) outlines the grounds, reasoning and outcomes in 
these cases – six were allowed (four were historical cases and four were intrafamilial cases).182 
The relevance of tendency and coincidence evidence, and judicial misdirection related to such 
evidence, supported a number of successful appeals against conviction. In our sample, 15.4 
per cent of successful conviction appeals involved tendency and/or coincidence evidence, 
representing more than one-third of successful admissibility appeals. Donnelly et al. (2011, p 
200) found tendency and/or coincidence evidence made up 10 per cent of admissibility cases, 
or 7.1 per cent of admissibility errors in all sexual assault cases. This suggests that tendency 
and/or coincidence evidence may more often give rise to errors in child sexual assault cases 
than in adult sexual assault cases. However, caution is warranted in drawing conclusions as 
the number of cases is relatively small. 
3. Relationship/context evidence 
A number of cases in our sample raised the use of relationship or context evidence on 
appeal.183 However, only two cases were successful on this ground.184 
Appendix A15.7 (see Online appendices to the appeals study, available at 
www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au) summarises the different grounds in successful 
admissibility appeals. 
                                                     
181 R v Fletcher [2005] NSWCCA 338; R v Richard Norman Mearns [2005] NSWCCA 396; AE v The Queen [2008] 
NSWCCA 52; Clark v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 122; DJV v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 272; AW v The Queen 
[2009] NSWCCA 1; BP v The Queen; R v BP [2010] NSWCCA 303; ES v The Queen (No 1) [2010] NSWCCA 197; ES 
v The Queen (No 2) [2010] NSWCCA 198; KTR v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 271; LJW v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 
114; RWC v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 332; FB v The Queen; R v FB [2011] NSWCCA 217; R v SK; SK v The Queen 
[2011] NSWCCA 292; BJS v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 123; Colquhoun v The Queen (No 1) [2013] NSWCCA 190; 
Colquhoun v The Queen (No 2) [2013] NSWCCA 191; Peter Versi v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 206.  
182 AE v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 52; DJV v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 272; RWC v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 
332; ES v The Queen (No 1) [2010] NSWCCA 197; Colquhoun v The Queen (No 1) [2013] NSWCCA 190; Colquhoun 
v The Queen (No 2) [2013] NSWCCA 191. Four were limb 2 appeals on grounds of tendency and coincidence: AE 
v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 52; DJV v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 272, ES v The Queen (No 1) [2010] NSWCCA 
197, RWC v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 332. Two were limb 3 appeals on grounds of tendency and coincidence: 
Colquhoun v The Queen (No 1) [2013] NSWCCA 190; Colquhoun v The Queen (No 2) [2013] NSWCCA 191. 
183 See for example: R v AMN [2005] NSWCCA 124; Qualtieri v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 95; DTS v The Queen 
[2008] NSWCCA 329; Rodden v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 53; ARS v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 266; DJV v The 
Queen [2008] NSWCCA 272; Colquhoun v The Queen (No 2) [2013] NSWCCA 191.  
184 DJV v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 272; Colquhoun v The Queen (No 2) [2013] NSWCCA 191. 
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Judicial misdirections 
Child sexual assault cases frequently involve a number of judicial directions and warnings over 
and above the common directions given in a criminal trial, or even in sexual assault trials 
generally (that is, involving an adult complainant) (see Judicial Commission of New South 
Wales, 2007, p 27; Judicial College of Victoria, 2014). The law with respect to judicial 
directions and warnings in child sexual assault cases is complex. Over the last decade, there 
has been increasing recognition that too many directions are given during the trial, and that 
jurors often do not understand them (NSW Law Reform Commission, 2008, [1.23]; Donnelly 
et al., 2011, p 203; Shead, 2014; Australian Law Reform Commission, 2010, Chapter 28). At 
the outset of a trial, a judge may be required to warn the jury of the potentially traumatic 
nature of sexual assault. The judge may also issue various other warnings (depending on the 
case) relating to the use of pre-recorded witness testimony and closed-circuit television 
(CCTV) (Judicial Commission, 2007, [3-020]). In some circumstances, a judge will also provide 
comment during the Crown case in relation to CCTV, pre-recorded witness statements or 
where a court-appointed person cross-examines the complainant (Judicial Commission, 2007, 
[3-060]). However, most jury directions and warnings will come during summing-up. In BWT 
(2002), Wood CJ at CL (as he then was) per [32] set out eight directions and warnings that 
might be given in summing-up in sexual assault trials at the time:  
(a) the Murray direction (R v Murray, 1987), to the effect that, where there is only one witness 
asserting the commission of a crime, the evidence of that witness “must be scrutinised with 
great care” before a conclusion is arrived at that a verdict of guilty should be brought in; 
(b) The Longman direction (as reinforced in Crampton and Doggett), that by reason of delay, 
it would be “unsafe or dangerous” to convict on the uncorroborated evidence of the 
complainant alone, unless the jury – scrutinising the evidence with great care, considering the 
circumstances relevant to its evaluation, and paying heed to the warning – was satisfied of its 
truth and accuracy; 
(c) The Crofts direction (Crofts v The Queen, 1996), where, if a jury is to be informed, in 
accordance with s 107 of the Criminal Procedure Act, that a delay in complaint does not 
necessarily indicate that the allegation is false, and that there may be good reasons why a 
victim of sexual assault may hesitate in complaining about it, then it should also be informed 
that the absence of a complaint or a delay in the making of it may be taken into account in 
evaluating the evidence of the complainant, and in determining whether to believe him or her 
(but not in terms reviving the stereotyped view that complainants in sexual assault cases are 
unreliable or that delay is invariably a sign of the falsity of the complaint: Crofts at 451); 
(d) The KRM direction (KRM v The Queen, 2001), to the effect that, except where the evidence 
relating to one count charging sexual assault is admissible, in relation to another count or 
counts alleging a separate occasion of such an assault, the jury must consider each count 
separately and only by reference to the evidence which applies to it; this direction should be 
balanced, where appropriate, by a reminder that if the jury has a reasonable doubt concerning 
the credibility of the complainant’s evidence on one or more counts, they can take that into 
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account when assessing his or her reliability on the other counts (see R  v Markuleski, 2011: 
[259]-[263]); 
(e) Any warning which may be required by reason of a ruling that limits the use of evidence 
concerning a complaint, or delay in complaint, to the question of credibility (e.g. under 
s 108(3) of the Evidence Act, as an exception to the credibility rule), or alternatively that allows 
it to be taken into account (e.g. under s 66 of the Evidence Act, as an exception to the hearsay 
rule) as evidence of the facts asserted; 
(f) The Gipp warning (conveniently so called, although there was divided reasoning in Gipp v 
The Queen, 1998), concerning the way in which evidence of uncharged sexual conduct 
between an accused and a complainant can be taken into account as showing the nature of 
the relationship between them, but not so as to substitute satisfaction of the occurrence of 
such conduct for proof of the act charged; 
(g) Any warning that may be necessary in relation to the use of coincidence evidence (under 
s 98 of the Evidence Act) where the accused is charged in the one indictment with sexual 
assault against two or more complainants, requiring the jury to be satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt, firstly, of the offences alleged in respect of one complainant, and then of 
the existence of such a substantial and relevant similarity between the two sets of acts as to 
exclude any acceptable explanation other than that the accused committed the offences 
against both complainants; 
(h) A BRS direction (BRS v The Queen, 1997) that, where evidence revealing criminal or 
reprehensible propensity is admitted, but its use is limited to non-propensity or tendency 
purposes (for example, those considered proper in that case), then it is to be used only for 
those purposes, and not as proof of the accused’s guilt. 
Changes over the last decade in law and practice have arguably streamlined, clarified and 
minimised unfairness, prejudice and potential error in judicial warnings and directions.185 
However, as the findings of this study suggest, judicial misdirections may continue to be a 
source of error in child sexual assault trials, generating a basis for overturning convictions. 
Appendix A15.8 (see Online appendices to the appeals study, available at 
www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au) summarises types of successful judicial 
185 See for example, s 165B Evidence Act 1995 (NSW); s 294AA Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), which heavily 
regulates the Longman direction. See also Jarret v The Queen (2014); s 294AA Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) 
– from 2007, a court cannot suggest complainants as a class are unreliable, and a prohibition was introduced on
warning the jury of the danger of convicting on uncorroborated evidence. From 2007, a Crofts direction is only 
to be given if sufficient evidence exists to justify such a warning: s 294(2)(c) Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW); 
s 165 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) – from 1 January 2009, it is impermissible for a court to suggest that state children 
as a class are unreliable witnesses.  
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misdirection cases in the study sample. Most of the judicial errors related to giving inadequate 
warnings to the jury, unbalanced judicial summing-up, and failure to correctly direct the jury. 
Against this backdrop, we examined those appeal cases that raised issues relating to the 
following judicial directions and warnings, which are recognised as being particularly 
problematic in child sexual assault prosecutions (Shead, 2014). 
Fifteen cases in our sample raised an appeal related to a Longman direction; most of these, 
were historical child sexual abuse cases (nine out of 14).186 Of these 15 cases, only four 
succeeded on the basis of a Longman misdirection. All four were historical cases, with delay 
ranging from six to 20 years. Appendix A15.10 (see Online appendices to the appeals study, 
available at www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au) presents the cases in our sample that 
appealed on the basis of a Longman ground, and the grounds of the successful cases. Three 
of the successful Longman appeals were decided on the basis of the pre-amended legislation, 
and a fourth case, ST v The Queen187, centred on the misapplication of the new legislation by 
the trial judge.188 This suggests that reforms have been successful in reducing Longman-
related misdirections.  
Five cases raised an appeal related to a Murray direction; only one of these was successful. 
Three cases related to a Markuleski direction, two to a Crofts direction and one to a Black 
direction 189 ; all of these were unsuccessful. Three cases involved an appeal against an 
Edwards warning190; all were successful on the grounds of the Edwards warning. 
Appendix A15.8 (see Online appendices to the appeals study, available at 
www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au) provides a summary of the grounds in successful 
misdirection appeals. 
186 One of the 15 cases could not be classified as being a historical or non-historical case of child sexual assault. 
187 [2010] NSWCCA 5. 
188  The Criminal Procedure Amendment (Sexual and Other Offences) Act 2006 (NSW), s 294, affected the 
operation of the Longman warning. Under the amendments, judges may issue warnings if ‘(a) the delay in 
making a complaint by the person on whom the offence is alleged to have been committed is significant, and 
(b) the Judge is satisfied that the person on trial for the offence has suffered a significant forensic disadvantage 
caused by that delay’. Under the same act s 294(5), the ‘mere passage of time is not in itself to be regarded as 
establishing a significant disadvantage’. This amendment has since been repealed, but is replicated in substance 
in s 165B of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW).  
189 Where the jury indicates that it is unable to reach a verdict and the preconditions for allowing a majority 
verdict are not satisfied, a direction should be given: Black v The Queen (1993, at 50–1). This recognises that the 
jury must be free to deliberate without any pressure being brought to bear upon it. 
190 An Edwards warning should be given in a case if the prosecution contends that a lie is evidence of guilt: 
Edwards (1993). 
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15.6 CASE CHARACTERISTICS 
The following analyses address research question five: 
Is there any difference in the rate of appeals, the grounds of appeals and the outcomes 
of appeals in cases: 
a. where there is delayed complaint, compared with cases reported immediately
in childhood?
b. involving institutional abuse, compared with intrafamilial cases of abuse and
other extrafamilial cases?
To address the second part of this question, the cases in our sample were classified into three 
broad categories: Intrafamilial, extrafamilial and institutional cases. 
Intrafamilial cases were defined to include a complainant–perpetrator relationship that is 
biological, or borne of marriage/cohabitation; thus, stepfathers or de facto partners living 
together with a parent, complainant or other family member were classified as intrafamilial. 
Extrafamilial cases were defined as those that fell outside the scope of intrafamilial cases, and 
typically included family friends, partners who are not live-in and strangers, but did not 
include abuse occurring within an institutional or organisational setting. There is no precise 
definition of what constitutes institutional child sexual abuse. The Royal Commission has 
taken a broad view of what is encompassed by institutional child sexual abuse, extending to 
sexual abuse of a child that occurs in private and public settings, including in childcare, 
cultural, educational, religious, sporting and other institutions.191 
191 The Royal Commission’s Terms of Reference (2014) define ‘institution’ to mean: 
any public or private body, agency, association, club, institution, organisation or other entity or group of 
entities of any kind (whether incorporated or unincorporated), however described, and: 
i. includes, for example, an entity or group of entities (including an entity or group of entities that no
longer exists) that provides, or has at any time provided, activities, facilities, programs or services of 
any kind that provide the means through which adults have contact with children, including through 
their families; and  
ii. does not include the family.
Child sexual abuse happens in an ‘institutional context’ if, for example: 
i. it happens on the premises of an institution, where the activities of an institution take place, or in
connection with the activities of an institution; or 
ii. it is engaged in by an official of an institution, in circumstances (including circumstances involving
settings not directly controlled by the institution) where you consider that the institution has, or its 
activities have, created, facilitated, increased, or in any way contributed to (whether by act or omission) 
the risk of child sexual abuse, or the circumstances or conditions giving rise to that risk; or  
iii. it happened in any other circumstances where you consider that an institution is, or should be
treated as being, responsible for adults having contact with children. 
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Using this broad definition, 29 of the 291 cases (10.0 per cent) in our sample were classified 
as institutional child sexual abuse. Six cases (2.1 per cent) could not be classified as 
intrafamilial, extrafamilial or institutional on the information available to us.192 While these 
three categories were not treated as mutually exclusive, ultimately one case was classified as 
both institutional and intrafamilial193, and one as both institutional and extrafamilial.194 Three 
cases were both intrafamilial and extrafamilial.195   
Of the appeals, 142 cases (48.8 per cent) involved intrafamilial abuse and 119 cases (40.9 per 
cent) involved extrafamilial abuse. Table A15.9 presents a breakdown, by year, of these three 
categories of abuse.  
  
                                                     
192 SH v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 79; RJ v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 263; TJ v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 
257; Carlton v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 244; Goss v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 190; RA v The Queen [2007] 
NSWCCA 251.  
193 R v Cunningham [2006] NSWCCA 176. 
194 R v PFC [2011] NSWCCA 117. 
195 R v O [2005] NSWCCA 327; Ross v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 207; RS v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 227. 
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Table A15.9: Comparison of types of abuse 
Year Intrafamilial child 
sexual abuse 
Extrafamilial child 
sexual abuse 
Institutional 
child sexual 
abuse 
Unclear 
n %(b) n %(b) N %(b) n %(b) 
2005 16 47.1 15 44.1 4 11.8 0 0.0 
2006 21 53.8 15 38.5 4 10.3 0 0.0 
2007 12 44.4 12 44.4 2 7.4 1 3.7 
2008 13 33.3 19 48.7 6 15.4 1 2.6 
2009 14 46.7 12 40.0 2 6.7 2 6.7 
2010 20 54.1 14 37.8 2 5.4 1 2.7 
2011 12 57.1 7 33.3 3 14.3 0 0.0 
2012 14 42.4 15 45.5 4 12.1 1 3.0 
2013 20 64.5 10 32.3 2 6.5 0 0.0 
TOTAL 142 48.8 119 40.9 29 10.0 6 2.1 
Notes: 
(a) The figures don’t add up to 100 per cent, and the total number of cases adds up to 296, due to five cases 
falling into more than one category of abuse (as listed above). 
(b) The data is a percentage of the yearly sample. 
There is notable variation in the percentage representation of intrafamilial and extrafamilial 
cases between years in the period 2005–13. Although there is an overall increase in the 
percentage representation of intrafamilial cases on appeal, from 47.1 per cent in 2005 to 64.5 
per cent in 2013, there is considerable fluctuation over this period. The opposite pattern is 
apparent in relation to extrafamilial cases, with a decrease from 44.1 per cent in 2005 to 32.3 
per cent in 2013; however, similarly, fluctuations are marked over this period.  
Table A15.10 provides a breakdown of the three categories of abuse by either their historical 
or non-historical status. Overall (as expected), historical child sexual abuse is 
over-represented in institutional cases. 
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Table A15.10: Types of abuse by historical child sexual abuse (HCSA) or non-historical child 
sexual abuse (non-HCSA) 
Year Intrafamilial child sexual 
abuse 
Extrafamilial child sexual 
abuse 
Institutional child sexual 
abuse 
 HCS
A 
%(a) Non- 
HCSA 
%(a) HCSA %(a) Non-
HCSA 
%(a) HCSA %(a) Non-
HCSA 
%(a) 
2005 5 31.3 11 68.8 1 6.7 14.0 93.3 2 50.0 2 50.0 
2006 11 52.4 10 47.6 1 6.7 14.0 93.3 2 50.0 2 50.0 
2007 6 50.0 6 50.0 3 25.0 9.0 75.0 2 100.0 0 0.0 
2008 4 30.8 9 69.2 3 15.8 16.0 84.2 5 83.3 1 16.7 
2009 5 35.7 9 64.3 1 8.3 91.7 83.3 1 50.0 1 50.0 
2010 7 35.0 13 65.0 4 28.6 10.0 71.4 1 50.0 1 50.0 
2011 2 16.7 10 83.3 1 14.3 6.0 85.7 1 33.3 2 66.6 
2012 2 14.3 12 85.7 4 26.7 11.0 73.3 2 50.0 2 50.0 
2013 8 40.0 12 60.0 0 0.0 10.0 100.0 1 50.0 1 50.0 
Total 50 35.2 92 64.8 18 15.1 101.0 84.9 17 58.6 12 41.4 
Notes: 
(a) This represents a percentage of the yearly sample. 
Unclear non-historical child sexual abuse cases counted as non-historical child sexual abuse for the purposes of 
this table. 
Institutional cases on appeal 
Appendix A15.13 (see Online appendices to the appeals study, available at 
www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au) lists the 29 cases of institutional abuse that were 
the subject of appeal in the period 2005–13, and summarises the key features of these cases. 
This is not a large sample of cases (10 per cent of the study sample). A qualitative analysis of 
these institutional cases was undertaken to examine what challenges and/or issues arose in 
these cases as they moved through the prosecutorial process; few systemic issues were 
discernible from this review. 
Of the 29 institutional cases on appeal, 17 were historical child sexual abuse; just under half 
revealed delay in complaint or reporting of 20 years or more. Of these 17 historical cases, six 
involved an appeal against conviction only; four involved an appeal against sentence only; 
four were appeals against both conviction and sentence; two were appeals by the Crown 
against sentence; and one was an interlocutory appeal by the Crown. 
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Of the historical institutional cases, nine succeeded on appeal (at least in part). Of the 
non-historical cases, six succeeded on appeal (six of 12). Accordingly, in total, 15 of 29 
institutional cases were successfully appealed. 
Drilling down further, five of the nine successful historical institutional cases involved an 
appeal by the accused against conviction; three were appeals against conviction only; and 
two were appeals against both conviction and sentencing. Four of the five succeeded on the 
conviction ground, one of which also succeeded in part on its sentencing grounds. Two of 
these cases succeeded on the basis of judicial misdirection. For example, in Healey v The 
Queen196, the appeal succeeded on the basis of judicial failure to direct the jury in relation to 
uncharged instances of sexual misconduct. In Healey v The Queen197, the appeal succeeded 
on the basis of an inappropriate Longman warning, failure to direct the jury regarding the 
evidentiary standard, and a failure in the judicial summing-up to jury. 
Turning to the six successful non-historical institutional cases, five involved an appeal by the 
accused, but only one of these was a successful appeal against conviction. In this case, Galvin 
v The Queen198, the appeal succeeded on the basis of the admission of inadmissible evidence. 
Three appeals against sentence succeeded, as did two Crown appeals. 
Comparison of historical versus non-historical child sexual abuse appeal cases  
As noted earlier, this study relied largely on published judgments of the NSWCCA. The facts 
of a case documented in appeal judgments are variable and inconsistent in focus and detail; 
in some cases, they are difficult to distil or not included in the appeal judgment. In order to 
obtain more complete information on the facts of a case, we referred to the reported decision 
at first instance. For example, it was not always apparent from the appeal judgment whether 
the case was a historical matter. However, in eight cases (2.7 per cent)199, the decision at first 
instance was not reported, so some of the factual data necessary to categorise the case as 
either historical child sexual abuse or non-historical child sexual abuse was simply not 
accessible to us.200 These cases were excluded from this part of the study, as documented 
below.  
                                                     
196 [2008] NSWCCA 229. 
197 [2006] NSWCCA 235. 
198 [2006] NSWCCA 66. 
199 In one of these cases, Cargnello v DPP [2012] NSWCCA 162, there was no specific complainant and, as such, 
it was grouped with the unclear cases. 
200 This points to a broader challenge in the systematic analysis of child sexual abuse cases, being a lack of 
consistent information about cases and clearly established metrics for comparison of cases and samples in 
research and study. 
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15.7 DEFINITIONAL LIMITATIONS 
Historical cases of child sexual abuse may be variously defined, and there is no clear definition 
of what constitutes a historical case of child sexual abuse (Newbury, 2014). In this study, we 
defined historical child sexual abuse as a case of child sexual abuse reported by an adult 
complainant and non-historical child sexual abuse as a case involving a child complainant. We 
used this definition based on the information most readily extractable from our dataset, 
allowing us to compare historical and non-historical child sexual abuse. Historical child sexual 
abuse, however, may arguably be more appropriately defined by other markers (for example, 
lapse in time between alleged abuse and disclosure and/or reporting or charges being laid). 
However, even this approach raises difficult questions about how much time must lapse 
between onset and reporting before a case becomes historical in nature; ‘historicity is always 
a matter of degree’ (Newbury, 2014, p 44). 
This problem is exemplified by a number of ‘grey’ cases of historical child sexual abuse 
identified in our sample. For example, consider a case where abuse occurs when the 
complainant is aged three and disclosure and reporting occurs when they are aged 15 (as in 
MM v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 262). Here, the lapse in time between onset of abuse and 
reporting and/or charges is 12 years, but the complainant is still not an adult. Using the 
definition adopted in this study, this case is categorised as a non-historical child sexual abuse 
case. However, qualitatively how is this case different to a case where the abuse starts when 
the victim is aged 14 and reporting occurs when the complainant is aged 26 (as in KNP v 
The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 213)? The latter case is categorised as a historical child sexual 
abuse case in this study, but both cases have an equivalent lapse in time between onset and 
reporting. This points to clear limits in our definition of historical child sexual abuse. It also 
points to the fact that our categorisation on the basis of the age of the complainant at the 
time of reporting or charges assumes a qualitative difference in a case involving a child 
compared with an adult complainant (which may or may not be relevant or reflected in the 
issues on appeal). For example, there may be differences in the type and quality of evidence 
that may be available in the case which, while relevant at trial, may not arise as an issue on 
appeal. 
15.8 THE FINDINGS 
The majority of child sexual offence cases on appeal in our sample were not historical cases 
of child sexual abuse (that is, they most commonly involved a child complainant and not an 
adult complainant). In total, over the nine-year period under study, 84 cases (28.9 per cent) 
were historical. Table A15.11 and Figure A15.5 provide a breakdown by year of the number 
of historical and non-historical appeal cases. Appendices A15.11 and A15.12 (see Online 
appendices to the appeals study, available at www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au) 
provide, respectively, a full list and detailed summary of the identified historical child sexual 
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abuse cases in the study sample. The percentage of historical cases fluctuated around an 
average of 28.9 per cent over the period, peaking at 40.7 per cent in 2007. The low of 14.3 per 
cent in 2011 is not readily explainable. There was no apparent significant trend in the number 
of historical cases on appeal over the study period. 
Table A15.11: Number and percentage of historical and non-historical child sexual abuse cases 
by year 
Year Historical cases Non-historical cases Unclear cases Total 
N %(a) n %(a) n %(a) 
2005 8 23.5 25 73.5 1 2.9 34 
2006 14 35.9 25 64.1 0 0.0 39 
2007 11 40.7 15 55.6 1 3.7 27 
2008 12 30.8 27 69.2 0 0.0 39 
2009 7 23.3 20 66.7 3 10.0 30 
2010 12 32.4 24 64.9 1 2.7 37 
2011 3 14.3 17 81.0 1 4.8 21 
2012 8 24.2 24 72.7 1 3.0 33 
2013 9 29.0 22 71.0 0 0.0 31 
Total 84 28.9 199 68.4 8 2.7 291 
Note:  
(a) These are percentages of the total sample by year. 
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Figure A15.5: Number and percentage of historical child sexual abuse (HCSA) and non-historical child sexual 
abuse (non-HCSA) cases by year 
Historical child sexual abuse cases are of special interest in this report because a large 
proportion of institutional cases of child sexual abuse – the focus of the Royal Commission’s 
brief – are historical cases.201 Also, such cases are often acknowledged as presenting marked 
challenges for the prosecution, often giving rise to evidentiary challenges (Quadara, 2014; 
Shead, 2014). Delayed reporting often arises as an issue in the case (Shead, 2014; Esposito, 
2014).  
A majority of the historical child sexual abuse cases in the study sample were intrafamilial 
(59.5 per cent). None of the historical child sexual abuse cases in our sample involved a 
stranger. Of these cases, 32 (38.1 per cent) involved a complainant aged younger than 10, 33 
(39.3 per cent) involved a complainant aged between 10 and 12, and 31 cases (36.9 per cent) 
involved a complainant older than 12.202  
Analysis revealed few substantive differences between historical child sexual abuse and non-
historical child sexual abuse cases in terms of the grounds of appeals argued and outcomes 
of appeals.  
                                                     
201 For example, analysis of the Royal Commission’s private sessions between 17 January 2013 and 30 April 2014 
found that survivors took an average of 22 years to disclose institutional abuse after it began; see Royal 
Commission into Institutional Reponses to Child Sexual Abuse Interim Report Volume 1 (2014, p 158).  
202 Percentages add to more than 100 per cent as some cases involved multiple complainants across different 
age groups. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
HCSA n HCSA % Non-HCSA n Non-HCSA %
292 
Table A15.12 provides a comparison of historical child sexual abuse cases and non-historical 
child sexual abuse cases, on the basis of the grounds of appeal. Table A15.13 presents a 
comparison of outcomes in the cases. 
Table A15.12: Types of appeal in historical and non-historical child sexual abuse cases 
Type of appeal Historical cases Non-historical cases 
n %(a) %(b) N %(c) %(b) 
Appeal against conviction only 
(n=82) 
26 31.0 31.7 56 27.1 68.3 
Appeal against sentence by 
accused only  
(n=117) 
29 34.5 24.8 88 42.5 75.2 
Appeal against conviction and 
sentence by accused only  
(n=47) 
18 21.4 38.3 29 14.0 61.7 
Crown-only appeals against 
sentence  
(n=23) 
6 7.1 26.1 17 8.9 73.9 
Interlocutory appeals(d) 
(n=11) 
3 3.6 27.3 8 3.8 72.7 
Joint appeals by Crown and 
accused 
(n=11) 
2 2.4 18.2 9 4.3 81.9 
Notes: 
(a) The data represents the percentage of all historical child sexual abuse cases (n=84). 
(b) The data represents the percentage of all cases in the relevant type of appeal. 
(c) The data represents the percentage of all non-historical child sexual abuse cases (n=207). 
(d) The data includes interlocutory appeals by both the Crown and the accused. 
Non-historical child sexual abuse figures here include cases where the status of historical child sexual abuse 
could not be determined. 
Table A15.13: Comparison of outcomes between historical and non-historical child sexual 
abuse cases by limb 
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Type of appeal 
Historical cases Non-historical cases 
N %(a) %(b) N %(c) %(b) 
Limb 1 grounds  
(percentage of successful cases) 
23 
(3) 
27.4 
(3.6) 
32.4 
 
48 
(4) 
23.2 
(1.9) 
67.6 
 
Limb 2 grounds 
 (percentage of successful 
cases) 
18 
(5) 
21.4 
(6.0) 
36.0 
 
32 
(8) 
15.5 
(3.9) 
64.0 
 
Limb 3 grounds 
 (percentage of successful 
cases) 
39 
(8) 
46.4 
(9.5) 
33.3 
 
78 
(21) 
37.7 
(10.1) 
66.7 
 
Notes: 
(a) The data represents the percentage of all historical child sexual abuse cases (n=84). 
(b) The data represents the percentage of all cases in the relevant type of appeal. 
(c) The data represents the percentage of all non-historical child sexual abuse cases (n=207). 
Non-historical child sexual abuse figures here include cases where the status of historical child sexual abuse 
could not be determined. 
Limb 1 refers to conviction appeals on the grounds of whether, having regard to the evidence, the jury’s verdict 
is unreasonable or cannot be supported.  
Limb 2 asks whether there has been a wrong decision on any question of law. This limb is directed to decisions 
made during the trial.  
Limb 3 asks whether there has been a miscarriage of justice. 
Table A15.12 shows little difference between historical and non-historical child sexual abuse 
appeal cases in terms of the rate of appeal against conviction only (31.0 per cent and 27.1 per 
cent respectively). A modestly lower percentage of historical child sexual abuse cases (34.5 
per cent) involved appeals against sentence only by the accused compared with non-historical 
child sexual abuse cases (42.5 per cent). A higher percentage of historical child sexual abuse 
cases (21.4 per cent) involved appeal against conviction and sentence by the accused 
compared with non-historical child sexual abuse cases (14 per cent). Although the numbers 
are small, a smaller percentage of historical child sexual abuse cases (7.1 per cent) involved 
Crown-only appeals against sentence compared with non-historical child sexual abuse cases 
(8.9 per cent). Similarly, a lower percentage of historical child sexual abuse cases involved a 
joint Crown–accused appeal (2.4 per cent) than did non-historical child sexual abuse cases 
(4.3 per cent). The significance of these modest differences in types of appeal between the 
two types of abuse is not readily apparent. 
As Table A15.13 reveals, in terms of the grounds of appeal, a similar percentage of historical 
and non-historical child sexual abuse cases (27.4 per cent compared with 23.2 per cent, 
respectively) raised an appeal under a limb 1 ground on the basis of the verdict of the jury 
being unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence. A greater proportion of historical cases 
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succeeded with a limb 2 ground; 21.4 per cent of historical cases raised a limb 2 ground 
compared with 15.5 per cent of non-historical cases, and 6 per cent of historical cases 
succeeded on a limb 2 argument compared with 3.9 per cent of non-historical child sexual 
abuse cases. The only other discernible difference in this data is that a greater proportion of 
historical child sexual abuse appeal cases raised a limb 3 ground (that is, a miscarriage of 
justice not raised at trial) compared with non-historical appeal cases (46.4 per cent of 
historical child sexual abuse cases raised a limb 3 ground compared with 37.7 per cent non-
historical cases; overall, 10.1 per cent of non-historical cases succeeded on a limb 3 ground 
compared with 9.5 per cent of historical cases). 
Table A15.16 below provides a detailed comparative breakdown of the outcomes of appeals 
for historical and non-historical child sexual abuse cases across the three broad categories of 
appeal cases – conviction, sentence severity and Crown appeal. 
Overall, historical child sexual abuse appeals (both against conviction and sentence, including 
by the Crown) were marginally more successful than non-historical child sexual abuse appeals 
in the period 2005–13, with an overall rate of 59.3 per cent and 54.5 per cent respectively. In 
2013 only, non-historical cases (56.5 per cent) were markedly more successful on appeal 
overall compared with historical cases (25 per cent). Over the period 2005–13, the overall 
success rate for historical cases decreased from 50 per cent to 25 per cent, but there was 
considerable fluctuation in the success rate. The opposite trend is seen for non-historical 
cases, with the overall rate of successful appeals increasing from 32 per cent in 2005 to 56.5 
per cent in 2013; a similar degree of fluctuation is seen in historical child sexual abuse cases 
over this period. 
Of successful appeals against conviction (n=39), 66.7 per cent were non-historical cases 
compared with 33.3 per cent of historical child sexual abuse cases. Of the historical cases on 
appeal, 24 (28.6 per cent) included an appeal by the accused on the basis of admission or 
rejection of evidence and 32 (38.1 per cent) included an appeal related to judicial 
misdirection. Around 28 per cent of appeals against conviction succeeded: 46 were historical 
and 93 were non-historical child sexual abuse cases. In a majority of successful historical child 
sexual abuse appeals against conviction, delay was in issue. Eight historical child sexual assault 
cases succeeded on grounds of admissibility of evidence and 16 succeeded on the basis of 
judicial misdirection. Most successful appeals against conviction resulted in an acquittal, with 
no real difference discernible in the rates between historical and non-historical child sexual 
abuse cases. 
Historical child sexual abuse cases resulted in more successful appeals against sentence 
severity compared with non-historical cases. Of the successful appeals against sentence 
severity, 68.8 per cent were non-historical cases compared with 31.3 per cent of historical 
cases. However, 68.2 per cent of appeals against sentence in historical child sexual abuse 
cases succeeded compared with 57.6 per cent of appeals in non-historical cases. The 
outcomes in successful appeals against sentence showed little difference between historical 
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and non-historical child sexual abuse cases. Of the 30 successful historical child sexual abuse 
appeals against sentence, one resulted in a varied sentence and 29 in a new sentence 
(96.7 per cent). Of the successful appeals against sentence in non-historical child sexual abuse 
cases, five resulted in a varied sentence (four of these involved a reduction of the non-parole 
period)203 and 61 in a new sentence (92.4 per cent). 
A detailed summary of the characteristics and outcomes of the 84 historical child sexual abuse 
cases is presented in Appendix A15.12 (see Online appendices to the appeals study, available 
at www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au). 
In how many cases was delay raised as an issue on appeal? 
In the study sample, 74 cases (25.4 per cent) were positively identified as raising the issue of 
delay on appeal; 217 cases (74.6 per cent) were identified as not giving rise to delay as an 
issue on appeal. Table A15.14 presents the percentage of cases where delay was an issue on 
appeal for both historical and non-historical matters.204 A majority of the historical cases (57.1 
per cent) involved delay as an issue compared with only 12.6 per cent of non-historical cases. 
Indeed, nearly two-thirds (64.9 per cent) of the cases that raised delay were historical; this is 
not surprising. Table A15.15 presents a comparative view of success on the issue of delay in 
historical and non-historical cases. Although numbers are small and caution is warranted, the 
findings presented in Table A15.15 suggest that delay continues to be more of an issue in 
historical than in non-historical child sexual abuse cases. Almost 78 per cent of appeals that 
succeeded on the basis of delay were historical cases and only 22 per cent were non-historical 
cases. 
                                                     
203 MLP v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 271; Clare v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 30; MAJW v The Queen [2009] 
NSWCCA 255; NW v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 178; TJC v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 413. 
204  Appendix A15.12 (see Online appendices to the appeals study, available at 
www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au) marks historical cases in which delay was in issue.  
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Table A15.14: Number and percentage of historical and non-historical cases in which delay 
was raised on appeal 
Year Delay as issue Historical child 
sexual abuse with 
delay as issue 
Non-historical 
child sexual 
abuse with 
delay as issue 
Percentage 
with delay 
as an issue 
in 
historical 
child 
sexual 
abuse 
cases  
n % n % n % 
2005 12 35.2 7 87.5 5 19.2 58.3 
2006 13 33.3 7 50.0 6 24.0 53.8 
2007 11 40.7 10 90.9 1 6.3 90.9 
2008 7 17.9 4 33.3 3 11.1 57.1 
2009 7 23.3 3 42.9 4 17.4 42.9 
2010 7 18.9 6 50.0 1 4.0 85.7 
2011 3 14.3 0 0.0 3 16.7 0.0 
2012 5 15.1 4 50.0 1 4.0 80.0 
2013 9 29.0 7 77.8 2 9.1 77.8 
TOTAL 74 25.9 48 57.1 26 12.6 64.9 
Notes:  
All percentages are calculated as a proportion of the yearly sample or subgroup (the yearly historical or 
non-historical child sexual abuse sample). 
Cases that could not be categorised as historical or non-historical child sexual abuse were included in the 
non-historical child sexual abuse figures. 
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Table A15.15: Number of successful appeals by year on the basis of delay  
Year Total cases 
successful on delay 
Historical cases 
successful on delay  
Non-historical 
cases successful on 
delay  
 n %(a) N %(b) n %(b) 
2005 2 16.7 2 100.0 0 0.0 
2006 3 23.1 2 66.7 1 33.3 
2007 4 36.4 4 100.0 0 0.0 
2008 4 57.1 3 75.0 1 25.0 
2009 4 57.1 3 75.0 1 1.0 
2010 3 42.9 2 66.7 1 33.3 
2011 1 33.3 0 0.0 1 100.0 
2012 3 60.0 3 100.0 0 0.0 
2013 3 33.3 2 66.7 1 33.3 
Total 27 36.5 21 77.8 6 22.2 
Notes: 
(a) The data represents a percentage of cases in the year in which delay was raised as an issue on appeal. 
(b) The data is a percentage of appeals that succeeded each year on the basis of the issue of delay. 
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15.9 OTHER CASE CHARACTERISTICS 
We also briefly examined possible associations between some other case characteristics that 
emerged as potentially interesting, and appeal trends and outcomes in our sample of cases.  
Guilty pleas 
We examined the link between plea in the case and outcome on appeal. Table A15.17 
provides a breakdown, by year, of the plea in the case. In our sample, 42.3 per cent of cases 
involved a guilty plea. The number of cases with at least one guilty plea decreased in absolute 
terms from 21 in 2005 to 15 in 2013, and in percentage terms from 61.8 per cent to 48.4 per 
cent; the number of cases with a guilty plea fluctuated between years in the period 2005–13. 
In 2007, only seven of the cases in our sample involved at least one guilty plea – the lowest 
number seen in the period under study.  
Table A15.17: Number and percentage of cases involving a guilty plea 
Year Cases with at least one guilty plea Cases without a guilty plea 
n %(a) n %(a) 
2005 21 61.8 13 38.2 
2006 12 30.8 27 69.2 
2007 7 25.9 20 74.1 
2008 13 33.3 26 66.7 
2009 19 63.3 11 36.7 
2010 14 37.8 23 62.2 
2011 9 42.9 12 57.1 
2012 13 39.4 20 60.6 
2013 15 48.4 16 51.6 
TOTAL 123 42.3 168 57.7 
Notes: 
(a) The data represents a percentage of each year’s sample under study. 
 
Table A15.18 shows the relationship between guilty pleas and the historical nature of the 
case. Historical and non-historical cases both involved a guilty plea in about 42.5 per cent of 
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cases. There is erratic fluctuation in the percentage of cases in the period 2005–2013 involving 
a guilty plea for both historical and non-historical cases.  
Table A15.18: Relationship of cases involving a guilty plea to historical and non-historical child 
sexual abuse 
Year Historical abuse Non-historical abuse 
n %(a) n %(b) 
2005 3 37.5 18 72.0 
2006 5 35.7 7 28.0 
2007 4 36.4 3 20.0 
2008 6 50.0 7 25.9 
2009 6 85.7 13 65.0 
2010 2 16.7 12 50.0 
2011 1 33.3 8 47.1 
2012 4 50.0 9 37.5 
2013 3 33.3 12 54.6 
TOTAL 34 42.7 88 42.5 
Notes:  
(a) The data represents a percentage of historical child sexual abuse appeal cases in each year in the sample. 
(b) The data represents a percentage of non-historical child sexual abuse appeal cases in each year in the sample. 
Cases that could not be categorised as historical or non-historical child sexual abuse are included in the figures 
for non-historical child sexual abuse cases for this table. 
Table A15.19 shows the percentage of extrafamilial and intrafamilial cases with at least one 
guilty plea. Of intrafamilial cases, 44.4 per cent involved at least one guilty plea compared 
with 42.9 per cent of extrafamilial cases. Eleven institutional cases involved a guilty plea. The 
percentage of guilty pleas by year is erratic – no trends are discernible over this period. 
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Table A15.19: Relationship between guilty plea and type of abuse 
Year Intrafamilial Extrafamilial 
At least one guilty plea in 
case 
%(a) At least one guilty plea in 
case 
%(b) 
2005 10 62.5 10 66.7 
2006 8 38.1 4 26.7 
2007 5 41.7 1 8.3 
2008 7 53.8 5 26.3 
2009 9 64.3 9 75.0 
2010 4 20.0 10 71.4 
2011 6 50.0 3 42.9 
2012 5 35.7 4 26.7 
2013 9 45.0 5 50.0 
TOTAL 63 44.4 51 42.9 
Notes:  
(a) This data represents the percentage of total intrafamilial cases. 
(b) This data represents the percentage of total extrafamilial cases. 
15.10 JUVENILE OFFENDERS 
Another interesting characteristic that emerged in our analysis, and which we decided to 
probe, was the number of appeal decisions involving a juvenile offender. Notwithstanding the 
difficulties of identifying cases that potentially involved a juvenile offender, we found that 5 
per cent of appeal decisions were identified as involving a juvenile. This does not mean that 
95 per cent of cases involved a non-juvenile offender; rather, it means that, based on the 
information available in the appeal judgment, we could only positively identify 16 cases as 
involving a juvenile accused. Table A15.20 provides a breakdown, by year, of the number of 
cases we identified as involving a juvenile offender. Appendix A15.14 (see Online appendices 
to the appeals study, available at www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au) summarises the 
basis and outcome of these cases. The majority of these cases (12) were sentencing appeals. 
Eight of these cases were extrafamilial cases of abuse. Half of the cases (eight of 16) resulted 
in the appeal being upheld, in whole or in part. 
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Table A15.20: Cases identified with juvenile offenders 
Year n Percentage of yearly 
sample 
2005 7 20.6 
2006 2 5.1 
2007 2 7.4 
2008 2 5.1 
2009 1 3.3 
2010 1 2.7 
2011 1 4.8 
2012 0 0.0 
2013 0 0.0 
TOTAL 16 5.5 
15.11 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
There has been limited research examining outcomes in child sexual offence cases that are 
appealed. The primary aim of this study was to fill some gaps in our understanding of the 
outcomes in such cases – and identify possible associating factors – through a systematic 
review. We examined 291 child sexual abuse cases on appeal in the NSWCCA between 2005 
and 2013. The study focused in particular on the possible differences in grounds of appeal 
and outcomes in historical cases of child sexual abuse compared with cases involving a child 
complainant. 
The first question was designed to determine the rate of appeal in child sexual offence cases, 
including appeals by the accused and by the Crown, and the rate of appeals against conviction 
and sentence. The study confirmed that child sexual abuse appeals are not uncommon, and 
that a significant number of child sexual abuse cases give rise to an appeal against conviction 
and/or sentence. We estimated the rate of appeal in child sexual abuse cases for the period 
2005–13 at almost 17 per cent. While the number of child sexual abuse appeals over the nine-
year period 2005–13 has remained relatively stable, taking into account the findings of 
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previous research, a decrease in the proportion of child sexual abuse appeals was noted 
compared with appeals overall since 2000. 
The vast majority of child sexual abuse cases in this study involved appeals by the accused (89 
per cent); of these, more were against sentence (59.5 per cent) than against conviction 
(54.1 per cent). One of the most marked findings was the decline in child sexual abuse 
conviction appeals between 2000 and 2013, with conviction appeals decreasing from 61.3 per 
cent of all child sexual abuse appeals in 2000 to 31.4 per cent in 2013. A corresponding 
increase, although not quite as marked, was observed in appeals against sentence severity. 
These overall trends, while clear, did not reveal linear trajectories of change; fluctuations with 
multiple peaks and troughs were noted over the period 2000–13. Moreover, the number of 
cases each year is low, so caution is warranted in interpreting these findings. 
Secondly, we examined the outcome and success rate of child sexual assault appeals. More 
than half of the appeals in our sample succeeded, either wholly or in part. The rate of success 
in appeals overall, and for appeals against conviction and sentence severity, was erratic over 
the period under study, with unremarkable change overall. Our findings in relation to the 
success rates of appeals differ significantly from the earlier findings of the Judicial 
Commission.205 
The vast majority of conviction appeals in our study resulted in a new trial. This finding is also 
at odds with earlier research conducted by the Judicial Commission, which reported 
significantly higher rates of acquittal.206 The reason for this difference is not clear. 
Thirdly, we probed the main grounds of appeal in child sexual assault cases and examined 
whether there is evidence that some grounds of appeal are more likely to succeed than 
others. We found that just over half of the appeals against conviction in the study included 
argument on the basis that the verdict of the jury was unreasonable, or could not be 
supported having regard to the evidence. Ten per cent of these cases were successful on this 
basis. One-third of the appeals against conviction included argument that the verdict should 
be overturned on the basis of error on a question of law (with objection raised at trial); of 
these, one-quarter were successful. Just under three-quarters of the conviction cases raised 
miscarriage of justice on any other ground; a little over one-quarter were successful. A 
majority of appeals against conviction were argued on more than one ground. The findings 
suggest that judicial misdirections remain a significant source of error in child sexual assault 
trials, generating a basis for overturning convictions and jury verdicts; 16.5 per cent of all 
conviction appeal cases succeeded on this basis and more than half of the successful appeals 
against conviction involved judicial misdirection. 
                                                     
205 See pp 269–70. 
206 See pp 270. 
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Finally, the study examined possible associations between certain case characteristics, 
grounds and outcomes of appeal in child sexual abuse cases. We were particularly interested 
in examining whether there is any difference in the rate of appeals, the grounds of appeals 
and the outcomes of appeals in cases: 
a. where there is delayed complaint compared with cases reported immediately in 
childhood? 
b. involving institutional abuse compared with intrafamilial and other extrafamilial 
abuse cases? 
Only 29 cases in this study involved institutional child sexual abuse; of these, 17 were 
historical cases of abuse. There were more intrafamilial (48.8 per cent) cases than 
extrafamilial (40.9 per cent) cases in our total sample. In our sample, 84 cases (28.9 per cent) 
involved historical child sexual abuse. In 74 cases, delay was an issue on appeal; of these, 57.1 
per cent were historical cases of abuse. More than 60 per cent of the appeals in historical 
cases involved delay as an issue; a much smaller proportion (12.6 per cent) of non-historical 
appeal cases involved delay. These findings suggest that delay continues to be an issue in the 
prosecution of historical cases of child sexual abuse. Almost 60 per cent of historical cases of 
child sexual abuse were intrafamilial. Few other substantive differences were found between 
historical and non-historical child sexual abuse appeal cases in our sample. Overall, historical 
child sexual abuse appeals (against both conviction and sentencing) were more successful 
than non-historical appeal cases in the period 2005–13. However, over this period, the overall 
success rate for historical cases noticeably decreased, but with considerable fluctuation 
between years. The opposite trend was found for non-historical cases, with the overall rate 
of successful appeal noticeably increasing from 2005 to 2013. A similar degree of fluctuation 
between years was found in non-historical cases. 
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APPENDIX A15.1: CASE LIST BY YEAR 
 
Year Case Name  
2005  
1.  GJ v R [2005] NSWCCA 447 
2.  R v ABS [2005] NSWCCA 255 
3.  R v AMN [2005] NSWCCA 124 
4.  R v BJB [2005] NSWCCA 441 
5.  R v Boulad [2005] NSWCCA 289 
6.  R v EGC [2005] NSWCCA 392 
7.  R v Fletcher [2005] NSWCCA 338 
8.  R v Grattan [2005] NSWCCA 306 
9.  R v GWM [2005] NSWCCA 101 
10.  R v Hunt [2005] NSWCCA 210 
11.  R v JJS [2005] NSWCCA 225 
12.  R v KNL [2005] NSWCCA 260 
13.  R v MDB [2005] NSWCCA 354 
14.  R v Richard Norman Mearns [2005] NSWCCA 396 
15.  R v Wicks [2005] NSWCCA 409 
16.  R v WSP [2005] NSWCCA 427 
17.  Regina v AD [2005] NSWCCA 208 
18.  Regina v AEL [2005] NSWCCA 148 
19.  Regina v Campbell [2005] NSWCCA 125 
20.  Regina v Davies [2005] NSWCCA 384 
21.  Regina v H [2005] NSWCCA 282 
22.  Regina v JDB [2005] NSWCCA 102 
23.  Regina v JTAC [2005] NSWCCA 345 
24.  Regina v Lawson [2005] NSWCCA 346 
25.  Regina v McQueeney [2005] NSWCCA 168 
26.  Regina v MSS [2005] NSWCCA 227 
27.  Regina v NZ [2005] NSWCCA 278 
28.  Regina v O [2005] NSWCCA 327 
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29.  Regina v Pearson [2005] NSWCCA 116 
30.  Regina v R T I [2005] NSWCCA 337 
31.  Regina v RTGS [2005] NSWCCA 293 
32.  Regina v Rymer [2005] NSWCCA 310 
33.  Regina v Sangalang [2005] NSWCCA 171 
34.  Regina v Suey [2005] NSWCCA 22 
2006  
1.  D’Amico v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 316 
2.  DPW v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 295 
3.  DRE v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 280 
4.  Fina’i v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 134 
5.  FV v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 237 
6.  Galvin v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 66 
7.  Gorrick v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 232 
8.  Healey v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 235 
9.  JAH v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 250 
10.  JJB v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 126 
11.  JJT v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 283 
12.  KNP v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 213 
13.  LAB v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 202 
14.  Leonard v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 267 
15.  Lozanovski v R [2006] NSWCCA 143 
16.  Magrin v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 17 
17.  MLP v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 271 
18.  NWL v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 67 
19.  Perry v R [2006] NSWCCA 351 
20.  PGM v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 310 
21.  Qualtieri v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 95 
22.  Peter John Reed v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 314 
23.  R v Cunningham [2006] NSWCCA 176 
24.  R v Dagwell [2006] NSWCCA 98 
25.  R v Hillsley [2006] NSWCCA 312 
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26.  R v RAG [2006] NSWCCA 343 
27.  R v TWP [2006] NSWCCA 141 
28.  Regina v MMK [2006] NSWCCA 272 
29.  Regina v Poole [2006] NSWCCA 93 
30.  RELC v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 383 
31.  RJP v R [2006] NSWCCA 149 
32.  Sepulveda v R [2006] NSWCCA 379 
33.  Shannon v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 39 
34.  Sharwood v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 157 
35.  Sharyn Ann Munn v Regina; Thomas Miller v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 61 
36.  Sheehan v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 233 
37.  Sheehan [No 2] v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 332 
38.  TJC v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 413 
39.  Wilson v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 217  
2007   
1.  AEL v R [2007] NSWCCA 97 
2.  AJB v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 51 
3.  Anthony Boulattouf v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 102 
4.  Bryan v R [2007] NSWCCA 351 
5.  CJG v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 190 
6.  CTM v R [2007] NSWCCA 131 
7.  DJB v R; R v DJB [2007] NSWCCA 209 
8.  GAC v Regina, WC v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 287 
9.  GAT v R [2007] NSWCCA 208 
10.  JMW v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 187 
11.  Kamm, William v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 201 
12.  KJR v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 165 
13.  MJL v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 261 
14.  Nelson v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 221 
15.  Norris v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 235  
16.  NT v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 143 
17.  Pavitt v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 88 
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18.  Picken v Regina; Regina v Picken [2007] NSWCCA 319 
19.  R v GAC [2007] NSWCCA 315 
20.  R v KRL [2007] NSWCCA 354 
21.  RA v R [2007] NSWCCA 251 
22.  RJS v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 241 
23.  Rolfe v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 155 
24.  Rowney v R [2007] NSWCCA 49 
25.  SI v R [2007] NSWCCA 181 
26.  Smith v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 156 
27.  XY v R [2007] NSWCCA 72 
2008   
1.  AE v R [2008] NSWCCA 52 
2.  AGW v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 81 
3.  AJO v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 28 
4.  Carlton v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 244 
5.  Clare v R [2008] NSWCCA 30 
6.  Clark v R [2008] NSWCCA 122 
7.  DJV v R [2008] NSWCCA 272 
8.  Dousha, Malcom Ross v R [2008] NSWCCA 263 
9.  DTS v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 329 
10.  FAM v R [2008] NSWCCA 167 
11.  Featherstone v R [2008] NSWCCA 71 
12.  Fernando v R [2008] NSWCCA 97 
13.  Fisher v R [2008] NSWCCA 129 
14.  Gordon-King v R [2008] NSWCCA 335 
15.  Healey v R [2008] NSWCCA 229 
16.  Hogan v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 150 
17.  Hudson v R [2008] NSWCCA 90 
18.  IE v R [2008] NSWCCA 70 
19.  Ivimy v R [2008] NSWCCA 25 
20.  Jeffrey Wayne Davie v R [2008] NSWCCA 2 
21.  Kamm, William v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 290 
7 
22.  Langbein v R [2008] NSWCCA 38 
23.  Makarov v R (No 1) [2008] NSWCCA 291 
24.  Makarov v R (No 2) [2008] NSWCCA 292  
25.  Makarov v R (No 3) [2008] NSWCCA 293 
26.  McCarthy v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 320 
27.  NRW v R [2008] NSWCCA 318 
28.  Perez v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 46 
29.  Philopos v R [2008] NSWCCA 66 
30.  R v Katon [2008] NSWCCA 228 
31.  R v PGM [2008] NSWCCA 172 
32.  R v Smith [2008] NSWCCA 247 
33.  Regina v WC [2008] NSWCCA 268  
34.  Ridley v R [2008] NSWCCA 299 
35.  RJA v R [2008] NSWCCA 137  
36.  Rodden v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 53 
37.  Rylands v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 106 
38.  SGJ v R; KU v R [2008] NSWCCA 258 
39.  WC v R [2008] NSWCCA 75 
2009   
1.  AW v R [2009] NSWCCA 1 
2.  Clarke v R [2009] NSWCCA 49 
3.  CPG v R [2009] NSWCCA 120 
4.  CPW v R [2009] NSWCCA 105 
5.  Cusack v R [2009] NSWCCA 155 
6.  DGB v R [2009] NSWCCA 307 
7.  Eedens v R [2009] NSWCCA 254 
8.  Giles v DPP [2009] NSWCCA 308 
9.  GRD v R [2009] NSWCCA 149 
10.  Goss v R [2009] NSWCCA 190  
11.  GSH v R; R v GSH [2009] NSWCCA 214 
12.  Henry v R [2009 NSWCCA 69 
13.  JDK v R; R v JDK [2009] NSWCCA 76 
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14.  Johnston v R [2009] NSWCCA 82 
15.  KAF v R [2009] NSWCCA 184 
16.  Kite v R [2009] NSWCCA 12 
17.  MAJW v R [2009] NSWCCA 255 
18.  OM v R, MH v R, AA v R, AS v R [2009] NSWCCA 267 
19.  Orkopoulos v R [2009] NSWCCA 213 
20.  Pease v R [2009] NSWCCA 136 
21.  PH v R [2009] NSWCCA 161 
22.  R v King [2009] NSWCCA 117 
23.  R v Woods [2009] NSWCCA 55 
24.  Salvatore v R [2009] NSWCCA 104 
25.  SAT v R [2009] NSWCCA 172 
26.  SDS v R [2009] NSWCCA 159 
27.  Simpson v R [2009] NSWCCA 297 
28.  SKA v R; R v SKA [2009] NSWCCA 186 
29.  TJ v R [2009] NSWCCA 257 
30.  Toalepai v R [2009] NSWCCA 270 
2010  
1.  Allen v R [2010] NSWCCA 47 
2.  AWKO v R [2010] NSWCCA 90 
3.  BG v R [2010] NSWCCA 301  
4.  Bonwick v R [2010] NSWCCA 177 
5.  BP v R; R v BP [2010] NSWCCA 303 
6.  BT v R [2010] NSWCCA 267 
7.  CC v Regina [2010] NSWCCA 337 
8.  Chivers v R [2010] NSWCCA 134 
9.  Corby v R [2010] NSWCCA 146 
10.  Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v JG [2010] NSWCCA 222 
11.  DJS v R [2010] NSWCCA 200 
12.  EK v R [2010] NSWCCA 199 
13.  ES v R (No 1) [2010] NSWCCA 197 
14.  ES v R (No 2) [2010] NSWCCA 198 
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15.  GG v Regina [2010] NSWCCA 230 
16.  Hitchen v R [2010] NSWCCA 77 
17.  Kenny v R [2010] NSWCCA 6 
18.  KTR v R [2010] NSWCCA 271 
19.  LJ v Regina [2010] NSWCCA 289 
20.  LJW v R [2010] NSWCCA 114 
21.  Majid v R [2010] NSWCCA 121 
22.  Mayall, David Graham v R [2010] NSWCCA 37 
23.  McGrath v R [2010] NSWCCA 48 
24.  PG v Regina [2010] NSWCCA 216 
25.  R v Jarrold [2010] NSWCCA 69 
26.  R v Lee [2010] NSWCCA 88 
27.  R v Muldrock [2010] NSWCCA 106 
28.  R v SJH [2010] NSWCCA 32 
29.  R v Tyrone Chishimba; Tyrone Chishimba v R; Likumbo Makasa v R; 
Mulenga v R; R v Mumbi Peter Mulenga [2010] NSWCCA 228 
30.  Regina v PWD [2010] NSWCCA 209 
31.  Regina v XY [2010] NSWCCA 181 
32.  RJ v R [2010] NSWCCA 263 
33.  RWB v R; R v RWB [2010] NSWCCA 147 
34.  RWC v R [2010] NSWCCA 332 
35.  Shaw v R [2010] NSWCCA 23 
36.  ST v Regina [2010] NSWCCA 5  
37.  Vincent Egan v R [2010] NSWCCA 235 
2011  
1.  AAT v R [2011] NSWCCA 1 
2.  ARS v R [2011] NSWCCA 266 
3.  BIP v R [2011] NSWCCA 224 
4.  DJF v R [2011] NSWCCA 6 
5.  FB v R; R v FB [2011] NSWCCA 217 
6.  HJWG v R [2011] NSWCCA 50 
7.  Ingham v R [2011] NSWCCA 88 
8.  IS v R [2011] NSWCCA 142 
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9.  LB v R [2011] NSWCCA 220 
10.  MM v R [2011] NSWCCA 262 
11.  Mokhaiber v R [2011] NSWCCA 10 
12.  MRW v R [2011] NSWCCA 260 
13.  NLR v R [2011] NSWCCA 246 
14.  NW v R [2011] NSWCCA 178 
15.  PWB v R [2011] NSWCCA 84 
16.  Regina v KB; Regina v JL; Regina v RJB [2011] NSWCCA 190 
17.  R v NJK [2011] NSWCCA 151 
18.  R v PFC [2011] NSWCCA 117 
19.  R v SK; SK v R [2011] NSWCCA 292 
20.  Salman v DPP [2011] NSWCCA 192 
21.  Smith v R [2011] NSWCCA 163 
2012   
1.  BG v R [2012] NSWCCA 139 
2.  Burrows v R [2012] NSWCCA 113 
3.  Cargnello v DPP [2012] NSWCCA 162 
4.  Cross v R [2012] NSWCCA 114 
5.  DF v R [2012] NSWCCA 171 
6.  DS v Regina [2012] NSWCCA 159 
7.  GEH v R [2012] NSWCCA 150 
8.  GN v R [2012] NSWCCA 96 
9.  JAD v R [2012] NSWCCA 73 
10.  Jones v R [2012] NSWCCA 262 
11.  JRM v R [2012] NSWCCA 112 
12.  KSC v R [2012] NSWCCA 179 
13.  LG v R [2012] NSWCCA 249 
14.  Mark McKey v Regina [2012] NSWCCA 1 
15.  Martin v R [2012] NSWCCA 253 
16.  MJ v R [2012] NSWCCA 146 
17.  PGM (No 2) v R [2012] NSWCCA 261 
18.  PK v Regina [2012] NSWCCA 263 
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19.  R v Brown [2012] NSWCCA 199 
20.  R v DAJ [2012] NSWCCA 143 
21.  R v GWM [2012] NSWCCA 240 
22.  R v Jarrett [2012] NSWCCA 81 
23.  R v Muldrock [2012] NSWCCA 108 
24.  R v SBR [2012] NSWCCA 233 
25.  RLS v R [2012] NSWCCA 236 
26.  RJT v R [2012] NSWCCA 280 
27.  Ross v R [2012] NSWCCA 207 
28.  RM v R [2012] NSWCCA 35 
29.  SH v Regina [2012] NSWCCA 79 
30.  Simpson v R [2012] NSWCCA 246 
31.  SKA v Regina [2012] NSWCCA 205 
32.  Van Der Bann v R [2012] NSWCCA 5 
33.  Wong v R [2012] NSWCCA 39 
2013   
1.  Adam v Jolly [2013] NSWCCA 76 
2.  AG v R [2013] NSWCCA 264 
3.  ALS v R [2013] NSWCCA 63 
4.  BJS v R [2013] NSWCCA 123 
5.  Colquhoun v R (No 1) [2013] NSWCCA 190 
6.  Colquhoun v R (No 2) [2013] NSWCCA 191 
7.  Dawson v R [2013] NSWCCA 61 
8.  DJM v R [2013] NSWCCA 101 
9.  FD v R [2013] NSWCCA 139 
10.  Franklin v R [2013] NSWCCA 122 
11.  Kertai v R [2013] NSWCCA 252 
12.  KW v R [2013] NSWCCA 31 
13.  LA v R [2013] NSWCCA 146 
14.  Leslie v R [2013] NSWCCA 48 
15.  Lipchin v R [2013] NSWCCA 77 
16.  LP v Regina [2013] NSWCCA 330 
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17.  Magnuson v R [2013] NSWCCA 50 
18.  MJ v R [2013] NSWCCA 250 
19.  MPB v R [2013] NSWCCA 213 
20.  O’Brien v R [2013] NSWCCA 197 
21.  Peter Versi v R [2013] NSWCCA 206 
22.  R v DKL [2013] NSWCCA 233 
23.  R v XY [2013] NSWCCA 121 
24.  RO v R [2013] NSWCCA 162 
25.  RP v R [2013] NSWCCA 192 
26.  RRS v R [2013] NSWCCA 94 
27.  RS v R [2013] NSWCCA 227 
28.  Steadman v R (No 1) [2013] NSWCCA 55 
29.  SW v R [2013] NSWCCA 255 
30.  TDP v R; R v TDP [2013] NSWCCA 303 
31.  Trevor Essex v R [2013] NSWCCA 11 
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APPENDIX A15.2: CATEGORIES OF OFFENCES 
 
2005-2013 Type of abuse Disclosure type 
Categories of offences Intra-
familial 
Extra-
familial 
Institutional Non-
historical 
Historical Unclear 
Child pornography 25 18 5 34 11 2 
Intentionally imported goods and 
digital images containing child 
pornography  
 1  1   
Disseminating child pornography  2   2   
Attempt to use a child under 14 
for pornographic purposes  
1   1   
Use of child for pornographic 
purposes  
2 1 1 3 1  
Using child under 14 for 
pornographic purposes  
6   6   
Using child over 14 for 
pornographic purposes  
  1  1  
Using child under 18 for 
pornographic purposes  
 2   1  
Possession of child pornography  6 5 2 9 4  
Producing child pornography  5 1  5 1  
Publication of child pornography        
Importation of child pornography  1 1  1  
1 
(Cargnello 
v DPP 
[2012]) 
Use of internet to access child 
pornography 
 1    
1 
(Cargnello 
v DPP 
[2012]) 
Use of internet to transmit child 
pornography  
 1   1  
Use of a carriage service to 
transport child pornography 
      
Use of a carriage service to access 
child pornography 
 1 1 2   
Transmitting child pornography  1   1   
Accessing child pornography  1   1   
Aggravated film of a person in a 
private act 
 1   1  
14 
Exposing child to indecent 
material with intent to procure 
child for sexual activity  
 1   1  
Abusing a child for pornographic 
purposes 
 1  1   
Procuring a child under 14 for 
pornographic purposes 
 1  1   
Indecency / Assault 139 98 31 145 115 8 
Act of indecency  6 3 2 4 6 
1 (PG v 
Regina 
[2010]) 
Act of indecency with child under 
10 
4 2  5 1  
Act of indecency with child under 
16  
10 10 1 10 11  
Act of gross indecency  1  2  3  
Act of gross indecency with male 
under 18 
 1 1  2  
Aggravated act of indecency upon 
child under 16  
7 3 3 8 5  
Aggravated act of indecency of 
child under 10  
 1   1  
Aggravated act of indecency  4 2 1 3 4  
Common assault 1 1  1 1  
Assault 2 1  1 2  
Assault with an act of indecency 
against child under 10 
1 1  2   
Indecent assault  16 12 7 8 27  
Indecent assault on child under 10  12 9 2 21 2  
Indecent assault on child under 16  16 8 2 9 16  
Indecent assault on female under 
16  
7 2  2 6 
1 (PG v 
Regina 
[2010])  
Aggravated indecent assault  24 23 7 41 12 
2 (Regina 
v 
Campbell 
[2005], 
Bryan v R 
[2007],  
Aggravated indecent assault of a 
child under 10 
9 1 1 6 4 
1 (PG v 
Regina 
[2010]) 
15 
Aggravated indecent assault of a 
child under 16  
15 12 2 17 10 
2 (NLR 
[2011], 
Franklin 
[2013]) 
Aggravated indecent assault in 
company  
 2  2   
Aggravated indecent assault with 
an act of indecency  
1    1  
Persistent abuse of child  1   1   
Maliciously inflict grievous bodily 
harm with intent  
 1  1   
Assault occasioning actual bodily 
harm 
 
2    1 
1 (Regina 
v 
Campbell 
[2005]) 
Maliciously inflicting actual bodily 
harm with the intent to have 
sexual intercourse 
 1  1   
Assault with intent to commit 
rape 
 1  1   
Kidnapping with intent to have 
sexual intercourse 
 1  1   
Carnal Knowledge 11 3 1 2 13 0 
Attempt to unlawfully and 
carnally know victim 
 1   1  
Unlawful carnal knowledge 4    4  
Carnal knowledge of a child under 
10  
2   1 1  
Carnal knowledge of a person 
between 10-16  
2 1 1 1 3  
Carnal knowledge of a girl 
between 10-17  
1    1  
Unlawful carnal knowledge of 
person under 16  
 1   1  
Detaining with intent to have 
carnal knowledge  
1    1  
Carnal knowledge by father  1    1  
Sexual intercourse 147 123 21 190 100 7 
Attempted sexual intercourse 
with a child under 10 
5 5  9 1  
Attempted sexual intercourse 
with a child between 10-14 
  1 1   
16 
Attempted sexual intercourse 
with a child between 10-15 
2 1  2 1  
Attempted sexual intercourse 
with child between 10-16  
1  1 1 1  
Attempted intercourse with child 
14-16  
 1  1   
Attempted sexual intercourse 
without consent 
2 1  2 1  
Attempted homosexual 
intercourse with male 10-18 
1    1  
Attempted aggravated sexual 
assault  
1   1   
Attempted aggravated sexual 
assault of child 10-16 
1    1  
Attempted sexual intercourse 
with child under 16 
1    1  
Attempted aggravated sexual 
intercourse with child under 16 
1    1  
Attempted aggravated sexual 
intercourse without consent 
 1  1   
Rape (s 63) 1    1  
Sexual intercourse  2  1 1  
Sexual intercourse without 
consent 
4 8 1 5 8  
Sexual intercourse with child  2  2   
Sexual intercourse with child 
under 10  
39  27 2 53 13 
2 (PG v 
Regina 
[2010], 
NLR 
[2011]) 
Aggravated Sexual intercourse 
with a child under 14 under 
authority 
2   2   
Aggravated Sexual intercourse 
with a child under 16 [under 
authority]  
3   
3 
 
 
  
Sexual intercourse with a child 
under 16 
12 10   10 12  
Sexual intercourse without 
consent with a child under 16 
6 5  5 6  
Sexual intercourse with a child 
between 10-14 
2 4 1 5 2  
Sexual intercourse with a child 
between 14-16  
4  11 1 14 3  
17 
Sexual intercourse with child 10-
16  
11 8 1 6 13 
1 (Bryan v 
R [2007]) 
Sexual intercourse with male 
between 10-18  
 2  1 1  
Sexual intercourse with person 
under 18  
 1  1   
Aggravated sexual intercourse 1  1 1 1  
Aggravated sexual intercourse 
with a child under 10  
1 4  5   
Aggravated sexual intercourse 
with child under 14  
 2 1 3   
Aggravated sexual intercourse 
with a child between 10-14 
3 1  4   
Aggravated sexual intercourse 
with a child between 10-16 
7 3 1 6 5  
Aggravated sexual intercourse 
with a child between 14-16 
3 3 1 5 1 
 1 
(Franklin 
[2013]) 
Aggravated sexual intercourse 
with a child between 14-17 
1 1  2   
Aggravated sexual intercourse 
with person under 16  
7 3  5 4 
1 (KAF v R 
[2009]) 
Aggravated sexual intercourse 
without consent  
10 6 2 14 3 
1 (PG v 
Regina 
[2010]) 
Aggravated sexual assault with 
child 10-16 
1    1  
Aggravated sexual assault with 
child under 10 
 1  1   
Aggravated sexual assault  5 8 1 10 4  
Persistent sexual abuse of a child  5   4 1  
Sexual assault on child  2   2   
Homosexual intercourse with 
child aged 10-18 
2 4 6 1 10 
1 (Bryan v 
R [2007]) 
Incest  1    1  
Sexual intercourse with person 
under 16 outside Australia 
 1  1   
Maliciously inflicting ABH with 
intent to have sexual intercourse 
 1   1  
Aiding and abetting 9 6 2 10 6 1 
Encouragement of sexual 
intercourse with a child under 16 
outside Australia.  
 1    
1 
(Cargnello 
18 
v DPP 
[2012]) 
Incitement to commit an act of 
indecency on a child under 10  
2   1 1  
Inciting an act of indecency 
against child under 16  
1    1  
Procuring a female under 21 for 
another to have carnal knowledge  
1    1  
Procuring an act of indecency   1  1  
Inciting a child under 10 to 
commit an act of indecency  
3 2  5   
Inciting a child under 16 to 
commit an act of indecency 
 1   1  
Inciting a child under 16 to 
commit an act of indecency 
(aggravated) 
1   1   
Inciting a child under 16 to 
commit an act of indecency 
outside Australia 
 1  1   
Inciting a child above 16 to 
commit an act of indecency 
  1  1  
Inducing a child to participate in 
an act of child prostitution  
1   1   
Aiding and abetting sexual 
intercourse with a child under 10 
      
Aiding and abetting sexual assault  1  1   
Other offences  9 16 6 21 10 0 
Detaining for advantage 1 2 1 3 1  
Use of offensive weapon with 
intent to intimidate 
1    1  
Possessing child abuse material 1   1   
Using a carriage of services a 
reasonable person would regard 
offensive 
1   1   
Robbery with an offensive 
weapon  
 1  1   
Act intended to pervert the 
course of justice  
1  1 1 1  
Kidnapping   2  2   
Contravention of AVO  1 1  2   
Buggery  3 1 1  5  
Supply prohibited drug   2  1 1  
19 
Notes:  
For the purpose of this table, each offence is recorded only once per case, irrespective of the number of 
counts charged in the case. 
Offence categories map onto corresponding sections of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) and other relevant 
legislation. 
Charges were not ascertainable in the following cases and accordingly are not reflected in this table: Regina v 
RGTS [2005] NSWCCA 293; R v RAG [2006] NSWCCA 343; JJT v Regina [2006]; DRE v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 
280; Carlton v R [2008 NSWCCA 244]; Clark v R [2008] NSWCCA 122; TJ v R [2009] NSWCCA 257; Goss v R 
[2009] NSWCCA 190; Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v JG [2010] NSWCCA 222; RJ v R [2010] NSWCCA 
263; KTR v R [2010] NSWCCA 271. 
 
  
Possessing prohibited drug   1 1   
Murder  3  3   
Administering stupefying drug to 
enable aggravated sexual assault 
without consent 
  1 1   
Hindering police in the exercise of 
their duty 
  1 1   
Second degree principal to 
another person intending to 
hinder the investigation of a 
serious indictable offence  
 1  1   
Possessing an offensive weapon 
with intent to commit an 
indictable offence  
 1  1   
Breaking and entering a dwelling 
and committing a serious 
indictable offence  
 1  1   
Possess   1   1  
TOTAL:  340 264 66 402 255 18 
20 
APPENDIX A15.3: LIMB 1 CASES 
 
Year Case Name  Successful? 
2005    
1.  R v AMN [2005] NSWCCA 124 N 
2.  R v BJB [2005] NSWCCA 441 N 
3.  R v Grattan [2005] NSWCCA 306 N 
4.  R v Richard Norman Mearns [2005] NSWCCA 396 N 
5.  R v WSP [2005] NSWCCA 427 N (but successful on Limb 3) 
6.  Regina v NZ [2005] NSWCCA 278 N 
7.  Regina v R T I [2005] NSWCCA 337 N (but successful on Limb 3) 
8.  Regina v RTGS [2005] NSWCCA 293 N 
2006    
9.  Healey v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 235 N (but successful on Limb 3) 
10.  Leonard v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 267 N 
11.  NWL v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 67 Y, in part 
12.  PGM v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 310 N (but successful on Limb 2) 
13.  Qualtieri v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 95 N (but successful on Limb 3) 
14.  Wilson v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 217  N 
2007    
15.  Anthony Boulattouf v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 102 N 
16.  Bryan v R [2007] NSWCCA 351 N 
17.  CJG v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 190 N 
18.  CTM v R [2007] NSWCCA 131 N 
19.  DJB v R; R v DJB [2007] NSWCCA 209 N 
20.  GAC v Regina, WC v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 287 N 
21.  Kamm, William v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 201 N 
22.  Norris v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 235 Y (also successful on Limb 2) 
23.  Pavitt v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 88 N 
24.  R v KRL [2007] NSWCCA 354 N 
25.  RJS v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 241 N (but successful on Limb 3) 
26.  Rolfe v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 155 N 
21 
27.  Rowney v R [2007] NSWCCA 49 N 
28.  SI v R [2007] NSWCCA 181 Y 
29.  Smith v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 156 N 
2008    
30.  AE v R [2008] NSWCCA 52 Y (also successful on Limb 2) 
31.  AGW v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 81 N (but successful on Limb 3) 
32.  Clark v R [2008] NSWCCA 122 N 
33.  DJV v R [2008] NSWCCA 272 Y (also successful on Limb 2 and 3) 
34.  Fernando v R [2008] NSWCCA 97 N 
35.  Hogan v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 150 N 
36.  Makarov v R (No 1) [2008] NSWCCA 291 N 
37.  Makarov v R (No 2) [2008] NSWCCA 292  N 
38.  Perez v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 46 N 
39.  Rylands v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 106 N 
2009    
40.  Cusack v R [2009] NSWCCA 155 N 
41.  GSH v R; R v GSH [2009] NSWCCA 214 N 
42.  JDK v R; R v JDK [2009] NSWCCA 76 N (but successful on Limb 2) 
43.  Orkopoulos v R [2009] NSWCCA 213 N 
44.  SKA v R; R v SKA [2009] NSWCCA 186 N 
45.  Toalepai v R [2009] NSWCCA 270 N 
2010   
46.  BG v R [2010] NSWCCA 301  N 
47.  LJW v R [2010] NSWCCA 114 N 
48.  PG v Regina [2010] NSWCCA 216 N 
49.  R v Tyrone Chishimba; Tyrone Chishimba v R; 
Likumbo Makasa v R; Mulenga v R; R v Mumbi 
Peter Mulenga [2010] NSWCCA 228 
Y 
50.  RWC v R [2010] NSWCCA 332 N (but successful on Limb 2) 
51.  ST v Regina [2010] NSWCCA 5  N (but successful on Limb 3) 
52.  Vincent Egan v R [2010] NSWCCA 235 N 
2011   
53.  FB v R; R v FB [2011] NSWCCA 217 N 
22 
54.  MM v R [2011] NSWCCA 262 N 
2012    
55.  BG v R [2012] NSWCCA 139 N 
56.  Burrows v R [2012] NSWCCA 113 N 
57.  JAD v R [2012] NSWCCA 73 N (but successful on Limb 3) 
58.  Jones v R [2012] NSWCCA 262 N 
59.  KSC v R [2012] NSWCCA 179 N 
60.  MJ v R [2012] NSWCCA 146 N 
61.  PGM (No 2) v R [2012] NSWCCA 261 N 
62.  Ross v R [2012] NSWCCA 207 N 
63.  SKA v Regina [2012] NSWCCA 205 Y, in part (also successful on Limb 3) 
64.  Wong v R [2012] NSWCCA 39 N 
2013    
65.  ALS v R [2013] NSWCCA 63 N (but successful on Limb 3) 
66.  Colquhoun v R (No 1) [2013] NSWCCA 190 N (but successful on Limb 3) 
67.  Colquhoun v R (No 2) [2013] NSWCCA 191 N (but successful on Limb 3) 
68.  LP v Regina [2013] NSWCCA 330 N 
69.  MJ v R [2013] NSWCCA 250 N 
70.  Peter Versi v R [2013] NSWCCA 206 N 
71.  RO v R [2013] NSWCCA 162 N 
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APPENDIX A15.4: LIMB 2 CASES 
 
Year Case Name  Successful? 
2005    
1.  R v Fletcher [2005] NSWCCA 338 N 
2.  R v Grattan [2005] NSWCCA 306 N 
3.  R v MDB [2005] NSWCCA 354 N 
4.  Regina v Rymer [2005] NSWCCA 310 N 
2006    
5.  DRE v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 280 N 
6.  Galvin v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 66 Y (also successful on Limb 3) 
7.  KNP v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 213 N 
8.  LAB v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 202 N 
9.  Magrin v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 17 N 
10.  PGM v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 310 Y 
11.  Peter John Reed v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 314 N 
12.  Regina v Poole [2006] NSWCCA 93 Y (also successful on Limb 3) 
13.  Sepulveda v R [2006] NSWCCA 379 N 
14.  Sharwood v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 157 N 
15.  
Sharyn Ann Munn v Regina; Thomas Miller v 
Regina [2006] NSWCCA 61 
Y (also successful on Limb 3) 
16.  Sheehan v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 233 Y 
17.  TJC v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 413 Y (also successful on Limb 3) 
2007    
18.  
Anthony Boulattouf v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 
102 
N 
19.  Kamm, William v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 201 N 
20.  Norris v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 235 Y (also successful on Limb 1) 
21.  Pavitt v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 88 N 
22.  Rolfe v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 155 N 
23.  Rowney v R [2007] NSWCCA 49 N 
2008    
24 
24.  AE v R [2008] NSWCCA 52 Y (also successful on Limb 1) 
25.  Clark v R [2008] NSWCCA 122 N 
26.  DJV v R [2008] NSWCCA 272 Y (also successful on Limb 1 and 3) 
27.  Gordon-King v R [2008] NSWCCA 335 N 
28.  Langbein v R [2008] NSWCCA 38 N 
29.  Makarov v R (No 3) [2008] NSWCCA 293 N (but successful on Limb 3) 
30.  Philopos v R [2008] NSWCCA 66 N 
31.  Rodden v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 53 N (but successful on Limb 3) 
2009    
32.  AW v R [2009] NSWCCA 1 N 
33.  JDK v R; R v JDK [2009] NSWCCA 76 Y 
34.  MAJW v R [2009] NSWCCA 255 N 
2010   
35.  Chivers v R [2010] NSWCCA 134 Y 
36.  DJS v R [2010] NSWCCA 200 N 
37.  EK v R [2010] NSWCCA 199 N 
38.  ES v R (No 1) [2010] NSWCCA 197 Y (also successful on Limb 3) 
39.  KTR v R [2010] NSWCCA 271 N 
40.  LJ v Regina [2010] NSWCCA 289 N 
41.  LJW v R [2010] NSWCCA 114 Y 
2011   
42.  ARS v R [2011] NSWCCA 266 N 
43.  R v SK; SK v R [2011] NSWCCA 292 N 
2012    
44.  BG v R [2012] NSWCCA 139 N 
45.  Cargnello v DPP [2012] NSWCCA 162 N 
46.  GEH v R [2012] NSWCCA 150 N 
2013    
47.  BJS v R [2013] NSWCCA 123 N 
48.  Peter Versi v R [2013] NSWCCA 206 N 
49.  RRS v R [2013] NSWCCA 94 N 
50.  TDP v R; R v TDP [2013] NSWCCA 303 N 
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APPENDIX A15.5: LIMB 3 CASES 
 
Year Case Name  Successful? Limb 2 as well? 
2005     
1.  R v AMN [2005] NSWCCA 124 N  
2.  R v BJB [2005] NSWCCA 441 N  
3.  R v Fletcher [2005] NSWCCA 338 N Y 
4.  R v Grattan [2005] NSWCCA 306 N Y 
5.  R v MDB [2005] NSWCCA 354 N Y 
6.  R v Richard Norman Mearns [2005] NSWCCA 
396 
N  
7.  R v WSP [2005] NSWCCA 427 Y  
8.  Regina v NZ [2005] NSWCCA 278 N  
9.  Regina v R T I [2005] NSWCCA 337 Y  
10.  Regina v RTGS [2005] NSWCCA 293 N  
11.  Regina v Rymer [2005] NSWCCA 310 N Y 
2006     
12.  DPW v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 295 N  
13.  Galvin v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 66 Y (also successful on Limb 2) Y 
14.  Gorrick v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 232 N  
15.  Healey v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 235 Y  
16.  JJB v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 126 N  
17.  JJT v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 283 N  
18.  KNP v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 213 N Y 
19.  LAB v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 202 N Y 
20.  Leonard v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 267 N  
21.  NWL v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 67 N (but successful in part on 
Limb 1) 
 
22.  PGM v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 310 N (but successful on Limb 2) Y 
23.  Qualtieri v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 95 Y  
24.  Regina v Poole [2006] NSWCCA 93 Y (also successful on Limb 2) Y 
25.  RELC v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 383 Y  
26.  Sharwood v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 157 N Y 
27.  Sharyn Ann Munn v Regina; Thomas Miller v 
Regina [2006] NSWCCA 61 
Y (also successful on Limb 2) Y 
28.  TJC v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 413 Y (also successful on Limb 2) Y 
26 
29.  Wilson v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 217  N  
2007     
30.  Anthony Boulattouf v Regina [2007] 
NSWCCA 102 
N Y 
31.  CTM v R [2007] NSWCCA 131 N  
32.  DJB v R; R v DJB [2007] NSWCCA 209 N  
33.  GAC v Regina, WC v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 
287 
N  
34.  JMW v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 187 N  
35.  Kamm, William v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 
201 
N Y 
36.  KJR v R [2007] NSWCCA 165 N  
37.  Norris v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 235  N (but successful on Limb 1 & 
2) 
 
38.  Pavitt v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 88 N Y 
39.  Picken v Regina; Regina v Picken [2007] 
NSWCCA 319 
N  
40.  RJS v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 241 Y  
41.  Rolfe v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 155 N Y 
42.  SI v R [2007] NSWCCA 181 N (but successful on Limb 1)  
43.  Smith v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 156 N  
2008     
44.  AGW v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 81 Y  
45.  AJO v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 28 Y  
46.  Carlton v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 244 N  
47.  Clark v R [2008] NSWCCA 122 N Y 
48.  DJV v R [2008] NSWCCA 272 Y (also successful on Limb 1 
and 2) 
Y 
49.  DTS v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 329 N  
50.  Gordon-King v R [2008] NSWCCA 335 N Y 
51.  Healey v R [2008] NSWCCA 229 Y  
52.  Hogan v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 150 N  
53.  Hudson v R [2008] NSWCCA 90 N  
54.  Jeffrey Wayne Davie v R [2008] NSWCCA 2 N  
55.  Kamm, William v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 
290 
N  
56.  Langbein v R [2008] NSWCCA 38 N Y 
57.  Makarov v R (No 1) [2008] NSWCCA 291 N  
27 
58.  Makarov v R (No 2) [2008] NSWCCA 292  N  
59.  Makarov v R (No 3) [2008] NSWCCA 293 Y Y 
60.  McCarthy v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 320 N  
61.  Perez v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 46 N  
62.  Philopos v R [2008] NSWCCA 66 N Y 
63.  Rodden v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 53 Y Y 
64.  Rylands v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 106 N  
2009     
65.  AW v R [2009] NSWCCA 1 N Y 
66.  CPG v R [2009] NSWCCA 120 N  
67.  Cusack v R [2009] NSWCCA 155 N  
68.  DGB v R [2009] NSWCCA 307 N  
69.  Johnston v R [2009] NSWCCA 82 Y  
70.  MAJW v R [2009] NSWCCA 255 N Y 
71.  Orkopoulos v R [2009] NSWCCA 213 N  
72.  Pease v R [2009] NSWCCA 136 N  
73.  TJ v R [2009] NSWCCA 257 N  
74.  Toalepai v R [2009] NSWCCA 270 N  
2010    
75.  BG v R [2010] NSWCCA 301  N  
76.  BP v R; R v BP [2010] NSWCCA 303 N  
77.  CC v Regina [2010] NSWCCA 337 Y  
78.  EK v R [2010] NSWCCA 199 N Y 
79.  ES v R (No 1) [2010] NSWCCA 197 Y (also successful on Limb 2) Y 
80.  ES v R (No 2) [2010] NSWCCA 198 N N 
81.  GG v Regina [2010] NSWCCA 230 N  
82.  KTR v R [2010] NSWCCA 271 N Y 
83.  LJW v R [2010] NSWCCA 114 N Y 
84.  McGrath v R [2010] NSWCCA 48 N  
85.  R v Tyrone Chishimba; Tyrone Chishimba v R; 
Likumbo Makasa v R; Mulenga v R; R v 
Mumbi Peter Mulenga [2010] NSWCCA 228 
N (but successful on Limb 1)  
86.  RJ v R [2010] NSWCCA 263 Y  
87.  RWB v R; R v RWB [2010] NSWCCA 147 N  
88.  RWC v R [2010] NSWCCA 332 N (but successful on Limb 2) Y 
89.  ST v Regina [2010] NSWCCA 5  Y  
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90.  Vincent Egan v R [2010] NSWCCA 235 N  
2011    
91.  ARS v R [2011] NSWCCA 266 N Y 
92.  DJF v R [2011] NSWCCA 6 Y  
93.  FB v R; R v FB [2011] NSWCCA 217 N  
94.  Ingham v R [2011] NSWCCA 88 N  
95.  MM v R [2011] NSWCCA 262 N  
96.  MRW v R [2011] NSWCCA 260 N  
 2012    
97.  Cargnello v DPP [2012] NSWCCA 162 N Y 
98.  DF v R [2012] NSWCCA 171 N  
99.  DS v Regina [2012] NSWCCA 159 N  
100. JAD v R [2012] NSWCCA 73 Y  
101. Jones v R [2012] NSWCCA 262 N  
102. KSC v R [2012] NSWCCA 179 N  
103. Mark McKey v Regina [2012] NSWCCA 1 Y  
104. PGM (No 2) v R [2012] NSWCCA 261 N  
105. Ross v R [2012] NSWCCA 207 N  
106. SH v Regina [2012] NSWCCA 79 Y  
107. SKA v Regina [2012] NSWCCA 205 Y (also successful on Limb 1)  
 2013    
108. ALS v R [2013] NSWCCA 63 Y  
109. BJS v R [2013] NSWCCA 123 N Y 
110. Colquhoun v R (No 1) [2013] NSWCCA 190 Y  
111. Colquhoun v R (No 2) [2013] NSWCCA 191 Y  
112. LP v Regina [2013] NSWCCA 330 N  
113. MJ v R [2013] NSWCCA 250 N  
114. Peter Versi v R [2013] NSWCCA 206 N Y 
115. RO v R [2013] NSWCCA 162 N  
116. Steadman v R (No 1) [2013] NSWCCA 55 N  
117. TDP v R; R v TDP [2013] NSWCCA 303 N Y 
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APPENDIX A15.6: SUCCESSFUL CONVICTION APPEAL CASES BY LIMB, SUCCESSFUL 
GROUND OF APPEAL AND ORDERS ENTERED 
 
CASE NAME LIMB 
1 
LIMB 2  LIMB 3 ORDER 
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O
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o
m
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o
n
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Regina v R T I [2005] 
NSWCCA 337 
       New trial 
R v WSP [2005] NSWCCA 
427 
       New trial 
Galvin v Regina [2006] 
NSWCCA 66 
       New trial 
Healey v Regina [2006] 
NSWCCA 235 
       New trial 
NWL v Regina [2006] 
NSWCCA 67        Acquittal 
PGM v Regina [2006] 
NSWCCA 310 
       New trial 
Qualtieri v Regina 
[2006] NSWCCA 95 
       New trial 
Regina v Poole [2006] 
NSWCCA 93 
       New trial 
RELC v Regina [2006] 
NSWCCA 383 
       New trial 
Sharyn Ann Munn v 
Regina; Thomas Miller v 
Regina [2006] NSWCCA 
61 
       New trial 
Sheehan v Regina [2006] 
NSWCCA 233 
       New trial 
TJC v Regina [2006] 
NSWCCA 413 
       Acquittal 
Norris v Regina [2007] 
NSWCCA 235 
       Acquittal 
RJS v Regina [2007] 
NSWCCA 241 
       New trial 
SI v R [2007] NSWCCA 
181 
       Acquittal 
AE v R [2008] NSWCCA 
52 
       
New trial & 
acquittal 
(on different 
counts) 
AGW v Regina [2008] 
NSWCCA 81 
       New trial 
AJO v Regina [2008] 
NSWCCA 28 
       Acquittal 
30 
DJV v R [2008] NSWCCA 
272 
       New trial 
Healey v R [2008] 
NSWCCA 229 
       Decision left 
to DPP 
Makarov v R (No 3) 
[2008] NSWCCA 293 
       New trial 
Rodden v Regina [2008] 
NSWCCA 53 
       New trial 
JDK v R; R v JDK [2009] 
NSWCCA 76 
       New trial 
Johnston v R [2009] 
NSWCCA 82 
       New trial 
CC v Regina [2010] 
NSWCCA 337 
       New trial 
Chivers v R [2010] 
NSWCCA 134 
       New trial 
ES v R (No 1) [2010] 
NSWCCA 197 
       
Decision left 
to DPP 
R v Tyrone Chishimba; 
Tyrone Chishimba v R; 
Likumbo Makasa v R; 
Mulenga v R; R v Mumbi 
Peter Mulenga [2010] 
NSWCCA 228 
       Acquittal 
RJ v R [2010] NSWCCA 
263 
       New trial 
RWC v R [2010] 
NSWCCA 332 
       New trial 
ST v Regina [2010] 
NSWCCA 5  
       New trial 
DJF v R [2011] NSWCCA 
6 
       New trial 
JAD v R [2012] NSWCCA 
73 
       New trial 
Mark McKey v Regina 
[2012] NSWCCA 1 
       Acquittal 
SH v Regina [2012] 
NSWCCA 79 
       Acquittal 
SKA v Regina [2012] 
NSWCCA 205 
       
Acquittal & 
new trial 
(on different 
counts) 
ALS v R [2013] NSWCCA 
63 
       New trial 
Colquhoun v R (No 1) 
[2013] NSWCCA 190 
       New trial 
Colquhoun v R (No 2) 
[2013] NSWCCA 191 
       New trial 
Note: 
This table is presented using a format similar to that used by Donnelly et al. (2011) in Appendix A but it does not 
provide a breakdown of the number of times each ground of appeal was successful in a single case, as done in 
Donnelly et al. (2011: 253); it only indicates whether a ground was successful at least once (or in part) in each 
case.  
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APPENDIX A15.7: SUCCESSFUL ADMISSIBILITY CASES BY SUCCESSFUL GROUND OF 
APPEAL  
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Galvin v Regina [2006] 
NSWCCA 66 
   1  1 
PGM v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 
310 
1     1 
Regina v Poole [2006] 
NSWCCA 93   1   1 
Sharyn Ann Munn v Regina; 
Thomas Miller v Regina [2006] 
NSWCCA 61 
  1   1 
AE V R [2008] NSWCCA 52     1 1 
DJV v R [2008] NSWCCA 272  2   1 3 
ES v R (No1) [2010] NSWCCA 
197 
   1 1 2 
RJ v R [2010] NSWCCA 263 
  1   1 
RWC v R [2010] NSWCCA 332    1 1 2 
Colquhoun v R (No 1) [2013]     1 1 
Colquhoun v R (No 2) [2013]  1   1 2 
 
Total number of admissibility 
errors 
1 3 3 3 6 16 
Objection taken 1 2 2 3 4 12 
No objection taken 0 1 1 0 2 4 
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APPENDIX A15.8: SUCCESSFUL MISDIRECTION CASES BY SUCCESSFUL GROUND OF 
APPEAL  
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n
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u
n
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R v WSP [2005] 
NSWCCA 427 
  1      1 
Galvin v Regina 
[2006] NSWCCA 66 
   2     2 
Healey v Regina 
[2006] NSWCCA 235 
1  2    1  4 
Qualtieri v Regina 
[2006] NSWCCA 95 
1       1 2 
RELC v Regina [2006] 
NSWCCA 383 
       1 1 
Sheehan v Regina 
[2006] NSWCCA 233 
  1      1 
TJC v Regina [2006] 
NSWCCA 413 
   1     1 
Norris v Regina 
[2007] NSWCCA 235 
   2     2 
RJS v Regina [2007] 
NSWCCA 241 
   1     1 
AGW v Regina [2008] 
NSWCCA 81 
   1     1 
DJV v R [2008] 
NSWCCA 272 
   1  1   2 
Healey v R [2008] 
NSWCCA 229 
 1       1 
Rodden v Regina 
[2008] NSWCCA 53 
1     1   2 
JDK v R; R v JDK 
[2009] NSWCCA 76 
1        1 
CC v Regina [2010] 
NSWCCA 337 
 1     1  2 
33 
Chivers v R [2010] 
NSWCCA 134 
   1 1    2 
ES v R (No 1) [2010] 
NSWCCA 197 
     1   1 
ST v Regina [2010] 
NSWCCA 5 
  1      1 
RWC v R [2010] 
NSWCCA 332 
     1   1 
DJF v R [2011] 
NSWCCA 6 
1        1 
Mark McKey v Regina 
[2012] NSWCCA 1 
1        1 
SKA v Regina [2012] 
NSWCCA 205 
   1  1   2 
Colquhoun v R (No 2) 
[2013] NSWCCA 191 
1        1 
 
Total number of 
misdirection errors 
7 2 6 8 1 5 2 2 35 
Objection taken 1 0 1 2 1 2 0 0 7 
No objection taken 6 2 5 6 0 3 2 2 28 
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APPENDIX A15.9: TABLE OF TENDENCY/COINCIDENCE EVIDENCE CASES 
 
 Case Overall  
appeal 
successful? 
Context of 
CSA 
Basis for appeal (grounds relating to 
tendency and/or coincidence evidence) 
Appellant submissions Held 
1.  Colquhoun v 
R (No 1) 
[2013] 
NSWCCA 
190 
 
Appeal 
against 
conviction 
Yes 
 
 
 
Extrafamilial – 
Non-historical 
child sexual 
abuse 
Ground 1:  
 A miscarriage of justice occurred 
as a result of the admission and/or 
use of evidence of sexual interest 
in the appellant. 
 
 
 
Ground 1 Appellant: 
 The evidence the subject of ground 1 can be 
particularised as follows: 
◦ (a) Photographs and video recordings of 
the complainant in the appellant's 
possession; 
◦ (b) Telephone conversation between the 
complainant's mother and the appellant 
subsequent to the alleged offences. 
 As regards (a), the CDs were not relevant 
except to show sexual interest of the appellant 
in the complainant; this evidence therefore 
amounted to tendency evidence and was, in 
the absence of compliance with Evidence Act 
1995 s 96, inadmissible. (at [19]) 
 As regards (b), the statements attributed to 
the appellant that he was missing the 
complainant, and that the psychiatrist with 
whom he had spoken had suggested he had 
separation anxiety, amounted to evidence of 
sexual interest in the complainant and were 
therefore inadmissible as tendency evidence. 
(at [33])  
 
Ground 1 Crown: 
 As regards (a), the evidence was admissible as 
context evidence [20]. 
◦ It provided independent support for the 
complainant's evidence of the types of 
recreational activities that he enjoyed 
with the appellant. Furthermore, the 
evidence did not suggest any sexual 
interest of the appellant in the 
Held Ground 1: Accepted in part 
 As no objection was made at trial, leave is 
required under r 4 of the Criminal Appeal Rules 
in order to rely upon this ground [12]. 
 As regards (a): 
 The Crown has implicitly accepted that if the 
evidence did in fact suggest a sexual interest, 
compliance with ss 97 and 101 of the Evidence 
Act 1995 would have been required. No 
direction on the evidence was sought or given 
at trial [20]. 
 Even if the evidence was admitted purely as 
context evidence, where the impugned 
evidence is that an accused had a sexual 
interest in a child complainant and acted upon 
that interest, the need for a tendency direction 
is apparent [21]. 
o The case law has gone further and 
treated evidence of an accused's sexual 
interest in a child complainant as being 
tendency evidence subject to the 
strictures of ss 97 and 101 of the Evidence 
Act, even when the evidence does not 
suggest that the accused had previously 
committed an unlawful sexual act in 
relation to the child [22]. 
o See: R v AH (1999) 42 NSWLR 
702,708-9; Qualtieri v R [2006] 
NSWCCA 95; 171 A Crim R 
462, [87]; DJV v R [2008] 
NSWCCA 272; 200 A Crim R 
206, [30, [39]; ES v R (No 1) 
[2010] NSWCCA 197, [38]-[40]; 
35 
complainant. 
 
ES v R (No 2) [2010] NSWCCA 
198, [67]; RWC v R [2010] 
NSWCCA 332, [126]-[128]; 
BBH v R [2012] HCA 9; 245 CLR 
499, [152]; Steadman v R (No 
1) [2013] NSWCCA 55, [10]. 
o 'Whilst I have some misgivings as to 
whether evidence which is in effect no 
more than evidence of motive (because it 
is simply evidence of a sexual interest of 
the accused in the complainant which has 
not been acted upon) should be treated 
as tendency evidence, the Court must 
accept the existing approach, at least 
where, as here, there has been no 
specific challenge to it' [22]. 
 Whilst many photographs were admissible as 
context evidence, many were not; many 
showed the complainant, and were close-up 
photographs of the complainant's body. This 
character of the photos was emphasised by the 
evidence of the complainant's mother, and was 
emphasised in cross-examination by the Crown 
[25]. 
 Similarly, the video footage (which paused and 
focused upon the complainant's crotch) was 
the basis of implication and assertion 
concerning the nature of the relationship [26]. 
 The trial judge's summing-up was a plain 
invitation to the jury to form a view as to 
whether the footage indicated a sexual interest 
in the complainant, and therefore to engage in 
impermissible tendency reasoning [27]. 
 The photographs and film should not have 
been admitted, except insofar as they were 
reasonably necessary for purposes of context 
[29]. 
 Direction should have been given as there was 
a real risk of impermissible tendency 
reasoning. The evidence was “a significant 
feature of the trial, without which it is 
realistically possible that the outcome of the 
trial might have been different (R v Wilson 
[2005] NSWCCA 20; 62 NSWLR 346, [20]-[21]).” 
36 
The proviso to s 61(1) of the Criminal Appeal 
Act is inapplicable (at [29]). 
 Leave under r 4 of the Criminal Appeal Rules 
should be given [30]. 
 As regards (b): 
o This evidence “was comprehensible as 
simply indicating a close friendship 
between the appellant and the 
complainant and thus supporting the 
complainant's evidence of that. It was not 
suggested to this Court that at the trial 
this evidence had been sought to be used 
as evidence of sexual interest.” [33]. 
 This second aspect of the first ground of appeal 
should be rejected [34]. 
Ground 1 accepted (in part); Grounds (2)-(8) 
rejected. Leave under ground 1 allowed. Appellant’s 
convictions quashed. New trial of the charges; the 
appellant was convicted. 
 
2.  Colquhoun v 
R (No 2) 
[2013] 
NSWCCA 
191 
 
Appeal 
against 
conviction 
Yes 
 
 
Extrafamilial – 
Non-historical 
child sexual 
abuse 
Ground 1: 
A miscarriage of justice occurred as a 
result of the admission and/or use of 
evidence of sexual interest of the 
appellant. 
 
Ground 2: 
The trial judge misdirected the jury with 
respect to the use of evidence of 
uncharged conduct. 
 
 
 
Appellant submissions:  
Grounds 1 and 2:  
 The grounds relate to the following evidence: 
◦ (a) Photographs and video recordings of 
children possessed by the appellant; 
▪ The Crown emphasised that the 
photographs were of children and 
not adults, and that were many 
were partially clothed; it was 
suggested that they were “the sort 
of photographs that one might find 
in a family album” and were 
“consistent with unusual interest” 
[11]-[12]. 
◦ (b) The evidence of child witnesses WA 
and EG. 
▪ The Crown submitted that the 
appellant had an “usual 
relationship” with boys in the area 
and had a “focus on dealing with 
adolescent or near-adolescent 
boys” [14]. 
 
Held Ground 1 and 2: Accepted  
 Not all of the evidence can be characterised as 
context evidence, as affirmed by its volume 
and content and the way it was utilised at trial 
[20]. 
 It was not permissible for the jury to have 
regard to evidence of uncharged acts to 
establish a sexual desire or feeling of the 
appellant for the complainant, as the summing 
up suggested [21]. 
 The summing up constituted an invitation to 
engage in impermissible tendency reasoning 
[21]. 
 It was not permissible for the trial judge to 
indicate to the jury, without precise 
explanation, that the evidence was able to be 
used ‘to show the relationship between the 
accused and the complainant’ [22].  
 
Grounds (1) and (2) accepted, Grounds (3)-(11) 
rejected. Appeal allowed, appellant’s convictions 
quashed, new trial directed 
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Crown submission:  
Grounds 1 and 2: 
 The evidence was admissible to support the 
complainant's evidence that he regularly spent 
time with the appellant, swimming and fishing, 
in a context that was likely to be enjoyable for 
a young boy [19]. 
 Whilst the trial judge's direction on the use of 
the evidence was erroneous, the Court should 
nevertheless apply the proviso to s 61(1) of the 
Criminal Appeal Act and dismiss the appeal 
[23]. 
3.  RWC v R 
[2010] 
NSWCCA 
332 
 
Appeal 
against 
conviction 
Yes 
 
 
Intrafamilial – 
historical 
child sexual 
abuse 
Ground 3: 
The learned trial judge erred in law by 
permitting the crown to lead evidence 
from [KC] in that: 
 the evidence was irrelevant to any 
issue pertaining to the appellant’s 
guilt of the offences; 
 the evidence was entirely 
prejudicial and lacked any or any 
proper probative value; and/or 
 the probative value of the 
evidence was clearly outweighed 
by its prejudicial effect. 
 
Ground 4: 
 The learned trial judge erred in law 
in failing to direct the jury on the 
use that could be made of the 
evidence of [KC] (complainant’s 
sister) in determining the guilt of 
the appellant. 
Ground 3 and 4: 
at trial the counsel made the following submissions:  
 “Your Honour it there assumes the sort of relevance 
really that one is really thinking about here to the 
facts in issue, to a fact in issue. Namely, whether or 
not this was an example of unnatural passion or 
grooming or something of that nature and my 
submission is that the probative value does not at all 
assume such a height that it outweighs the 
prejudicial effect of such material, particularly as it’s 
not related to a point in time. “ [103] 
 “It’s really very, very marginal but its 
prejudicial effect in my submission outweighs 
the probative value … so really that’s what the 
defence is saying there.” (AB 376-377, italics 
added) [103] 
Held Grounds 3 and 4: Accepted 
 The evidence in question was, on its proper 
evaluation, tendered as tendency evidence and 
that is the only relevance it could have had 
[130]. 
 The trial judge was denied the assistance, from 
both counsel, that he was entitled to receive. 
Neither made any attempt properly to identify 
the nature of the evidence, nor the appropriate 
tests to apply with respect to its admission. (at 
[132]) 
 There having been no notice given (and no 
application for dispensation), and the tests 
provided in s 97 and s 101 of the Evidence Act 
1995 not having been applied, the evidence 
ought not to have been admitted. (at [103]) 
 The written submissions filed on behalf of the 
appellant asserted categorically that the 
evidence of KC “surely was” background or 
relationship evidence. If that were correct, the 
admissibility test is that contained in s 137, to 
which no reference was made. Senior counsel 
for the Crown agreed. Senior counsel for the 
Crown was driven to take this position. If the 
evidence was properly categorised as tendency 
evidence, then it is clear that the appropriate 
steps (for example notice) had not been taken, 
and the appropriate tests (s 97, s 101) had not 
been applied. [124] 
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Grounds 3 and 4 accepted. Appeal allowed, 
convictions quashed. New trial ordered on all 
counts, new trial ordered.  
4.  ES v R (No 1) 
{2010] 
NSWCCA 
197 
 
Appeal 
against 
conviction 
Yes 
 
 
Intrafamilial - 
historical 
child sexual 
abuse 
At [33] 
Ground 1: 
“The trial judge erred in admitting the 
tendency evidence of the complainant's 
sister 'K' observation of the appellant 
touching the complainant's genitalia.” 
 
Ground 2: 
“The trial judge failed to adequately 
direct the jury and/or misdirected the 
jury in relation to this evidence.”  
 
- Held Ground 1: Accepted 
 If evidence of uncharged acts is to be used in 
any way other than as context evidence, the 
requirements or tendency evidence need to be 
satisfied (Qualtieri v R [2006] NSWCCA 95).  
 The evidence potentially had considerable 
probative force as corroborating the 
complainant; but it would have that force only 
as motive/tendency evidence [43]. 
 The evidence was not admissible as 
motive/tendency evidence because of a failure 
to comply with Evidence Act s 97. 
 The admission over objection of this evidence 
was a miscarriage of justice [44]. 
 
Held Ground 2: Accepted 
 The trial judge said the jury was entitled to 
take K's evidence into account as corroboration 
of the complainant's evidence if satisfied 
beyond reasonable doubt that it had occurred 
[45]. 
◦ The requirement of beyond reasonable 
doubt would only arise if K's evidence 
was admitted as tendency evidence, 
which it was not [46]. 
 Trial judge failed to combat the prejudicial 
effect of the wrongly admitted evidence; trial 
judge encouraged its use as corroboration, 
which it could not legitimately [46]. 
 
All 3 grounds of appeal accepted. Appeal allowed. 
Convictions and sentence quashed, new trial 
ordered. 
5.  DJV v R 
[2008] 
NSWCCA 
272 
 
Yes 
 
 
Intrafamilial – 
non-historical 
child sexual 
abuse 
Ground 3: 
The admission of the evidence of TB as 
'context' evidence resulted in an unfair 
trial. 
 
- Held in regards to all grounds collaboratively:  
 Statutory framework: 
o Per s 97, evidence of character, 
reputation, conduct or tendency is 
inadmissible unless notice is given or the 
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Appeal 
against 
conviction 
Ground 4:  
The admission of the evidence of 
uncharged acts as 'context' or 
'relationship' evidence resulted in a trial 
that was unfair. 
 
Ground 5: 
Her Honour failed to direct the jury that, 
before they could use the evidence of 
uncharged acts as evidence of tendency, 
they must be satisfied of that evidence 
beyond reasonable doubt. 
 
Court deems it to have 'significant 
probative value' [11]. 
o Per s 101, the probative value of the 
evidence must substantially outweigh any 
prejudicial effect upon the defendant 
[12]. 
 The Court reviewed the decision of the High 
Court in HML v R [2008] HCA 16, and its 
discussion of tendency and context evidence 
and the common law: [19]-[27]. 
 The accepted position in NSW is that evidence 
of 'relationship' may be admitted unless 
excluded after consideration has been given to 
s 135 or s 137 of the Evidence Act [28]. 
 Context evidence does not require a direction 
that it be proved beyond reasonable doubt 
[31]. 
 The judge who made the evidentiary rulings 
acknowledged that the Crown did not rely on 
the 'uncharged acts' as tendency evidence. 
Instead, the Crown relied upon it as evidence 
of the 'relationship' between the appellant and 
complainant, in the sense considered in Gipp v 
The Queen [1998] HCA 21 [33]. 
 Because the Crown said it did not tender it as 
tendency evidence, consideration of its 
admissibility was confined to s 135 and s 136 of 
the Evidence Act [33]. 
 The relevant test: 
o It is true that each event forms part of 
the 'relationship' between the appellant 
and complainant; however, that is not the 
touchstone for admissibility [36]. 
o There must be an issue in relation to the 
charged act(s) which justifies the 
admission of evidence of other events, 
including other occasions of sexual abuse. 
Unless there is such an issue, the 
evidence is likely to only be admissible, if 
at all, as tendency evidence [36]. 
o Thus, only if the evidence of the 
incident(s) in the Daintree assisted in 
explaining the context within the 
relationship in which the charged acts 
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occurred would it have been relevant 
[36]. 
 Application in the present appeal: 
o This was undoubtedly tendency evidence. 
Because there was no issue which 
justified the admission of the evidence as 
relationship evidence and it was not 
proffered as tendency evidence so it 
should have been rejected [39]. 
 
All grounds (1)-(5) accepted. Appeal upheld, 
conviction quashed, matter remitted back to district 
court for new trial.  
6.  AE v R 
[2008] 
NSWCCA 52 
 
Appeal 
against 
conviction 
Yes 
 
 
Intrafamilial – 
non-historical 
child sexual 
abuse 
Ground 2: The admission of tendency 
and/or coincidence evidence had 
resulted in an unfair trial 
 
Ground 2: 
 The trial judge erred in admitting tendency 
and/or coincidence evidence of alleged 
incidents with complainant 1 (PNE – 
stepdaughter) in the trial of the counts 
involving complainant 2 (CNE – daughter) 
By way of background: 
 In respect of tendency and coincidence, the 
Crown prosecutor at trial submitted that “the 
tendency relied upon by the Crown [...] is the 
tendency of the accused to engage in 
unwanted sexual activity with a young 
daughter [complainant 2] and a young step-
daughter [complainant 1] who were under his 
authority. The coincidence evidence relied 
upon by the Crown is the improbability of the 
events as described by each complainant 
occurring as a matter of coincidence or 
chance.” [38] 
 The trial judge held that the evidence had 
significant probative value under the tendency 
rule and coincidence rule due to the following 
features: [39] 
o “Both complainants were of a 
similar age when the assaults 
commenced – [complainant 1] was 
nine years of age and [complainant 
2] was 11 years of age”;  
Held Ground 2: 
1. At [37]-[50] per curiam: Bell JA and 
Hulme and Latham JJ: 
 The trial judge erred in admitting the evidence 
of complainant 1 at the trial of the counts 
involving complainant 2 under the coincidence 
rule: [43] and [46]. 
o The Crown on appeal conceded that 
“the allegations made by 
[complainant 1] were not of events 
that were substantially and 
relevantly similar to the allegations 
made by [complainant 2] nor were 
the circumstances in which they 
occurred substantially similar” [43]. 
o Complainant 2 complained of only 
one incident whereas complainant 1 
described a history of sexual 
molestation [42]. 
o In that light, the similarities that the 
judge identified (see above) “were, 
in reality, unremarkable 
circumstances that are common to 
sexual offences against children” 
[42]. 
 The trial judge erred in admitting the evidence 
of complainant 1 at the trial of the counts 
involving complainant 2, under the tendency 
rule: [44] and [46]. 
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o “Assaults on both complainants 
occurred at the appellant’s 
residence in a bedroom”; 
o “Each of the complainants were 
[sic] residing with the appellant in a 
family unit when the assaults took 
place”; 
o “At the time of the assaults the 
appellant and the complainant were 
the only people present in the 
bedroom”; 
o “The first assault on each 
complainant was in ‘largely identical 
terms’”; 
o “The appellant had warned each 
complainant, ‘Don’t tell anyone, he 
would always remind not to tell 
anyone and the accused told her 
she would get into trouble if she 
told’” 
 The trial judge also accepted that the Crown 
excluded the possibility of joint concoction (i.e. 
that complainant 1 and complainant 2, 
together, planned and fabricated the 
complaints against the appellant) 
o Whether the assaults occurred was 
in issue at the trial, so the possibility 
of joint concoction was essential 
[44]. 
o The trial judge applied the correct 
test (i.e. whether the evidence had 
substantial probative value). 
o Where the question of whether the 
assaults actually occurred is in issue, 
the possibility of joint concoction 
(where complainants, together, plan 
and fabricate the complaints) will be 
determinative of whether the 
evidence has substantial probative 
value. 
o The trial judge erred in finding there 
was no possibility of joint 
concoction: “the complainants were 
sisters and were in contact with one 
another at the time each made her 
complaint” [44]. 
o The possibility of joint concoction 
meant that, contrary to his 
Honour’s finding, the evidence of 
complainant 1 did not possess 
significant probative value in proof 
of the allegation that the appellant 
assaulted complainant 2 [44]. 
o The prejudicial effect on the 
appellant is likely to have been 
great – there is a risk the jury was 
overwhelmed by the evidence of 
the long course of sexual 
misconduct against complainant 1 
in considering whether to convict 
on the counts against complainant 2 
[45]. 
 
Appeal allowed in respect of ground (2) (relating to 
counts 14 and 15), and new trial directed. 
 
At [11]: 
 “Count 14 – during the winter in 1995 CNE came 
home after a game of netball. The appellant was the 
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only person at home. He asked her to come over to 
the bed on which he was lying. He pulled her next to 
him and put his hand under her underpants inserting 
his fingers into her vagina.”  
 Count 15 – this offence related to the same 
incident as that charged in count 14. The 
appellant touched CNE on the breasts. This was 
charged as an indecent assault.” 
 
Appeal against conviction allowed for all (2) grounds. 
Appeal allowed. Verdicts and convictions on counts 
11, 14 and 15 set aside. Verdict of acquittal 
substituted on count 11. New trial directed on 
counts 14 and 15.  
7.  Peter Versi v 
R [2013] 
NSWCCA 
206 
 
Appeal 
against 
conviction 
No 
 
 
Intrafamilial – 
historical 
child sexual 
abuse 
Ground 3: 
There was a miscarriage of justice in 
that the direction to the jury on 
tendency was unclear, confusing and 
misleading.  
 
Ground 7: 
There was a miscarriage of justice in 
that the directions by the trial judge, in 
addition to the directions on tendency 
and coincidence, were confusing and 
misleading when considered separately 
or in combination. 
Ground 3 
 There were unclear/confused directions as to 
the use to which the evidence of tendency 
(that the Appellant had a sexual interest in the 
complainant) might be put. 
Ground 7: 
 There is a risk that the jury was confused or 
misled on the facts and the law by the 
summing up. 
 
Held Ground 3: Rejected 
 “Whilst there were some obscurities and 
misspeaking in the judge’s directions, they 
were not such as to have led to any real risk 
that the jury might have been confused or 
misled” [144]. 
 “The judge warned that the jury must not 
reason that because the accused had 
committed one offence or more on another 
occasion, that he must have committed 
others” [143]. 
 “I am fortified in this conclusion by the fact 
that Mr Odgers did not seek any redirection 
upon this ground” [144]. 
 
Held Ground 7: Rejected 
 Whilst the directions from the judge were not 
always happily phrased, they were clear and 
there was no redirection sought from counsel 
at the time. 
 
All grounds of appeal (1)-(8) rejected. Appeal 
dismissed. 
8.  BJS v R 
[2013] 
NSWCCA 
123 
 
No 
 
  
Institutional – 
historical 
child sexual 
abuse 
 
Ground 2: 
The sentencing judge erred in permitting 
the Crown to rely upon tendency 
evidence. 
 
Ground 2: 
 There should have been 4 separate trials with 
no tendency/coincidence evidence. 
 The tendency evidence did not have the 
requisite significant probative value that 
Held Ground 1: Rejected 
 The sentencing judge’s summary of the 
tendency evidence was accurate – he focused 
on the consistency of the relevant tendency, 
not the factual differences. 
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Appeal 
against 
conviction 
and 
sentence 
 Ground 8: 
That sentencing judge erred in refusing 
to discharge the jury consequent upon 
permitting the Crown Prosecutor to 
cross-examine the Appellant as to 
tendency. 
 
substantially outweighed any prejudicial effect 
on the accused.  
 The tendency sought to be proved was that: 
o the Appellant had a tendency to 
have a sexual interest in girls aged 
7-17; 
o the Appellant used his position of 
authority and relationships with 
families to gain access to girls with 
whom he wished to engage in 
sexual activities;  
o that the particular activities he 
attempted to engage in were 
similar. 
 There were substantial differences in the 
behaviour alleged by each of the complainants 
– different sexual forms of offending alleged to 
have been committed upon girls of different 
ages in a variety of circumstances. 
 A risk of contamination/concoction of the 
evidence – sibling relationship between some 
of the complainants and tendency witnesses 
and media reporting. 
 
Ground 8:  
 At trial, questions were put by the Crown to 
the Appellant as to his interest in "young girls 
and young women." 
o The phrase "young girls and young 
women" went beyond the tendency 
that was advanced in support of the 
tendency evidence (an inference 
that the Appellant had indecently 
assaulted other young girls and 
young women beyond those who 
had given evidence). 
 The Appellant was asked about witnesses 
"coming along" to give evidence, and if they 
were mistaken in the evidence which they 
gave. 
o These questions were 
impermissible because the 
Appellant was being asked 
questions about whether a 
 The sentencing judge was well aware of the 
risk of contamination and excluded some 
proposed tendency evidence on this basis. 
 The sibling relationships in question did no 
more than establish a mere speculative chance 
of concoction, and any publicity was limited in 
its terms. 
 
Held Ground 8: Rejected 
 “There was no suggestion in any of the 
evidence that other unspecified young girls and 
young women had been the objects of sexual 
interest by the Appellant.” [189] 
 The question asked of the Appellant fell well 
short of asking him to explain or speculate on 
why witnesses had given evidence. He was not 
asked why a witness gave particular evidence. 
He was asked whether a witness was mistaken 
to suggest error, rather than invite an opinion 
as to the basis for the contradictory evidence. 
[195]. 
 
All grounds of appeal (1)-(10) rejected. Grounds (1)-
(9) appeal dismissed.  
Leave to appeal ground 10 granted, but appeal 
dismissed. 
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complainant, or other witness, had 
a motive to lie. 
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9.  R v SK; SK v 
R [2011] 
NSWCCA 
292 
 
Appeal 
against 
interlocutory 
judgement 
as to the 
admission of 
evidence 
 
 
No 
 
 
Intrafamilial – 
historical 
child sexual 
abuse 
Ground 1: 
Judicial error in concluding that the 
probative value of the evidence 
substantially outweighed the prejudicial 
effect  
Ground 2: 
Judicial error in concluding that there 
was no specific prejudice to the 
applicant in a joint trial and that the 
allegations by KD, WS and DiS (3 female 
complainants) could be tried together 
Grounds of Appeal by Crown:  
Ground 1: 
Judicial error in finding that the 
evidence of offences against DaS (fourth 
complainant, male) could not be used as 
tendency evidence in respect of the 
female complainants. 
 
 
Appellant submissions:  
 
Ground 1: 
 The Judge expressed some reservations with 
respect to the probative value of the evidence 
and that reservation was inconsistent with her 
Honour’s finding that the evidence had 
significant probative value [20]. 
 The temporal difference between the events 
alleged by the complaints, up to 8 years, is 
indicative of the limited capacity of the 
evidence in each case to rationally affect the 
probability that the applicant committed 
sexual assaults upon any of the complainants 
[20]. 
Ground 2: 
 Judge erred in stating that “no specific risk of 
what prejudice the accused will suffer, other 
than this generality has been referred to” 
when the oral and written submissions of 
counsel for the appellant had cited a number 
of cases in support of the proposition that 
there was a “real risk that the evidence might 
be misused by the jury in some unfair way” 
[31]. 
 
Crown Submission: 
Ground 4: 
 The evidence of DaS was entirely consistent 
with the proposed evidence of the female 
complainants, in that it demonstrated a modus 
operandi or pattern of behaviour towards 
young relatives between 6-12 years, who 
visited the premises where the applicant lived 
with his mother. When WS and DiS attained 
the age of 13 or 14, the only remaining 
children in the extended family were two boys, 
one of whom was DaS. As such, the appellant 
turned his attention to DaS. [41] 
Appellant Held Ground 1: Rejected 
 There was no inconsistency between the 
Judge’s remark and the finding that the 
evidence had significant probative value. The 
applicant’s submissions overlook the 
distinction between a finding that evidence is 
capable of rationally affecting the probability 
that the applicant committed the assaults, on 
the one hand, and a finding that the jury would 
ascribe to that evidence, when taken together 
with other evidence in the trial, probative 
value of a significant degree [25]. 
 The lapse of time between the alleged assaults 
is a powerful factor in reasoning towards the 
commission of these offences by the applicant. 
The Crown case is that the appellant would 
stop the assault when the children were of an 
age that he could no longer have influence 
over them.  
 In the absence of any prejudicial effect being 
identified by the applicant, beyond the generic 
prejudice inherent in tendency evidence (that a 
person with an established tendency will yield 
to that tendency whenever the opportunity 
arises), the applicant has not demonstrated 
that it was not open to the Judge to have found 
the test under s 101 was satisfied [28].  
Held Ground 2: Rejected 
 The applicant did not identify how the risk of 
misuse of the evidence by the jury could arise. 
It is not prejudicial simply because it tends to 
prove the commission of the offences. That 
constitutes, subject to proper directions, 
appropriate use of the evidence, not its misuse 
[34]. 
 The admissibility of the tendency evidence 
dictated the fate of the separate trial 
application – because the tendency evidence 
was correctly admitted, this ground of appeal 
failed.  
 
Crown: 
Held Ground 4: Allowed 
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 Gender was no aspect of the Crown’s reliance 
upon the tendency evidence. The tendency 
evidence acquired its force from the age of the 
complainants, the applicant’s ability to control 
the abusive environment, and his ability to 
exercise influence over the complainant. It was 
incorrect to reject the evidence of DaS as 
tendency evidence. The inevitable 
consequence of this is that the trial of the 
applicant ought to proceed on all charges [42-
3]. 
 
Grounds (1)–(3) rejected. Ground (4) Rejected. 
Appeal by appellant as to the admission of evidence 
dismissed. Appeal by Crown as to the exclusion of 
evidence allowed. 
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10.  FB v R; R v 
FB [2011] 
NSWCCA 
217 
 
Appeal 
against 
conviction 
and 
sentence 
No 
 
 
Institutional – 
Non-historical 
child sexual 
abuse 
Ground 1: 
 Trial judge erred in admitting the 
tendency evidence of witness, MD 
(witness also allegedly assaulted 
by appellant), pursuant to section 
97 Evidence Act. There was a 
miscarriage of justice due to the 
failure by the legal representatives 
of the appellant to adduce 
evidence of the specific contents 
of media reports relating to the 
witness, MD.  
 
Ground 1: 
 At trial, appellant agreed that he had 
performed oral sex on MD and also had sexual 
intercourse on the first occasion. He denied, 
however, that she was initially asleep and that 
he had given her pills. He claimed the sexual 
acts were consensual.  
 There was a miscarriage of justice because 
appellant’s legal representation did not admit 
evidence of a newspaper report that showed 
that SE (complainant) could have discovered 
that another person had made allegations that 
she was drugged and raped. The two limited 
ways in which the appellant argued that the 
evidence had significance were first, its 
capacity to bear on the tendency argument 
and secondly, its general ability to enlarge the 
environment in which there was discussion in 
the Grafton area concerning the accused’s 
aberrant sexual behaviour [52]. 
 
Held Ground 1: Rejected 
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 Evidence may be offered simply to show a 
tendency to act in a particular way, not 
necessarily in a criminal manner. Indeed, it is 
not necessary that the tendency to commit a 
particular crime or, for that matter, to commit 
a crime at all. The trial judge correctly 
recognised that, in order for MD’s evidence to 
have significant probative value as required by 
section 97, the Crown had to establish that the 
evidence possessed a degree of relevance to 
the events charged, such that it could be said 
that it was “important or of consequence”. The 
trial judge identified the relevant fact in issue 
in the trial. This was whether or not SE 
(complainant) had been subjected to the 
appellant’s sexual activity in the way she had 
asserted [24-25]. 
 It was clearly open to his Honour to find, as he 
did, that the evidence of MD made it 
significantly more likely that the appellant had 
carried out the acts alleged by SE, as the Crown 
case asserted.  
 His Honour noted, in both decisions, that mere 
contact or the possibility of contact does not, 
in itself, necessarily lead to an indication of a 
real chance of concoction. Overall, his Honour 
was satisfied that, on the whole of the material 
before him, at the time of the initial 
determination, that there was no real chance 
of concoction [36]. 
 Trial judge concluded that none of the material 
as to SE’s friendship with either AD (MD’s 
Brother) or TB (AD’s girlfriend), nor the 
contents of the brief telephone conversation 
between the two young women, raised even a 
hint of suspicion that there had been 
concoction or collusion between them [38]. 
 It is not necessary for me to traverse every 
single matter sought to be relied on by Newton 
under the headings of either contamination or 
concoction. His honour carefully examined all 
the matters which were argued before him, 
they generally being those matters presently 
raised before this court. He rejected the 
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submission that, individually or collectively, the 
matters relied upon pointed to a real chance of 
concoction or contamination. In my opinion, it 
was clearly open to his honour to make the 
findings that he did [45]. 
 There is no evidence from which it could be 
said that the failure to obtain the newspaper 
article (if that is what happened) demonstrates 
‘flagrant incompetence’ on the part of trial 
counsel [54]. Importantly, there was no 
reference in the article to the two white tablets 
nor that the girl fell asleep. This level of detail – 
critical to the complainant’s evidence is not 
disclosed in the articles and cannot be inferred 
from the simple use of the word ‘drugging’. In 
any event the complainant was clear in her 
evidence at trial that she had not seen articles 
in any newspaper or magazine [54]. The failure 
to adduce evidence of the articles could have 
been a tactical error but even if it was not, 
overlooking this evidence does not clear that 
bar to permit appellate intervention.  
 
Rejected on all grounds of appeal against 
conviction (1)-(4). Appeal against sentence 
ground (5) accepted. Appeal against conviction 
dismissed. Crown Appeal against sentence 
accepted. Sentence quashed. New sentence 
imposed. 
11.  LJW v R 
[2010] 
NSWCCA 
114 
 
Appeal 
against 
conviction 
No 
 
 
Intrafamilial – 
Non-historical 
child sexual 
abuse 
Ground 2: 
 The trial judge erred in admitting 
into evidence an alleged 
observation by the complainant of 
the accused masturbating in a 
motor vehicle in the course of a 
trip between Sydney and 
Muswellbrook 
 
Ground 3: 
 Trial judge erred in his directions 
to the Jury concerning tendency 
evidence 
 
Ground 2:  
It is submitted that the trial judge erred in: 
(a)  “Admitting the evidence as relevant to the state of 
mind of the accused and part of the res gestae of the 
sequence of events leading up to the arrival and 
sleeping arrangements at Muswellbrook;  
(b) Applying the test of "unfair" prejudice which is not 
part of the test under s 101(2) Evidence Act.  
(c) Failing to determine on what counts the evidence 
would be admissible  
(d) Failing to consider how an accused was likely to be 
prejudiced if evidence was admitted for the purposes 
of tendency reasoning on one or more counts but 
not on others;  
Held Ground 2: Rejected 
 “In my opinion that kind of reasoning would 
not be reasoning that the appellant was a type 
of person with a tendency to engage in sexual 
activity in the presence of boys. Rather, it was 
reasoning that, on this particular day, the 
appellant exhibited a state of mind displaying 
interest in and a lack of inhibition from such 
activity, a state of mind as to which it could be 
inferred that it was probable that it continued 
until the night-time of that day” [51]. 
 “In my opinion, what the trial judge said 
sufficiently indicates that he did address and 
determine the tests contained in s 101(2) and s 
50 
(e) Failed to perform the balancing exercise required 
under s 101(2). R v Blick (2000) 111 A Crim R 326 at 
[20]  
(f) Alternatively the trial judge failed to give 
consideration to the exercise of discretion 
pursuant to s 137 Evidence Act.” [43] 
 
Ground 3: 
 “It is submitted that the trial judge's directions 
concerning the tendency evidence were 
incorrect and misleading in the circumstances 
of the case in: […] 
 (b) failing to direct the jury that they could not 
use tendency reasoning in respect to the 
"alleged events in the car" in part of their 
reasoning in respect to the 1st and 2nd counts  
o The judge's directions are from SU 6-9 
14/3/08  
o The Courts have emphasised the need for 
care in identifying the basis upon which 
the evidence is admitted, either tendency 
or context  
o It is submitted that a specific "BRS" 
direction was required. Where evidence 
revealing criminal or reprehensible 
propensity is admitted, but its use is 
limited to non propensity or tendency 
purposes, for example those considered 
proper in that case, then it is to be used 
only for those purposes and not as proof 
of the accused's guilt otherwise: BRS v 
The Queen [1997] HCA 47; (1997) 191 CLR 
275” [54] 
137; and I see no error in that determination. I 
do not think there was any significant prejudice 
to the appellant and certainly not any unfair 
prejudice in admitting this evidence as 
tendency evidence on counts 3 and 4 but not 
on counts 1 and 2” [53]. 
 
Held Ground 3: Rejected 
 “In my opinion what the trial judge said could 
not reasonably have been understood as a 
suggestion by him that what occurred in the 
car could amount to a crime“[56]. 
 “The written and oral directions clearly set out 
how the jury were permitted to use evidence 
of the events in the car: that is, as to state of 
mind and res gestae in relation to counts 1 and 
2, and as tendency evidence in relation to 
counts 3 and 4” [57]. 
 “The trial judge referred to the possibility that 
the appellant was ‘giving way to thoughts in his 
mind of sexual activity ahead with the boys’… 
In the context of the whole summing up and 
the written directions, in my opinion, these are 
references to what the jury might infer about 
the appellant’s state of mind on that particular 
occasion and not to some general ‘guilty 
passion’“ [58-59]. 
 
All grounds (2)-(9) rejected. Appeal dismissed. 
 
12.  KTR v R 
[2010] 
NSWCCA 
271 
 
Appeal 
against 
conviction 
No 
 
 
Intrafamilial – 
historical 
child sexual 
abuse 
Ground 2: 
Directions in relation to evidence of 
violence were inadequate 
Ground 2:  
 The trial judge should have directed the jury on 
the evidence of violence, both at the time the 
evidence was given and in the summing up. 
This direction should have told in clear terms 
that the evidence was tendered as background 
to the relationships, and could not be used as 
tendency evidence. Citing R v JDK [2009] 
NSWCCA 76: [17] 
 
Held Ground 2: Rejected 
 The appellant's contention reflects a 
misunderstanding of R v JDK [2009] NSWCCA 
76 [118]. 
o The evidence in question explained the 
complainants' apparent acquiescence and 
failure to report; as the trial judge 
directed the jury at the conclusion of KG's 
evidence, this was sufficient as the jury 
would have 'readily understood the 
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Ground 3:  
 The Crown Prosecutor 'exceeded the 
boundaries permitted to a prosecutor' by 
making submissions on material not in 
evidence and making 'intemperate or 
inflammatory comments tending to arouse 
prejudice or emotion in the jury'. Citing R v 
Livermore (2006) 67 NSWLR 569; R v DDR 
[1998] 3 VR 380 [126]. 
 The address sought to “collapse the 
boundaries between the appellant's violent 
conduct and the charged sexual acts” by 
inviting the jury to use the evidence 
impermissibly as tendency evidence [122]. 
 The tendency notice identified sexual intent, 
not violence; the Prosecutor thereby invited 
the jury to reason directly from the appellant's 
violence to guilt vis-à-vis the sexual offences 
[125]. 
 
purpose for which similar evidence from 
the other witnesses was admitted'. [120]. 
o The directions 'did not elevate the 
evidence beyond its appropriate 
significance' and trial counsel raised no 
issue. Rule 4 applies. 
 
Held Ground 3: Rejected 
o The Crown Prosecutor's address was 
strong, but not inappropriate; the 
evidence justified the submission made 
by the Crown [123]. 
o Whilst the evidence of MW should have 
been excluded, the force of the 
admissible evidence suggests that its 
admission was not significant to the jury's 
verdict [124]. 
o No application was made by counsel at 
trial for a direction; this suggests that 
“the adverse impact now suggested […] 
may not have been the experience of 
those in the Court” [127]. 
o The evidence of violence contextualised 
the sexual abuse and affirmed that “any 
inclination they had to resist or complain 
was understandably influenced” by the 
appellant's violent behaviour [128]. 
 
All grounds of appeal (1)-(3) rejected. Appeal 
dismissed. 
13.  ES v R (No 2) 
[2010] 
NSWCCA 
198 
 
Appeal 
against 
conviction 
No 
 
 
Intrafamilal – 
historical 
child sexual 
abuse 
Ground 1: 
The trial miscarried by virtue of the 
reception of inadmissible and prejudicial 
evidence, and the treatment of the 
same by the Crown Prosecutor and the 
trial judge. 
 
Ground 1: 
 This evidence lacked any probative value as 
context and its admission as tendency 
evidence under ss 97 and 101 of the Evidence 
Act was not satisfied. Item (4) was particularly 
prejudicial [52]. 
 There was no direction to the jury at the time 
of admission of this evidence; the directions 
given in the summing up were inadequate [43]. 
 
Held Ground 1: Rejected 
 As regards evidence of the mother, it was 
relevant in filling out a 'realistic picture' of the 
relationship between complainant and 
appellant. However, to the extent that it could 
be considered as providing corroboration, it 
would be evidence of a sexual interest 
normally admissible only as tendency evidence. 
[67]. 
◦ On the other hand, its relevance as 
context evidence is strong. Whilst if 
objected to, it ought to have been 
rejected, the evidence was not objected 
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to and in fact used to advance the 
appellant's case; it does not now give rise 
to a miscarriage of justice justifying leave 
under r 4 [69]. 
 Trial judge failed to direct the jury adequately 
on the tendency evidence. However, in 
absence of a request for further direction, no 
miscarriage of justice justifies leave under r 4 
[71]. 
 
Ground 1 (only ground of appeal) rejected. Appeal 
dismissed. 
14.  BP v R; R v 
BP [2010] 
NSWCCA 
267 
 
Appeal 
against 
conviction 
 
No 
 
 
Intrafamilial - 
historical 
child sexual 
abuse 
Ground 1: 
There was a miscarriage of justice 
because the trial judge did not order 
separate trials in respect of the counts 
as to the complainants. 
 
Ground 2:  
There was a miscarriage of justice as a 
result of the trial judge's directions in 
respect of tendency/coincidence 
evidence. 
 
Ground 1: 
 The trial judge erred in holding that “evidence 
in respect of charges in relation to each 
complainant was admissible in respect of 
charges relating to other complainants as 
tendency and/or coincidence evidence, and on 
that basis rejecting the application for separate 
trials” [98]. 
 The trial judge was in error in holding that the 
probative value was not really challenged, and 
for failing to give reasons for holding that the 
evidence did have significant probative value 
[99]. 
 The real assertion made by the tendency and 
coincidence notices was that the appellant had 
a sexual interest in young children 
 The trial judge further erred in dealing with the 
question of concoction and/or contamination. 
(at [101]-[104]) 
 
Ground 2: 
The misdirections of the trial judge resulted in a 
miscarriage of justice. Specifically, the trial judge 
misdirected the jury in the following respects: [127] 
 “(1) In categorising the appellant’s alleged 
tendency as “an obsession with young 
prepubertal females and their sexual organs”, 
thereby suggesting that the appellant was the 
kind of person who would commit the charged 
offences;  
 (2) In telling the jury that they may be satisfied 
Held Ground 1: Rejected 
 The probative value of the evidence depends 
upon its probative value in establishing the 
tendency and on the probative value of the 
tendency (if established) in relation to an issue 
in the case. To be admissible, the evidence 
“must have significant probative value. It must 
be capable of rationally affecting the 
probability of the existence of a fact in issue to 
a significant extent, meaning (at least) an 
extent greater than required for mere 
relevance” [107]. 
 “[F]eatures of the appellant's conduct 
described by each complainant were 
sufficiently similar and sufficiently unusual for 
the evidence of each of them to have 
significant probative value in showing the 
specified tendencies”. O'Keefe and CGL are 
distinguishable. (at [112]-[114]) 
 The finding of the trial judge as to concoction 
was upheld; there was no real chance of 
concoction and consideration of the question 
does not alter the conclusion regarding the 
probative value of the evidence. (at [115]-[120] 
 There must be a risk of contamination that 
goes “to the substance of the evidence, and 
not merely to incidental details of no 
materiality”. In any case, no error was shown in 
the trial judge's reasoning. (at [121]-[124]) 
 Since the evidence of the different 
complainants was admissible as tendency 
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that the person who did one act must have 
done the others, and that the improbability of 
events occurring coincidentally establishes that 
the accused committed the offence;  
 (3) In confusing tendency and coincidence 
reasoning: R v Phan (1990) 54 SASR 561 at 567, 
R v DCC [2004] VSCA 230; (2004) 11 VR 129; 
and  
 (4) In not making it clear that, before they 
could use other acts to support a finding 
concerning any of the charged acts, they had 
to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of 
those other acts.” 
 
evidence in each of the cases, in my opinion 
there was no error in the trial judge’s decision 
to permit the trials of complaints by SP, TP and 
TM proceeding together [125]. 
 The significant probative value of the evidence 
“substantially outweighed any prejudicial 
effect it may have had” [126]. 
 
Held Ground 2: Rejected 
 [The first, second, and third points were not 
accepted] 
o Each comment was either qualified or 
must be viewed in its complete context. 
(at [128]-[130]) 
 As regards the third point, there was “not in 
this case the sharp distinction between 
tendency and coincidence reasoning 
identified” in R v DCC [2004] VSCA 230. In the 
present case, the “commission of some [acts] 
could evidence a tendency and thereby 
increase the probability that the appellant 
committed others” [133]. 
 As no direction was sought at trial, leave is 
required to rely on this alleged misdirection. 
“[E]ven if the trial judge did err in failing to 
clearly distinguish tendency and coincidence 
reasoning, there was no miscarriage of justice 
such as would justify leave” [134]. 
 
All grounds against conviction (1)-(3) rejected. 
Appeal against conviction dismissed.  
15.  AW v R 
[2009] 
NSWCCA 1 
 
Appeal 
against 
conviction 
No 
 
 
Intrafamilial, 
Non-historical 
child sexual 
abuse 
Ground 3: 
Evidence admitted as tendency evidence 
lacked the degree of probative force 
that was capable of substantially 
outweighing any prejudicial effect upon 
the appellant (the threshold test of 
s97(1)(b) and s101(2) Evidence Act) 
Ground 3:  
 Compared to other similar cases (R v MM 
[2004] NSWCCA 364), the tendency evidence 
at trial lacked sufficient detail and was 
unsupported by objective evidence.  
 
Held Ground 3: Rejected 
 “There was a degree of particularity and 
contemporaneity in the tendency evidence 
that allowed the trial judge to reach the 
conclusion that it was significantly probative” 
[48]. 
 
All grounds of appeal (1)- (4) rejected. Appeal 
dismissed. 
16.  Clark v R 
[2008] 
No 
 
Non-historical 
child sexual 
Ground 1: Ground 1: Held Ground 1: Rejected 
In respect of the tendency evidence: 
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NSWCCA 
122 
 
Appeal 
against 
conviction 
 
 
abuse, extra-
familial 
The trial miscarried for a number of 
reasons 
 
(Ground 3): 
 There was insufficient evidence to 
convict on the first (recruiting for child 
pornography) and second (indecent 
assault) counts 
 
(Ground 4): 
The verdicts on the first and seconds 
counts were unsafe or unreasonable 
 
 The trial judge erred in admitting evidence as 
tendency evidence 
 The trial judge did not identify the count to 
which the tendency evidence (some of which 
was adduced by the appellant, which the 
appellant believed would go to his defence) 
related [103]. 
 Some of the evidence in the tendency notices 
was inadmissible under section 94 of the 
Evidence Act because it was directed to facts in 
issue [107]. 
 Some of the evidence tendered by the 
appellant contained highly prejudicial material 
and asserted that the appellant committed 
other criminal acts [110]. 
 
Ground 3: 
“The evidence of the complainant did not prove the 
case and [...] his Honour must have used tendency 
reasoning, relying on the statements of other 
youths” [159]. 
 
Ground 4: 
 The trial judge was “apparently impressed by 
the evidence of witnesses as to 
tendency/coincidence evidence called by the 
Crown” [198]. 
 A failure to link the tendency evidence to a 
count did not make the evidence inadmissible 
[104] 
 The evidence in the tendency notices the 
appellant claimed was inadmissible under 
section 94 was not inadmissible: the evidence 
was incapable of proving tendency and was not 
tendered for that purpose [108] 
 The trial judge did not take into account any of 
the evidence tendered by the appellant 
asserting that the appellant committed other 
criminal acts [111] 
In respect of use of witness statements 
 The trial judge did not use the statements for a 
tendency purpose [142] 
 In any event the statements did not harm the 
appellant [142] 
 
Held: Ground 3: Rejected 
 Per Barr J with whom Bell JA and Buddin J 
agreed: 
o The trial judge was entitled on the 
evidence to find that the appellant had 
tried to recruit the complainant to take 
part in the production of pornographic 
photographs  
 
Held: Ground 4: Rejected 
In respect of the tendency / coincidence evidence 
 The appellant’s submission that the trial judge 
was “apparently impressed by the evidence of 
witnesses as to tendency / coincidence 
evidence called by the Crown” was not correct 
[199]. 
 The tendency evidence was not called by the 
Crown, it was called by the appellant [199]. 
 In any event, the trial judge did not have 
regard to it other than if it assisted the defence 
[199]. 
 
All grounds of appeal rejected, appeal dismissed.  
17.  R v Richard 
Norman 
No 
 
Intrafamilial, 
non-historical 
Ground 1: Ground 1: 
 
Held Ground 1: Rejected 
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Mearns 
[2005] 
NSWCCA 
396 
 
Appeal 
against 
conviction 
and 
sentence 
 
 child sexual 
abuse 
The trial judge erred by giving 
inadequate and incorrect directions in 
respect of the relationship  
evidence.  
 
 The evidence of uncharged acts was effectively 
left to the jury as (i) relationship evidence, and 
(ii) tendency evidence. This was despite the 
evidence being admitted only for the purposes 
of relationship evidence [53]. 
 The direction of the trial judge fell short of 
what was required to prevent the jury from 
using the evidence on a tendency basis [53].  
 The trial judge inadvertently introduced 
notions of 'guilty passion' and therefore 
tendency evidence at [60]. 
 
 The Court reviewed pre- and post-Evidence Act 
authority on directions of this nature and its 
relationship to the Evidence Act, particularly 
the broad conceptions of 'guilty passion' and 
'contextual evidence'. In essence, the Court 
reiterated that evidence of uncharged acts as 
demonstrative of 'guilty passion' now required 
compliance with the Act under the statutory 
requirements for the admission of tendency 
evidence [57]-[65]. 
 The trial judge substantially relied on the 
direction in Regina v Sydney Wickham (17 
December 1991, unreported) and thereby 
overlooked the critical distinction between that 
case and the present trial [66].  
 The question therefore arises whether the 
direction and the omission of a specific anti-
propensity warning gave risk to a risk of 
impermissible tendency reasoning, to be 
determined by examination of trial conduct 
and the summing up [67].  
 The appellant's counsel made no reference to 
the acts in the closing address, the evidence 
only surfacing in the summing up by the Crown 
prosecutor [70]. 
 An extensive direction was given on the issue 
of delay in complaint, including the difficulties 
faced by the appellant in meeting allegations 
extending over a number of years [70]. 
 The whole of the direction, but for two 
sentences which 'obliquely' raised aspects of 
tendency evidence, was entirely in conformity 
with restricting the use of the evidence to 
understanding the broader sexual history or 
context within which the charged acts occurred 
[71]. 
 “The appellant’s counsel at trial, a person who 
is attuned to the discernment of potentially 
prejudicial directions, did not interpret those 
sentences in that way. Still less would a 
number of lay persons divine such a meaning 
from these unfortunate words” [71]. 
 There was no miscarriage of justice and rule 4 
applies. 
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All grounds (1)-(5) rejected. Leave against conviction 
dismissed. Leave to appeal against sentence granted. 
Appeal dismissed. 
18.  R v Fletcher 
[2005] 
NSWCCA 
338 
 
Appeal 
against 
conviction  
No 
 
 
Institutional – 
historical 
child sexual 
abuse 
Ground 1:  
“The learned trial judge erred in law in 
admitting the evidence of [GG – Witness 
who had sexual encounters with 
appellant), because:  
 it was not tendency evidence 
within the meaning of the 
Evidence Act s97;  
 it did not have significant 
probative value;  
 the probative value of the 
evidence did not substantially 
outweigh its prejudicial effect on 
the appellant (s101);  
 there was no ground for its 
admission.”  
 
Ground 2: 
“If the evidence of [GG] was admissible 
(which the appellant denies) the learned 
trial judge erred in law in directing the 
jury that the evidence could be used as 
showing a tendency to commit each and 
all of the offences charged in the 
indictment and its use should have been 
confined to showing a tendency to 
commit the offence the subject of Count 
4” [31]. 
 
 
Ground 1: 
The appellant argued that the evidence of GG was 
not admissible under s97 because [53]: 
1. “Evidence did not have significant probative 
value. 
2. The probative value of the evidence did not 
substantially outweigh the prejudice to the 
accused. 
3. It was evidence of two acts of one type remote 
in time and circumstance from any of the acts 
charged. The only similarity was to the single 
act charged in Count 4. It was too remote in 
time and circumstance to be admissible as 
evidence relevant to Count 4. Even if 
admissible in respect of the act alleged in 
Count 4, it was irrelevant to all the other 
counts and its use as tendency evidence should 
have been restricted to Count 4. 
4. The evidence did not pass the stringent test 
posed by s 101(2) and therefore could not have 
survived the narrow ‘unfair prejudice’ test in 
s 135 or s 137. 
5. Had the appellant been charged with the two 
offences alleged by [GG], it is highly likely he 
would have succeeded in an application to 
have the [GG] charges tried separately from 
the [charges concerning the complainant], 
because evidence of the former would not get 
in as evidence of the latter. 
6. The effect of the evidence was to permit 
evidence of irrelevant bad character to taint 
the jury’s deliberations and to deprive the 
appellant of the real chance of an acquittal on 
each charge.”  
 
Held Ground 1: Rejected 
 The challenge to the admission of the evidence 
is, therefore, effectively an attack upon the 
decision making process at each step of the 
sequence involved in a consideration of the 
admission of evidence under s 97 [54].  
 The present appellant’s argument focused too 
narrowly upon a tendency to have sexual 
intercourse in a particular fashion.  
 The DPP’s explanation, provided to the 
appellant’s legal advisors, shows that the 
“tendency” which it sought to establish was 
wider, and more detailed.  
 Tendency evidence is able legitimately to be 
used to prove that the appellant has a 
tendency to commit a crime of the kind and 
circumstances alleged.  
 But in order to find the appellant guilty, there 
would need to be evidence that proves, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the alleged 
crime was committed.  
 In the current proceedings, the evidence of 
that crime was given by the complainant and 
accepted by the jury.  
 It would be impossible, given the nature of the 
allegation made, to find that this crime had 
been committed against the complainant and 
not find that the appellant was the 
perpetrator.  
 Therefore the identity of the perpetrator (and 
by deduction tendency evidence making the 
identification more probable) becomes of 
substantially less importance in the 
proceedings and the tendency evidence has far 
less significance when weighing it against the 
necessary prejudice [124] 
 The trial judge was asked, primarily, to admit 
the evidence on the basis of s 97 of the Act, 
which he did in relation to GG, to prove the 
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conduct of the appellant when the major issue 
was conduct by any person. However, where 
that which is in issue is not the identity of the 
perpetrator but the happening of the event or 
conduct that was criminal, the tendency of the 
alleged perpetrator will less often meet the 
tests in the Act. Indeed, on one view, the 
tendency of the perpetrator may be irrelevant 
to that question [126].  
 Tendency evidence will be rationally probative 
of the fact that a particular person, out of the 
class of persons with opportunity, may have 
engaged in certain conduct.  
 It will not, by proving the tendency of a 
particular person, prove, in the manner 
required to satisfy the admissibility tests 
required by the Act, that otherwise unproven 
conduct has occurred.  
 This has particular application when one is 
dealing with evidence that is said to be 
tendency or coincidence evidence. 
 Evidence that is relevant within the meaning of 
s 55, to either the occurrence of an event or 
the identity of the perpetrator (the major and a 
minor issues in these proceedings), but 
rendered inadmissible or unable to be used, by 
operation of either the requirement in s 7(1)(b) 
and s 98(1)(b) or the requirement imposed by 
s 101(2) of the Act, to prove tendency or lack 
of coincidence, is admissible for the purpose of 
assessing the credibility of a witness, subject to 
the provisions of s 137 of the Act [134] 
 Applying the above analysis to the current 
circumstances one is faced with the following 
scenario.  
 Firstly, the evidence of prior conduct 
(previously referred to as either the tendency 
conduct or other conduct) is not admissible 
and may not be relevant to prove the 
occurrence of the conduct charged.  
 The trial judge has allowed the tendency 
evidence to be used in an impermissible 
manner and, even though it would, on the 
above analysis, possibly be admissible for a 
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different use, it would need to be, and was not, 
subject to specific directions to the jury as to 
its use nor was it subjected to s 137 of the Act 
[140].  
 There is clearly more than sufficient evidence 
upon which the appellant could have been 
convicted and, assuming the complainant were 
to be believed, would have been convicted.  
 This is so even disregarding the evidence 
sought to be impugned in this appeal.  
 The problem is that the effect of the tendency 
evidence admitted was to taint the 
deliberations of the jury by using the evidence 
in a manner it could not legitimately do.  
 In those circumstances, the only proper course 
is for there to be a new trial on the charges 
[142]. 
 
Held Ground 2: Rejected 
 Despite the complaint about directions 
contained in the ground as framed, the 
substance of this ground is the admission 
of the evidence of GG in relation to all 
counts in the indictment.  
 Since in considering the above ground it 
was concluded that the evidence was 
admissible in relation to all counts, it 
follows that this ground cannot succeed 
[73]. 
 
Appeal against conviction dismissed.  
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APPENDIX A15.10: CASES RAISING A LONGMAN GROUND 
 Case name historical child sexual 
abuse 
Categorisation Success of case Grounds of success where relevant 
1.  R v MDB [2005] No Extrafamilial No _ 
2.  R v WSP [2005] 
NSWCCA 427 
Yes 
 
13 year delay (1995-2002) 
and 6 year delay (1989-
2002), although both had 
disclosed prior without 
action taken 
Intrafamilial Yes, on Longman Four grounds of appeal were raised in relation to two separate trials concerning the same 
offender; three of these, including a Longman ground, were for one trial and one, also a 
Longman ground, was raised in relation to the second trial. Only the Longman ground for 
the second trial was successful, with two of three judges allowing the appeal. 
 
Hulme J noted that the difference between his judgment and that of the dissenting judge, 
Spigelman CJ, “lies in impression” – first, of the strength of the warning required by 
Longman, and secondly, of the strength of the warning actually given by the trial judge 
[184]. Sully J concurred with these general reasons, adding that he believed the appellant 
was entitled to a “dangerous to convict” direction [93]. 
3.  Sepulveda v R [2006] 
NSWCCA 379 
Yes Extrafamilial No _ 
4.  Healey v Regina [2006] 
NSWCCA 235 
 
Yes 
 
~20 year delay (1987 –
unclear disclosure) 
Institutional Yes, on Longman Two Longman grounds were made out.  
 
First, the trial judge was held to have erred in extending a Longman warning to possible 
forensic disadvantage suffered by the Crown. Though in R v MDB, such a warning was 
allowed by virtue of being an “error of no effect”, it could not be said that this was the case 
here. There was a possibility of impermissibly advantaging the Crown’s case, and as such, 
the ground was upheld. 
 
Second, the Longman warning given was held to be inadequate, in that it failed to 
specifically warn about “the fragility of youthful recollection.” Due to the particular facts in 
the case, including his age (around puberty) and history, and the length period of delay, 
the judgment stated that “the risk of fantasy and distortion could not be ignored.”  
5.  JJB v Regina [2006] 
NSWCCA 126 
Yes 
 
9 year delay (offence 1987, 
report 1996 but accused 
failed to appear, arrested 
2004) 
Intrafamilial No _ 
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6.  Sheehan v Regina 
[2006] NSWCCA 310 
Yes 
 
19 year delay (1981-2000), 
although mother was aware 
Intrafamilial  Yes, on Longman The singular ground of appeal was that the trial judge erred by giving an inadequate 
Longman direction, in that: 1) the instructions were not framed as a warning, 2) they 
lacked the necessary strength, 3) they were undermined by other directions, 3) there was 
no warning concerning the difficulties of testing the evidence. There was no use of the 
words “dangerous to convict” for counts 1-9, which was described as “puzzling” by the 
appeal judgement. A distinction was drawn between different grounds; for counts 1-7, 
there was no corroboration. There was a substantial delay, and the allegations took place 
when the complainant was quite young in age. As such, for Counts 1-7, the appeal was 
allowed, as there was a possibility the appellant may not have been convicted had the 
Longman warning been adequate. However, for Count 10, the appeal was rejected, since 
the Crown case was “overwhelming,” and thus no substantial miscarriage of justice could 
be made out.  
7.  Leonard v Regina [2006] 
NSWCCA 267 
Yes 
 
13 year delay (1989-2002) 
Intrafamilial No - 
8.  Sharyn Ann Munn v 
Regina; Thomas Miller v 
Regina [2006] NSWCCA 
61 
No Extrafamilial Yes, but not on 
Longman; on 
grounds of 1) 
failure to discharge 
jury when at least 
one juror had bias 
against accused 
and 2) judicial 
error in 
interpretation of s 
293 Criminal 
Procedure Act 
1986. 
- 
9.  DRE v Regina [2006] 
NSWCCA 280 
No Extrafamilial No - 
10.  KJR v R [2007] NSWCCA 
165 
Yes 
~20 years (1979- unclear 
disclosure) 
Intrafamilial No - 
11.  Perez v Regina [2008] 
NSWCCA 46 
No Extrafamilial No - 
61 
12.  TJ v R [2009] NSWCCA 
257 
Unclear Unclear 
(relationship not 
described) 
No - 
13.  AW v R [2009] NSWCCA 
1 
No Intrafamilial No - 
14.  ST v Regina [2010] 
NSWCCA 5 
Yes 
 
7 years (1999-2006) 
Extrafamilial Yes, on Longman The appeal succeeded on its Longman ground, namely that the trial judge failed to give a 
Longman warning as a result of the 6 year delay between the commission of the crime and 
eventual police complaint. An error was made in that the trial judge believed the relevant 
legislation to be s 294 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Under the amendment, the trial judge 
was required to determine whether “significant forensic disadvantage” had occurred 
before warning about delay, and that “the mere passage of time is not in itself to be 
regarded as establishing delay.” However, the Act was amended before the trial but after 
the accused was tried, and TJ v R had previously held that in such circumstances, the 
amendments did not apply. As such, a Longman direction was required; however, only a 
Murray direction was given, which was insufficient. 
15.  GG v Regina [2010] 
NSWCCA 230 
Yes 
 
16 years (1984 – police 
report 2008, although 
informed friend in 1987, 
DOCS in 1988; first police 
report in 1996, but accused 
not located) 
Intrafamilial No - 
Note: 
Green shaded cells signifies case was successful on Longman ground.
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APPENDIX A15.11: CASE LIST – HISTORICAL CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 
 
Year Case name 
2005 n = 8 
1.  R v BJB [2005] NSWCCA 441 
2.  R v EGC [2005] NSWCCA 392 
3.  R v Fletcher [2005] NSWCCA 338 
4.  Regina v R T I [2005] NSWCCA 337 
5.  R v Grattan [2005] NSWCCA 306 
6.  R v WSP [2005] NSWCCA 427 
7.  Regina v AEL [2005] NSWCCA 148 
8.  Regina v Rymer [2005] NSWCCA 310 
2006 n = 14 
9.  D’Amico v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 316 
10.  FV v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 237 
11.  Gorrick v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 232 
12.  Healey v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 235 
13.  JJB v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 126 
14.  KNP v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 213 
15.  Leonard v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 267 
16.  Lozanovski v R [2006] NSWCCA 143 
17.  R v TWP [2006] NSWCCA 141 
18.  RJP v R [2006] NSWCCA 149 
19.  NWL v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 67  
20.  Sepulveda v R [2006] NSWCCA 379 
21.  Sheehan v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 233 
22.  Sheehan [No 2] v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 332 
2007 n = 11 
63 
23.  AJB v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 51 
24.  GAT v R [2007] NSWCCA 208 
25.  Kamm, William v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 201 
26.  KJR v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 165 
27.  MJL v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 261 
28.  Nelson v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 221 
29.  Norris v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 235 
30.  Pavitt v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 88 
31.  GAC v Regina, WC v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 287 
32.  R v KRL [2007] NSWCCA 354 
33.  Rowney v R [2007] NSWCCA 49 
2008 n = 12 
34.  AE v R [2008] NSWCCA 52 
35.  AJO v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 28 
36.  Dousha, Malcom Ross v R [2008] NSWCCA 263 
37.  DTS v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 329 
38.  Featherstone v R [2008] NSWCCA 71 
39.  Healey v R [2008] NSWCCA 229 
40.  Ivimy v R [2008] NSWCCA 25 
41.  Kamm, William v Regina [2008] NSWCCA 290 
42.  Makarov v R (No 2) [2008] NSWCCA 292  
43.  Makarov v R (No 3) [2008] NSWCCA 293 
44.  NRW v R [2008] NSWCCA 318 
45.  R v Katon [2008] NSWCCA 228 
2009 n = 7 
46.  CPW v R [2009] NSWCCA 105 
47.  Giles v DPP [2009] NSWCCA 308 
48.  GRD v R [2009] NSWCCA 149 
49.  Orkopoulos v R [2009] NSWCCA 213 
64 
50.  PH v R [2009] NSWCCA 161 
51.  SDS v R [2009] NSWCCA 159 
52.  Simpson v R [2009] NSWCCA 297 
2010 n = 12 
53.  BP v R; R v BP [2010] NSWCCA 303 
54.  Chivers v R [2010] NSWCCA 134 
55.  ES v R (No 1) [2010] NSWCCA 197 
56.  ES v R (No 2) [2010] NSWCCA 198 
57.  GG v Regina [2010] NSWCCA 230 
58.  KTR v R [2010] NSWCCA 271 
59.  LJ v Regina [2010] NSWCCA 289 
60.  R v Jarrold [2010] NSWCCA 69 
61.  Regina v PWD [2010] NSWCCA 209 
62.  RWB v R; R v RWB [2010] NSWCCA 147 
63.  ST v Regina [2010] NSWCCA 5 
64.  BG v R [2010] NSWCCA 301 
2011 n = 3 
65.  IS v R [2011] NSWCCA 142 
66.  R v SK; SK v R [2011] NSWCCA 292 
67.  R v PFC [2011] NSWCCA 117 
2012 n = 8 
68.  DF v R [2012] NSWCCA 171 
69.  KSC v R [2012] NSWCCA 179 
70.  Martin v R [2012] NSWCCA 253 
71.  R v Brown [2012] NSWCCA 199 
72.  RLS v R [2012] NSWCCA 236 
73.  RM v R [2012] NSWCCA 35 
74.  Simpson v R [2012] NSWCCA 246 
75.  Wong v R [2012] NSWCCA 39 
65 
2013 n = 8 
76.  Magnuson v R [2013] NSWCCA 50 
77.  MPB v R [2013] NSWCCA 213 
78.  R v DKL [2013] NSWCCA 233 
79.  RP v R [2013] NSWCCA 192 
80.  Steadman v R (No 1) [2013] NSWCCA 55 
81.  Versi v R [2013] NSWCCA 206 
82.  RO v R [2013] NSWCCA 162 
83.  LP v Regina [2013] NSWCCA 330 
84.  BJS v R [2013] NSWCCA 123 
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APPENDIX A15.12: SUMMARY OF HISTORICAL CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES, 2005–13 
 
Year Case name 
(judgment 
date) 
Nature of 
appeal 
Offences Age1 Relationship2 Period of delay Evidentiary issues 
on appeal 
Judicial 
misdirection on 
appeal 
Outcome/s 
2005 n = 8         
Successful Cases 
1. R v BJB 
[2005] 
NSWCCA 
441* 
 
(16/12/05) 
Against 
conviction & 
sentence 
2 counts indecent 
assault, 2 counts 
buggery 
8 y Intrafamilial: 
Accused was 
complainant’s 
uncle 
30 year delay in 
disclosure 
(1970 – 
committal 
hearing 2003) 
Inconsistencies in 
the complainant’s 
evidence in issue 
N/A Appeal against conviction not allowed. 
Sentence appeal allowed in part – 
erroneous understanding of maximum 
sentence available for count 1 (indecent 
assault on a victim under 16)  
Original effective sentence of 5 years’ 
imprisonment (with 3 years non-parole) 
reduced to 4 years’ imprisonment (with 3 
years non-parole)  
                                                      
1 Age of complainant at offence/onset of abuse. 
2 Perpetrator/accused-complainant relationship. 
67 
2. Regina v R T I 
[2005] 
NSWCCA 
337* 
 
(20/9/05) 
 
 
Against 
conviction 
2 counts of sexual 
intercourse with a 
person under the age of 
16, 3 counts of sexual 
intercourse without 
consent, 1 count 
maliciously inflicting 
ABH with intent to have 
sexual intercourse, 1 
count of assault.  
15y  Extrafamilial: 
(school friend's 
father, but living 
with him at the 
time). 
Complainant 
intellectually 
handicapped.  
Uncertain 
(offences 
occurred in 
1983; issues 
with 
recollection 
and memory at 
trial)  
Issues with 
uncertainty and 
inconsistencies of 
evidence in relation 
to complainant’s 
age at time of 
offence.  
Admission of 
relationship 
evidence at issue.  
Directions as to 
complainant’s 
reliability at issue.  
 
 
Appeal against conviction allowed – 
miscarriage of justice. At the special 
hearings, the judge failed to enquire as to 
whether the appellant properly understood 
the nature of the election to proceed judge 
alone.  
 
The determinations that the appellant had 
committed all offences set aside, and new 
special hearings ordered.  
3. R v WSP 
[2005] 
NSWCCA 
427* 
 
(14/12/05) 
Against 
conviction & 
sentence 
 
3 counts of indecency in 
aggravating 
circumstances, 1 count 
of sexual intercourse 
with child under 16 and 
2 counts of secual 
intercourse with child 
between 10 and 16 
years 
12 y 
14 y 
Intrafamilial: 
Accused was 
complainant’s 
de facto father 
13 year delay 
(1995-2002) 
and 6 year 
delay (1989-
2002), although 
both had 
disclosed prior 
without action 
taken 
Jury’s use of prior 
sexual misconduct 
not the subject of 
charges at issue 
Failure to give 
sufficiently strong 
Longman warning 
at issue. 
Appeal against conviction dismissed (counts 
1–2)  
 
Appeal against conviction allowed (counts 
4–7). New trial ordered in respect of these 
charges  
 
4. Regina v 
Rymer [2005] 
NSWCCA 
310* 
 
(6/9/05) 
Against 
conviction & 
sentence 
2 counts sexual 
intercourse with a child 
(under 10), 1 count 
sexual intercourse with 
a child (10-16 years) 
9 y Intrafamilial: 
Accused was 
mother’s 
de  facto partner 
 
8 year delay in 
disclosure 
(1994-2002) 
Exclusion of 
exculpatory 
statements by 
accused 
 
N/A Appeal against conviction dismissed 
 
Appeal against sentence allowed – original 
sentence exceeded maximum available 
penalty for counts 2–3 
 
Original sentence of 9 years’ imprisonment 
(with 6 year non-parole) reduced to 5 years 
6 months’ imprisonment (with 3 year non-
parole) 
Unsuccessful Cases 
5. R v EGC 
[2005] 
NSWCCA 
392* 
 
(21/11/05) 
Against 
sentence 
 
3 counts sexual 
intercourse with child 
(under 10), 1 
aggravated indecent 
assault on person under 
16 
7 y 
4 y 
Intrafamilial: 
Accused was 
stepfather of 
complainant 
 
16 year delay 
(1986-2002, 
although 
disclosed in 
1991 without 
N/A N/A Sentence appeal not allowed. 
68 
formal 
complaint) 
6. R v Fletcher 
[2005] 
NSWCCA 
338* 
(23/9/05) 
Against 
conviction 
 
1 count act of 
indecency, 8 counts 
homosexual intercourse 
with a male (10-18 
years) 
14 y Institutional: 
Accused was 
parish priest 
~15 year delay 
(1989-2004 
pre-trial 
hearings) 
Admission of 
tendency evidence 
Direction of jury 
as to use of 
evidence 
Appeal against conviction not allowed 
7. R v Grattan 
[2005] 
NSWCCA 
306* 
 
(2/9/05) 
Against 
conviction 
 
5 counts act of 
indecency, 1 count 
sexual intercourse with 
child (under 16), 1 
count attempted sexual 
intercourse with child 
(under 16), 3 counts 
aggravated sexual 
intercourse 
10 y Intrafamilial: 
Accused was 
complainant’s 
uncle 
9 year delay 
(1993/4-2002) 
Evidence of 
uncharged acts at 
issue 
Directions as to 
the complaint’s 
distressed 
condition at issue 
Appeal against conviction dismissed 
8. Regina v AEL 
[2005] 
NSWCCA 148 
 
(20/4/05) 
Against 
sentence 
1 count of sexual 
intercourse with person 
under 16 years, 1 count 
of aggravated indecent 
assault. 
13y  
14y  
Institutional: 
('spiritual leader' 
with many 
'spiritual wives', 
association 
between the 
complainant and 
accused lasted for 
20 years) 
N/A N/A N/A Appeal against sentence not allowed 
 
2006 
 
n = 14         
Successful Cases 
9. D’Amico v 
Regina [2006] 
NSWCCA 316 
 
(10/10/06) 
Against 
sentence 
1 count aggravated act 
of indecency, 2 counts 
aggravated sexual 
assault, 1 count 
aggravated indecent 
assault 
12 y Accused was the 
complainant’s 
uncle by marriage 
8 year delay 
(1995-2003) 
N/A N/A Appeal against sentence allowed – error in 
application of discount for appellant’s plea 
of guilty  
 
Original effective sentence of 8 years 3 
months’ imprisonment (with 5 years 6 
69 
months non-parole) reduced to 7 years 3 
months’ imprisonment 
(with 5 years 4 months non-parole) 
10. FV v Regina 
[2006] 
NSWCCA 237 
 
(17/8/06) 
Against 
sentence 
1 count aggravated 
indecent assault, 1 
count attempted 
aggravated sexual 
intercourse, 1 count 
aggravated sexual 
intercourse 
12 y Accused was the 
complainant’s 
father 
7 year delay 
(1997-2004) 
N/A N/A Appeal against sentence allowed in part – 
error in (1) assessing the objective 
seriousness of count 2, and (2) 
accumulating the sentence for count 2 onto 
that for count 3 
 
Sentences for counts 1 and 3 confirmed; 
sentence for count 2 reduced to 6 years’ 
imprisonment (with 3 years non-parole). 
Original effective sentence of 8 years 3 
months imprisonment (with 5 years 6 
months non-parole) reduced to 7 years 3 
months imprisonment (with 4 years 3 
months non-parole) 
11. Healey v 
Regina [2006] 
NSWCCA 
235* 
 
(4/8/06) 
Against 
conviction 
3 counts sexual 
intercourse with a male 
child (10-18 years) 
13 y Accused was a 
nurse at a facility 
for behaviour 
problems 
13 year delay 
(1987-2000) 
N/A Inappropriate 
Longman 
direction, 
inadequate Crofts 
direction 
Appeal against conviction allowed – 
miscarriage of justice resulting from a series 
of misdirections from the trial judge, 
including in his summing up  
 
New trial ordered 
12. Lozanovski v 
R [2006] 
NSWCCA 143 
 
(5/5/06) 
Against 
sentence 
 
4 counts indecent 
assault on a child, 2 
counts sexual 
intercourse with 
consent with a child, 1 
count sexual 
intercourse without 
consent, 1 count detain 
for advantage 
9 y Accused was the 
complainant’s 
uncle 
~20 year delay 
(1982 – unclear 
disclosure) 
N/A N/A Appeal against sentence allowed in part. 
Effective sentence was manifestly excessive 
– partial accumulation produced an 
aggregate head sentence beyond the range 
appropriate to the totality of the appellant’s 
criminality  
 
Original effective sentence of 8 years 6 
months imprisonment (with 6 years non-
parole) reduced to 5 years 6 months (with 4 
years non-parole) 
13. R v TWP 
[2006] 
NSWCCA 141 
 
(1/5/06) 
Crown 
against 
sentence.  
1 count indecent 
assault, 2 counts 
aggravated indecent 
assault, 1 count incest, 
1 count common 
assault, 12 counts 
7 y 
10 y 
11 y 
Accused was the 
complainant’s 
father 
20 year delay 
(1984-2004) 
N/A N/A Crown appeal allowed on sentence – 
original sentence was manifestly 
inadequate  
 
Original effective sentence of 10 years’ 
imprisonment (with 7 years 6 months non-
70 
sexual intercourse with 
a child (10-16 years) 
parole) increased to 12 years non-parole 
with 4 years balance of term  
14. NWL v Regina 
[2006] 
NSWCCA 67  
 
(29/3/06) 
Against 
conviction & 
sentence 
9 counts of aggravated 
indecent assault, 2 
counts of inciting a 
person above the age of 
16 years to commit an 
act of indecency.  
12y Extrafamilial (golf 
coach). 
10 year delay 
(1993 – 2003 
report to 
police)  
N/A Failure to 
adequately refer 
to evidence in 
directing jury on 
issue of consent 
at issue.  
Failure to direct 
jury on issue of 
consent.  
Appeal against conviction allowed in part. 
Conviction and sentence quashed (count 8 – 
inciting a person above the age of 16 to 
commit an act of indecency), on the basis of 
being unsupported by evidence  
 
Appeal against sentence allowed in part. 
Sentences quashed (counts 2–7, 9 and 11), 
and sentences entered in compliance with 
the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act as in 
force at the time of the offences  
 
Original effective sentence of 6 years 
imprisonment (with 4 years non-parole) 
reduced to 5 years imprisonment (with 3 
years non-parole) 
15. Sepulveda v R 
[2006] 
NSWCCA 
379* 
 
(29/11/06) 
Against 
conviction 
10 counts indecent 
assault, 5 counts of 
buggery 
9 y 
12 y 
Accused was the 
complainant’s 
neighbour 
20 year delay 
(1979-1999) 
Admission of 
clandestinely 
recorded 
conversation at 
issue 
Failure to give a 
Longman 
direction 
Appeal against conviction not allowed 
16. Sheehan v 
Regina [2006] 
NSWCCA 
233* 
 
(16/8/06) 
Against 
conviction 
8 counts sexual 
intercourse without 
consent with child 
(under 16) 
6 y Accused was the 
complainant’s 
stepfather 
19 year delay 
(1981-2000), 
although 
mother was 
aware 
N/A Failure to give 
Longman 
direction 
Appeal against conviction allowed in part. 
Convictions and sentences quashed (counts 
1–7), because of judge’s failure to give 
appropriate Longman warning, and because 
complainant’s evidence was 
uncorroborated. Conviction (count 10) 
confirmed, because despite the delay 
before disclosure, complainant’s evidence 
was corroborated by her mother 
 
Convictions and sentences (counts 1–7) 
quashed, and new trial in respect of these 
counts ordered 
71 
17. Sheehan [No 
2] v Regina 
[2006] 
NSWCCA 332 
 
(3/11/06) 
Against 
sentence 
8 counts sexual 
intercourse with a child 
under 16  
10 y Accused was the 
complainant’s 
father 
~20 year delay 
(1981 – unclear 
disclosure) 
N/A N/A Appeal against sentence allowed in part – 
sentence for count 10 excessive in light of 
convictions for counts 1–7 being quashed  
 
Original sentence (count 10 only) of 7 years 
6 months (with 5 years non-parole) reduced 
to 6 years’ imprisonment (with 4 years non-
parole) 
Unsuccessful Cases 
18. Gorrick v 
Regina [2006] 
NSWCCA 
232* 
(3/8/06) 
Against 
conviction & 
sentence 
7 counts sexual 
intercourse with a child 
(10-16 years) 
14 y Accused was 
complainant’s de 
facto father 
~15 years delay 
(around 1989 – 
2004 trial) 
ERISP evidence 
admission at issue 
N/A Appeal against conviction not allowed 
 
Appeal against sentence not allowed 
19. JJB v Regina 
[2006] 
NSWCCA 
126* 
 
(26/4/06) 
Against 
conviction 
2 counts sexual 
intercourse without 
consent with child (10-
16 years)  
6 y Accused was the 
complainant’s 
uncle 
9 year delay 
(offence 1987, 
report 1996 but 
accused failed 
to appear, 
arrested 2004)  
N/A Inadequate 
direction of 
forensic 
disadvantage due 
to delay 
Appeal against conviction not allowed 
20. KNP v Regina 
[2006] 
NSWCCA 
213* 
 
(20/7/06) 
Against 
conviction 
4 counts indecent 
assault, 3 counts 
homosexual 
intercourse, 2 counts 
gross indecency 
13 y Accused was the 
complainant’s 
stepfather 
~12 year delay 
(1988- early 
2000s) 
Admission of prior 
disclosure at issue 
Inadequate 
direction as to 
lack of 
corroborating 
evidence and 
delay in 
complaint 
Appeal against conviction not allowed 
21. Leonard v 
Regina [2006] 
NSWCCA 
267* 
(31/8/06) 
Against 
conviction 
5 counts act of 
indecency, 1 count 
sexual intercourse with 
a child (under 16)  
7 
year
s 
Accused was the 
complainant’s 
stepfather 
13 year delay 
(1989-2002)  
Admission of 
evidence of prior 
disclosure to 
mother at issue 
Inadequate 
Longman 
direction 
Appeal against conviction not allowed 
22. RJP v R [2006] 
NSWCCA 149 
 
(16/5/06) 
Against 
sentence 
1 count carnal 
knowledge of a girl 
(under 10), 1 count act 
9 y Accused was the 
complainant’s 
brother  
~35 year delay 
(1968 – 2004 
trial)  
N/A N/A Appeal against sentence not allowed 
72 
of indecency on a child 
(under 16)  
2007 n = 11         
Successful Cases 
23. AJB v Regina 
[2007] 
NSWCCA 51* 
 
(5/3/07) 
Against 
sentence 
5 counts indecent 
assault of a child (under 
16)  
6 y Accused was the 
stepfather of the 
complainant 
~14 year delay 
(1979 – 
disclosure to 
police hotline 
in 1993 but no 
action taken, 
further 
complaint with 
action taken in 
2005. Had 
disclosed to 
mother in 
1982) 
N/A N/A Appeal against sentence allowed – original 
sentence manifestly excessive 
 
Original effective sentence of 4 years’ 
imprisonment (with 3 years non-parole) 
reduced to 3 years’ imprisonment (with 1 
year 6 months non-parole) 
24. GAT v R 
[2007] 
NSWCCA 208 
 
(14/05/07) 
Against 
sentence 
1 count carnal 
knowledge of a person 
between the age of 10 
and 16 years. 1 count 
indecent assault of 
person under age of 16, 
1 count indecent assault 
of person under the age 
of 16 years, 1 count of 
act of indecency with 
person under the age of 
16 years, 1 count 
aggravated sexual 
intercourse with person 
aged between 14 and 
16 years.  
13y  
14y  
11y 
Accused was the 
father of one 
complainant and 
the grandfather 
of the other two 
complainants.  
 
20 year delay 
(1985 – other 
victims disclose 
in 2005 
prompting first 
complainant to 
disclose)  
 
N/A N/A  
 
  
Appeal against sentence allowed – the 
starting point of the sentence was too high, 
and the principle of totality was misapplied  
 
Original effective sentence of 13 years’ 
imprisonment (with 9 years 6 months non-
parole) reduced to 10 years 6 months 
imprisonment (with 7 years non-parole) 
25. MJL v Regina 
[2007] 
Against 
conviction & 
asentence 
6 counts indecent 
assault of child under 
16, 2 counts indecent 
6 y Accused was the 
father of the 
complainant 
~25 years 
(disclosure of 
offences from 
N/A N/A Appeal against conviction not allowed 
 
73 
NSWCCA 
261* 
 
(4/9/07) 
assault, 1 count carnal 
knowledge of a girl (10-
17 years) 
1974 were 
prompted by 
instance of 
abuse of 
grandchild)  
Appeal against sentence allowed – the 
sentence was manifestly excessive, and the 
judge erred in not finding special 
circumstances pursuant to section 44(2) of 
the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 
 
Original effective sentence of 12 years’ 
imprisonment (with 9 years non-parole) 
reduced to 9 years’ imprisonment (with 6 
years non-parole)  
26. 
Nelson v 
Regina [2007] 
NSWCCA 
221* 
 
(25/7/07) 
Appeal 
against 
sentence 
1 count indecent assault 16 y 
Accused was a 
friend of women 
who had cared 
for complainant 
at children’s 
home 
~30 year delay 
(1972-unclear 
disclosure)  
N/A N/A 
Appeal against sentence allowed – the 
offence was mischaracterised as mid-range 
in objective gravity; sentence was decided 
on the basis of the commission of other, 
unproved offences; and sentence was 
manifestly excessive  
 
Original effective sentence of 14 months 
imprisonment (8 months non-parole) 
reduced to 4 months imprisonment 
27. Norris v 
Regina [2007] 
NSWCCA 
235* 
 
(6/8/07) 
Appeal 
against 
conviction 
1 count indecent 
assault, 1 count sexual 
intercourse with a child 
under 16 
11 y Accused was a 
friend of the 
complainant’s 
father 
~20 years (1983 
– disclosure to 
police 2003, 
although 
disclosed to 
boyfriend 1993)  
N/A Judicial 
misdirection as to 
how to consider 
the separate 
counts on 
indictment 
Appeal against conviction allowed. The 
convictions for counts 1–2 were 
unreasonable, having regard to both the 
evidence, and the jury’s verdicts of not 
guilty on counts 3–4 
 
Convictions quashed 
Unsuccessful Cases 
28. Kamm, 
William v 
Regina [2007] 
NSWCCA 
201* 
(09/7/07) 
Against 
conviction & 
sentence 
1 count of act of 
indecency upon child, 1 
count sexual 
intercourse with child 
(10-16 years) 
14 y Accused was the 
leader of the 
complainant’s 
religious 
community 
9 year delay 
(1993-2002) 
N/A N/A Appeal against conviction not allowed 
Appeal against conviction not allowed 
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29. KJR v Regina 
[2007] 
NSWCCA 
165* 
 
(29/6/07) 
Against 
conviction & 
sentence 
4 counts carnal 
knowledge, 1 count 
indecent assault, 1 
count assault 
occasioning ABH 
9 y Accused was the 
complainant’s 
father 
~20 years 
(1979- unclear 
disclosure) 
N/A Directions as to 
tendency 
evidence and 
failure to give 
Longman 
direction at issue 
Appeal against conviction not allowed 
 
Appeal against sentence not allowed 
30. Pavitt v 
Regina [2007] 
NSWCCA 88* 
 
(2/4/07) 
Appeal 
against 
conviction 
4 counts of sexual 
intercourse without 
consent, 1 count of 
buggery, 2 counts of 
indecent assault 
12 y Accused was the 
elder brother of 
complainant’s 
school friends 
19 years (1983-
2002) 
Admission of 
recorded 
conversation and 
prior consistent 
representation by 
complainant at 
issue 
Summary of the 
relevant evidence 
in judicial 
summing up at 
issue 
Appeal against conviction not allowed 
31. 
GAC v Regina, 
WC v Regina 
[2007] 
NSWCCA 
 287 
 
(10/10/07) 
Against 
conviction 
4 counts aggravated 
indecent assault; 1 
count sexual 
intercourse with person 
under the age of 10 
years, 1 count sexual 
intercourse with a child 
under 16 years, 1 count 
sexual intercourse 
without consent. 
5y  
Mother and 
stepfather 
(multiple 
offenders)  
17 year delay 
(1987 – 2004) 
Admission of 
evidence of 
interview with 
police in 1995 
(where complainant 
did not disclose) at 
issue.  
N/A Appeal against conviction not allowed 
32. R v KRL 
[2007] 
NSWCCA 
354* 
(18/12/07) 
Against 
conviction 
1 count assault on 
female under 16 
10 y Accused was the 
complainant’s 
father 
~35 years (1965 
– unclear 
disclosure) 
N/A N/A Appeal against conviction not allowed 
33. Rowney v R 
[2007] 
NSWCCA 49* 
(27/12/07) 
Against 
conviction 
3 counts sexual 
intercourse with a 
person under 10, 1 
count indecent assault 
13 y Accused lived 
nearby to the 
complainant 
~15 years delay 
(1987 – unclear 
disclosure) 
Rejecting evidence 
that the defence 
sought to tender 
N/A Appeal against conviction not allowed 
2008 n =12       
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Successful Cases 
34. AJO v Regina 
[2008] 
NSWCCA 28* 
 
(21/12/08) 
Against 
conviction & 
sentence  
2 counts indecent 
assault, 1 count carnal 
knowledge of a girl (10-
16 years), 2 counts 
sexual intercourse 
without consent of child 
(under 16), 1 count 
sexual intercourse with 
a child (10-16years) 2 
counts aggravated 
sexual intercourse 
without consent 
11 y 
13 y 
Accused was the 
brother and uncle 
of the 
complainants. 
~20 years (1980 
– unclear 
disclosure) 
N/A N/A Appeal against conviction allowed in part – 
conviction and sentence on count 4 
quashed, and a verdict of acquittal entered 
on that count. However, since sentence for 
count 4 was being served concurrently, no 
change to overall effective sentence 
 
Appeal against sentence on other counts 
dismissed  
 
Original effective sentence of 9 years 3 
months imprisonment (with 5 years 3 
months non-parole) maintained  
35. AE v R [2008] 
NSWCCA 52* 
 
(20/3/08) 
Against 
conviction 
2 counts sexual 
intercourse with a child 
under 16, 1 count 
indecent assault 
9 y 
11 y 
Accused was 
stepfather and 
father 
22 year delay 
(1983-2005) 
Admission of 
tendency evidence 
at issue 
N/A Appeal against conviction allowed. Verdict 
on count 11 inconsistent, having regard to 
the verdict on other counts re: complainant 
1. Verdict unreasonable on counts 14–15 re: 
complainant 2, on account of admission of 
tendency and/or coincidence evidence 
resulting in an unfair trial 
 
Conviction quashed; verdict of acquittal 
substituted (count 11), and new trial 
ordered (counts 14–15) 
36. Dousha, 
Malcom Ross 
v R [2008] 
NSWCCA 263 
 
Against 
sentence 
6 counts act of 
indecency on child 
under 16, 1 count 
sexual intercourse with 
child (10-16 years), 1 
8 y Accused lived in 
the same unit 
block.  
18 years (1986-
2004) 
N/A N/A Appeal against sentence allowed in part – 
sentence for count 8 does not reflect the 
finding of special circumstances (section 44 
of Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act) in 
appellant’s favour 
76 
(1/12/08) count sexual 
intercourse with a child 
(under 10) 
 
Sentence on count 8 of 6 years 6 months 
imprisonment (3 years non-parole) reduced 
to 6 years 6 months imprisonment (1 year 
non-parole) 
 
Therefore, original effective sentence of 10 
years 6 months imprisonment (with 7 years 
non-parole) reduced to 10 years 6 months 
imprisonment (with 5 years non-parole)  
37. Featherstone 
v R [2008] 
NSWCCA 71* 
 
(23/4/08) 
Against 
sentence 
3 counts indecent 
assault, 3 counts 
procuring act of 
indecency, 5 counts 
homosexual intercourse 
with male (10-18 years), 
1 count gross act of 
indecency on male 
under 18 
11 y Accused was a 
music teacher at 
complainant’s 
school 
21 year delay 
(1982-2003, 
disclosure 
prompted by 
publicity of 
conviction for 
child 
pornography)  
N/A N/A Appeal against sentence allowed – 
misapplication of the principle of totality; 
failure to find special circumstances other 
than accumulation of sentences; and 
manifestly excessive individual and total 
sentences  
 
Original effective sentence of 16 years 11 
months imprisonment (with 12 years 11 
months non-parole) reduced to 12 years 7 
months imprisonment (with 7 years non-
parole) 
38. Healey v R 
[2008] 
NSWCCA 
229* 
 
(2/10/08) 
Against 
conviction 
3 counts homosexual 
intercourse with a male 
(10-18 years) 
13 y Accused was 
nurse at clinic for 
behavioural 
problems where 
complainant 
attended  
~20 year delay 
(1987- unclear 
disclosure)  
N/A Judicial direction 
as to whether lies 
could be taken as 
a consciousness 
of guilty at issue 
Appeal against conviction allowed – trial 
judge erred in directing the jury that 
appellant’s lies could be taken into account 
as consciousness of guilt  
 
Convictions quashed. The DPP allowed to 
determine whether, in light of both the 
imminent expiry of the non-parole period 
and of time served, the appellant should be 
put on trial again  
77 
39. Makarov v R 
(No 3) [2008] 
NSWCCA 293 
 
(9/12/08) 
Against 
conviction 
5 counts homosexual 
intercourse with a child 
(10-18 years), 1 count 
gross indecency, 4 
counts aggravated 
indecent assault on a 
person under 16 
13y Accused was 
music teacher  
6 year delay 
(1998-2004) 
N/A Judicial directions 
as to the use of 
relationship 
evidence at issue 
Appeal against conviction allowed – failure 
to sever counts relating to different 
applicants; admission of 
relationship/context evidence that was 
unfairly prejudicial; various failures to direct 
the jury  
 
Convictions and sentences quashed; new, 
separate trials ordered  
40. R v Katon 
[2008] 
NSWCCA 228 
 
(2/10/08) 
Crown appeal 2 counts act of 
indecency on person 
under 16, 3 counts 
sexual intercourse with 
person under 16, 2 
counts possession of 
child pornography, 2 
counts use of child 
under 18 for 
pornography 
13 y Complainant did 
odd jobs at the 
accused’s house 
~5 years (1998- 
disclosure to 
police in 2003, 
formal 
complaint 
made 2006) 
N/A N/A Appeal by Crown allowed – allowance of 
concurrent sentences produced a total 
effective sentence that was manifestly 
inadequate, and did not reflect the totality 
of criminality involved in the offences  
 
Original effective sentence of 5 years’ 
imprisonment (with 3 years non-parole) 
increased to 7 years’ imprisonment (with 5 
years non-parole)  
Unsuccessful Cases 
41. DTS v Regina 
[2008] 
NSWCCA 
329* 
(19/11/08) 
Against 
conviction 
1 count aggravated 
indecent assault 
12 y Accused was 
family friend 
~10 year delay 
(1991 – unclear 
disclosure) 
N/A Murray direction 
and direction as 
to relationship 
evidence at issue 
Appeal against conviction not allowed 
42. Kamm, v 
Regina [2008] 
NSWCCA 
290* 
(10/12/08) 
Against 
conviction 
1 count of act of 
indecency upon child, 1 
count sexual 
intercourse with child 
(10-16 years) 
14 y Accused was the 
leader of the 
complainant’s 
religious 
community 
9 year delay 
(1993-2002) 
N/A N/A Appeal against conviction not allowed 
43. Makarov v R 
(No 2) [2008] 
NSWCCA 292  
Against 
conviction 
3 counts aggravated act 
of indecency, 1 count 
aggravated sexual 
14 y Accused was 
music teacher 
7 year delay 
(1997-2004) 
Admission of 
context evidence at 
issue 
N/A Appeal against conviction not allowed 
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(9/12/08) 
intercourse with person 
(10-16 years), 5 counts 
homosexual intercourse 
with child (10-18 years) 
44. Ivimy v R 
[2008] 
NSWCCA 25 
 
(19/12/08) 
Against 
sentence 
8 counts aggravated 
indecent assault, 4 
counts aggravated 
indecent with an act of 
indecency, 1 count 
indecent assault 
7 y Accused was the 
complainant’s de 
facto father  
~10 years (1992 
– unclear 
disclosure)  
N/A N.A Appeal against sentence not allowed 
45. NRW v R 
[2008] 
NSWCCA 318 
 
(18/12/08) 
Against 
sentence 
4 counts sexual 
intercourse with a child 
(under 10), 1 count 
aggravated act of 
indecency, 2 count 
aggravated sexual 
assault, 1 count 
attempted homosexual 
intercourse (10-18 
years), 1 count 
homosexual intercourse 
with a child (10-18 
years)  
8 y 
6 y 
Accused was de 
facto father  
18 year delay 
(1989-2007)  
N/A N/A Appeal against sentence not allowed 
2009 n =7         
Successful Cases 
46. CPW v R 
[2009] 
NSWCCA 
105* 
 
(23/4/09) 
Against 
sentence 
2 counts indecent 
assault, 3 counts 
aggravated indecent 
assault, 1 count act of 
indecency, 1 count 
sexual intercourse with 
a child, 4 counts 
indecent assault on a 
child, 2 counts sexual 
intercourse without 
consent with a child 
16 y  
11 y 
14 y 
10 y 
Accused was the 
grandfather of 
the complainants 
24 years (1982-
2006, 
disclosure for 
historical child 
sexual abuse 
prompted by 
additional 
recent 
instances of 
abuse) 
N/A N/A Appeal against sentence allowed in part. 
The ratio of the non-parole period to head 
sentence was disproportionate (93%) 
 
Sentences for 3 of 13 counts confirmed, and 
for all other counts quashed; appellant re-
sentenced 
 
Original effective sentence of 12 years 6 
months imprisonment (with 11 years 8 
months non-parole) reduced to 12 years 
imprisonment (with 8 years non-parole) 
79 
47. Giles v DPP 
[2009] 
NSWCCA 308 
 
(18/12/09) 
Against 
sentence 
1 count aggravated act 
of indecency, 7 counts 
sexual intercourse with 
a child (10-16 years) 
11 y Accused was the 
complainant’s 
step-father 
11 years (1995-
2006) 
N/A N/A Appeal against sentence allowed – notional 
starting points for each individual sentence 
exceeded the maximum penalty  
 
Original effective sentence of 16 years 
imprisonment (with 11 years non-parole) 
reduced to 11 years 6 months 
imprisonment (with 9 years 6 months non-
parole) 
48. GRD v R 
[2009] 
NSWCCA 
149* 
 
(22/5/09) 
Against 
sentence 
6 counts indecent 
assault upon a child, 3 
counts act of indecency 
with a child 
9 y Accused was the 
complainant’s 
step father 
29 years (1976- 
report to police 
in 2005, 
although 
complained to 
sister in 1980) 
N/A N/A Appeal against sentence allowed – sentence 
was manifestly excessive in light of 
sentencing practices at the time of offences  
 
Original effective sentence of 6 years 
imprisonment (with 3 years non-parole) 
reduced to 4 years imprisonment (with 2 
years non-parole)  
49. Orkopoulos v 
R [2009] 
NSWCCA 213 
 
(25/8/09) 
Against 
conviction & 
sentence 
1 count sexual 
intercourse without 
consent, 2 counts 
indecent assault, 1 
count aggravated 
indecent assault, 8 
counts sexual 
intercourse with a male 
(10-18 years) 
15y Accused was a 
family friend 
~10 years (1995 
– unclear 
disclosure)  
N/A Judicial directions 
as to tendency 
evidence at issue 
Appeal against conviction dismissed  
 
Appeal against sentence allowed – failure to 
grant leniency in circumstances where the 
offence has been abolished 
 
Original effective sentence of 13 years 11 
months imprisonment (with 9 years 3 
months non-parole) reduced to 13 years 8 
months imprisonment (with 9 years non-
parole) 
50. PH v R [2009] 
NSWCCA 
161* 
 
(26/6/09) 
Against 
sentence 
8 counts indecent 
assault, 3 counts carnal 
knowledge with child, 7 
counts carnal 
knowledge by father 
15 y 
11 y 
Accused was the 
complainants’ 
father  
~35 years 
(1966-2002) 
N/A N/A Appeal against sentence allowed – 
misapplication of the principles in Pearce v 
The Queen; manifestly excessive sentence 
in light of sentencing practices at the time 
of offences  
 
Original effective sentence of 17 years 
imprisonment (with 12 years non-parole), 
but typographical error recorded it as 20 
years. Reduced to 14 years 6 months 
imprisonment (6 years 6 months non-
parole)  
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51. Simpson v R 
[2009] 
NSWCCA 
297* 
 
(17/12/09) 
Against 
sentence 
1 count sexual 
intercourse without 
consent, 2 counts sexual 
intercourse with a child 
(10-16 years), 3 counts 
aggravated indecent 
assault on child 
12 y Accused was 
family friend 
5 years (2000-
2005) 
N/A N/A Appeal against sentence allowed in part 
Unsuccessful Cases 
52. SDS v R 
[2009] 
NSWCCA 159 
(10/6/09) 
Against 
sentence 
4 counts sexual 
intercourse with a child 
(10-16 years) 
14 y Accused was the 
brother-in-law of 
the complainant 
~10 years 
(1997- unclear 
disclosure)  
N/A N/A Appeal against sentence not allowed 
2010 n =12 
 
        
Successful Cases 
53. BP v R; R v BP 
[2010] 
NSWCCA 
303* 
 
(13/12/10) 
Against 
conviction 
and Crown 
appeal 
3 counts indecent 
assault on child, 5 
counts aggravated 
indecent assault on 
child, 2 counts sexual 
intercourse with a child 
5 y 
6 y 
8 y 
Accused was the 
complainants’ 
father and 
grandfather 
~35 years 
(1970-2003, 
disclosure of 
historical child 
sexual abuse 
prompted by 
recent 
incidents of 
abuse) 
N/A Judicial direction 
as to tendency 
evidence and risk 
of concoction at 
issue 
Appeal against conviction not allowed 
 
Crown appeal allowed – judge’s failure to 
apply principles in Pearce v The Queen; 
aggregate sentence failed to properly 
reflect the objective seriousness of the 
offences  
 
Original effective sentence of 2 years 8 
months imprisonment (1 year 4 months 
non-parole) increased to 4 years’ 
imprisonment (with 2 years 3 months non-
parole) 
54. Chivers v R 
[2010] 
Appeal 
against 
3 counts sexual 
intercourse without 
10 y Accused was 
family friend 
23 years (1983-
2006) 
N/A Murray direction 
at issue 
Appeal against conviction allowed for count 
4 (sexual intercourse without consent); 
81 
NSWCCA 
134* 
 
(30/7/10) 
conviction & 
sentence 
consent, 2 counts act of 
indecency 
conviction and sentences quashed, and new 
trial ordered  
 
Appeal against sentence not considered 
55. ES v R (No 1) 
[2010] 
NSWCCA 
197* 
 
(6/9/10) 
Against 
conviction 
5 counts indecent 
assault of a person 
under the age of 16 
years, 1 count act of 
indecency towards a 
person under the age of 
16 tears, 1 count 
indecent assault.  
12y Accused was 
partner of the 
complainant’s 
mother.  
 (1974 – 2007)  Admission of 
witness evidence as 
to seeing appellant 
touch complainant.  
Failure to 
adequately 
direct/misdirect 
jury in relation to 
evidence.  
Appeal against conviction allowed – judge 
erred in admitting tendency evidence; judge 
misdirected the jury in relation to tendency 
evidence; miscarriage of justice resulting 
from admission of inadmissible and 
prejudicial evidence 
 
Convictions and sentences quashed; new 
trial ordered  
56. LJ v Regina 
[2010] 
NSWCCA 289 
 
(10/12/10) 
Against 
sentence 
1 count aggravated 
sexual assault 
14 y Accused was a 
family friend 
~12 years 
(1996-2008/9) 
N/A N/A Appeal against sentence allowed – 
sentencing judge erred in applying the 
utilitarian value of the guilty plea, and in 
failing to take into account the provisions of 
the Criminal Case Conferencing Act.  
 
Original effective sentence of 2 years 2 
months imprisonment (with 1 year 4 
months non-parole) reduced to 1 year 6 
months imprisonment (with 1 year non-
parole) 
57. R v Jarrold 
[2010] 
NSWCCA 69 
 
(3/5/10) 
Crown appeal 2 counts indecent 
assault, 3 counts 
production of child 
pornography, 1 count 
use of internet to 
transmit child 
pornography, 1 count 
possession of child 
pornography, 1 count 
exposing child to 
indecent material 
12 y 
14 y 
Accused was 
friend of father 
30 years 
(1978/9 – 2008, 
action 
prompted by 
police search 
for child 
pornography) 
N/A N/A Crown appeal allowed. 9 grounds of appeal 
accepted, most relating to errors in judge’s 
exercise of discretion; consequently, 
sentence was manifestly inadequate  
 
Original effective sentence of 5 years’ 
imprisonment (with 3 years non-parole) 
increased to 7 years 5 months 
imprisonment (with 5 years 6 months non-
parole) 
58. Regina v 
PWD [2010] 
NSWCCA 209 
 
(17/9/10) 
Crown appeal 10 counts indecent 
assault 
14 y Accused was 
school teacher 
~30 years (1977 
– unclear 
disclosure) 
Ruling as to 
admission of 
tendency evidence 
at issue 
N/A Crown appeal allowed – judge erred in 
ruling that tendency evidence was 
inadmissible  
 
82 
Rulings made by trial judge vacated, and 
tendency evidence held to be admissible. 
All counts on the indictment to be tried 
together  
59. RWB v R; R v 
RWB [2010] 
NSWCCA 147 
 
(12/7/10) 
Appeal 
against 
conviction & 
Crown appeal 
  
 
6 counts sexual 
intercourse with a child 
under 10, 1 count 
inciting an act of 
indecency against a 
child, 3 counts indecent 
assault, 2 counts sexual 
intercourse with a child 
under 10 
6 y Accused was the 
complainant’s 
uncle 
16 years (1990-
2006) 
N/A Judicial direction 
on beyond 
reasonable doubt 
at issue 
Appeal against conviction not allowed 
 
Crown appeal allowed –judge erred in 
failing to apply principles in Pearce v The 
Queen, and in considering evidence of 
hardship in custody, in the absence of any 
evidence; sentence was manifestly 
inadequate as a result of failure to properly 
reflect the objective seriousness of the 
offences  
 
Original effective sentence of 5 years’ 
imprisonment (2 years 6 months non-
parole) increased to 11 years 4 months 
imprisonment (with 8 years 6 months non-
parole) 
60. ST v Regina 
[2010] 
NSWCCA 5*  
(10/2/10) 
Against 
conviction  
2 counts sexual 
intercourse with a child 
under 10 
5 y Accused was 
acting as 
babysitter to the 
complainant  
7 years (1999-
2006) 
N/A Longman 
direction at issue 
Appeal against conviction allowed – failure 
to give a Longman warning resulted in a 
miscarriage of justice 
 
Convictions quashed; new trial ordered  
Unsuccessful cases 
61. BG v R [2010] 
NSWCCA 
301* 
 
(13/12/10) 
Against 
conviction 
1 count carnal 
knowledge of girl, 1 
count act of indecency, 
2 counts gaining with 
intent to have carnal 
knowledge, 3 counts of 
rape, 1 count procuring 
female under 12 for 
another to have carnal 
knowledge, 1 count 
buggery 
12 y Accused was de 
facto partner of 
complainant’s 
mother 
~35 years (1970 
– unclear 
disclosure) 
N/A N/A Appeal against conviction not allowed 
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62. ES v R (No 2) 
[2010] 
NSWCCA 198 
 
(6/9/10) 
Against 
conviction 
4 counts indecent 
assault, 1 count act of 
indecency 
11 y Accused was 
step-grandfather 
~9 years (1999 
– unclear 
disclosure) 
Admission of 
generalised 
evidence of ongoing 
misconduct and 
uncharged acts at 
issue 
Failure to give 
direction as to 
use of tendency 
evidence.  
Appeal against conviction not allowed 
63. GG v Regina 
[2010] 
NSWCCA 
230* 
 
(12/10/10) 
Against 
conviction 
and sentence 
3 counts sexual 
intercourse without 
consent with a child, 2 
counts indecent assault 
on child  
12 y Accused was the 
complainant’s 
step father 
16 years (1984- 
police report 
2008, although 
informed friend 
in 1987, DOCS 
in 1988, first 
police report 
1996 but 
accused no 
located) 
N/A Longman 
direction at issue 
Appeal against conviction not allowed 
 
Appeal against sentence not allowed 
64. KTR v R 
[2010] 
NSWCCA 271 
 
(3/12/10) 
Against 
conviction 
15 counts sexual assault 12 y 
10 y 
Accused was 
stepfather of 
complainants 
27 years (1979-
2006) 
Admission of 
evidence of violent 
behaviour by 
appellant at issue 
Judicial direction 
as to evidence of 
appellant’s 
violence at issue 
Appeal against conviction not allowed 
2011 n = 3         
Successful Cases 
65. IS v R [2011] 
NSWCCA 142 
 
(6/7/11) 
Against 
sentence 
2 counts sexual 
intercourse with child, 2 
counts aggravated 
indecent assault on 
child, 1 count persistent 
sexual abuse of child, 1 
count act of indecency 
towards child 
9 y Accused was 
complainant’s 
father 
10 years (1997-
2007) 
N/A N/A Appeal against sentence allowed in part – 
judge erred in failing to find special 
circumstances (count 4), and in setting both 
an individual (count 4) and overall sentence 
with disproportionate parole and non-
parole periods 
 
Original effective sentence of 11 years 8 
months 29 days imprisonment (with 9 years 
2 months 28 days non-parole) reduced to 
11 years 8 months 29 days (with 8 years 8 
months 28 days non-parole)  
84 
66. R v SK; SK v R 
[2011] 
NSWCCA 292 
 
(1/4/11) 
Against 
conviction & 
Crown appeal 
19 counts indecent 
assault, sexual 
intercourse and 
attempted sexual 
intercourse 
6 y Accused was 
complainant’s 
uncle 
~30 years (1980 
– unclear 
disclosure) 
Ruling on the 
admission of 
evidence of acts 
against three 
complainants at 
joint trial at issue 
N/A Appeal against conviction now allowed 
 
Crown appeal against interlocutory 
judgment re: admission of evidence allowed 
– judge erred in finding tendency evidence 
inadmissible  
 
Tendency evidence held to be admissible  
Unsuccessful Cases 
67. R v PFC 
[2011] 
NSWCCA 117 
Appeal 
against 
sentence by 
Crown 
2 counts aggravated 
indecent assault on 
child, 2 counts 
attempted sexual 
intercourse with child, 2 
counts aggravated 
sexual intercourse with 
child, 10 counts sexual 
intercourse with child, 1 
count use of child for 
pornographic purposes 
11-
15 
year
s 
 
 
Extrafamilial - 
Accused was 
acquaintance (for 
two 
complainants, 
was father of 
their 
acquaintance) 
 (CA: offences 
occurred 
between 1 Aug 
1997 to 11 Feb 
2009, convicted 
at first trial on 
26 June 2009… 
so no period of 
delay  
[at 2]) 
 
N/A N/A Crown appeal against sentence dismissed.  
 
2012 n = 8       
 
  
Successful Cases 
68. DF v R [2012] 
NSWCCA 
171* 
 
(17/8/12) 
Against 
conviction & 
sentence 
3 counts indecent 
assault, 3 counts 
attempt to unlawfully 
and carnally know 
10 y Accused was an 
acquaintance 
32 years (1978-
2006, although 
reported to 
friend in 1986) 
N/A Direction in 
accordance with 
R v Markuleski 
(effect of the 
complainant’s 
credibility on 
verdict) at issue 
Appeal against conviction not allowed 
 
Appeal against sentence allowed 
69. KSC v R 
[2012] 
NSWCCA 
179* 
Against 
conviction & 
sentence 
3 counts aggravated 
sexual assault of a child, 
1 count aggravated 
indecent assault, 1 
12 y Accused was the 
uncle by marriage 
of the 
complainant 
~10 year (1997 
– unclear 
disclosure) 
N/A Inadequate 
direction as to 
forensic 
disadvantage 
Appeal against conviction not allowed 
 
Appeal against sentence allowed. Sentence 
for count 11 (common assault) manifestly 
85 
 
(23/8/12) 
count aggravated act of 
indecency, 3 counts 
attempted aggravated 
sexual assault of child, 1 
count assault, 1 count 
aggravated sexual 
assault 
caused by delay 
and use of 
context evidence 
of uncharged act 
at issue. 
excessive; however, no reduction in 
sentence resulted, as this sentence was 
wholly concurrent with other sentences 
being served 
 
Original effective sentence of 15 years’ 
imprisonment (with 10 years non-parole) 
maintained  
70. Martin v R 
[2012] 
NSWCCA 253 
 
(13/12/12) 
Against 
sentence 
2 counts aggravated 
indecent assault on 
child under 10, 1 count 
aggravated indecent 
assault on child under 
16, 2 counts producing 
child pornography, 2 
counts filming a person 
in a private act 
7 y Accused was 
family friend 
16 years (1992-
2008, although 
disclosed to 
police in 1994 
but no action 
taken) 
N/A N/A Appeal against sentence allowed – finding 
of special circumstances not reflected in 
judge’s maintenance of overall statutory 
ratio between total non-parole period and 
total head sentence  
 
Original effective sentence of 5 years 2 
months imprisonment (with 3 years 11 
months non-parole) reduced to 5 years 
(with 3 years 7 months non-parole)  
71. R v Brown 
[2012] 
NSWCCA 199 
 
(18/9/12) 
Crown appeal 20 different victims:  
2 counts buggery, 4 
counts of homosexual 
intercourse with a male 
aged 10-18, 2 counts of 
committing an act of 
indecency with a male, 
1 count of committing 
an act of gross 
indecency, 1 count of 
indecent assault, 1 
count of sexual 
intercourse without 
consent and 16 counts 
of assault on a male 
accompanied by an act 
of indecency.  
8-
17y 
Accused was a 
youth group 
leader 
~25 years (1974 
– unclear 
disclosure) 
N/A N/A Appeal by Crown allowed – judge failed to 
apply principle of totality; judge erred in 
approach to anal penetration; judge 
misunderstood the maximum penalty for 
count 19 
 
Original effective sentence of 10 years’ 
imprisonment (with 6 years non-parole) 
increased to 20 years’ imprisonment (with 
12 years non-parole)  
72. RM v R 
[2012] 
NSWCCA 35* 
 
(19/3/12) 
Accused 
appeal 
(interlocutory
). Special 
hearing 
2 counts act of 
indecency on a child, 1 
count incitement to 
commit an act of 
indecency on a child, 1 
8 y Accused was the 
complainant’s 
cousin  
20 years (1989 
– 2009) 
N/A N/A Appeal allowed against interlocutory 
judgment refusing a permanent stay on 
criminal proceedings 
 
86 
before a 
judge alone  
count persistent sexual 
abuse 
Matter remitted to trial judge to consider 
afresh the question of whether a stay 
should be granted  
73. Simpson v R 
[2012] 
NSWCCA 
246* 
 
(23/11/12) 
Against 
sentence 
1 count aggravated act 
of indecency, 1 count 
aggravated indecent 
assault, 1 count sexual 
intercourse with a 
person under 10 
8 y Accused was a 
neighbour of the 
complainant 
13 years (1997 
– 2010) 
N/A N/A Appeal against sentence allowed for count 3 
(sexual intercourse with a person under 10) 
– non-parole period maintained, but 
additional term manifestly excessive in light 
of the range of sentences imposed for this 
offence at the time of the offences  
 
Original effective sentence of 6 years 9 
months imprisonment (with 3 years 9 
months non-parole) reduced to 4 years 9 
months imprisonment (with 3 years 5 
months non-parole) 
Unsuccessful Cases 
74. RLS v R 
[2012] 
NSWCCA 236 
 
(15/11/12) 
Against 
sentence 
2 counts indecent 
assault, 4 counts 
homosexual 
intercourse, 2 counts 
act of gross indecency 
13 y 
14 y 
x 2 
Accused was a 
family friend 
~25 years (1980 
– unclear 
disclosure) 
N/A N/A Appeal against sentence not allowed 
75. Wong v R 
[2012] 
NSWCCA 39 
(5/4/12) 
Against 
conviction 
1 count aggravated 
sexual assault, 1 count 
indecent assault 
12 y Accused was a 
friend of the 
complainant’s 
father 
~10 years (2002 
– unclear 
disclosure) 
N/A N/A Appeal against conviction not allowed 
2013 n = 9         
 
Successful cases 
76. Magnuson v 
R [2013] 
NSWCCA 50* 
 
(1/3/13) 
Against 
sentence 
13 counts indecent 
assault on child, 8 
counts sexual 
intercourse with child, 2 
counts inciting person 
under 16 to commit an 
8 y 
7 y 
9 y 
Accused was the 
complainants’ 
stepfather and 
cousin 
~35 year delay 
(1977 – unclear 
disclosure) 
N/A N/A Appeal against sentence allowed – non-
parole period calculated incorrectly; 
sentences imposed were manifestly 
excessive; judge erred in finding certain 
factors as aggravating  
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act of indecency, 1 
count act of indecent, 1 
count ravish and carnal 
knowledge 
Original effective sentence of 19 years’ 
imprisonment (with 13 years non-parole) 
reduced to 16 years’ imprisonment (with 9 
years non-parole) 
77. MPB v R 
[2013] 
NSWCCA 
213* 
 
(16/9/13) 
Against 
sentence 
4 counts indecent 
assault on female under 
16, 2 counts indecent 
assault on child under 
10, 1 count attempted 
sexual intercourse on 
child under 10 
7 y Accused was the 
father and 
grandfather to 
the complainants 
~35 years (1972 – 
unclear disclosure 
prompted by recent 
incident of abuse 
with 
granddaughter) 
N/A N/A Appeal against sentence allowed – sentence 
was manifestly excessive in light of 
sentencing patterns at the time of offences; 
failure to accumulate certain sentences  
 
Original effective sentence of 8 years 6 
months imprisonment (with 5 years 6 
months non-parole) reduced to 7 years 3 
months imprisonment (with 4 years 3 
months non-parole) 
78. RP v R [2013] 
NSWCCA 192 
 
(22/8/13) 
Against 
sentence 
1 count indecent assault 
on female under 16, 2 
counts sexual 
intercourse with a child 
under 10, 2 counts 
aggravated sexual 
intercourse without 
consent, one count 
sexual intercourse with 
a child (10-16 years), 1 
count aggravated 
indecent assault, 1 
count possession of 
child pornography 
11 y Accused was 
uncle and 
grandfather to 
the complainants 
~30 years (1978 – 
unclear disclosure 
promoted by recent 
incident of abuse 
with 
granddaughters) 
N/A N/A Leave to appeal granted. Appeal allowed. 
Sentence quashed.  
 
Sentence for the first indictment changed to 
2 months – partially accumulated by 1 
month.  
Unsuccessful Cases 
79. R v DKL 
[2013] 
NSWCCA 
233* 
 
(18/10/13) 
Crown appeal 1 count sexual 
intercourse with a child 
under 10, 1 count use of 
offensive weapon with 
intent to intimidate 
11 y 
13 y 
7 y 
Accused was 
complainants’ 
father  
18 years (1993 
– police 
complaint with 
action in 2011, 
although 
reported to 
police without 
N/A N/A Crown appeal not allowed 
88 
action in 1997 
and 2005) 
80. Steadman v R 
(No 1) [2013] 
NSWCCA 55 
(13/3/13) 
Against 
conviction 
3 counts indecent 
assault on child 
12 y Accused was 
complainant’s 
uncle 
~30 year delay 
(1983 – unclear 
disclosure) 
Admission of 
context evidence at 
issue 
Judicial direction 
on context 
evidence at issue 
Appeal against conviction not allowed 
81. Versi v 
R [2013] 
NSWCCA 
206* 
(14/11/13) 
Against 
conviction & 
sentence 
1 count act of indecency 
with a child, 1 count 
sexual intercourse with 
a child (10-16 years) 
11 y Accused was the 
complainant’s 
step father 
~25 years (1985 
– unclear 
disclosure) 
Admission of 
coincidence 
evidence at issue 
Judicial directions 
on coincidence 
and tendency 
evidence at issue 
Appeal against conviction not allowed 
 
Appeal against sentence not allowed 
82. RO v R [2013] 
NSWCCA 
162* 
(9/7/13) 
Against 
conviction & 
sentence 
2 counts indecent 
assault on child under 
16 
13 y Accused was 
complainant’s 
stepfather 
~15 year delay 
(1994 – unclear 
disclosure) 
N/A N/A Appeal against conviction not allowed 
 
Appeal against sentence not allowed 
83. LP v Regina  
[2013] 
NSWCCA 
330* 
 
(23/12/13) 
Against 
conviction 
1 count assault with an 
act of indecency, 2 
counts unlawful carnal 
knowledge, 2 counts 
sexual intercourse 
without consent 
11 
year
s 
Accused was the 
complainant’s 
stepfather 
24 years (1982-
2006, although 
disclosed to 
mother in 
1984) 
Admission of 
evidence suggesting 
appellant had 
admitted offences 
at issue 
N/A Appeal against conviction not allowed 
84. BJS v R [2013] 
NSWCCA 123 
Appeal 
against 
conviction 
and sentence 
only by 
accused. 
 
11 counts of indecent 
assault on child under 
16 
 
11/1
2 y 
12/1
3 y 
7-9 
year
s 
Institutional - 
Accused was a 
Catholic priest 
~25-30 years 
(1980-1981 – 
unclear 
disclosure) 
Multiple, including 
admission/use of 
tendency/coinciden
ce evidence 
Multiple, 
including 
direction to jury 
re use of 
tendency/coincid
ence evidence 
Grounds (1)-(9) appeal Dismissed. Leave to 
appeal ground 10 granted but appeal 
dismissed.  
Notes: 
Yellow highlighted cells indicate institutional cases in the sample of historical child sexual abuse (n = 17).  
* and purple highlighted cells indicate delay was in issue (n= 49).  
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Case name and 
context of abuse 
Grounds of appeal Evidentiary issue on appeal  Judicial misdirection on appeal Judicial reasoning  Outcome and Limb 
classification3 
historical child sexual abuse cases  
Successful Cases on Appeal  
                                                      
3 Limb classification: according to s6(1) Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW).  
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1. R v Brown [2012] 
NSWCCA 199 
 
Applicant was a 
church youth group 
leader, who 
perpetrated 20 
different victims 
over 22 years 
25 years (1974 – 
unclear disclosure). 
Grounds of Appeal Against 
Sentence by Crown:  
1. The sentencing Judge failed 
to reflect the principle of 
totality in the aggregate 
sentence 
2. The sentencing Judge erred 
in his approach to the 
offences of anal penetration 
3. The sentencing judge erred in 
erroneously identifying the 
maximum penalty for count 
19 as 2 years when it was 5 
years 
The sentence was manifestly 
inadequate. 
N/A N/A 
Held in respect of Ground (1) and (4) - Accepted 
 The high level of criminality in the respondent’s conduct is not only 
obvious in the commission of very many serious offences over a very 
long period of time but in the circumstance, pointed to by the Crown 
prosecutor, that the respondent constantly found new victims. When he 
found them, he accompanied his behaviour with the accoutrements of 
the experienced sexual predator, showing his victims pornographic films 
and plying them on occasions with alcohol and drugs. The aggregate 
sentence imposed by his Honour was manifestly inadequate to reflect 
the seriousness of the offending over 22 years upon 20 victims [39]. 
Held in respect of Ground (2) - Accepted 
 There is substance in the Crown’s submission that what seems to have 
been applied is a ‘blanket’ assessment. Putting to one side for the 
moment whether 5 years itself (or 4 years) is shown to be inadequate, 
the variations in the criminality, which are obviously apparent in the 
elements constituting the crimes for which sentenced needed to be 
assessed, do not lead to a conclusion that individual criminality has 
been assessed.  
Held in respect of Ground (3) - Accepted 
 Upholding this ground does not call for an isolated order affecting 
Count 19 but the error contributes an element to determination of 
whether the aggregate sentence was manifestly inadequate and, if so, 
what re-sentence should be applied.  
Outcome: 
Crown appeal against 
sentence allowed, 
sentences quashed, 
appellant  
re-sentenced. 
 
Limb: N/A 
2. Regina v PWD 
[2010] NSWCCA 
209 
 
School teacher 
assaulted 4 
students at St 
Stanislaus' College. 
  
30 year delay 
Crown interlocutory 
 
Grounds of appeal against 
evidence exclusion by Crown:  
(1) Her honour erred in ruling 
that the tendency evidence 
was inadmissible. 
 
Inadmissibility of tendency 
evidence (Ground 1) 
Crown Submission:  
 The trial judge erred in 
making the lack of 
similarity between the 
sexual acts or 
surrounding 
circumstances the 
determining factor in 
assessing the probative 
value of the evidence 
[50]. 
 The trial judge's focus on 
the lack of modus 
operandi, system or 
pattern with common 
N/A Judicial reasoning regarding (Ground 1) - Accepted 
 Tendency evidence, even if relevant, is inadmissible by virtue of s 97 
Evidence Act unless, relevantly, para (b) is satisfied. Even if so 
satisfied, court must reject evidence unless s 101(2) is satisfied, that 
is, its probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect on 
the defendant [57]-[65]. 
 Two issues arise: [74] 
o 1) Did the trial judge err in rejecting the tendency evidence as not 
having a significant probative value: s 97(1)(b), or because its 
probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect: s 101(2). 
o 2) Should there be two trials in the matter, as raised in the course 
of argument.  
 On its proper reading, PNJ is distinguishable from the present case 
[81]-84]. 
 The trial judge also erred in considering the question of innocent 
association [85]. 
 The evidence of the four complainants and the other two tendency 
Outcome: 
Appeal Allowed. 
 
Orders:  
 Vacate the rulings 
made by Flannery 
DCJ on 7 May 2010; 
 The evidence of 
tendency that the 
prosecution intends 
to produce 
pursuant to the 
Evidence Act 1995, 
s 97(1) contained in 
the notice dated 19 
April 2010 is 
91 
thread as the basis for 
exclusion, was 
erroneous for the 
purposes of establishing 
tendency [50]. 
 Identity, where system 
or pattern is often of 
importance, was not in 
issue in this case. The 
trial judge's reliance 
upon PNJ v DDP [2010] 
VSCA 88 brought about 
this misconception. That 
case was about 
coincidence, not 
tendency evidence. [50]. 
 
Respondent submission: 
The differences in the sexual 
activity alleged in relation to 
the complainants and the 
other witnesses, and the 
absence of relevant similarity 
in the circumstances in which 
the conduct was said to have 
occurred, were such that 
there were no unifying 
features of the case to 
warrant a finding that the 
evidence relied upon as 
tendency evidence had 
significant probative value 
[54]. 
witnesses is capable of rationally affecting the assessment of the 
probability of the respondent having engaged in the conduct alleged 
and had a sexual interest in doing so [88]. 
 The evidence upon which the Crown seeks to rely is not excluded by s 
101(2) [89]. 
 The trial judge erred in finding that whatever significant probative 
value there may be in the evidence, that did not substantially 
outweighed its prejudicial effect [89]. 
 There can be no doubt that the case in respect of each complainant 
will be substantially weakened if the evidence of each complainant is 
not cross-admissible as tendency evidence and the evidence of the 
other two witnesses is not admissible in respect of each complainant 
[94]. 
o Section 5F(3A) is satisfied. 
 
admissible;  
 Order that counts 
1-10 on the 
indictment be tried 
together. 
 
Limb: N/A 
3. Makarov v R (No 
3) [2008] NSWCCA 
293 
 
Foreign music 
teacher, 
Appeal against conviction only by 
accused. 
(1) The learned trial Judge erred 
in failing to sever the counts 
relating to one complainant 
from the counts relating to 
the other and to order 
separate trials relating to 
Failed to reject relationship 
evidence (Ground 8) 
Judicial directions as to the 
use of relationship evidence at 
issue (Ground 5) 
 
Failed to direct jury in 
response to questions 
(Ground 7) 
Judicial reasoning regarding:  
(Ground 5) - Accepted 
Application: 
 This was a case in which two complainants made broadly similar 
allegations of sexual molestation against the appellant. The evidence 
of one was not admissible in order to prove the appellant’s guilt of 
the offences involving the other because such probative value as it 
possessed did not substantially outweigh any prejudicial effect it may 
Outcome: 
Appeal Allowed, 
conviction and 
sentence quashed. 
 
Limb: 2, 3 
92 
complainants were 
his students.  
 
6 year delay 
each.  
(2) The learned trial Judge erred 
in failing to discharge the jury 
on the application of defence 
counsel on 12 September 
2005.  
(3) The learned trial Judge erred 
in failing to discharge the jury 
on the application of defence 
counsel on 2 and 13 
September 2005.  
(4) The trial miscarried and there 
was a miscarriage of justice 
as a result of the prejudice 
arising out of the matters 
raised under grounds 1, 2 
and 3 above.  
(5) The trial Judge failed 
adequately to direct the jury 
in relation to 
a. (i) the prejudicial evidence; (ii) 
the issues that arose 
following upon the joinder of 
the counts' (iii) the use that 
could be made of the 
evidence of ‘relationship’; (iv) 
the use that could be made of 
the evidence of one 
complainant in the counts 
relating to the other; (v) the 
standard of proof in relation 
to the evidence of the 
“improper sexual 
relationship” between the 
appellant and the 
complainants.  
(6) The trial miscarried and there 
was a miscarriage of justice 
as a result of perjury that C 
and B committed against the 
appellant during proceedings 
in relation to the evidence 
concerning: 
a. (i) the exclusively professional 
have on the appellant, per s 101(2) [73]. 
 The risk of misuse of the evidence, in the circumstances, was of a 
very high order [74]-[80]. 
Decision: 
 The decision to permit the trial to proceed on the indictment 
charging counts involving the two complainants, in circumstances in 
which the evidence of the allegations made by one was not 
admissible on the trial of the allegations involving the other, was 
productive of a miscarriage of justice [82]. 
 The trial judge’s directions were not capable of overcoming the 
prejudice that arose as the result of the joint trial and the admission 
of all the evidence of the appellant's other sexual misconduct [82]. 
 As regards ground (5)(v), in sexual assault cases the standard of proof 
of tendency evidence is beyond reasonable doubt [30]. McClellan CJ 
(with whom Hidden and Fullerton JJ agreed) held that evidence 
admitted as context evidence does not require a direction that it be 
proved beyond reasonable doubt [85]. 
 
(Ground 7) - Rejected 
 The trial judge made no errors of the nature alleged [98]-[110]. 
 
(Ground 8) - Rejected 
 Where it is relevant, evidence of other sexual misconduct is 
admissible notwithstanding that the allegations have not been the 
subject of investigation in the jurisdiction in which the misconduct is 
said to have occurred or that any investigation has not led to charges 
being preferred against the accused [111]-[112]. 
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(musical, psychological and 
psychiatric) issues; (ii) the 
“relationship” evidence; (iii) 
the Counts No 2 and 5; (iv) 
the Count No 3; (v) the Counts 
No 7 and 8. 
(7) The trial Judge failed 
adequately to direct the jury 
in relation to the jurors’ 
questions concerning the lack 
of proof, transcript of 
summing-up and 
impossibility to reach the 
verdicts on eight counts out 
of 10. 
(8) The trial judge erred in failing 
to reject the “relationship” 
evidence, which had been 
related to the jurisdiction of 
Ukraine and had not been 
investigated nor by 
Australian or Ukrainian Police 
on the territory of Ukraine. 
(9) The trial Judge erred in failing 
to provide for the appellant 
as a former foreigner with 
English as a second language 
an access to an interpreter 
t[h]rough the simultaneous 
headphone translation or 
proper conditions for 
simultaneous translation of 
interpreter – with intervals 
for translation – that 
international law and 
standards required. 
(10) The trial miscarried and there 
was a miscarriage of justice 
as a result of the Crown 
Prosecutor and Trial Judge 
misconduct in relation to the 
time of the essence offences 
No 2, 5 and 3. 
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4. Healey v R 
[2008] NSWCCA 
229 
 
Nurse at clinic for 
behavioural 
problems, 
complainant was 
patient.  
 
20 year delay 
Appeal against conviction only by 
accused. 
(1) Verdict was unreasonable 
and unsupportable on the 
evidence. 
(2) Trial judge erred in his 
summation of the case 
because his Honour did not 
put the defence case to the 
jury. 
(3) Trial judge erred by 
extending a Longman 
direction to possible forensic 
disadvantage suffered by the 
Crown  
(4) The Longman warning was 
inadequate because it failed 
to specifically warn the jury 
about the fragility of youthful 
recollection  
(5) The trial judge erred by 
failing to direct the jury that 
they needed to be satisfied 
that uncharged criminal 
conduct occurred before they 
could use evidence of the 
conduct against the 
appellant.  
(6) The trial judge erred by (a) 
suggesting to the jury that 
their determination would 
involve accepting one version 
as opposed to the other and 
(b) failing to direct the jury 
that they did not have to 
believe that the appellant 
was telling the truth before 
he was entitled to be 
acquitted.  
(7) The trial judge erred by 
failing to direct the jury that 
rejection of the 
complainant’s motive to lie 
does not mean that the 
N/A Judicial direction as to whether 
lies could be taken as 
consciousness of guilty, at 
issue. 
 
Failing to direct jury regarding 
use of evidence (Ground 5) 
Appellant submission: 
 The Crown led two 
instances of uncharged 
sexual misconduct by the 
appellant on M. The 
appellant complained 
that the judge omitted to 
direct the jury that they 
could only use evidence 
of criminal acts against 
the appellant if they were 
first satisfied that the acts 
occurred.  
Judge erred in suggestion to 
jury (Ground 6) 
 
Failing to direct jury regarding 
truthfulness of statement 
(Ground 7): 
 M admitted in cross- 
examination that both he 
and his de facto wife had 
virtually no assets. They 
had a car each that was 
all. It was suggested that 
M might have lied for 
financial gain.  
Inadequate Crofts direction 
(Ground 8):  
Appellant submission: 
 The appellant complains 
that the trial judge 
repeated the direction 
about the explicable 
Judicial reasoning regarding: 
(Ground 5) - Accepted 
 The jury has been told as to the use they could make of evidence of 
uncharged acts of sexual assaults without being told that they have 
to be satisfied that they occurred. There is a real basis for doubting 
whether they did occur. There has been a miscarriage of justice. 
(Ground 6) - Rejected 
 The judge reminded the jury that the Crown had to prove the case 
beyond reasonable doubt and the jury was warned that it would be 
dangerous to convict on M’s evidence alone. On two occasions the 
judge told the jury that merely because the accused gave evidence 
that did not mean that he had to prove or disprove anything. 
Sometime later in the summing-up the judge instructed the jury that 
before that could accept M’s (complainant) evidence as establishing 
beyond reasonable doubt that these offences have been committed 
they would have to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that M was 
reliable, accurate, consistent and telling the truth. When the 
summing up is taken as a whole the jury would have understood that 
they had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the accuracy, 
reliability, consistency and truthfulness of M’s evidence before they 
could convict [107].  
(Ground 7) - Rejected 
 Having regard to the terms of the summing-up and its emphasis upon 
the Crown having to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and the 
various warnings which were given there was no reasonable 
possibility that the jury might consider that there had been a reversal 
of the onus of proof in relation to the existence of a motive to lie. In 
the circumstances of the present case, the suggested direction was 
not necessary.  
(Ground 8) - Rejected 
 While greater emphasis was given to the explanation for the delay 
than for the delay itself, I do not think that the directions exceeded 
the permissible bounds. The jury were made fully aware of the delay. 
While the issues of delay in complaint was one of the issues relied 
upon by the appellant, the issues relating to the conduct and 
opportunities for the appellant at the clinic were at the center of the 
trial.  
(Ground 9) - Rejected 
 It was not unfairly prejudicial to elicit the prime facts of the meeting 
at Bondi Junction and the trip to his unit and the friendship which 
formed. However, the cr0ss-examination went further in seeking to 
establish, and obtain admissions that the appellant had seriously 
Outcome: 
Appeal Allowed, 
convictions set aside, 
new trial ordered. 
 
Limb: 3 
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complainant is necessarily 
telling the truth 
(8) The trial judge erred by giving 
an inadequate Crofts 
direction 
(9) Trial judge erred by failing to 
direct the jury that they 
should disregard evidence 
and arguments concerning 
the inappropriateness of the 
appellant’s conduct 
 
delay in complaint both 
before and after the Croft 
direction and that the 
Crofts direction was 
entirely subsumed by the 
judge’s remarks about 
why a delay in complaint 
was understandable. The 
complaint was as to a 
lack of balance.  
Failure to direct jury about 
evidence regarding 
inappropriate conduct 
(Ground 9):  
 The appellant submitted 
that the Crown 
Prosecutor cross-
examined the appellant 
at length and repetitively 
about what as described 
as ‘inappropriate 
conduct’. The appellant 
complained that these 
questions sought to 
emphasise that in 
forming a friendship with 
M the appellant had 
acted unethically and had 
perpetrated an abuse of 
trust. This generated 
unfair prejudice. 
 
failed in his professional duty… While no objection could correctly be 
taken to the question eliciting primary facts showing the relationship 
between the appellant and M, objection was not taken by the 
appellant’s trial counsel to questions suggesting serious failure of 
professional duty.  
 The now challenged evidence having been admitted without 
objection… it is too late for these matters to be raised… The jury 
would not have thought that they were dealing with a case of 
professional misconduct and they were clearly directed as to what 
the Crown had to prove before they could convict the appellant. The 
unfairly prejudicial portions of cross-examination and of the 
prosecutor’s address to which I have referred would, to put it mildly, 
not have helped the appellant when the jury were assessing his 
credit and considering his evidence. 
5. Featherstone v R 
[2008] NSWCCA 71 
 
Music teacher at 
school, the victims 
were students. 
Applicant met one 
complainant 
through a YMCA 
Appeal against sentence only by 
accused. 
1. [Not identified] 
2. [Not identified] 
3. [Not identified] 
4. [Not identified] 
5. [Not identified] 
6. His Honour erred by failing to 
find special circumstances 
other than to deal with the 
N/A N/A Judicial reasoning Regarding (Grounds 6, 7, 8): 
 All Grounds Accepted 
 Central to the challenge against the individual sentences and to the 
aggregate sentence is that the sentencing judge was required to 
sentence the applicant by reference to sentencing patterns applicable at 
the time of the offences: R v MJR [2002] NSWCCA 129 [33]. 
o [The Court reviewed a number of unreported cases identified the 
applicant: [38]-[44]. 
o This small sample of cases involving broadly similar sexual offences 
supports the applicant's submission that there has been a significant 
Outcome: 
Grant leave to appeal. 
Appeal allowed and 
sentences quashed, 
re-sentenced. 
 
Limb: N/A 
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camp, the second 
through a Boys’ 
home for wards of 
the state, and the 
third through 
mutual friend.  
 
21 year delay 
accumulation of sentences. 
7. The individual sentences and 
the total effective sentence is 
manifestly excessive. 
8. His Honour erred in the 
manner in which he 
accumulated sentences and 
by failing to give proper 
effect to the principle of 
totality. 
 
upward trend in the length of sentences for offences of this character 
in recent years. [45]. 
 Demonstrated error: 
o Error has been demonstrated in that the overall sentence is outside 
the range when regard is had to the pattern of sentencing of 
paedophile offenders for multiple offences over the period of the 
commission of these offences [45]. 
o The challenge of individual sentences is made good with respect to 
the s 81A offences (Counts 2,4, 6) [46]. 
o Error has also been demonstrated in the structure of the sentences, 
which produced an effective non-parole period that is approximately 
75% of the aggregate sentence. Taking into account the pattern of 
sentences in the period, it was an error not to give effect to the 
finding of special circumstances and therefore fix an effective non-
parole somewhat more in line with the pattern of the time [47]. 
 Error having been established, it is not necessary to deal with the other 
grounds of appeal, save for particular comments [48]. 
 The effect upon the victims: 
o The victim impact statements serve as 'an eloquent reminder, if it 
were needed, of the long-term impact of sexual abuse on children 
and, as MCL puts it, the mental toll that it takes on the victim’ [50]. 
o SP describes his distress at learning that he had been videorecorded 
as a child in a sexually compromising position. PP reports continued 
difficulty in developing appropriate relationships both with men and 
women [50]. 
 [The Court reviewed subjective aspects of the case and character 
affidavits: [55]-[64]. 
 The pleas of guilty followed negotiations and were relatively late; a 
discount of 10% is appropriate [66]. 
 It was submitted that there was evidence towards rehabilitation, the 
pattern f offending having concluded more than 13 years prior to the 
applicant's arrest. Having reviewed the evidence, the applicant's 
likelihood of re-offending is low and his prospects of rehabilitation are 
reasonable [67]. 
 The references to the offence being 'representative of his conduct' are 
to be taken in the context of depriving the offender of a submission that 
the offences were isolated lapses [74]. 
 In the absence of any material relating to the conditions of the 
applicant's confinement, this Court will not accord significant weight to 
the circumstance that the applicant is a protection prisoner [75]. 
 Following the re-sentence, the applicant will be subject to an effective 
non-parole period of 7 years of an aggregate term of 12 years 7 months 
[76]. 
 In relation to counts 1, 2, 4, 5, and 12 the sentences are to be fixed 
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terms without a non-parole period [77]. 
6. Nelson v Regina 
[2007] 
NSWCCA 221 
 
Accused was a 
friend of women 
who had cared for 
complainant at 
children’s home. 
 
30 year delay 
Ground of Appeal against 
sentence by Applicant: 
1. His Honour sentenced on the 
basis that the applicant had 
committed other offences 
against the complainant, in 
the absence of any 
evidentiary foundation for 
that approach. 
2. His Honour gave 
disproportionate weight to 
considerations of general 
deterrence. 
3. His Honour erred in 
characterising the offence as 
mid-range in terms of its 
objective gravity. 
4. The sentence was manifestly 
excessive. 
 
Sentencing without 
evidentiary foundation 
(Ground 1) 
N/A Judicial Reasoning regarding:  
(Ground 1) - Accepted 
 There was no evidence before his Honour of the complainant's date 
of birth, or her age as at December 1971, when the sexual 
relationship commenced [10]. 
 There was nothing to contradict the submission that the sexual 
relationship between them was consensual, up until the complaint 
decided that it was 'adulterous' and she rebuffed the applicant [10]. 
 There was nothing in the Victim Impact Statement that justified the 
conclusion that other offences had been committed [10]. 
 Whilst the ground is made out, it does not follow that a custodial 
sentence should not have been imposed. The complainant regarded 
the applicant's wife as the mother she had always wanted. She longed 
to be part of the applicant's family. Not only did the applicant prey 
upon the complainant's natural affections, but his conduct towards 
her put an end to any prospect of an adoption. When, despite the 
applicant's threats, the complainant reported his behaviour, the 
applicant denied any wrongdoing and the complainant was branded 
as a liar [12]. 
Outcome: 
Leave to appeal 
granted, appeal 
allowed, sentence 
quashed. 
 
Limb: N/A 
98 
7. NWL v Regina 
[2006] NSWCCA 67 
 
Applicant is a golf 
coach of the 
complainant who 
attended his 
classes.  
 
10 year delay 
Grounds of Appeal against 
conviction by Appellant: 
1. The verdicts of the jury on 
Counts 2,3,4,5,6,7,9 and 11 
are unreasonable and cannot 
be supported, having regard 
to the evidence. 
2. The learned judge failed 
adequately to refer to the 
relevant evidence in directing 
the jury on the issue of 
consent as it bore upon the 
aforesaid counts 
3. The learned judge wrongly 
directed and omitted to 
direct, the jury on the issues 
of consent. 
4. The convictions on counts 8, 
10 were unsupported by 
evidence and neither they 
nor count 12 can stand if any 
of the foregoing grounds are 
made good. 
 
Unsupported evidence for 
convictions (Ground 4): 
 It was conceded by the 
Crown that the appeal 
against the conviction 
on count 8 had to 
succeed.  
 With regard to the 
convictions on count 10 
and 12, it was submitted 
on behalf of the 
appellant that there was 
insufficient evidence 
from the complainant to 
enable the jury to be 
satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt that 
the element of the 
offence charged, that 
the appellant had 
‘incited’ the complainant 
to commit an act of 
indecency had been 
proved. Encouragement 
or asking were 
insufficient.  
Judge failed to adequately 
direct jury regarding evidence 
(Grounds 2 & 3): 
 Appellant submission 
 In the summing-up the 
trial judge had wrongly 
conflated the two notions 
of the accused being a 
reluctant participant and 
the accused not 
consenting. The accused 
could have been a 
reluctant participant and 
yet have consented.  
 
Judicial reasoning regarding: 
(Grounds 2 & 3) - Rejected 
 Even if in other contexts ‘reluctance’ might not be inconsistent with 
the giving of consent, in the passage in the present summing-up the 
trial judge, having used the expression ‘reluctant participant’ 
immediately went on to define what he meant by that expression – 
‘in other words he was not consenting’. The trial judge had already 
directed the jury that the Crown had to prove that the complainant 
had not consented, that consent involved conscious and voluntary 
permission by the complainant to the appellant to engage in the 
sexual act and that consent obtained after persuasion was still 
consent.  
 It was submitted that the jury had not been directed that the issue of 
consent had to be considered by them on each count in its context 
and the jury had not been told that they could decide the issue 
differently on different counts. However, the trial judge in his 
summing up had summarised the evidence on each count individually 
and had not been asked by counsel for the appellant at trial to go 
into any further detail.  
(Ground 4) – Rejected 
 In my opinion, on the evidence given by the complainant, which was 
not objected to, that he had been asked or encouraged by the 
appellant to masturbate the appellant, particularly in the context of 
all of the evidence given by the complainant, it was open to the jury 
to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on each of counts 10 and 12 
that the appellant had incited the complainant. 
Outcome: 
Appeal against 
conviction on count 8 
allowed, all others 
dismissed.  
Appeal against 
sentence allowed in 
part. 
 
Limb: 1, 3 
8. Healey v Regina 
[2006] NSWCCA 
235 
 
Appeal against conviction only by 
accused. 
(1) Verdict was unreasonable 
and unsupportable on the 
evidence. 
N/A 
Inappropriate Longman 
direction, inadequate Crofts 
direction. 
 
Judicial reasoning regarding: 
 
(Grounds 3 & 4) - Both Accepted 
 The effect of introducing the notion of disadvantage to the Crown 
through the delay and consequent loss of supportive evidence on its 
part was the risk of thereby enhancing the Crown case impermissibly 
Outcome: 
Appeal Allowed, 
conviction set aside, 
new trial ordered. 
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Nurse at clinic for 
behavioural 
problems. 
  
20 year delay 
(2) Trial judge erred in his 
summation of the case 
because his Honour did not 
put the defence case to the 
jury. 
(3) Trial judge erred by 
extending a Longman 
direction to possible forensic 
disadvantage suffered by the 
Crown.  
(4) The Longman warning was 
inadequate because it failed 
to specifically warn the jury 
about the fragility of youthful 
recollection.  
(5) The trial judge erred by 
failing to direct the jury that 
they needed to be satisfied 
that uncharged criminal 
conduct occurred before they 
could use evidence of the 
conduct against the 
appellant.  
(6) The trial judge erred by (a) 
suggesting to the jury that 
their determination would 
involve accepting one version 
as opposed to the other and 
(b) failing to direct the jury 
that they did not have to 
believe that the appellant 
was telling the truth before 
he was entitled to be 
acquitted.  
(7) The trial judge erred by 
failing to direct the jury that 
rejection of the 
complainant’s motive to lie 
does not mean that the 
complainant is necessarily 
telling the truth. 
(8) The trial judge erred by giving 
an inadequate Crofts 
direction. 
Inappropriate Longman 
Direction (Grounds 3& 4). 
 
Failure to direct jury regarding 
evidentiary standard (Ground 
5) 
 Appellant submission: 
  The Crown led two instances 
of uncharged sexual 
misconduct by the appellant on 
M (complainant). The appellant 
complained that the judge 
omitted to direct the jury that 
they could only use evidence of 
criminal acts against the 
appellant if they were first 
satisfied that the acts occurred.  
Erred in suggestion to jury 
(Ground 6) 
 
Failing to direct jury about 
motive (Ground 7) 
Appellant submitted: 
 M admitted in cross-
examination that both he 
and his de facto wife had 
virtually no assets. They 
had a car each, that was 
all. It was suggested that 
M might have lied for 
financial gain. 
Inadequate Crofts direction 
(Ground 8) 
 The appellant complains 
that the trial judge 
repeated the direction 
about the explicable 
delay in complaint both 
before and after the Croft 
direction and that the 
Crofts direction was 
entirely subsumed by the 
and watering down the effect of the Longman warning. The appellant 
did not receive the benefit of warning having the effect to which he 
was entitled and the Crown received an advantage to which it was 
not entitled.  
 A long period of time elapsed. M was a lad with a troubled history 
and he was of an age where sexual matters were likely to be of great 
interest as he developed. The risk of fantasy and distortion could not 
be ignored. A warning to this effect was justified 
(Ground 5) - Accepted 
 The jury has been told as to the use they could make of evidence of 
uncharged acts of sexual assaults without being told that they have 
to be satisfied that they occurred. There is a real basis for doubting 
whether they did occur. There has been a miscarriage of justice 
 
(Ground 6) - Accepted 
 The judge reminded the jury that the Crown had to prove the case 
beyond reasonable doubt and the jury was warned that it would be 
dangerous to convict on M’s evidence alone. On two occasions the 
judge told the jury that merely because the accused gave evidence 
that did not mean that he had to prove or disprove anything. 
Sometime later in the summing-up the judge instructed the jury that 
before that could accept M’s evidence as establishing beyond 
reasonable doubt that these offences have been committed they 
would have to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that M was 
reliable, accurate, consistent and telling the truth. When the 
summing up is taken as a whole the jury would have understood that 
they had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the accuracy, 
reliability, consistency and truthfulness of M’s evidence before they 
could convict [107].  
 
(Ground 7) - Rejected 
 Having regard to the terms of the summing-up and its emphasis upon 
the Crown having to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and the 
various warnings which were given there was no reasonable 
possibility that the jury might consider that there had been a reversal 
of the onus of proof in relation to the existence of a motive to lie. In 
the circumstances of the present case, the suggested direction was 
not necessary.  
(Ground 8) - Rejected 
 While greater emphasis was given to the explanation for the delay 
than for the delay itself, I do not think that the directions exceeded 
the permissible bounds. The jury were made fully aware of the delay. 
While the issues of delay in complaint was one of the issues relied 
upon by the appellant, the issues relating to the conduct and 
Limb: 1, 3 
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(9) Trial judge erred by failing to 
direct the jury that they 
should disregard evidence 
and arguments concerning 
the inappropriateness of the 
appellant’s conduct. 
 
judge’s remarks about 
why a delay in complaint 
was understandable. The 
complaint was as to a 
lack of balance.  
Failing to direct jury about 
when to disregard evidence 
(Ground 9) 
The appellant submitted that 
the Crown Prosecutor cross-
examined the appellant at 
length and repetitively about 
what as described as 
‘inappropriate conduct’. The 
appellant complained that 
these questions sought to 
emphasise that in forming a 
friendship with M the 
appellant had acted unethically 
and had perpetrated an abuse 
of trust. This generated unfair 
prejudice 
opportunities for the appellant at the clinic were at the center of the 
trial.  
(Ground 9) - Rejected 
 It was not unfairly prejudicial to elicit the prime facts of the meeting 
at Bondi Junction and the trip to his unit and the friendship which 
formed. However, the cross-examination went further in seeking to 
establish, and obtain admissions that the appellant had seriously 
failed in his professional duty… While no objection could correctly be 
taken to the question eliciting primary facts showing the relationship 
between the appellant and M, objection was not taken by the 
appellant’s trial counsel to questions suggesting serious failure of 
professional duty.  
The now challenged evidence having been admitted without objection… it 
is too late for these matters to be raised… The jury would not have 
thought that they were dealing with a case of professional misconduct and 
they were clearly directed as to what the Crown had to prove before they 
could convict the appellant. The unfairly prejudicial portions of cross-
examination and of the prosecutor’s address to which I have referred 
would, to put it mildly, not have helped the appellant when the jury were 
assessing his credit and considering his evidence. 
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9. Orkopoulos v R 
[2009] 
NSWCCA 213 
 
Appellant was a 
councilor and 
member of 
parliament. 
Appellant supplied 
teenage boys with 
drugs and alcohol 
and then engaging 
them in sexual 
acts.  
 
10 year delay 
 
Grounds of Appeal against 
conviction by appellant: 
1. That the verdicts are unsafe 
and unsatisfactory  
2. Judicial failure in giving 
adequate directions 
regarding the tendency 
evidence adduced against 
each complainant in respect 
of the evidence of other 
complainants 
Grounds of appeal against 
sentence by appellant: 
3. The head sentence was 
excessive 
4. Judicial failure to account in 
sentencing for matters 
involving s 78K Crimes Act 
1900 that leniency should be 
granted in circumstances 
where the offence has been 
abolished. 
 Failure to give adequate 
directions to jury  
(Ground 2):  
Appellant submission: 
 Trial judge should have 
directed the jury that they 
must be satisfied of the 
tendency evidence 
beyond reasonable doubt. 
 Trial judge did not make 
specific directions about 
the confined use that the 
jury could make of the 
tendency evidence. 
Judicial Reasoning regarding (Ground 2) - Rejected 
 The summing up of the trial judge directed the jury that they ought 
to be satisfied of the tendency evidence – this direction was 
sufficient.  
The directions were sufficient and were discussed with the parties during 
the trial. 
Outcome: 
Appeal against 
conviction dismissed, 
appeal against 
sentence upheld in 
part, appellant re-
sentenced. 
 
Limb: 1, 3 
Unsuccessful Cases on Appeal  
10. RLS v R [2012] 
NSWCCA 236 
 
The Appellant 
attended the same 
Jehova’s Witness 
Church as the 
complainant’s 
family. Interaction 
with the appellant 
occurred through 
the Church.  
Grounds of appeal against 
sentence by Appellant: 
1. Sentencing judge did not 
properly apply the principle 
of totality 
2. Sentencing judge erred in 
taking into account the 
record of prior convictions as 
an aggravating factor. (Not 
argued at the hearing) 
3. Sentencing judge erred in 
refusing to find special 
circumstances 
N/A N/A 
Held in respect of Ground (1) - Rejected 
 His Honour was required to consider the totality of the criminal 
behavior arising from the child sexual assault offences which were 
before him. In my view it is evidence that he did so. In particular, he 
made specific reference to totality principles, and to the relevant 
authorities, in the course of his reasons. No error is made out.  
Held in respect of Ground (3) - Rejected 
 The principal reason for his Honour declining to make any adjustment 
between the non-parole period and the parole period was because he 
formed the view that the parole period was, of itself, long enough to 
allow for adequate supervision and support. In my view there is nothing 
Outcome: 
Appeal Dismissed. 
 
Limb: N/A 
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25 years (1980 – 
unclear disclosure). 
 
4. Sentence imposed was 
manifestly excessive 
5. Sentencing judge was 
mistaken as to the maximum 
penalty for the child 
pornography offences 
6. Sentencing judge erred in not 
fixing a non-parole period for 
the child pornography 
offence 
7. Sentence for the child 
pornography offences is 
manifestly excessive 
within his Honour’s reasons which would suggesting that his discretion 
miscarriage.  
Held in respect of Ground (4) - Rejected 
 The issue of the sentencing practice which existed at the time of the 
offending was not raised by either party before the sentencing judge. 
The sentencing judge should have taken into account the fact that at 
the time of the offending, and in the absence of any statutory 
restriction being placed upon the length of a non-parole period, the 
practice was to set a non-parole period between one-third and one half 
of the term. His Honour’s failure in this respect amounts to error.  
 However, all the factors of the offences mandated the imposition of a 
significant term of imprisonment. Having regard to all of these errors 
and notwithstanding the error which has been established, I am not of 
the opinion that some other sentence was warranted in law and should 
have been passed. This sentence was not manifestly excessive.  
Held in respect of Ground (5) - Not Decided 
 It is common ground between the parties that having regard to the 
legislative history of s91H under which the applicant was charged, the 
maximum penalty was in fact 5 years imprisonment (sentencing judge 
said that it was 10 years). This establishes an error.  
 I have considered the question of whether some other sentence is 
warranted in law and should have been passed according to ground (7). 
Held in respect of Ground (6) - Not decided 
 The construction of his Honour’s reasons which has been advanced by 
the applicant is, in my view, the only reasonable construction which is 
open. His Honour’s imposition of a fixed term of imprisonment and the 
absence of any variation to the statutory ratio when the sentences are 
considered as a whole are inconsistent with his finding of special 
circumstances. The error is made out but doesn’t necessarily require 
intervention.  
Held in respect of Ground (7) - Rejected 
 The applicant’s commission of the child pornography offences came 
against a background of offending in a manner which exhibited an illegal 
sexual interest in teenage boys. The plea of guilty was hardly entered at 
an early time.  
 The possession of child pornography is an important contributing 
element to the general problem which exists in the community arising 
from the creating and distribution of child pornography.  
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This offence, particularly at a time when the offender was still on parole 
for the previous offences, reflects a degree of recidivism as far as his 
criminal sexual interest in children is concerned. Persons who yield to such 
an interest, particularly if they have a history of doing so in one form or 
another, should expect significant punishment. For these reasons, and 
notwithstanding the identified errors on the part of the sentencing judge, I 
am not satisfied that any lesser sentence was warranted in law. 
11. Regina v PFC 
[2011]  
NSWCCA 117 
 
Respondent took 
on mentoring role 
for complainant 
who was 
experiencing family 
dysfunctions. 
Complainant came 
into respondent’s 
care with approval 
of the Department 
of Community 
Services.  
Grounds of appeal against 
sentence by Crown:  
1. Judicial error in failing to 
order an effective degree of 
partial accumulation, thus 
resulting in an overall 
sentence that fails to 
adequately reflect the 
totality of the respondent’s 
criminality. 
2. Judicial failure to properly 
assess the objective 
seriousness of the pervert 
the course of justice offences 
and erred in taking into 
account that the pervert the 
course of justice offences did 
not ultimately result in any 
miscarriage of justice. 
3. Judicial error in imposing an 
effective total term and 
effective non-parole period 
which were manifestly 
inadequate. 
 
N/A N/A 
Held in respect of Grounds (1) and (3) - Rejected 
 The sheer number and seriousness of the offences meant that some 
degree of concurrency and partial accumulation was inevitable. His 
Honour was required to take into account that a number of the 
offences were interrelated.  
 Appropriate sentences are to be passed in respect of each offence 
but then the sentencing judge needs to apply the complementary 
principles of proportionality and totality in order to formulate a final 
sentence which is appropriate for the totality of the criminality. To 
accumulate all of those offences which involved different 
complainants and different periods of time would produce a total 
sentence which was crushing.  
 Once a sentencing judge has set individual sentences for each 
offence, the questions of accumulation and/or concurrence are 
discretionary matters… The process followed by his honour of setting 
discrete sentences for each offence and then determining the overall 
sentence so as to have regard to proportionality and totality was fully 
in accord with principle and authority. In any event, the total 
sentence passed was a not insignificant one [63]. 
Held in respect of Ground (2) - Rejected 
 His Honour did err in taking in to account on the question of 
objective seriousness, the fact that the acts intended to pervert the 
course of justice did not succeed. This, however, does not end the 
matter. Even though his Honour erred in taking that matter into 
account when assessing objective seriousness, the sentences 
imposed were still well within the range available and have not been 
challenged by the Crown.  
Outcome: 
Crown appeal against 
sentence dismissed. 
 
Limb: N/A 
12. Makarov v R 
(No 2) [2008] 
NSWCCA 292 
 
Grounds of Appeal against 
conviction only by accused. 
(1) The trial miscarried and there 
was a miscarriage of justice 
as a result of the perjury of A 
Admission of context 
evidence at issue. 
 
Failure to adequately direct 
jury (Ground 6): 
Appellant’s submission: 
 The Appellant complains 
about the way in which the 
Judicial reasoning in regards to: 
 
(Ground 6 & 7) - Rejected 
 The Crown submissions were both open on the evidence and 
Outcome: 
Appeal against 
conviction Dismissed. 
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Foreign music 
teacher, 
complainants (A) 
were his students.  
 
7 year delay 
(complainant) committed 
against the Appellant during 
the trial in relation to the 
evidence concerning the 
exclusively professional 
(musical, psychological and 
psychiatric) issues. 
(2) The trial miscarried and there 
was a miscarriage of justice 
as a result of the false 
testimony under oath that 
both A and Mr W Thomson 
committed against the 
Appellant during proceedings 
in relation to the date of A’s 
very last performance in 
Sydney in July 1997.  
(3) The trial miscarried and there 
was a miscarriage of justice 
as a result of the false 
testimony under oath that 
both A and Mr W Thomson 
committed against the 
Appellant during proceedings 
in relation to the reasons and 
circumstances of A’s moving 
from Mr Thomson’s place to 
the Appellant’s place in 
October 1999.  
(4) The trial miscarried and there 
was a miscarriage of justice 
as a result of the trial judge 
and Crown Prosecutor’s 
misconduct in relation to the 
evidence of the Appellant 
concerning the reasons and 
circumstances of A’s moving 
from Mr Thomson’s place to 
the Appellant’s place in 
October 1999.  
(5) The “fresh” evidence as a 
proof of the fact that the 
verdicts of the jury had been 
reached on the grounds of 
Failure to prove elements to 
requisite standard (Ground 7) 
Appellant submits:  
 That the crown failed to 
prove the elements to the 
requisite standard of proof. 
They also submitted that 
the Crown unfairly attacked 
the applicant’s character 
during cross-examination.  
Crown’s submissions: 
 The trial prosecutor was 
not unfairly discrediting 
witnesses in her address to 
the jury, and in suggesting 
that the witnesses were 
not impartial, the Crown 
was accurately 
summarising the effect of 
the evidence. The crown 
submits that the passages 
relied upon by the 
appellant do not 
demonstrate that the 
Crown attacked his 
character, nor raised 
evidence of bad character 
in the trial.  
 
Failing to reject context 
evidence (Ground 10) 
Appellant submissions: 
 The appellant submits that 
evidence of sexual acts 
toward the complainant 
outside of the Australian 
jurisdiction should be 
excluded.  
 Contends that context 
evidence could only be 
introduced on the basis of 
Crown Prosecutor referred 
to Exhibit 1 in her closing 
address to the jury [101]. 
 The Appellant complains 
that the Crown Prosecutor’s 
address completely 
distorted the essence of the 
evidence in Exhibit 1. It had 
not been the aim of the 
Appellant to show complete 
45-minute lessons. The 
Appellant had edited 18 
master tapes and made a 
videotape of short duration 
especially for the court 
proceedings. The Appellant 
submitted that the Crown 
had misled the jury by 
suggesting that the jury 
“might get a very distorted 
impression” and by 
suggesting that the 
“movements in and out” of 
the room had been 
selectively recorded.  
 
Crown’s submission:  
 The Crown submits that the 
arguments of the Crown 
Prosecutor on this issue 
were entirely appropriate. It 
was consistent with 
evidence of A to the effect 
that “the video [has] been 
compiled especially to fish 
out those interruptions” and 
“every excerpt of every 
student has people coming 
in, that is definitely not the 
frequency people were 
coming in” (T55). The 
Appellant’s evidence was to 
a similar effect (T146, T168-
169, T184).  
appropriate; there was no breach of the principles enunciated in R v 
Livermore (2006) 76 NSWLR 659, nor of the prosecutor's duties [105], 
[111], [123]-[124]. 
 The comments of the Crown were not raising bad character. It is 
clear that one of the issues in the trial was the extent to which the 
Appellant exercised a degree of control over A, which may throw 
light upon the circumstances in which the offences charged were said 
to have occurred, his ability to continue to perform as a concert 
pianist and A’s reasons for not making earlier complaint with respect 
to them [128]. 
 The use of the word 'harem' was unfortunate but it was not repeated 
and was withdrawn [135]. 
 
(Ground 10) - Rejected 
 The ground is misconceived. The law does not provide that sexual 
acts must occur within New South Wales before evidence of them is 
admissible as context evidence [155]. 
 The appellant does not contend that the context evidence should not 
have been admitted for any other reason [156]. 
 The trial judge gave clear directions to the jury concerning the 
permitted use of context evidence at the time it was led from A, and 
again during the summing up. No further direction was sought by 
defence counsel in this respect. No error has been established nor 
has a miscarriage of justice been demonstrated [157]. 
Limb: 1, 3 
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the false evidence that A and 
Mr Thomson provided under 
oath during proceedings in 
relation to the “relationship” 
evidence and Counts 1-9.  
(6) Both the trial judge and 
Crown Prosecutor failed 
adequately to direct the jury 
in relation to:  
a. (i) an examination the area of 
the musical performing under 
stress [sic]; (ii) an examination 
of the evidence of the 
Defence’s witnesses, Mr Virag 
and Mr Novikov; (iii) the 
Exhibit 1 [video recordings of 
the piano lessons 
interruptions in Room 34 of 
the Kharkov Music School in 
Ukraine]; (iv) the legal 
concept of the Crown 
Prosecutor’s status.  
(7) The trial miscarried and there 
was a miscarriage of justice 
as a result of the nature and 
quality of the evidence relied 
upon by the trial Crown 
Prosecutor and violation by 
the trial Crown Prosecutor of 
the legal principles of burden 
of proof, proof, standard of 
proof and presumption of 
innocence.  
(8) The trial miscarried and there 
was a miscarriage of justice 
as a result of unfair conduct 
by the trial Crown Prosecutor 
in relation to the trial 
separation rule.  
(9) The acquittal of the Appellant 
on Count 9 as a proof of the 
jurors’ reasonable doubt 
concerning A’s credibility and 
truthfulness.  
legal investigation in 
Ukraine. [151] As the 
alleged acts had not been 
investigated in Ukraine, it 
ought not to have been 
admitted. [152]  
 
Crown’s Submissions: 
 Submits that the 
Appellant’s argument is 
misconceived. There is 
no requirement that the 
conduct must occur 
within the NSW 
jurisdiction before it can 
be admitted into context 
evidence. Further, there 
is no requirement that 
the admission purpose 
of this evidence be for 
official investigation 
before it can be 
admitted. [153] the 
Crown further submitted 
that the trial judge gave 
very clear directions to 
the jury regarding the 
permitted use of this 
evidence at the time it 
was lead. [154]. 
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(10) The trial judge erred in failing 
to reject the context 
evidence, which had been 
related to the jurisdiction of 
Ukraine and had not been 
investigated by Australian or 
Ukrainian police on the 
territory of Ukraine.  
(11) The trial judge erred in failing 
to provide for the Appellant, 
as a former foreigner with 
English as a second language 
an access to an interpreter 
through the simultaneous 
headphone translation or 
proper conditions for 
simultaneous translation of 
interpreter - with the 
intervals for translation - that 
international law and 
standards required.  
(12) The trial miscarried and there 
was a miscarriage of justice 
as a result of improper 
investigation, DPP and Crown 
Prosecutor conducted in 
relation to the time of the 
essence of the Offences 4-8, 
that caused a misconduct of 
the trial judge and Crown 
Prosecutor on the same 
issue. 
13. Kamm v R 
[2008] NSWCCA 
290 
 
Leader of religious 
community. 
 
9 year delay 
Grounds of Appeal against 
conviction only by accused.  
(1) The trial miscarried because 
counsel for the appellant did 
not answer serious 
allegations of impropriety 
made against him by a 
witness during examination. 
(2) The trial miscarried because 
the prosecution asked 
questions of the 
Improper questions posed to 
witness (Ground 3): 
 The prosecutor’s cross-
examination of a witness 
(assistant of the appellant 
and member of the 
religious community of 
which the appellant was 
the head) should not have 
been permitted to the 
extent that the witness was 
N/A Judicial reasoning regarding (Ground 3) - Rejected 
 (per Giles JA [57]): 
 The cross-examination had substantial probative value in questioning 
the witness’s credibility [57]. 
 There was no outweighing danger of unfairness to the appellant [57]. 
The jury would not have thought any less of the appellant simply through 
it being shown that the witness was one of the appellant’s “queens” [57]. 
Outcome: 
Dismissed. 
 
Limb: 3 
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complainant’s mother in 
cross-examination that were 
either irrelevant or lacked 
substantial probative value 
and which in any event were 
offensive such that they 
caused unfair prejudice to 
the appellant. 
(3) The trial miscarried because 
the prosecution asked 
questions of a witness which 
were irrelevant or which 
lacked substantial probative 
value and which in any event 
were offensive and caused 
unfair prejudice to the 
appellant. 
asked about whether she 
was one of the appellant’s 
“queens” / “mystical 
spouses” (sexual partners) 
and was prepared to lie for 
the appellant [53]. 
 The cross-examination 
lacked substantial 
probative value and 
unfairly prejudiced the 
appellant in creating a 
“very dark cloud of 
suspicion” over him [53]. 
 
14. Kamm, William 
v Regina [2007] 
NSWCCA 201 
 
Leader of religious 
community. 
 
9 year delay 
Appeal against conviction and 
sentence by accused.  
(1) The trial judge erred in 
permitting the Crown 
Prosecutor to amend the 
indictment, following the 
close of the Crown case and 
during the presentation of 
evidence for the defence, by 
changing the terms of count 
4 on the indictment, in such a 
manner that it required the 
applicant to be re-arraigned 
in relation to that count 
alone (at [26]).  
(2) The trial proceedings on 
count 4 were a nullity in that, 
following the re-arraignment 
of the appellant on that 
count, he was never put in 
charge of the jury, nor were 
the jury ever properly sworn 
by being required to take an 
oath to bring in a verdict 
according to the evidence on 
that count (at [26]). 
N/A Inadequate judicial direction 
to jury and failure to discharge 
jury 
(Grounds 3 & 4) 
Appellant submission: 
 That, in order to avoid at 
least the perception of an 
unfair trial, the judge had 
no option but to 
discharge the jury: R v. 
Maric (1978) 52 ALJR 
631[46].  
 The manner in which the 
appellant’s defence was 
prejudiced was 
irremediable. “A” was the 
most important witness 
for the appellant, since 
her evidence called into 
question the 
complainant’s evidence 
on count 4, the most 
serious charge [47].  
 The jury’s note indicated 
more than an observation 
Judicial reasoning:  
(Ground 4) - Rejected 
 There was plainly nothing improper in the conduct of the jury [49]. 
 Juries are correctly encouraged to observe witnesses giving evidence so 
they can assess their reliability, and are entitled to observe and take 
into account what witnesses say and do when they are not actually 
giving evidence: cf. Government Insurance Office of NSW v. Bailey 
(1992) 27 NSWLR 304 at 314 [50]. 
 If what is observed was not in view of Counsel, then it may be necessary 
that it be disclosed and dealt with by evidence and/or submissions: R v. 
Martin (2000) 78 SASR 140 at [34]; R v. White (1987) 49 SASR 154 [50]. 
 It is inevitable that jurors will sometimes form impressions of witnesses 
as they give evidence, and sometimes ones the judge would disagree 
with [52]. 
 The assessment of witnesses is a matter for the jury; and the fact that 
jurors may form impressions about witnesses as a case proceeds, is not 
a reason for thinking they will not do their duty and come to a 
conclusion at the end of the case having regard to all the evidence, and 
if appropriate, revise impressions formed earlier [52]. 
 If the judge is told by the jury of observations that the judge thinks are 
highly improbable, it may be appropriate for the judge to express his 
view and warn the jury against acting on those observations [53]. 
 In this case, if anything, the judge’s directions were too favourable to 
the appellant, in that they gave an unequivocal direction that the 
observations had no relevance and that the jury should disregard them 
[54].  
Outcome: 
Dismissed. 
 
Limb: 1, 2, 3 
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(3) The trial proceedings 
miscarried, and the judge 
erred in failing to discharge 
the jury, after the jury sent in 
a note, during the course of 
defence evidence, disclosing 
the fact that one or more 
members of the jury had 
formed the view that a 
witness called by the defence 
was being "coached" by 
another defence witness 
[26]. 
(4) The directions given by the 
trial judge seeking to address 
the problem created by the 
jury’s action in ground three 
above was inadequate and 
insufficient to overcome the 
overwhelming prejudice and 
unfairness created by their 
action. The perception of 
prejudgment by the jury of 
the weight to be given to 
evidence given by witnesses 
for the defence was in all the 
circumstances irremediable 
[26]. 
(5) The verdicts of the jury on all 
of the counts on the 
indictment are unreasonable 
having regard to the 
evidence [26]. 
about a witness, namely a 
conclusion she was doing 
something improper, 
thus indicating a real risk 
of pre-judgment on an 
important matter that 
went to the fairness of 
the trial [48].  
Despite the directions given by 
the judge, there remained a 
perception that the jury had 
pre-judged the matter 
unfavorably to the appellant 
[48]. 
The fact that the jury drew the judge’s attention to the matter, rather than 
indicating prejudice or pre-judgment suggests that the jury was very 
concerned to act fairly, and to obtain guidance from the judge. It should 
not be assumed that the jury did not act on the judge’s directions: Gilbert v 
The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 414 at 425 [54]. 
15. R v Fletcher 
[2005] NSWCCA 
338 
 
Church based 
15 year delay. 
Appeal against conviction only by 
accused.  
(1) “The learned trial judge 
erred in law in admitting 
the evidence of [GG], 
because: 
a. it was not tendency evidence 
within the meaning of the Evidence 
Act s97; 
b. it did not have significant probative 
Admission of tendency 
evidence (Ground 1): 
 The appellant argued that 
the evidence of GG was not 
admissible under s97 
because [53]: 
(1) “It did not have 
significant probative 
Misdirection of Jury as to use 
of tendency evidence (Ground 
2)  
 
Judicial Reasoning regarding (Ground 1):  
(per Simpson J with whom McClellan CJ at CL agreed): 
 In Mickelberg v The Queen [1989] HCA 35; 167 CLR 259 the decision 
made by the trial judge was made prospectively, on the basis of the 
statements before him, including the statements of the complainant.  
 Hence, to establish a “wrong decision of [a] question of law” in these 
circumstances, it would be necessary that the appellant show that 
the decision to admit the evidence was wrong at the time it was 
Outcome: 
By Majority Appeal 
Dismissed. 
Limb: N/A 
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value; 
c. the probative value of the 
evidence did not 
substantially outweigh its 
prejudicial effect on the 
appellant (s101); 
d. there was no ground for its 
admission. 
(2) If the evidence of [GG] was 
admissible (which the 
appellant denies) the 
learned trial judge erred in 
law in directing the jury that 
the evidence could be used 
as showing a tendency to 
commit each and all of the 
offences charged in the 
indictment and its use 
should have been confined 
to showing a tendency to 
commit the offence the 
subject of Count 4.” 
 
value. 
(2) The probative value of 
the evidence did not 
substantially outweigh 
the prejudice to the 
accused. 
(3) It was evidence of two 
acts of one specific sort 
remote in time and 
circumstance from any 
of the acts charged. The 
only similarity at all was 
to the single act charged 
in Count 4. It was too 
remote in time and 
circumstance to be 
admissible as evidence 
relevant to Count 4. 
Even if admissible in 
respect of the act 
alleged in Count 4, it was 
irrelevant to all the 
other counts and its use 
as tendency evidence 
should have been 
restricted to Count 4. 
(4) The evidence did not 
pass the stringent test 
posed by s101(2) and 
therefore could not have 
survived the narrow 
‘unfair prejudice’ test in 
s135 or s137. 
(5) Had the appellant been 
charged with the two 
offences alleged by [GG], 
made.  
 it is implicit in the decision that the judge concluded that the 
evidence of GG in the two paragraphs of his statement that he 
admitted was capable of rationally affecting the probability of the 
existence of a fact in issue, and that, in the light of other evidence he 
anticipated would be adduced (presumably, principally, that of the 
complainant), he assessed that the jury would ascribe to it significant 
probative value.  
 In order properly to determine the ground as pleaded, this court 
really should have access to the actual material that was before the 
trial judge, and not the evidence that was subsequently given in the 
trial.  
 If, on that material, it was open to the judge to make the assessment 
that he did (and no error of the House kind is demonstrated), then this 
ground of appeal must be rejected [39]-[40]. 
 There is no error in the (implicit) conclusion that the jury would ascribe 
to the evidence significant probative value [68]. 
 Equally plainly, however, the evidence had a significant prejudicial 
effect.  
 The question which arises under s101(2) (as it has been construed) is 
whether the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed 
the prejudice to the appellant.  
 If, in the trial judge’s view, it did not, then pursuant to s101(2) (on the 
conventional construction), he was obliged to reject it.  
 That exercise, involved the judge putting himself, so far as he could, in 
the shoes of the jury, and predicting what use they would make of it 
[69]. 
 If the evidence had been limited to the bald assertions of sexual 
intercourse contained in the two paragraphs which the trial judge 
specifically mentioned, then it may be that the probative value did not 
substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect.  
 However, the circumstances that allowed the evidence to pass the 
s97(1) test were also material in this evaluation.  
 The prejudicial effect was significant, but it was open to the judge to 
conclude that the prejudicial effect was substantially outweighed by 
the probative value.  
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it is highly likely he 
would have succeeded in 
an application to have 
the [GG] charges tried 
separately from the 
[charges concerning the 
complainant], because 
evidence of the former 
would not get in as 
evidence of the latter. 
(6) The effect of the 
evidence was to permit 
evidence of irrelevant 
bad character to taint 
the jury’s deliberations 
and to deprive the 
appellant of the real 
chance of an acquittal on 
each charge.” 
Crown submission:  
 The DPP’s explanation, 
provided to the appellant’s 
legal advisors, shows that 
the “tendency” which it 
sought to establish was 
wider, and more detailed.  
 The DPP sought to 
establish a pattern of 
behaviour, or even a 
modus operandi, in the 
appellant’s behaviour. This 
included the use of his 
position as parish priest in 
meeting Catholic families 
and involving himself in 
their lives, developing a 
 There was thus no error of law in the decision to admit the evidence 
[70]. 
Held (Ground 1) per Rothman J - Accepted 
 Even the use of the evidence of prior conduct for the purpose set out in 
paragraph 137(b) would be impermissible because the tests in s.98 and 
s.101(2) have not been satisfied [138].  
 In the current proceedings, the evidence would be admissible, subject to 
the operation of s.137 of the Act, only for the purpose expressed in the 
direction in sub-paragraph (c) above, because, as previously outlined, the 
evidence, although relevant, is not admissible under s.97 or s.98 and 
cannot be used, even if admitted, for that purpose or effect because of 
the operation of s.101(2) of the Act.  
 It would be then extraordinary for the evidence, in those circumstances, 
to be admitted even on the narrower basis in paragraph (c) above [139]. 
 The trial judge has allowed the tendency evidence to be used in an 
impermissible manner and, even though it would, on the above analysis, 
possibly be admissible for a different use, it would need to be, and was 
not, subject to specific directions to the jury as to its use nor was it 
subjected to s.137 of the Act [140].  
 There is clearly more than sufficient evidence upon which the appellant 
could have been convicted and, assuming the complainant were to be 
believed, would have been convicted.  
 This is so even disregarding the evidence sought to be impugned in this 
appeal.  
 The problem is that the effect of the tendency evidence admitted was to 
taint the deliberations of the jury by using the evidence in a manner it 
could not legitimately do.  
 In those circumstances, the only proper course is for there to be a new 
trial on the charges [142]. 
 
Judicial Reasoning regarding (Ground 2):  
(per Simpson J with whom McClellan CJ at CL agreed): 
 Rejected 
 Despite the complaint about directions contained in the ground as 
framed, the substance of this ground is the admission of the evidence 
of GG in relation to all counts in the indictment.  
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special relationship with 
the families, the children of 
the families, and in 
particular with a child the 
focus of his attention; and 
the introduction of the 
child to sexually explicit 
material and, eventually, 
inappropriate sexual 
behavior [67]. 
 Since in considering the above ground it was concluded that the 
evidence was admissible in relation to all counts, it follows that this 
ground cannot succeed [73]. 
16. Regina v AEL 
[2005] NSWCCA 
148 
 
Leader of a 
spiritual discussion 
group which the 
complainant 
attended. Had 
relations with each 
other over 20 
years.  
 
Second 
complainant: 12 
years 
 
Appeal against sentence only by 
accused.  
1. The sentencing judge erred in 
pronouncing that aggravated 
indecent assault was an 
offence for which the 
authorities and sentencing 
precedents require the 
imposition of prison 
sentences. 
The sentence imposed for count 2 
was manifestly excessive. 
N/A N/A 
Held in respect of ground (1): 
 Rejected 
 It may be accepted, as argued at first instance, that indecent assault 
generally or in its aggravated form does not necessarily require the 
imposition of a custodial sentence. [11]-[12] 
 His Honour's words meant no more than that by reference to the 
authorities and the precedents, and looking at the facts of the case, a 
custodial sentence was necessary. [14] 
 In the circumstances, however, any sentence less than one of full 
time custody for theses serious offences would have been 
inadequate. [12] 
Held in respect of ground (2):  
 Rejected 
 The sentencing judge was entitled to take a 'particularly strong view' 
on count 2 [17]. 
o (i) The complainant was the daughter of the applicant subject to 
his control and the offence was accordingly a 'very gross breach 
of trust' [17]. 
o (ii) This was not an isolated offence; one of the Victorian 
offences, with which the sentence was made partly concurrent, 
was for an indecent assault the applicant perpetrated during 
1987 and 1988 [17]. 
o (iii) The complainant suffered 'substantial psychological damage' 
[18]. 
o (iv) Courts have often observed the difficult of drawing anything 
but broad conclusions from sentencing statistics. Here, they only 
suggest that the sentence imposed was high in the range of 
existing sentences [19]. 
o (v) The net effect of the sentences was to increase the non-parole 
Outcome: 
Dismissed 
Limb: N/A 
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period by a little over 9 months and the head sentence by about 
2½ years. These periods are 'no inconsiderable' for a man of the 
applicant's age and health. However, it is not suggested that the 
applicant will be unable to receive proper medical attention by 
virtue of incarceration [20]. 
 The appeal should be dismissed on account of: 
 the 'very serious nature and consequences' of the offence; and [19]. 
 the fact that it cannot be said that the applicant's age and state of 
health were such as to render impermissible the resulting extension 
of the period of incarceration [21]. 
17. BJS v R [2013] 
NSWCCA 123 
 
Former catholic 
priest welcomed 
into the homes of 
the victims by their 
Catholic parents. 
He took advantage 
of his 
position/status by 
befriending the 
parents and often 
attending their 
homes, and staying 
overnight. 
Appeal against conviction and 
sentence by accused.  
Against conviction: 
(1) The sentencing judge erred in 
ordering that all of the 
counts of each complainant 
be tried together; 
(2) The sentencing judge erred in 
permitting the Crown to rely 
upon tendency evidence; 
(3) The sentencing judge erred in 
finding hypnosis evidence to 
be irrelevant to the issue of 
two witnesses' reliability and 
thus he refused to exclude 
the evidence. 
(4) The sentencing judge erred in 
upholding an objection 
preventing the defendant 
being permitted to cross-
examine CP (witness claiming 
to also have beeen assaulted 
by appellant) and MG 
(complainant) about the 
content of the counselling 
sessions. 
(5) The sentencing judge erred in 
excluding expert evidence in 
the defence case bearing 
upon the reliability of 
witnesses MG and CP. 
(6) The sentencing judge erred in 
refusing to discharge the jury 
Multiple, including admission 
and use of 
tendency/coincidence 
evidence. 
 
Regarding tendency and 
coincidence evidence: 
(Ground 2) 
Appellant submitted that:  
 The tendency evidence 
did not have the 
requisite significant 
probative value that 
substantially 
outweighed any 
prejudicial effect on the 
accused.  
 The tendency sought to 
be proved was that: 
o the Appellant had a 
tendency to have a 
sexual interest in 
girls aged 7-17 
o the Appellant used 
his position of 
authority and 
relationships with 
families to gain 
access to girls whom 
he wished to engage 
in sexual activities  
Multiple, including direction to 
jury re use of tendency 
/coincidence evidence. 
 
Misdirection regarding expert 
evidence (Ground 4)  
Appellant submitted: 
 This ground relates to the 
matters covered by 
grounds 3 & 5. The judge 
incorrectly directed that 
Mr Lyleson’s counselling 
notes regarding MG 
should not be produced 
because they did not pass 
the communication 
privilege provisions test 
(ss 295 - 300 of the Act). 
 The trial miscarried 
because the 
examination/cross-
examination of CP and 
MG concerning their 
psychological counselling 
sessions was not 
permitted and the cross-
examination of Mr 
Lyleson and Ms Schaan as 
well as the calling of Dr 
Judicial reasoning regarding Tendency and Coincidence evidence (Ground 
2) - Rejected 
 The sentencing judge’s summary of the tendency evidence was 
accurate – he focused on the consistency of the relevant tendency, 
not the factual differences. 
 The sentencing judge was well aware of the risk of contamination 
and excluded some proposed tendency evidence on this basis. 
 The sibling relationships in question did no more than establish a 
mere speculative chance of concoction, and any publicity was limited 
in its terms. 
 
Judicial reasoning regarding expert evidence on hypnosis (Grounds 3 & 5) 
- Rejected 
 The recollections of MG and CP were never forgotten and were 
reported to witnesses before undergoing therapy. They were not 
dealing with the issue of recovered memory. 
 Further, Mr Lyleson and Mrs Schaan denied engaging in hypnotic 
techniques. It was speculative on the part of Dr Roberts to assert that 
because certain techniques described by Ms Schaan ‘could’ be 
associated with hypnosis, that this was so.  
 There was no attempt to enhance or recover any memory for either 
witness and Dr Roberts was not able to explain how hypnosis might 
adversely affect a witness’s memory where the hypnosis was not 
directed towards that memory. 
 The judge looked at the probative value of the evidence of MG and 
CP, and balanced that against its prejudicial effect. He also went 
further and made an assessment of the reliability of the evidence, a 
step which on one view of s137 he should not have taken (should be 
a matter for the jury) but which could only favour the Appellant. 
Judicial reasoning regarding misdirection (Ground 4): Rejected 
Outcome: 
Grounds 1-9 appeal 
dismissed. Leave to 
appeal ground 10 
granted but appeal 
dismissed. 
 
Limb: 2, 3 
113 
in circumstances where the 
Crown was permitted to 
adduce evidence of the 
psychiatric history of witness 
"Y" (CP) despite the judge’s 
earlier ruling that such 
evidence was not relevant to 
the issues to be tried. 
(7) The sentencing judge erred in 
ruling that the Crown 
Prosecutor be permitted to 
cross-examine the Appellant. 
(8) That sentencing judge erred 
in refusing to discharge the 
jury consequent upon 
permitting the Crown 
Prosecutor to cross-examine 
the Appellant as to tendency. 
(9) That sentencing judge erred 
in directing the jury after 
they commenced their 
deliberations that they could 
"reluctantly agree" as to their 
verdict. 
 
Against sentence: 
(10) The sentence imposed was 
too severe. 
 
o that the particular 
activities he 
attempted to 
engage in were 
similar 
 There were substantial 
differences in the 
behaviour alleged by 
each of the 
complainants – different 
sexual forms of 
offending alleged to 
have been committed 
upon girls of different 
ages in a variety of 
circumstances. 
 A risk of 
contamination/concocti
on of the evidence – 
sibling relationship 
between some of the 
complainants and 
tendency witnesses and 
media reporting. 
 
Expert evidence regarding 
hypnosis (Grounds 3 & 5) 
Appellant submission put 
forward that: 
 The sentencing judge 
had not properly applied 
s137 of the Evidence Act 
to the evidence of MG 
and CP who had 
undertaken treatment 
with psychologists CP 
(Mr Lyleson and Mrs 
Schaan) which was akin 
to hypnosis and he had 
not taken into account 
the effect of hypnosis on 
Roberts should also be 
allowed. 
 CP and MG were the only 
witnesses hypnotised and 
allowing their evidence to 
be given in the trial as 
tendency evidence would 
create an unfair prejudice 
to the accused because 
he would not be able to 
cross-examine them 
about the fact that they 
had been hypnotised and 
would not be able to 
suggest to them that 
because of that 
hypnotism their 
memories of what 
occurred were affected. 
Trial judge erred in directing 
jury to “reluctantly agree” to a 
verdict (Ground 9) 
 The sentencing judge 
referred to ‘reluctant’ 
agreement, giving 
analogies of when 
someone might agree to 
something reluctantly. 
The analogies might have 
distorted the reasoning 
process followed by the jury. 
 For the same reasons set out for rejecting Grounds 3 & 5, the 
sentencing judge was correct in not allowing these documents to be 
tendered in evidence. The probative value of the counselling notes 
was of a very low order and could not be characterised as having 
"substantial probative value". 
 There is no evidence to suggest that either of the witnesses has a 
false or entrenched memory as a result of hypnotism. 
 The evidence that could be given by Mr Lyleson, Mr Schaan or Dr 
Roberts could not do anything more than raise a bare possibility that 
their memories may have been affected in some way. 
Judicial reasoning regarding misdirection to jury about verdict (Ground 
9): Rejected 
 Whilst the analogies were not helpful and had the potential to 
be misunderstood by the jury, the judge’s direction, as a whole, 
reminded the jury of the standard of proof and did not 
disadvantage the Appellant. 
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the probative value of 
their evidence. 
 The opinion of Dr 
Roberts shows that the 
process of hypnosis is 
prone to creating 
memories of events that 
may not have occurred, 
to distorting 
recollections and to 
make evidence 
unreliable, even when 
hypnosis may not have 
been directed to 
treating those 
memories. 
 Therefore, the probative 
value of the evidence 
given by MG and CP was 
seriously reduced, so as 
not to satisfy the 
balancing test required 
by s137. 
Non-historical child sexual abuse Cases 
Successful cases on Appeal 
18. Cross v R [2012] 
NSWCCA 114 
 
 
Applicant operated 
a sporting school, 
the victim 
attended. 
 
Grounds of Appeal against 
sentence:  
(1) Sentencing judge erred when 
imposing a fixed term for 
Count 1. 
(2) Sentencing judge erred by 
misdirecting himself as to the 
correct maximum penalty for 
Count 2 and so fell into error 
in arriving at an appropriate 
sentence for the offence. 
(3) The overall sentence was 
manifestly excessive.  
N/A Trial judge misdirected himself 
(Ground 2) 
 
Judicial Reasoning regarding (Ground 2) - Ground of appeal not decided – 
considered in light of ground - Accepted 
 In his sentencing remarks, the sentencing judge mentioned that the 
maximum penalty was 15 years for Count 2. In fact, the correct 
maximum penalty was 10 years before the offences were committed 
before the maximum penalty was raised.  
The Crown accepted that this was a material error but claimed that a less 
severe sentence than that which was handed out was not warranted [37]. 
Outcome: 
Leave to appeal granted,  
Appeal allowed. 
Sentences quashed, 
appellant  
re-sentenced.  
 
Limb: N/A 
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19. R v Woods 
[2009] 
NSWCCA 55 
 
Appellant was a 
youth liaison 
officer and 
coached a sporting 
team which the 
complainant was a 
member. 
 
No Delay 
 
Appeal by crown and appellant 
respond 
 Grounds:  
1. (1) Sentence was manifestly 
inadequate.  
 
N/A N/A Judicial reasoning for sentence –  
 Accepted 
 The manner in which the Judge chose to group the offences was 
appropriate to the circumstances of this case [47]. 
 In the sentencing remarks, it appears that the absence of aggravating 
features in relation to the offences justifies a downward revision in 
the assessment of objective gravity. ‘The logical extension of this 
proposition is that the greater the number of aggravating actors 
missing from the commission of a child sexual assault offence, the 
lower will be its objective criminality. This is problematic, to say the 
least [52]. 
 ‘The structure of the offences and the legislative policies 
underpinning them, assume that young children are not capable, by 
and large, of understanding the significance of sexual activity (hence 
the absence of informed consent) or of asserting their will over that 
of an adult. How then, can the fact that a victim co-operates with an 
offender be relevant to an assessment of the objective gravity of an 
offence of this type? That is not to say that evidence of a victim’s 
resistance and/or an offender’s efforts to restrain a victim are not 
relevant to an assessment of objective gravity for offences of this 
type. Such a circumstance would aggravate a child sexual assault 
offence. But the absence of struggle or resistance (that is, the child’s 
co-operation) cannot in our view, mitigate such an offence’ [53]. 
 ‘The judge’s assessment of the criminality inherent in the offence… 
was generous to the respondent… This offence should have attracted 
a more significant penalty than imposed by the judge’ [56]. 
‘The fact is that almost every charge of a sexual nature against the 
respondent was based solely upon admissions made by him during the 
record of interview with the police… It is a well-established principle that a 
significant discount on sentence should be allowed in relation to a person 
who comes forward and admits to offences which the authorities would 
not otherwise have known about… The discount applied by the Judge did 
not adequately reflect the degree of assistance given by the respondent n 
this case. A discount of 40% would more appropriately reflect the 
combination of the respondent’s early plea of guilty and his significant 
assistance to the authorities’ [70]. 
Outcome: 
Appeal allowed, 
sentences quashed, 
appellant 
re-sentenced. 
 
Limb: N/A 
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20. Galvin v Regina 
[2006] NSWCCA 66 
 
Appellant owned 
theatrical business 
which the 
complainant (AM) 
attended. 
Appellant and 
complainant were 
close friends. 
Appeal against conviction only by 
accused. 
(1) The trial judge erred by 
admitting into evidence the 
video taped interview 
between MW (complainant 
who committed suicide) and 
Senior Constable Alison 
Forbes dated 9 September 
2002. 
(2) The trial judge erred by 
admitting into evidence the 
portions of the video taped 
interview between AM 
(Complainant) and Senior 
Constable Alison Forbes 
dated 4 September 2002 
wherein AM suggested that 
the accused had engaged in 
improper acts with MW and 
Kristen Andrews. 
(3) The trial judge erred by 
failing to direct the jury that 
MW’s evidence relating to 
uncharged sexual acts was to 
be used as evidence of the 
relationship that existed 
between the appellant and 
the complainant and could 
not be used for any other 
purposes; 
(4) (abandoned); 
(5) The trial miscarried because 
of the failure to deal properly 
with the complainant’s 
evidence.  
Admission of inadmissible 
evidence; miscarriage due to 
failure to deal properly with 
complainant’s evidence. 
 
Admission of inadmissible 
evidence (Ground 1) 
Appellant’s submission:  
 That errors of principle 
occurred such that the 
decision to admit the 
evidence, 
notwithstanding s 137 of 
the Evidence Act, 
miscarried [18]. 
 That the trial judge 
misconceived the proper 
way in which the jury 
could use the evidence 
and that his reasons for 
admitting the evidence 
disclosed an 
inconsistency that went 
to the very heart of his 
decision [18]. 
 
Trial judge erred by admitting 
evidence of complainant’s 
interview with police  
(Ground 2) 
Appellant’s submission: 
 That these two portions 
of the interview were 
irrelevant but raised a 
suggestion that the 
appellant had been 
Failure to direct/warn jury as 
to use of particular pieces of 
evidence. 
Failure to direct/warn jury 
about evidence relating to 
uncharged events (Ground 3) 
Held:  
 It is unnecessary to 
determine this ground of 
appeal (at [50]).  
 It will be a matter for the 
trial judge to formulate 
what warning and 
directions to give if any 
part of MW’s edited 
interview is admitted into 
evidence [50]. 
 The chief criticism of the 
summing up was that: 
o the trial judge did not 
repeat to the jury the 
basis upon which 
MW’s evidence could 
be used as context 
evidence 
o He did not warn the 
jury against using it as 
a basis for propensity 
reasoning [51].  
 No such direction was 
sought [51].  
 It might be thought 
inadvisable to introduce 
the notion of tendency to 
the jury simply to warn 
Judicial reasoning regarding admission of inadmissible evidence (Ground 
1) - Accepted  
 MW’s interview contained: 
1. Evidence of uncharged sexual activity between the complainant and 
the appellant.  
2. Allegations that had not been supported by the evidence of the 
complainant herself [19].  
 Such claims were relatively minor relative to the complainant’s 
allegations [19]. 
 Admissibility of such evidence depends on the purpose of admission 
and its probative value for that purpose  
o If admitted as context evidence, its probative value depends on 
the need for the complainant’s specific allegations giving rise to 
the charges to be put into context so the jury can understand 
the full nature of the allegations.  
o If the evidence is being used to prove a tendency of the 
accused to indulge in sexual activity with the complainant, it 
has to satisfy s 97 and s 101 of the Evidence Act [19]. 
 Context evidence and tendency evidence impact upon the 
complainant’s credibility but in different ways.  
o Context Evidence: makes the complainant’s account more 
intelligible and may explain aspects of her conduct, such as the 
absence of complaint.  
o Tendency Evidence: makes it more probable that the 
complainant is telling the truth in respect of the particular 
allegations because the accused is likely to have acted in the 
way that the complainant said he did [20]. 
 The interview of MW contained four discrete types of evidence:  
1. Direct evidence of one of the counts in the indictment;  
2. Direct evidence of uncharged allegations of sexual assaults by the 
appellant upon the complainant;  
3. Evidence of complaint by the complainant to MW about sexual 
acts committed by the appellant;  
4. An alleged confession by the appellant to MW of sexual activity 
with the complainant [21]. 
Outcome: 
Appeal Allowed, 
convictions and 
sentences quashed, new 
trial ordered. 
 
Limb: 2 
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The trial judge erred by failing to 
warn the jury in relation to MW’s 
evidence: (i) that they should not 
draw any inference adverse to the 
appellant or give the evidence any 
greater weight because the 
evidence was given in video form. 
acting in a similar way 
with Ms Andrews [45]. 
 That the reference to 
MW in the first passage 
referred to an earlier 
question and answer 
excised from the 
interview before the jury 
where the complainant 
referred to the appellant 
sexually assaulting MW 
[45]. 
 
them against such 
reasoning [51]. 
 However evidence of 
other sexual acts is so 
prejudicial when coming 
from someone other than 
the complainant that 
such a warning should 
always be given [51]. 
 There is a very significant 
risk that the jury might 
use evidence in that way 
without understanding 
that they were prohibited 
from doing so [51]. 
 During the summing up 
the trial judge repeated 
to the jury the two-step 
approach to take with 
MW’s evidence without 
indicating again the 
purpose for which it was 
before them and at least 
warning that it could not 
be used for any other 
purpose [52].  
 What the trial judge said 
during the summing up or 
when the evidence was 
first introduced was 
insufficient to warn the 
jury against using the 
evidence in some other 
way [52]. 
 There was a real risk in 
this case that the jury 
 At the trial no or insufficient attention was given to the distinction 
between the different types of evidence and how the jury might use 
each of them [21].  
 Because no attention was given to the different types of evidence 
contained in the interview of MW, it was dealt with in a general way 
by the trial judge when deciding whether to exclude it under s137 
[27].  
 Although the trial judge ultimately approached the question by 
weighing the probative value against its prejudicial effect, he did not 
give sufficient regard to [27]: 
o The nature of the evidence,  
o The purpose for which it could be used by the jury, and  
o Its potential for unfair prejudice having regard to that 
purpose.  
 If that had been done, it is not clear that all of the edited interview 
would have been admitted [27]. 
 The trial judge determined there would be no danger of unfair 
prejudice outweighing the evidence’s probative value for two 
reasons [28].  
 The complaint was made that the judge did not consider the 
possibility that the jury might conclude that MW committed suicide 
[35]. 
 It is not likely that the jury would have done so [35].  
 It was submitted that the trial judge’s discretion miscarried because, 
when considering whether to exclude the evidence under s 137 of 
the Act, he contemplated that the evidence would be subject of 
warnings under s 165 but he did not give those warnings in summing 
up [36]. 
 The only warning given was that the evidence was hearsay, untested 
by cross-examination [36]. 
 Defence counsel sought no other warning [36]. 
 There was no error in the trial not giving these warnings [37]. 
 The ground having been made out, the appeal must be allowed, the 
verdicts quashed and a new trial ordered. [38]. 
 It is unsatisfactory that the appeal must be allowed because of the 
Crown’s desire to admit MW’s interview [42]. 
 The Crown case against the appellant was strong even without this 
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might use the evidence as 
tendency [52]. 
 The jury should have 
been warned against 
such an approach [52].  
 There was no need for 
the trial judge to direct 
the jury against using 
allegations of other 
sexual acts made by MW 
to replace any counts on 
the indictment [52]. 
 There was no real risk 
that they would do so 
[52]. 
 
Failure to warn jury about 
MW’s evidence (Ground 6) 
Crown’s submission: 
 That s14 did not apply to 
MW’s video evidence 
because it was admitted 
under s 65 of the 
Evidence Act not under 
the Evidence (Children) 
Act (at [58]).  
 
material [42]. 
Held in respect to (Ground 2) – Rejected 
 It was open to the trial judge to allow the evidence [46].  
 The evidence was significant because it was part of the 
circumstances in which the complaint to Ms Andrews arose [46].  
 Although it was prejudicial to the applicant, that prejudice was not 
great in these circumstances [46]. 
 It was open to the trial judge to conclude that it should not be 
rejected under s 137 [46].  
 Not informing the jury about the acquittal was unnecessary [46]. 
 Even without that knowledge, the jury would not have used that 
evidence to the prejudice of the accused such as to cause a 
miscarriage of justice [46]. 
 Evidence was led that the appellant had no convictions and was a 
person of good character [46]. 
 Appropriate directions were given as to the use of that evidence [46]. 
 The second passage does not raise by itself or with the other 
passage, a suggestion of misconduct by the appellant with anybody 
but the complainant and perhaps Ms Andrews [47].  
 It was open to the trial judge to admit the evidence as part of the 
circumstances leading up to the complaint to AM’s parents [47]. 
 The jury were not aware of any of the allegations by either AM or 
MW of sexual assaults against MW [48]. 
 One should not read too much into what was put before the jury 
with knowledge they did not have [48].  
 The trial judge was not required to reject that part of the 
conversation under s137 on the basis that the jury might conclude 
that the complainant had told Ms Andrews about sexual assaults 
against MW [48].  
 The jury knew of two incidents involving MW in allegations of sexual 
assaults upon the complainant from the portion of MW’s interview 
[48]. 
 The jury could easily have concluded that this was what the 
complainant was referring to [48]. 
 
Held regarding (Ground 6) - Rejected 
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 It is unnecessary at present to determine whether s14 applies for 
MW’s evidence [58]. 
 It would be a cautious approach to give such a warning whenever 
evidence was given in this form [58]. 
 The failure to give the warning, even if required under s14 could not 
have led to a miscarriage of justice [58].  
 As the jury knew MW was dead, they could not have drawn any 
adverse inference about the use of video-evidence against the 
appellant [58].  
 The rest of the s14 warning concerns the weight given to the 
evidence [58]. 
 The only potential prejudice to the appellant could be that the jury 
was not warned against giving greater weight to the evidence 
because of its form [58]. 
 Given the directions about the hearsay nature of the evidence and 
that MW could not be cross-examined, no prejudice could have been 
suffered by failing to give this warning [58]. 
 The part of s25 omitted in the trial judge’s direction was that he did 
not direct the jury not to give more or less weight to the evidence 
because of its method [61].  
 Regarding prejudice to the appellant, the only relevant omission was 
to tell the jury that they were not to give the evidence more weight 
because it was taken by CCTV [61]. 
 The risk of the jury giving that evidence more weight for that reason 
was so slight that the failure to warn did not result in a miscarriage of 
justice [61]. 
21. R v 
Cunningham 
[2006] NSWCCA 
176 
 
Tutor, ran business 
in his home. Also 
assaulted child as 
de facto father. 
Appeal against sentence only by 
accused.  
1. The sentencing judge erred in 
finding that emotional harm 
caused by the offences was 
substantial.  
Sentences were manifestly 
excessive. 
N/A N/A Held in respect to (Ground 1) - Ground of Appeal not decided. 
 
Held in respect to (Ground 2) - Appeal allowed in part 
 It is necessary to re-sentence on count 5 because the starting point 
of 16 years 3 months was beyond the bounds of sound discretion. I 
consider that the starting point for the sentence for the offence of 
attempted sexual intercourse should be 13 years imprisonment. 
Allowing the applicant the discount of 20% of the utilitarian value of 
his plea, the sentence is 10 years and 3 months.  
 
Outcome: 
Appeal against sentence 
Allowed in part:  
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 Appeal against 
sentence for count 
5 (attempted 
sexual intercourse) 
quashed, new 
sentence imposed. 
 Appeal of other 
counts dismissed. 
 
Limb: N/A 
22. FB v R; R v FB 
[2011] NSWCCA 
217 
 
Headmaster of 
complainant’s 
school. Offences 
did not occur at 
school but at the 
appellant’s home. 
Complainant (SE) 
had family 
difficulties and 
appellant 
suggested to 
parents that SE 
spend two weeks 
at his family home 
for a “time out”.  
 
Appeal by Crown on sentencing 
and appeal by accused against 
conviction and sentence. 
(1) Trial judge erred in admitting 
the tendency evidence of 
witness, MD, pursuant to 
section 97 Evidence Act. 
There was a miscarriage of 
justice due to the failure by 
the legal representatives of 
the appellant to adduce 
evidence of the specific 
contents of media reports 
relating to the witness, MD.  
(2) Trial judge failed to take into 
account matters adverse to 
the credibility of the 
complainant in accepting her 
evidence.  
(3) Excessive judicial questioning 
created a real danger that 
the trial was unfair.  
(4) The verdict was 
unreasonable and incapable 
of being supported by the 
evidence. 
Admission use of 
tendency/coincidence 
evidence; unreasonable 
verdict; failure to take adverse 
matters into account re 
credibility evidence. 
Admission of tendency 
evidence (Ground 1): 
Appellant submission: 
Excessive judicial questioning. 
 
Excessive judicial questioning 
created a real danger that the 
trial was unfair (Ground 3):  
 Judicial questioning 
attempted to elicit evidence 
to bolster the prosecution 
case [102] and was 
conducted impermissibly, 
even though this was a 
judge only trial.  
 
Judicial reasoning regarding the admission of tendency evidence (Ground 
1) - Rejected  
Outcome: 
Dismissed. 
Appeal against 
conviction dismissed.  
Crown Appeal against 
sentence accepted.  
 
Sentence quashed. 
new sentence 
imposed .  
  
Limb: 3 
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 At trial, appellant agreed 
that he had performed oral 
sex on MD (witness) and 
also had sexual intercourse 
on the first occasion. He 
denied, however, that she 
was initially asleep and that 
he had given her pills. He 
claimed the sexual acts 
were consensual.  
 There was a miscarriage of 
justice because appellant’s 
legal representation did 
not admit evidence of a 
newspaper report that 
showed that SE 
(complainant) could have 
discovered that another 
person had made 
allegations that she was 
drugged and raped. The 
two limited ways in which 
the appellant argued that 
the evidence had 
significance were first, its 
capacity to bear on the 
tendency argument and 
secondly, its general ability 
to enlarge the environment 
in which there was 
discussion in the Grafton 
area concerning the 
accused’s aberrant sexual 
behaviour [52]. 
Verdict incapable of 
supporting evidence (Ground 
4): 
 Appellant submission: 
 The verdict was said to be 
unreasonable and 
incapable of being 
 Evidence may be offered simply to show a tendency to act in a 
particular way, not necessarily in a criminal manner. Indeed, it is not 
necessary that the tendency to commit a particular crime or, for that 
matter, to commit a crime at all. The trial judge correctly recognised 
that, in order for MD’s evidence to have significant probative value as 
required by section 97, the Crown had to establish that the evidence 
possessed a degree of relevance to the events charged, such that it 
could be said that it was “important or of consequence”. The trial judge 
identified the relevant fact in issue in the trial. This was whether or not 
SE had been subjected to the appellant’s sexual activity in the way she 
had asserted [24-25]. 
 It was clearly open to his Honour to find, as he did, that the evidence of 
MD made it significantly more likely that the appellant had carried out 
the acts alleged by SE, as the Crown case asserted.  
 His Honour noted, in both decisions, that mere contact or the possibility 
of contact does not, in itself, necessarily lead to an indication of a real 
chance of concoction. Overall, his Honour was satisfied that, on the 
whole of the material before him, at the time of the initial 
determination, that there was no real chance of concoction [36]. 
 Trial judge concluded that none of the material as to SE’s friendship 
with either AD (school friend of SE & MD’s brother) or TB (AD’s 
girlfriend), nor the contents of the brief telephone conversation 
between the two young women, raised even a hint of suspicion that 
there had been concoction or collusion between them [38]. 
 It is not necessary to traverse every single matter sought to be relied on 
by Newton (counsel for appellant) under the headings of either 
contamination or concoction. His honour carefully examined all the 
matters which were argued before him, they generally being those 
matters presently raised before this court. He rejected the submission 
that, individually or collectively, the matters relied upon pointed to a 
real chance of concoction or contamination. It was clearly open to his 
honour to make the findings that he did [45]. 
 There is no evidence from which it could be said that the failure to 
obtain the newspaper article (if that is what happened) demonstrates 
‘flagrant incompetence’ on the part of trial counsel [54]. Importantly, 
there was no reference in the article to the two white tablets nor that 
the girl fell asleep. This level of detail – critical to the complainant’s 
evidence is not disclosed in the articles and cannot be inferred from the 
simple use of the word ‘drugging’. In any event the complainant was 
clear in her evidence at trial that she had not seen articles in any 
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supported by the evidence 
because (a) the 
complainant’s evidence 
was uncorroborated, (b) 
the complainant failed to 
make any complaint 
consistent with what was 
asserted by her at trial until 
she spoke to the police in 
mid-2009, (c) the 
complainant gave 
inconsistent earlier 
“complaints” (d) the 
appellant was recovering 
from significant surgery 
and had wounds that made 
the suggested conduct very 
unlikely, (e) the 
complainant sent a thank 
you card to the appellant 
for allowing her to stay, (f) 
the complainants mother’s 
evidence suggested that 
the complainant behaved 
better after returning from 
the appellant’s house. 
newspaper or magazine [54]. The failure to adduce evidence of the 
articles could have been a tactical error but even if it was not, 
overlooking this evidence does not clear that bar to permit appellate 
intervention.  
Judicial reasoning regarding excessive judicial questioning (Ground 3) - 
Rejected 
 It was perfectly appropriate for his Honour to seek clarification… It was 
plainly designed to ascertain precisely when it was, according to the 
statement of the police officer, that the complainant became teary. In a 
case where her credibility, reliability and possible contamination by 
other witnesses were in issue, it was entirely proper for his Honour to 
make the enquiry. It was the trial judge’s duty to determine the facts. 
Moreover he did it in a polite and courteous way. He did not interrupt 
counsel [102]. 
 In every case, the questioning was clearly relevant to an issue that 
required clarification. Secondly, the questioning was invariably carefully 
introduced and politely stated. The witness, once asked, was allowed to 
answer as he or she wished. Thirdly there was not attempt to traduce or 
browbeat the witness. The overall impression was that the trial judge 
was simply endeavouring to clarify issues and obtain information to 
resolve issues that were troubling him [103]. 
 It is obvious that, in the course of clarifying the evidence, and throwing 
a clearer light on the issues at trial, a judge may, without taking sides 
one way or the other, involuntarily or inevitably, assist either the 
prosecution or the defence. This unintended consequence, if that is 
what happened, makes such an intervention inappropriate [109]. 
 
Judicial reasoning regarding verdict and supporting evidence (Ground 4) - 
Rejected 
 The case against the appellant was a strong one. The ultimate issues at 
trial were relatively simple and straightforward, even if the factual 
matrix was, as it often is in cases of this kind, somewhat complex and 
not without difficulty. If the complainant’s evidence were accepted and 
the appellant’s evidence rejected, a finding of guilt was not 
unreasonable. There is no doubt whatsoever that the complainant’s 
evidence should be accepted [121]. 
 The complainant’s evidence has the ring of truth about it. Of course, 
there were inconsistencies and there was an absence of complaint for 
considerable time. Those matters have to be weighed in the balance… 
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She positively did not wish her mother to find out what had happened. 
This also explains her reluctance to tell her friends exactly what 
happened and her aversion to revealing the gruesome details [121]. 
23. Majid v R 
[2010] 
NSWCCA 121 
 
Applicant was 
manager of store 
at which 
complainant 
worked.  
 
No delay 
Grounds of appeal against 
sentence by Applicant:  
1. The sentencing judge erred in 
applying s 44 Crimes 
(Sentencing Procedure) Act 
1999. He set a total sentence 
of 14 years with a non-parole 
period of 10 years, contrary 
to s 44(2), and with no 
finding of 'special 
circumstances' for the 
extension of the total 
sentence by approximately 
eight months.  
2. The sentencing judge gave 
insufficient weight to the fact 
that the applicant was 
suffering from PSTD at the 
time of, prior to and after the 
commission of the offences. 
3. The sentencing judge gave 
insufficient weight to the 
applicant's expression of 
contrition and remorse. 
4. The sentencing judge gave 
insufficient weight to the fact 
that the applicant would be 
serving his sentence in 
protective custody. 
The sentences imposed are 
manifestly excessive. 
N/A N/A 
Held in respect of ground (1): 
(per Johnson J, Simpson and McCallum JJ agreeing -Accepted 
 The sentencing judge erred in applying s 44 and no finding of 'special 
circumstances' was made, nor did the judge apply Hejazi v R [2009] 
NSWCCA 282 at [35]-[36]. ([36]) 
 There was error in the calculation of the head sentence on the 
second count. [37] 
Held in respect of ground (2): 
 (per Johnson J, Simpson and McCallum JJ agreeing) - Rejected 
 Per Stephens v R [2009] NSWCCA 240 at [16]-[18], there are inherent 
problems in expressing a ground in terms of 'insufficient weight' 
being given to different aspects of the applicant's subjective case in 
passing sentence. It tacitly concedes that some weight had been 
given to the factor. This point is equally relevant to grounds (2), (3) 
and (4) [40]. 
 'It is difficult to see how the applicant's condition could have 
warranted greater weight on sentence in the circumstances of this 
case' [42]. 
Held in respect of ground (3): 
 (per Johnson J, Simpson and McCallum JJ agreeing) - Rejected 
 The applicant had pleaded not guilty to the charges and proceeded 
to trial. Admission of guilt and contrition was not expressed until 
after he was convicted in April 2008 [47]. 
 As a sentencing judge is not obliged to accept assertions of 
contrition, the judge was entitled to approach this submission as a 
belated concession made only after the reality of conviction by jury 
[48]. 
 No error has been demonstrated in the sentencing judge's evaluation 
of the purported remorse and contrition. 
 
Held in respect of ground (4): 
 (per Johnson J, Simpson and McCallum JJ agreeing) - Rejected 
 The relevance of protective custody on sentence will depend upon a 
variety of factors; there is no automatic conclusion or formula to be 
applied, and no error has been demonstrated in the reasoning of the 
sentencing judge [58]. 
Outcome: 
Leave to appeal 
granted, appeal 
dismissed with respect 
to sentences imposed 
on counts 1, 3 and 4. 
 
New sentence ordered 
on count 2. 
 
Limb: N/A 
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Held in respect of ground (5): 
 (per Johnson J, Simpson and McCallum JJ agreeing) - Rejected 
 Whether the sentences are manifestly excessive is considered in 
terms of whether they are 'unreasonable' or 'plainly unjust'. Citing 
Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357 [52]. 
The separate offences were serious offences upon a 15-year old girl, 
involving a breach of trust and the use of force. Assessments of the 
objective seriousness of the offences (just short of mid-range and mid-
range, respectively) were not challenged. The applicant had a range of 
previous offences [63]-[65]. 
Unsuccessful Cases on Appeal  
24. SW v R [2013] 
NSWCCA 225 
 
Applicant was the 
victim’s mother’s 
School teacher 
who was later 
befriended. 
Applicant visited 
victim’s home 
often and started 
spending time 
alone with victim 
as parents fell ill.  
 
No delay 
Appeal by Appellant and Crown 
against sentence: 
(1) The sentencing judge erred in 
her application of the 
standard non-parole period 
legislation in light of the 
principles identified in 
Muldrock. 
(2) The sentencing judge erred in 
her assessment of the 
objective gravity of the 
offence. 
(3) The sentencing judge erred in 
finding that the age of the 
complainant was a “highly 
aggravating factor”. 
(4) The sentencing judge erred in 
finding that the offence was 
committed for sexual 
gratification. 
(5) (abandoned). 
(6) The sentence is manifestly 
excessive. 
N/A N/A 
Held in respect of ground (1): (at [44] to [45] per Johnson J with whom 
Hoeben J and Bellew J agreed) - Rejected 
 The sentencing judge had regard to objective and subjective factors, 
before turning to the imposition of sentence itself. She considered 
the facts, matters and circumstances relevant in reaching an 
appropriate sentence. 
 Further, it is difficult to see how the standard non-parole period (15 
years) has been accorded determinative weight given the imposition 
of a 5-year non-parole period. 
Held in respect of grounds (2), (3) & (4)  
 ([47] to [58] per Johnson J with whom Hoeben J and Bellew J agreed) - 
Rejected 
 Re ground 3, the victim was of an age well removed from the 
statutory ceiling of this offence – this may aptly be described as a 
highly aggravating factor. 
 Re grounds 2 and 4, there was no error in the findings re the act 
which constituted the offence. 
 Significant act of violation of a young child in the care of the 
offender, in a place he ought to have been safe, causing physical hurt 
and substantial ongoing emotional harm. 
 The child had no difficulty with constipation – no valid reason. 
Appellant denied act following arrest and psychologist report 
suggests denial and minimisation of responsibility – common. 
Outcome: 
Appeal Dismissed. 
 
Extension of time to 
appeal refused. 
 
Limb: N/A 
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 Offence correctly found to fall below the mid range of such an 
offence. 
Held in respect of ground (6) - Rejected 
[55] per Johnson J with whom Hoeben J and Bellew J agreed: 
 The Appellant does not demonstrate that the sentence is unreasonable 
or plainly unjust. 
 
25. LG v R [2012] 
NSWCCA 249 
 
Appellant and co-
accused were 
involved with the 
instruction at 
youth group where 
the complainant 
was a member. 
(1) Trial judge erred by imposing 
cumulative sentences in 
relation to each offence  
(2) Sentence overall was 
manifestly excessive 
 
N/A N/A 
Held in respect of Grounds (1) and (2): 
 The applicant was involved with her co-offender in a variety of sexual 
acts upon the complainant. Each act involved separate criminality of 
varying degrees of significance. Although part of an overall event, the 
sentencing judge was required to identify a sentence appropriate for 
each separate act. No complaint is made about the term of any of the 
individual sentences. The sentencing judge was mindful of the 
principle of totality. Although I may have provided a different 
structure, his Honour’s structure of the sentences was open to him 
and I am not persuaded that the sentencing discretion has 
miscarried. 
Outcome: 
Appeal Dismissed 
 
Limb: N/A 
26. MM v R [2010] 
NSWCCA 262 
 
Child care facility 
operated from 
appellant’s 
mother’s home.  
 
11 year delay 
Appeal against conviction only by 
accused.  
(1) Each of the verdicts is 
unreasonable and cannot be 
supported on the evidence: s 61(1) 
Criminal Appeal Act 1912. 
(6) The trial judge erroneously 
granted leave to the Crown to 
amend counts 1, 2, 3 and 4 to 
enlarge the timeframe within 
which the offences were allegedly 
committed. 
Unreasonable verdicts not 
supported by the evidence. 
 
Unreliability of evidence 
(Ground 1) 
Appellant submissions: 
 Evidence in the trial, was 
unreliable in a number of 
critical respects which, 
taken together, would 
justify the Court in finding 
that it was not open to be 
satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt of the 
appellant's guilt [67]. 
 The features of unreliability 
were identified as [68]: 
o Medical evidence 
Trial judge erroneously 
granted leave to the Crown. 
(Ground 6) 
Appellant submission:  
 As argued at the time 
leave was sought to 
amend, trial counsel's 
diligent preparation and 
his cross-examination of 
the complainant was 
neutralised by the 
amendment [61]. 
 
Judicial reasoning regarding unreliability of evidence (Ground 1) - 
Rejected 
 The question is whether upon the whole of the evidence it was not 
open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the 
appellant's guilt, notwithstanding that there is evidence to sustain a 
verdict as a matter of law.  
 This is a question of fact, requiring independent assessment of 
the evidence both as to its sufficiency and quality. SKA v R 
[2011 HCA 13 [66]. 
 As to the appellant's contention about the complainant's 
understanding: 
 The Court is not ready to assume that the complaint would 
know what full penile penetration of a vagina meant and how it 
was achieved, particularly in light of the fact that upon physical 
examination the complainant's hymen was intact. Further, no 
questions were asked (nor could they have been) as to the 
extent of her sexual experience [73]. 
 There is also force in the Crown submission that because of the 
lack of precision in the complainant's description of the 
Outcome: 
Appeal against 
conviction Dismissed. 
 
Limb: 1, 3 
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NB: Seven grounds of appeal filed; 
only the first and sixth grounds 
were relied upon at the hearing. 
rendered it unlikely 
that the assaults 
occurred; there was an 
absence of any trauma 
when complainant 
physically examined at 
age 16. 
o Complainant's 
recollection were 
unreliable; recollection 
of being sexually 
assaulted on multiple 
occasions when as 
young as 3 years old 
constituted by full 
penile penetration on 
12 or 13 occasions 
with the occasion the 
subject of the counts 
on the indictment 
being detailed as to 
time, place and the 
manner of the assaults 
and the appearance of 
the accused including 
the clothing he was 
wearing. 
o The complainant's 
early childhood 
recollection of sexual 
assault may have been 
a 'recovered' memory. 
 The complainant's 
evidence was undermined 
by grave doubts about her 
reliability generally, in 
particular her evidence 
about the extent of 
penetration [70]. 
o Nothing in the 
complainant's evidence 
operated to qualify her 
assertion that the 
appellant assaulted her 
mechanics of the penetrative assaults, questions of perception 
were rife and were properly a matter for Dr Kirkwood to 
comment upon [74]. 
 It was open to the jury to accept that there was penetration of her 
vagina by some degree properly constituted as penetration as a 
matter of law, and that the complainant perceived that the penis had 
entered her vagina such that she could describe it as fully in her 
vagina, but that the penetration was well short of complete 
penetration [75]. 
 There were legitimate questions raised by the evidence: [76] 
 concerning the timing and circumstances of the complaint; 
 the fact the earlier 'triggered memory' of the assaults did not 
result in complaint; and 
 there were discrepancies in the complainant's description of 
events and places relative to other evidence.  
 However, either standing alone or considered with the issue of 
penetration, it is not established that this undermines the strength of 
the evidence relied upon by the Crown, particularly when the jury 
had the advantage of seeing the complainant give her evidence and 
the appellant give his evidence an advantage which the Court does 
not have [76]. 
 
Judicial reasoning regarding (Ground 6): 
 The trial judge made reference to ss 20 and 21 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 1986 and applied Borodin v R [2006] NSWCCA 83: 
there was no actual prejudice to the accused by the amendment and 
the fact that an accused may lose a tactical advantage by reason of 
an amendment is, without more, not sufficient prejudice for leave to 
be refused [59]. 
 The only matter that changed in the Crown case at trial was the time 
when the family resided in the blue and white house which had been 
fixed by reference to direct evidence and that, as a a result, the 
complainant could not have been aged 3 at the time of the assault 
but rather between the ages of 3 and 5 [59]. 
 The trial judge provided detailed reasons for permitting the 
amendment of the indictment and the appellant has not identified 
any error in the reasons given [62]. 
 It is not clear how cross-examination of the complainant might have 
been significantly different had the indictment been amended at an 
earlier point [64]. 
 Moreover, it is of significance that no application was made to have 
the complainant recalled before the Crown formally closed its case 
[64]. 
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in excess of ten or a 
dozen times. The 
potential for the 
complainant's evidence 
concerning the extent of 
penetration 'to have 
sourced from her 
memory as a teenager of 
her perception as a child 
of what the appellant 
did' was not open on her 
evidence [71]. 
o Dr Kirkwood conceded in 
cross examination that, 
whilst the normal genital 
examination did not 
preclude the assaults as 
occurring as described, 
the examination was also 
consistent with no sexual 
assault having occurred 
[52]. 
o The Court should 
approach Dr Kirkwood's 
evidence as leaving no 
room for the 
complainant's evidence 
to be regarded as other 
than wholly implausible 
[71]. 
 Counsel also sought to 
emphasise that at the time 
of the interview with police 
she was almost 16 and by 
the trial, she was 17 and 
that we should assume 
that she would know what 
full penile penetration of a 
vagina meant and how it 
was achieved [73]. 
Crown submission (Ground 
1): 
128 
 The matters identified as 
unreliable were 'all 
agitated in the trial, in 
counsel's addresses and 
were the subject of careful 
directions from the trial 
judge'. Coupled with the 
advantage the jury had of 
considering the appellant 
and the complainant as 
witnesses, the Court should 
be well satisfied that the 
appellant is guilty of the 
offences on the indictment 
[69]. 
 As to the complainant's 
understanding of what 
occurred, the Court should 
not readily conclude that 
the complainant was 
describing any particular 
component of the complex 
structure of her genitalia 
when she referred to the 
appellant's penis being 
“injected into in her 
vagina” or that he “put his 
penis into her vagina” or 
even “all the way in her 
vagina” or that she had any 
current exposure to the 
genitalia of a male (other 
than the appellant's ten 
years earlier) [74]. 
27. Makarov v R 
(No 1) [2008] 
NSWCCA 291 
 
The applicant was 
the music teacher 
of the 
complainant.  
Grounds of appeal against 
conviction by appellant: 
(1) The trial miscarried and there 
was a miscarriage of justice 
as a result of perjury 
committed by D against the 
appellant during the 
proceedings in relation to the 
evidence concerning: 
Character evidence (Ground 
6): 
Miscarriage of justice as a 
result of impossibility of 
introducing the appellant's 
character.  
 
Evidence not proven to the 
requisite legal evidentiary 
Trial judge failed to 
adequately direct jury 
regarding legal concepts 
around evidence (Ground 2). 
Judicial reasoning regarding (Ground 2) - Rejected 
As regards ground (2)(i):  
 The contention is the same as that raised in Makarov No 2 (at [110]-
[112]) and for the same reasons, this ground is rejected [76]-[78]. 
As regards ground (2)(ii): 
 The trial judge's direction as to the content of 'beyond reasonable 
doubt' was in accordance with the accepted position that the test is a 
subjective one applicable to each individual juror. [84]. 
As regards ground (2)(iii): 
Outcome: 
Appeal against 
conviction Dismissed. 
 
Limb: 1, 3. 
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No Delay 
a. (i) the exclusively professional 
(musical, psychological, 
psychiatric) issues; (ii) the 
counts 8, 9; (iii) the time 
frame of the counts 1 to 3; (iv) 
the chapter from the 
autobiography and letter to 
the appellant’s fiftieth 
birthday; (v) the time factor 
for counts 1, 4 to 9; (vi) the 
pornography showing and 
CD’s placement issues – 
counts 4 to 8; (vii) oral sex 
issue. 
(2) The trial judge failed 
adequately to direct the jury 
in relation to: 
a. (i) the legal concept of the 
Crown prosecutor status; (ii) the 
legal concept of “beyond 
reasonable doubt”; (iii) the 
evidence concerning the time 
frame of the deleted computer 
files; (iv) the evidence of Mr 
Szakos and Mrs George; (v) the 
evidence concerning oral sex; 
(vi) the written records of the 
piano lessons.” 
(3) The trial miscarried and there 
was a miscarriage of justice 
as a result of the prejudiced 
decision the trial judge made 
in relation to the evidence of 
the Ukrainian Students (A, B 
and C) concerning the 
appellant's 'admissions' and 
the evidence concerning the 
deleted computer files. 
(4) The trial judge erred in failing 
to provide for the appellant, 
as a former foreigner with 
English as a second language, 
access to an interpreter 
through the simultaneous 
standard (Ground 7): 
The nature and quality of the 
evidence relied upon by the 
trial Crown prosecutor and 
violation by the trial Crown 
prosecutor of the legal 
principles of burden of proof, 
proof, standard of proof, and 
presumption of innocence. 
 
Incompetence on behalf of 
the appellant’s legal 
representatives and their 
failure to lead evidence 
(Ground 8). 
 The judge gave careful directions as to the drawing of inferences, 
which included a direction that it was a matter for them whether 
they drew the inference contended for by the Crown, and whether 
that inference confirmed the evidence of D. These directions were 
accurate and fair [86]-[89]. 
As regards ground (2)(iv): 
 The fact that counsel for the appellant, who was alive to the issues in 
the trial and immersed in its atmosphere, did not seek a correction 
suggests that the error with respect to Mr Szakos was not significant 
[94]. 
 The appellant's complaint in respect of Mrs George and the judge's 
remarks is without force. The judge's remarks were entirely accurate 
[96]. 
As regards ground (2)(v): 
 The Judge had earlier reminded the jury that the appellant relied on 
inconsistencies between the out of Court statements and the 
evidence in Court on the oral sex issue as going to D’s reliability. The 
Judge may have placed a different emphasis on that issue but 
ultimately the assessment of the inconsistencies was a matter for the 
jury [102]. 
As regards ground (2)(vi): 
 The appellant's contention that the trial judge intimated that the 
appellant bore an onus of proof is without basis. Each of the 
impugned remarks was preceded by a clear qualification or, in 
context, does not bear the character alleged [103]-[108]. 
 
Regarding (Ground 6) – Rejected 
 This submission proceeds on a misconception. Evidence of the 
appellant’s good character was not excluded by any decision of the 
trial Judge. The appellant’s Counsel stated that he would be 
endeavouring not to put character into play (T133.25). It would have 
been open to the appellant to adduce evidence of his good character 
but, as the trial Judge correctly warned, that course carried the risk 
that some of the evidence of the Ukrainian students would have 
become admissible. The appellant’s Counsel was wise to avoid that 
risk [163]. 
  
 Regarding (Ground 7) – Rejected 
 The evidence of the complainant D was admissible to prove the 
elements of the offences alleged in the indictment. The insinuation 
that the Crown’s frequent repetition of D’s allegations may be 
likened to a form of sorcery is absurd and must be firmly dismissed 
[167]. 
 The students were Crown witnesses. It was entirely appropriate for 
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headphone translation or 
proper conditions for 
simultaneous translation of 
interpreter – with the 
intervals for translation – 
that international law and 
standards required.  
(5) The trial miscarried and there 
was a miscarriage of justice 
as a result of the trial judge's 
bias against the appellant. 
The alleged bias is evident in: 
a. (i) prejudiced behaviour 
towards the appellant's 
counsel; (ii) prejudiced 
decisions; (iii) legal errors; 
and (iv) the trial judge's use of 
'a special technology of 
psychology programming the 
jury against the appellant'. 
(6) The trial miscarried and there 
was a miscarriage of justice 
as a result of impossibility of 
introducing the appellant's 
character. 
(7) The trial miscarried and there 
was a miscarriage of justice 
as a result of the nature and 
quality of the evidence relied 
upon by the trial Crown 
prosecutor and violation by 
the trial Crown prosecutor of 
the legal principles of burden 
of proof, proof, standard of 
proof, and presumption of 
innocence. 
(8) The trial miscarried and there 
was a miscarriage of justice 
as a result of the appellant's 
legal representative's 
incompetence in failing to 
uncover and lead the 
evidence that may have 
affected the result. 
the Crown prosecutor to identify the evidence she anticipated 
calling. The suggestion that the jury would have speculated about 
other matters is itself speculative [171]. 
 Regarding (Ground 8 ) –Rejected 
 The critical question for the purpose of ground 8 is whether the 
appellant has satisfied the onus of establishing that the failure to 
renew the objection (admission of Exhibit F) was negligent or 
incompetent and has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. He has not. 
[135]. 
 Much of this ground assumed the acceptance of other grounds which 
have been rejected [179]. 
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(9) The acquittal on Count 8 was 
proof of the jury's reasonable 
doubt concerning D's 
credibility and truthfulness. 
(10) The trial miscarried and there 
was a miscarriage of justice 
as a result of the Crown 
prosecutor and trial judge's 
misconduct in relation to the 
time of the essence of the 
offences in counts 1-7 and 
count 9. 
28. Regina v 
Lawson [2005] 
NSWCCA 227 
 
Appellant was a 
youth leader at 
Baptist church. 
Victim attended 
youth group 
events. 
Appeal against sentence only by 
accused.  
 
(1) The trial judge failed to 
adequately discount for the 
appellant’s guilty plea and 
contrition. 
(2) The trial judge erred in her 
finding that there was little 
evidence of true remorse. 
(3) The trial judge erred in giving 
little weight to the 
circumstance that the 
applicant had only one prior 
conviction and that he was 
not in breach of the good 
behaviour bond which he had 
received for that offence. 
(4) The trial judge failed to give 
weight to the fact that the 
prior conviction was twelve 
years old. 
(5) The trial judge failed to give 
any discount to the applicant 
by reason of his offer to give 
assistance. 
(6) The sentences were 
manifestly excessive. 
 
N/A N/A Discount for guilty plea (Ground 1) - Rejected 
 Pleas were not made at the earliest opportunity [16]. 
 Although, it was accepted that the applicants pleas had significant 
utilitarian value and the evidence in support of some counts was 
stronger than that in relation to others, the guideline judgment in R v 
Thomson and Houlton (2000) 49 NSWLR 383 contemplates an 
assessment in a range of 10 to 25 percent. There was therefore no 
miscarriage of justice in the trial judge’s discount of 15 percent [18]. 
Little evidence of remorse (Ground 2) - Rejected 
 That gross understatement of the applicant’s criminal activity 
contradicts the applicant’s claim to have genuine remorse [20]. 
 A plea of guilty is capable of manifesting remorse but it is not 
inevitably the case [22]. 
 The trial judge’s conclusion as to little evidence of remorse fortified 
by the content of a psychological pre-sentence report which stated 
that the applicant “denied the substance of most of the charges for 
which he has pleaded guilty” and has “strongly minimised his own 
sexual motivation” [23]. 
Weight given to evidence (Grounds 3 & 4) - Rejected 
 Breach of a good behaviour bond aggravates an offence but it does 
not become a factor of mitigation [25]. 
 The trial judge did adequately take into account the length in time 
since the previous conviction by expressly noting the year of its 
occurrence [25]. 
Offer of assistance (Ground 5) - Rejected 
 The assistance offered by the applicant was not of the kind which 
gave evidence against co-offenders [28] or crimes of which the 
Outcome: 
Appeal against 
sentence dismissed.  
 
Limb: N/A 
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authorities would have been unaware but for the frank confession of 
the offender [29].  
 The authorities were well aware of the applicant’s activity by reason 
of the courage of one of the victims in coming forward and reporting 
it [29].  
Manifestly excessive sentence (Ground 6) - Rejected 
 Whilst it is appropriate for a sentencing judge to take cognizance of 
established sentencing patterns, such are not derived from comparison 
with a single case [31]. 
  It is established that committing sexual offences whilst the victim has 
been drugged adds a significant degree of culpability to the 
administration of the drug intending to commit the offence: R v TA 
2003 57 NSWLR 444 [31].  
 In the present case the offences were premeditated and carefully 
planned as demonstrated by the order for the nitrous oxide [33]. 
29. R v Boulad 
[2005] NSWCCA 
289 
 
Offender was the 
victim’s ‘boyfriend’ 
however victim 
was a ward of the 
state and suffered 
recognised 
psychiatric illness 
and was underage. 
 
Appeal against sentence only by 
accused.  
(1) The sentencing judge erred in 
holding that an aggravating 
factor of the victim being 
vulnerable was present 
because the victim was 
young. 
(2) The sentencing judge erred in 
increasing the sentence for 
each count to reflect the fact 
that the applicant was being 
sentenced for multiple 
counts. 
(3) The sentences are manifestly 
excessive. 
 
N/A N/A Held in respect to (Ground 1) - Rejected 
 The Crown correctly conceded this ground [21]. 
 
Held in respect to (Ground 2) - Accepted 
 The sentencing judge imposed entirely concurrent sentences and 
took a 'global' approach, influenced by the fact the offences were 
committed over a relatively short period and involved the same 
victim [23]. 
 As the Crown concedes, the sentencing judge has fallen into error by 
approaching sentencing in a 'global fashion' without regard to what 
sentence was appropriate for each individual offence [24]. 
 This approach does not conform with Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 
CLR 60 [24]. 
 
Held in respect to (Ground 3) - Rejected 
 The conduct cannot be described as falling 'at the lower end of the 
spectrum [31]: 
 There was a significant age discrepancy between applicant and 
complainant. 
 The complainant's vulnerability had added significance because 
of her intellectual disability, moderate though it may have 
been. 
 Despite the absence of direct evidence on the applicant's 
Outcome: 
Against sentence. 
 
Leave to appeal 
granted. Appeal 
Dismissed. 
 
Limb: N/A 
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knowledge of this disability, he was well are of her age, 
background and propensity for engaging in risk-taking activities; 
he had professed to be concerned about her welfare in such 
matters. 
 The offending extended over a three month period and 
involved 19 separate incidents. 
 Not withstanding the applicant's favourable subjective features, 
it is not demonstrated that the sentences were manifestly 
excessive. Furthermore, despite the demonstrated errors, it is 
not established that another sentence was warranted in law: s 
6(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912. 
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APPENDIX A15.14: BASIS AND OUTCOME OF APPEALS INVOLVING A JUVENILE 
OFFENDER 
 
Year Case Type of 
abuse 
Basis of appeal Outcome of appeal 
2005 Regina v 
AD [2005] 
NSWCCA 
208 
Extrafamilial Appeal against sentence – excessive sentence; 
judge failed to take into account s 6 Children 
(Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW); judge 
erred in characterisation of offence; judge 
failed to give sufficient weight to applicant’s 
guilty plea and offer of assistance. 
Appeal dismissed. 
2005 Regina v 
MSS 
[2005] 
NSWCCA 
227 
Extrafamilial Appeal against sentence – excessive sentence; 
failure to sentence according to Children 
(Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW). 
Appeal dismissed. 
2005 Regina v 
NZ [2005] 
NSWCCA 
278 
Extrafamilial First two grounds concerned consistency of 
verdicts given by the jury in respect of accused 
and co-accused; second two grounds 
concerned use of videotaped interviews of 
Crown witnesses. 
Appeal dismissed. 
2005 Regina v H 
[2005] 
NSWCCA 
282 
Extrafamilial 10 grounds of appeal against sentence – 
overall sentence unduly harsh and severe; SJ 
erred in sentencing for aggravated sexual 
assault in respect of particular offence; SJ erred 
in determining an offence was of the worst 
type; SJ erred in assessing seriousness of 
offence; SJ made inadmissible assumptions of 
fact; SJ failed to give sufficient regard to 
applicant’s guilty plea, contrition and 
assistance to authorities; SJ failed to give 
sufficient regard to applicant’s developmental 
disability/mental illness. 
Appeal allowed and 
sentence imposed 
in DC quashed. 
Revised, lesser 
sentence imposed. 
2005 R v JSS 
[2005] 
NSWCCA 
225 
Intrafamilial Appeal against sentence – condition of bond 
unreasonably onerous/imprecise; length of 
bond excessive; SJ erred in dealing with 
applicant according to law. 
Bond quashed; 3rd 
ground of appeal 
rejected. 
2005 Regina v 
JTAC 
[2005] 
Intrafamilial Appeal against sentence – SJ erred in 
considering vulnerability of victims an 
aggravating factor; SJ erred in having regard to 
Appeal dismissed 
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NSWCCA 
345 
preventative detention in imposing sentence; 
excessive sentence. 
2005 Regina v 
JDB [2005] 
NSWCCA 
102 
Intrafamiilial Appeal against sentence – TJ erred in applying 
s 21A(2) of C(SP) Act 1999; excessive sentence. 
Appeal upheld. 
Sentence imposed 
by DC quashed and 
revised, lesser 
sentence imposed. 
2006 Regina v 
MMK 
[2006] 
NSWCCA 
272 
Extrafamilial Appeal against sentence – sentences 
manifestly inadequate. 
Appeal dismissed. 
2006 RJP v R 
2006 
[2006] 
NSWCCA 
149 
Intrafamilial Appeal against sentence – SJ failed to regard 
applicant’s youth; SJ erred in application of s 
21A(3)(g) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 
1999 (NSW); SJ erred in application of principle 
of totality; excessive sentence. 
Appeal dismissed 
2007 AEL v R 
[2007] 
NSWCCA 
97 
Intrafamilial Appeal against sentence – excessive sentence. Appeal upheld. 
Sentence quashed 
and revised 
sentence imposed 
2007 CTM v R 
[2007] 
NSWCCA 
131 
Extrafamilial Appeal against conviction – verdict 
unsafe/incapable of being supported by 
evidence; TJ erred in directions on onus and 
standard of proof; TJ erred by failing to apply 
Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 
(NSW); excessive sentence. 
Appeal against 
conviction 
dismissed; appeal 
against sentence 
upheld, sentence 
quashed and 
remitted to DC. 
2008 IE v R 
[2008] 
NSWCCA 
70 
Extrafamilial Appeal against sentence – judge failed to have 
adequate regard to applicant’s age; failed to 
regard applicant’s youth when considering 
objective seriousness of offence; excessive 
sentence. 
Appeal dismissed 
2008 AJO v 
Regina 
[2008] 
NSWCCA 
28 
Intrafamilial Four grounds of appeal: (1) in relation to 
anticipated quashing of conviction and 
sentence on count 4; (2) SJ erred in failing to 
take into account that counts 1 and 2 should 
have been dealt with in Children’s Court; (3) 
sentence for count 2 excessive; (4) penalty for 
count 10 excessive. 
Appeal allowed in 
part – conviction 
and sentence on 
single count 
quashed; appeal 
against sentence 
dismissed 
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2009 OM v R, 
MH v R, 
AA v R, AS 
v R [2009] 
NSWCCA 
267 
Extrafamilial Disparity in sentences between co-accused. Appeal allowed. 
2010 Regina v 
XY [2010] 
NSWCCA 
181 
Intrafamilial Judge erred in ruling that the evidence was not 
‘fresh in the memory’ and therefore not within 
hearsay exception. 
Appeal allowed and 
matter remitted to 
DC. 
2011 PWB v R 
[2011] 
NSWCCA 
84 
Intrafamilial 5 grounds. (1) TJ erred in having regard to 
standard non-parole period for one of the 
offences; (2) sentence for count 1 excessive; 
(3) overall sentence excessive – cumulative, 
not concurrent; (4) TJ erred in failing to 
consider moral culpability of applicant in 
regards to sexual abuse suffered himself; (5) TJ 
erred in failing to regard delay as mitigating 
circumstance. 
Grounds 1, 2, 3, 5 
accepted; ground 4 
rejected. Appeal 
allowed, sentences 
quashed and 
appellant re-
sentenced. 
 
Notes: 
SJ = Sentencing judge. 
TJ – Trial judge. 
DC = District Court. 
 
 
 
